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To my parents. 
I should greatly encourage young people looking for a thesis topic in 
history to study the origins and development of conscientious 
objectors. 
Romain Rolland to Pierre C&jsole, 
October 1923. 
Nous roulons, en apparence, Nternel rocher de Sisyphe. 
Constatation amere, et qui ddcouragerait d'aucuns. Mais nous 
sommes de ceux qui ne ddsesp-brent jarnais. Aussi bien trouvons- 
nous, jusque dans Faveu de notre d6ception, des raisons positives 
d'envisager l'avenir avec une confiance r6f16chie. 
La Paix par le Droit. 
Appel-Programme, 1920. 
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This thesis breaks new ground in examining for the first time the history of pacifism in 
interwar France. It attempts to define the contours of the French peace movement, to 
describe it organisationally and in terms of its intellectual content, and finally to place 
interwar pacifism in the broader context of French political culture. The study is based on 
several years of primary research in Paris, London, Washington, and Philadelphia, and 
makes extensive use of hitherto unused archival sources and printed primary material. Of 
especial interest is the wealth of information gleaned from the Fonds Gabrielle Duch8ne, 
the-Romain Rolland papers (which are still being catalogued), the Andrd Trocm6 papers, 
and others. 
The first section of the thesis, on pacifisme ancien style, analyses the interwar 
development of traditional 'ideological' or 'collaborative' French pacifism with roots 
which go back into the nineteenth century. In the twenties this type of pacifism followed 
an ascending curve in terms of pacifist commitment, but was never able to embrace the 
absolute claims of the more radical pacifism which was developing within and around it. 
There then emerged from this first paradigm the paradigm of pacifis"te nouveau style - 
which is the subject of the second section. This resulted from the slow convergence of three 
complementary strands of dissent from political society: historical dissent over the origins 
of the Great War and the thesis of unique German war guilt; political dissent over the 
nature of contemporary French political society; and finally, a dissenting belief that 
another war would spell the end of western civilisation. The third section deals with 
feminist pacifism. Its evolution was in opposition to the prevailing trend already 
elaborated, moving from a position of integral pacifism in the early twenties to an 
increasingly 'collaborative' stance in the thirties which had close links with Soviet 
inspired peace and antifascist movements in France. 
One of the principal themes of this thesis is the essentially political nature of French 
pacifism as opposed to the primarily ethical or religious (especially non-conformist 
Protestant) thinking infusing much of Anglo-American pacifism. It also considers, among 
much else, the extent to which violence was considered an acceptable tactic by some parts of 
French pacifism, especially in response to the threat of incipient fascism. The thesis 
concludes with two Appendices, the first examining the French government's response to the 
perceived problem of conscientious objection in 1933, and the second examining the political 
trajectory of Romain Rolland on the problem of peace in the interwar era. 
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In response to a 1934 survey on the 'crisis of pacifisnf, Marcel Nat wrote that 'it has 
often been said that the nations do not have the same sociological age, that the same 
institutions do not have same meaning everywhere7.1 His comment is particularly apposite 
with regard to the history of pacifism and peace movements in France. While there is a 
large body of historical writing on pacifism in America, Britain, and Germany, the dearth 
of historical writing on the French peace movement of this century is almost complete. 
What are the reasons for this strange lapse? Was France immune to the political 
phenomena which affected the rest of the interwar world? In fact, quite the opposite was 
true. The France of the twenties and thirties was alive with a plethora of pacifist groups 
of various inspirations and orientations. A large compendium of information about Franco- 
German peace groups published in 1932 under the patronage of Andrd Tardieu listed fifty 
'pacifist organisations' in France and a further seventeen groups which 'sympathised' with 
pacifism. 2 Four years later, the Centre International de Documentation Antiguerri6re in 
Paris published a peace yearbook for France which contained over two hundred 
organisations described as 'pacifist,. 3 On the surface, then, it would seem that the French 
peace movement was a hale and hearty creature enjoying large support within the French 
body politic. To some extent, this was true. Certainly until about 1933, large sections of 
French political society sought to portray themselves as 'pacifist'. There was tremendous 
support for Briand4, and as will become clear in Part I of this thesis, important figures of 
the French intellectual and political elite had close connections with what is described 
here as pacifisme ancien style. 
I Marcel D&tWponse A I'Enqu6te sur la Crise duPacifisme, PD 44,2 (February 1934), p. 78. 
2 See 'Les Organisations Pacifistes Franqaises' and 'Les Groupernents Sympathisants Franqais' 
in Nous voulons la Paix (Paris: SRIP, 1932), pp. 27-110. 
3 Annuaire de la Paix, (Paris: Centre International de Documentation Antiguerri&e, 1936). 
4 The old-style pacifists supported Briand most energetically. His conception of peace was 
closely allied to their 'ideological' or 'collaborative' stance. The support for Briand within the new 
pacifism was more nuanced and tended to recall the socialist Briand of the turn of the century. The 
LICP refused to be represented officially at Briand's funeral, underlining its wtarian attitude to 
French political society, even in the case of a man whom in other respects it admired. See for 
example, Robert Tourly, 'Sur une tombe, PH 106 (9 March 1934), p. I.; see also the announcement that 
unlike some pacifist groups, the LICP would not participate in the State funeral, in PH 15 (12-18 
March 1932), p. 1; see also Victor Mkric, 'Le veritable Briand', PH 17 (26 March -2 April 1932). 
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But it is important to underline that in contradistinction to the British or the German 
experience, there was no large, all-encompassing pacifist organisation in France. There is 
no French equivalent - in numbers at least - either to the Peace Pledge Union or to the 
German Peace Cartel. The French peace movement of the interwar period was a lively and 
probably numerically significant force, but it was also a balkanised, splintered movement, 
divided very much unto itself. Indeed, one of the theses of this study is that the 
predominantly political (as opposed to ethical) nature of French pacifism is one of the 
features which differentiates it from Anglo-Saxon pacifism. This emphasis on the 
political produced a shotgun effect in terms of its practical impact on the world of French 
politics. As the editors of the 1936 Annuaire cornmented. 
May we be permitted to draw one conclusion from the work here 
presented: it is the number of Organisations, even those genuinely 
pacifist, and the extraordnary dispersion of efforts for peace, 
among people who have the best will in the world. And we can 
add without fear of contradiction that these anisations are 
often almost totally ignorant of one another's vvoýkT 
The editors noted the warm reception they had received from all groups in compiling the 
Annuaire but remarked that in such a time of international tension, one had to wonder 
whether such dispersed efforts for peace would be effective. 6 
The first point, then, to bear in n-dnd in approaching a study of French interwar 
pacifism is the tremendous diversity of men, women and organisations struggling, often in 
almost complete isolation, for peace. There were many groups which appear to have 
consisted of chiefs, but few Indians; it is equally the case that many of the groups listedin 
the two works cited above, would not in the normal scheme of things be considered. as 
'pacifist'. For example, both works list the T rait d'Union, a naturist group, as one of the 
pacifist associations in France. There are also many instances in both compendiums of 
Masonic groups and positivist associations as well as the more main-stream groups 
supporting the League of Nations. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the 
Inter-Parliamentary Union are also mentioned. Groups promoting cultural or student 
exchanges with Germany figure prominently, as indeed do the veterans' organisations and 
the political parties most likely to be friendly. to peace ideas. The impression, therefore, is 
one of some semantic confusion about what was understood by the word 'pacifist', in 
addition to organisational effervescence. No doubt many of the groups listed in these 
prospectuses would be more at home classified merely as 'internationalist', or as something 
else entirely. For many, it is clear that peace was not their primary reason for being. 
5 Op. cit. Annuaire, pp. 11-12. 
6 lbid, p. 12. 
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Having said that, it seems clear that great portions of the French public in the interwar 
years considered themselves to be 'pacifists', whatever that word may mean. While there 
are indications that the word had begun to take on pejorative tinges during the Great War, 
it was nevertheless a fairly common thing to hear a politician proclaim himself a pacifist. 
One has only to think of Briand, and the great urge to peace which he incarnated, to see the 
truth of that. There are other examples, too. Herriot, for example, in a speech on I 
February 1925 at the Trocad6ro to raise money for a monument to peace, seemed to divide 
French society into the pacifist and nationalist camps when he cried, 'It is we pacifists who 
are the most true to the teachings of the war'. 7 The year previously, Charles Richet had 
written that the French soul was 'profoundly pacifist! and in 1932 he stated that France 
was the 'most pacific of all peoples'; he went so far as to argue that even the extreme right 
in France held 'no idea more dearly than that of peace!. 8 Even as late as 1937, in the face of 
a clearly worsening international situation, Th6odore Ruyssen, the President of the 
Association de la Paix par le Droit, could state quite confidently that since the formation of 
iK the APD pacifism had made 'tremendous conquests'. 'It is not an exageration to say that 
today pacifism is everywhere'. 9 But in fact, this very success - or apparent success - for the 
pacifist idea had become one its weaknesses. Ruyssen underlined that there were now so 
many types of pacifism that the movement had become 'frankly strangely incoherenC. If 
the end desired remained the same, the methods for reaching it, and the social and 
political analyses which underpinned them, had become almost irreconcilably different. 10 
This leads quite naturally to the problem of definition when discussing French 
pacifism. If pacifism is often equated with Communism by the man in the street in France, 
the reality was certainly different in the interwar years. As a quick glance at the 
tergiversations of the PCF during the twenties and thirties on the question of peace will 
show, French Communism in the interwar period was intermittently and opportunistically 
antimilitarist and internationalist, but hardly pacifist. Indeed, it is one of the basic 
premisses of this thesis that none of the political parties in interwar France can justifiably 
be considered 'pacifist'. Being multi-interest political groupings, the parties all had other 
concerns which, with the pressure of political events on a multitude of fronts, caused peace 
and pacifism to wax and wane in importance as the political seasons changed. Because the 
7 Cited in Jules Prudhommeaux, 'La Propagande. Le Monument de la R6conciliation; une 
Mani&station 6mouvante au Trocad6ro, PD 35,2 (February 1925), p. 83 
8 See Charles Richet, 'Soyons tous les Enfants de la Paixl', PD 34,3 (March 1924), pp. 105-107; 
Charles Richet, 'La vraie Figure de la France, PD 42,7/8 aulyý-August 1932), pp. 321-323; and Charles 
Richet, 'La vraie Figure de la France', PD 43,3 (March 1933), p. 97. See also Part I of this thesis, 
especially Chapter 4, for a discussion of how old-style French pacifism viewed French political society 
and its place in it. 




line has to be drawn somewhere, this study will therefore not be about the position of the 
French political parties on the question of peace. Other writers have examined this aspect 
of interwar history - indeed, it is probably true to say that what little has been written 
about peace in any connection in French history has been done from this angle. 11 Others, 
such as Antoine Prost, have dealt with 'pacifism' as a function of a larger whole, as one 
aspect of the experience of another group. 12 The few works which do attempt to treat the 
question of French pacifism proper, usually do so less than dispassionately and are often 
derisory in their superficiality. 13 The end result leaves one with the impression that 
perhaps, after all, the French are different and that they were spared the agonising 
debates over the problem of peace between the wars which beset the rest of the western 
world. 
But such a supposition is, of course, false. It ignores the fact that one of Europe's best 
known pacifists in the interwar period was a Frenchman - Romain Rolland - and that in fact 
11 See for example, Michel Bilis, Soci4listes et Pacifistes, 1933-1939.. L'inten4ble dilemme des 
socialistes franC4is. (Paris, Syros, 1979); Philippe Robrieux, Histoire IntAfrieure du parti communiste 
1920-1945. (Paris: Fayard, 1980). See also Richard Gombin, 'Socialisme et Pacifisme, in Rend R6mond 
and Janine Bourdin, eds., La France et les Franqais en 1938-1939 (Paris: Presses de la FNSP, 1978), pp. 
245-260. 
12 See Antoine Prost, Les Anciens Combattants et la SocilM Franýaise. 3 vols. (Paris: Presses de 
la FNSP, 1977), esp. III MentaliUs et Idiologies, pp. 77-119. A study which goes beyond the confines 
of this thesis and is also an example of a work which discusses pacifism as a function of other 
concerns (in this case admittedly closely allied to many of the concerns of interwar French pacifists) 
is Jean-Claude Delbreil, Les catholiques ftanfais et les tentatives de rapprochement franco- 
allemand (1920-1933). (Metz: Centre de Recherches Relations Internationales, 1972). See also Barnett 
Singer, 'From Patriots to Pacifists: The French Primary School Teachers, 1880-1940', Journal of 
Contemporary History 12 (1977), pp. 413-434. See also Isabel Boussard, 'Le pacifisme paysan! in Rend 
R6mond and Janine Bourdin, eds., La France et Us Franýais en 1938-1939 (Paris: Presses de la FNSP, 
1978), pp. 59-75. See also Jean-Franqois Sirinelli, 'Khigneux et normaliens aux ann6es vingf Th&e de 
Doctorat d'Etat, Universitd de Paris-X, Nanterre, 1986,5 vols., which contains some interesting 
material on the extent to which this rather specialised milieu of French society became impregnated 
with pacifist ideas. Mr Yves Santamaria is currently preparing a doctoral thesis on 'Le PCF dans la 
lutte pour la Paix, 1932-1936' under the direction of Annie Kriegel. For several years Jean-Marie 
Mayeur has run a joint research seminar at the Sorbonne and the Institut d'Etudes Politiques on 'Les' 
6glises r-hr6flen&devant la Guerre et la Pabe, but so far nothing has emerged in published form that I 
am aware of. 
13 Perhaps the most glaring example in the latter category is J. B. Barbier, Le Pacifisme dans 
I'Histoire de France (De IAn Mille 4 Nos Jours). (Paris: La Librairie Franqaise,, 1966). See also jean 
Defrasne, Le Pacifisme Collection 'Que sais-je? (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1983). See 
also Jean-Pierre Cattelain, L'Objection de Conscience. Collection 'Que sais-je? ' (Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de France, 1973). See also Marcel Merle, Pacifisme et Internationalisme XVIIe - XXe 
SWIes. (Paris: Armand Colin, 1966), which is a useful collection of texts from a variety of authors, not 
all of them by any means French, with rather little in the way of analysis. Two other works which 
deserve mention are Nicolas Faucier, Paciftsme et Antimilitarisme dans; 1entre-deux-guerres (Paris: 
Spartacus, 1983) and Michel Auvray, Objecteurs, insoumis, d4sedeurs. Histoire des riftactaires en 
France (Paris: Stock/2,1983). The first is a personal memoir by the companion of Louis Lecoin and is 
useful for details about one aspect of interwar French pacifism. Auvrays book is by. a present-day 
militant and conscientious objector and is also useful for detail, although at times rather polemical in 
approachý. Finally, see J. B. Duroselle, 'Les pr6c6dents historiques: pacifisme des ann6es 30 et 
neutralisme des anndes 50' in Pacifisme et dissuasion. Travaux et recherches de I'Institut Franqais de 
Relations Internationales sous la direction de Pierre Lelouche (Paris: IFRI, 1983), pp. 241-252. 
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the very word 'pacifisrre is French in origin. 14 How has this state of affairs come to pass? 
No doubt one reason is the legacy of the Second World War in France with all that that 
event conjures up in the historical imagination: Vichy, collaborationism, defeatism, the 
Ouration and so on. As one French commentator has written: 
In denying the virtue of war, rendered sacrosanct by tradition, 
pacifism shakes established ideas. It is lumped together with 
defeatism, with cowardice, with treason. 
Pacifism has, therefore, often taken on a pejorative connotation. It 
is perversion. It is to peace what fon-nalism is to form, simplism to 
simplicity, sentimentality to sentiment. 15 
He goes on to say that 'pacifism played its role in the birth of the Vichy r6gime'. 16 Thus, 
in the French mind, the notion of pacifism occasions distressing memories of a particularly 
difficult time in recent history. 
Clearly the usage of the word 'pacifism' contained several shades of meaning in the 
interwar years, and the same is true today. The historian is thus faced initially with a 
definitional problem in beginning an examination of interwar French- pacifism. One of the 
most important recent contributions to the historiography of the modern peace movement is 
Martin Ceadel's book on interwar British pacifism, which despite its Anglo-centricity is an 
important work for two reasons. Firstly, Ceadel attempts to define what is meant by 
pacifism, to delineate the boundaries between pacifism and what he calls pacificism, 
following A. J. P. Taylor's unfortunate usage. The former he defines as 'the belief that all 
war is always wrong and should never be resorted to', and the second as the 'assumption 
that war, though sometimes necessary, is always an irrational and inhumane way to solve 
disputes, and that its prevention should always be an over-riding political priority'. 17 The 
problem with this definition is that it is arguably artificial. As Ceadel himself admits, 
both of the above positions were described as 'pacifist' during the interwar period in 
Britain. The same is even more the case in France where the word pacifisme described the 
whole spectrum of pacifist activity. It was only in the late twenties that French pacifists 
began to feel the need to distinguish between ordinary pacifism which had a long history in 
14 On the place of Romain Rolland within French and European pacifism, see Appendix II of 
this thesis. On the origins of the word 'pacifisrn' which was first used at the Universal Peace Congress 
in Glasgow in 1901, see Roger Chickering, Imperial Germany and a World without War. The Peace 
Movement and German Society, 1892-1914. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), pp. 14-15. 
1,5 Defrasne, op. cit., p. 3. 
16 lbid, p. 111. 
17 Martin Ceadel, Pacifism in Britain 1914-1945. The Defining of a Faith (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1980), p. 3. Taylor's derivation may be found in AJ. P. Taylor, The Troublemakers: Dissent over Foreign Policy, 1792-1939 (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1957), p. 51, n. S. 
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France and the arrival of a new and more radical pacifism which was christened pacifisme 
int6gral. 
To separate the different strands of pacifism from one another like this in the case of 
France would leave us with only half the story of the interwar French pacifist experience. 
As Roger Chickering justly remarks in his study of the pre-war German peace movement, to 
do so would be to exclude 'from the category of pacifist the very people who invented the 
term as a self-designation'. 18 Instead, he defines as a pacifist anyone'who holds war to be 
wrong and has made a personal commitment to pursuing the kinds of activities he believes 
will lead to its systematic elimination from international affairs'. 19 Chickering's 
definitional approach has much to commend it. 20 
The basic limitation of this thesis will be that of definition. We shall define as 
pacifist those men, women and organisations in interwar France for whom peace was a 
primary, consistent, and over-riding concern and goal. This may seem a rather fluid 
definition, but it has the advantage of limiting the field of endeavour almost immediately. 
This is not, therefore, a study of political parties in interwar France. Whilst undoubtedly 
many of the parties, especially the Socialists, Communists, and Radicals, in varying ways 
and at different times, did express pacifist concerns, their primary purpose was never the 
achievement of peace as a goal in itself. In like manner, it would be interesting, but beside 
the point here, to consider in great detail the contribution made by such organisations as the 
Ligue des Droits de Momme, or the veterans' groups, to the struggle for peace. Both of 
these organisations had other, and more dominant, concerns and are therefore beyond the 
scope of this study- 
. Two further types of organisation or thinking which were sometimes confused with 
pacifism in France must also be excluded. The first is the series of groups which grew out of 
the Amsterdam Congress against Imperialist War in 1932 and the congress held against 
Fascism the following year at the Salle Pleyel in Paris. Aside from the fact that this 
movement, which became known as Amsterdam-Pleyel, has already attracted its own 
chroniclers2l, it is clear that it, too, had lin-titations on its attitudes towards what types of 
international wars n-dght be resisted. Having said that, Amsterdam-Pleyel lurks at times 
18 Chickering, p. 16. 
19 Ibid. 
20 The American-European Consultation on Peace Research in History, held from 24-29 August 
1986 at Stadtschlaining, Austria, tended in its majority to follow something like the Chickering 
definition, referring to 'peace advocacy rather than pacifism per se. 
21 See for example Rosemarie Schumann, Amsterdam 1932. Der Weltkongrefl gegen den 
imperialisfischen Krieg (East Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1985). See also the doctoral thesis by Yves 
Santamaria cited above. A group which seems to have evolved in the opposite direction to the 
Amsterdam-Pleyel movement was the Comitd de Vigilance des Intellectuels Anti , 
fascistes. See 
Nicole Racine-Furlaud, 'Le Comit6 de vigilance des intellectuels antifascistes (1934-1939). 
Antifascisme et pacifisme', Le Mouvement social 101 (October-December 1977), pp. 87-113. 
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like an 6ninence grise behind large parts of this study. Although international in scope and 
directed in some measure by the needs of Soviet foreign policy, its leading lights and 
greatest organisational successes were undoubtedly French. Amsterdam-Pleyel began as a 
protest against one sort of war - imperialist war - and ended up largely as the cover for an 
antifascist movement which accepted the idea of war as a potential necessity in an 
ideological crusade to protect the revolution and its home in the Soviet Motherland. 
Secondly, at the end of the thirties there is the thorny question of the position of the 
extreme Right in France on the question of war and peace. There is little doubt that for 
many partisans of the Right, the political situation in Europe had undergone a complete 
reversal with the Nazi seizure of power in 1933. As Jospeh Folliet pointed out in his 
perceptive essay Pacifisme de droite? Bellicisme de gauche?, the traditional poles within 
French political society seemed to have been reversed by the time of the Munich crisis of 
1938.22 Whereas sections of the Left were now clamouring for action against Mtler, parts of 
the extreme Right seemed to some contemporary pacifists to be supporting many of the 
traditional theses of pacifism. This today may seem bizarre. It is clear that the pacifisme 
des munichois, or at least of those among them who were normally on the political Right, 
was completely opportunistic in inspiration and had nothing to do with pacifism as it is 
here defined or was normally understood at the time. As will become evident in Part II of 
this thesis, the political sea-changes occurring in trance in the late thirties did provide 
French pacifists with a tremendous dilemma - to collaborate or not with these strange 
political bedfellows? Most pacifists refused to have anything to do with such a marriage 
of convenience; some, however, succumbed to the temptations of the hic et nunc and in so 
doing compromised their causeP 
Moving beyond the problem of definition to that of typology, one is confronted with 
several recent and competing conceptual approaches to the history of pacifism. Reinhold 
Liltgemeier-Davin, for example, divides the peace movement up into two broad categories: 
what he calls 'organisational pacifism! and 'radical pacifism!. In the'former are subsumed 
the categories of 'scientific', juridical and democratic pacifism, as. well as an idealistic 
ethical-humanitarian pacifism. Radical pacifism he divides into non-violent and 
revolutionary tendencies. Overlapping between the two are the religious pacifists and a 
'pedagogical' pacifism. 24 This division has much to commend it in an analysis of the 
French example. Following this schema, what is denoted in this thesis as pacifisme ancien 
style would represent an example of 'organisational' pacifism, while pacifisme nouveau 
22 See Joseph Folliet, Pacpnw de droite? Bellicisme de gauche? (Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1938). 
23 See especially Part 11, Chapter 4 Munich and all that') for a discussion of this problem. 
24 Reinhold Lfitgemeier-Davin, Pazifismus zwischen Kooperation und Konfrontation. Das 
Deutsche Friedenskartell in der Weimarer Republik. (K61n: Pahl-Rugenstein Verlag, 1982), pp. 13-17. 
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style would be a clear case of 'radical' pacifism, incorporating both non-violent and 
revolutionary elements. 
Undoubtedly one of the most significant contributions made recently to the 
historiography of pacifism is that by Ceadel. His definitional approach is arguably 
unhelpful in the French or European context, and his analytical structure, taken largely 
from Weber and the sociology of religion, has some limitations in its applicability to the 
French case. The very sub-title of his work, 'The Defining of a Faith', indicates the extent 
to which the religious analysis underpins his argument. Nevertheless, there is much in his 
study that is suggestive for a history of the French peace movement of the same era. 
Ceadel distinguishes between what he calls the 'inspirations' for pacifism and its 
'orientations'. The former can be divided up into three further sub-categories: religious, 
political Oe. socialist or anarchist), and humanitarian. The humanitarian inspiration 
was, according to Ceadel, the one major philosophical advance made by interwar pacifism, 
because it attempted to derive a value-neutral, utilitarian justification for pacifism. 
Pacifism can moreover have three orientations according to Ceadel: sectarian, 
collaborative, and non-violent. Depending on the political climate of the day, pacifism 
therefore either retreats into a sectarian stance which condemns completely the society 
around it and withdraws into purity, or else, it is tempted out of its shell into collaborative 
arrangements The third possible orientation he defines as non-violence which 'presupposes 
exceptionally favourable circu 
- 
mstances', is the 'most optimistic' of the three, and 'assumes 
that pacifism can be applied as an immediately effective policy in the world as it is'. 25 
Somewhat paradoxically, Ceadel writes that 'the most confident and impressive pacifism 
has resulted where pacifists have been driven, by disagreement with a society convinced of 
the inevitability of war, into a sectarian orientation'. 26 
The use of the tenn'non-violene presents problems for the student of French pacifism as 
Part II of this thesis makes clear. For many French integral pacifists of the thirties, 
pacifism did not mean non-violence at all. They envisaged the application of violence to 
situations on an individual or civic level with surprising equanimity. Nevertheless, it will 
be apparent that the Ceadel model can be applied to the French example with some degree 
of success. The old-style pacifists would therefore represent the collaborative orientation, 
and the new-style pacifists a sectarian stance. The feminist pacifists present a problem, 
however. They were at the same time both collaborative and sectarian in their 
orientation, although increasingly collaborative as the thirties progressed. In the 
immediate post-war period, however, the Ligue Internationale des Fernmes pour la Paix et 
la Libert6, represented in France both an absolute rejection of war and the society which 
25 Ceadel, Padfism in Britain, pp. 15-16. 
26 fbid, pp. 16-17. 
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engendered it, and paradoxically also a collaborative position of involvement with 
political society in an attempt to prevent its recurrence. 
It is clear, then, that despite the major contribution made by Ceadel to the typology of 
pacifism, there remain problems of interpretation. A further criticism one might raise is 
the extent to which the sociology of religion approach is applicable to the far more secular 
French example. Admittedly, one is speaking here merely of an analytical tool, which in 
many ways has much to commend it, but in studying the French case, one cannot help but be 
struck by the essentially political and secular nature of much of French pacifism. 
Roger Chickering's approach to the typology of pacifism is similar in some respects to 
Ceadel's, although he does not follow the strict definition of pacifism employed by the 
latter. Chickering's model is based upon Karl Mannheimýs work on the sociology of 
knowledge. He distinguishes between what he calls a 'utopiarf pacifism which 'conceives 
of war as an inseparable aspect of a social and political order that is utterly corrupt and 
beyond rehabilitation', and on the other hand an 'ideological' pacifism which 'rejects war 
because of the threat it poses to a social and political order that is basically sound and 
praiseworthy'. 27 Thus, in Chickering's model, utopian pacifism is largely a 'sectarian and 
chiliastic phenomenon', the province of 'marginal sectors of society'. The difference 
between the two types of pacifism is reduced to the following: 'Whereas utopian pacifism 
anticipates a radical personal or collective solution to the problem, ideological pacifism 
calls for moderate, constructive reform within the framework of political society'. 28 
Finally, Chickering stresses that neither type of pacifism necessarily pr ecludes what he 
terms 'the instrumental use of violence. For the ideological pacifist, 'both wars of national 
defence and the use of collective sanctions by international agencies' are quite permissible. 
The utopian pacifist 'fluctuates between extreme passivity and extreme, often violent 
activism'. 29 
It seems clear that the Chickering model is the most easily applicable to the interwar 
French case. The pacifists discussed in Part I are readily assimilated into the category of 
ideological pacifism, as indeed those of Part II quite easily fit the category of utopian 
pacifism. The feminists, once again, present a special case which is discussed in Part III. 
They vacillate between a utopian and an ideological pacifism, gradually moving more in 
the direction of the latter as the interwar period progresses. 
There are conceptual similarities between the Chickering and Ceadel approaches. 
Ceadel goes one step further than Chickering in differentiating explicitly between 
inspirations and orientations, but his inclusion of nonviolence as an orientation seems out of 
27 Chickering, p. 19. 
28 lbid, pp. 19-20. 
29 lbid, p. 21. 
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place in a description of European, or at least French, pacifism. There were many pacifists 
within the Ligue Internationale des Combattants de la Paix, for example, who espoused a 
violent, civil response to the threat of war. The use of nonviolence as a criterion for 
establishing orientation thus seems irrelevant in the French context, the imposition 
perhaps of an Anglo-centric conception of what rightly constitutes pacifism on the European 
situation. In this sense, Chickering comes much closer to the mark in his acceptance of 
revolutionary violence as one of the potential methods of pacifism. 
The problem with both the Ceadel and the Chickering models is the lack of any sense 
of evolution over time. Both models do, of course, permit the possibility of change but in a 
manner a little reminiscent of the Sekundenstil. At any given moment the orientation of a 
pacifist group can thus be ascertained, but there is little sense of movement or change. And 
yet, one of the theses of the work here presented, is that there was a great deal of 
movement and change over time. In order to make sense of this it seems appropriate to 
employ the idea of paradigmatic change. As will become clear in the body of the thesis, 
French pacifism evolved remarkably over the period in question. In 1919, what is called 
pacifisme ancien style defined the paradigm in French pacifism to which all subsequent 
developments must refer. Gradually, over the course of the twenties, with the rise of 
pessin-tism, fears of another war, and the growing feeling that little had fundamentally 
changed in the European situation since 1918, a gradual realisation that a more radical 
pacifism was needed overcame some pacifists. This is not to say that this radical response 
to war was entirely new; it was not. There had been 'integral' pacifists before 1930, but 
what is new at the end of the twenties is the fact that these isolated instances of absolute, 
'integral' pacifism began to coalesce into a proper movement with its own ideas, leaders and 
publications. In so doing, it emerged into the body politic and became a force in French 
politics. 
These then, are the two fundamental dichotomies in this study: that between old-style 
pacifism which was, to use Chickering's model, largely ideological in orientation; and the 
new-style pacifism, which was more utopian. A variation on this theme is to be found in 
the feminist pacifism of the Ligue Internationale des Fernmes pour Ia Paix et la Libertd 
which is discussed in Part 111. Feminist pacifism followed a trajectory in opposition to the 
development from old to new-style pacifism. As Part III makes clear, the feminists of the 
LIFPL were pacifistes nouveau style before the distinction even existed. But they were 
never entirely utopian or sectarian in their orientation; they maintained close links with 
political society despite their espousal of an absolute pacifism. As the interwar years 
progressed, this orientation became increasingly 'collaborative' or 'ideological', in 
opposition to the evolution occurring from old to new-style pacifism. Even within old-style 
pacifism, the situation was hardly static. In the age of Briand and the optimism of the 
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twenties, the old-style pacifism followed an ascending curve bringing it close on several 
issues to the emerging new-style pacifism. But the rise to power of Hitler across the Rhine 
rapidly brought this to an end, and old-style pacifism reverted to its former ideological 
prescriptions for peace. 
Some final comments are in order before we proceed to the main body of the thesis. It is 
important to emphasise that one is dealing here with the politics of the margins. Perhaps 
by its very nature the politics of dissent was always, even in its collaborative, ideological 
forms, somewhat beyond the pale of French political society. This marginality varied from 
group to group, orientation to orientation, and. over time. The Association de la Paix par le 
Droit, for example, seems to have had fairly close contacts with mainstream French 
political life. The same cannot really be said about the new-style pacifism which because 
of its dissenting attitude on a variety of issues seems to have maintained a fairly strict 
posture of sectarianism or utopianism. The point to be made is that the historian of 
marginality is somewhat like the medievalist, forever digging for clues to what the 
pacifists of the interwar period really thought. In some cases, he is successful. But in many 
instances, he must content himself with published primary material because pacifist 
archives simply do not exist. This is certainly the case in this study of French pacifism. 
The Gabrielle DucMne bequest at the Bibliothýque de Documentation Internationale 
Contemporaine at Nanterre is rich in otherwise untraceable tracts, pamphlets and books, 
but in terms of correspondence with other pacifists it is primarily useful for the history of 
feminist pacifism. Part III of this thesis is therefore heavily based on this sort of archival 
material. The Romain Rolland Papers in the Bibliothýque Nationale were also consulted, 
but they are unfortunately still in the process of being sorted and catalogued, and were 
therefore of limited use in this thesis. The author also consulted the Andrd Trocm6 papers 
in the Swarthmore College Peace Collection in America; this too was only of limited use 
because of Trocm6's tangential connection with this study. The Archives Nationales and 
the Service Historique de I'Arm6e de Terre were used primarily for Appendix I on the 
government's reaction to a perceived conscientious objection problem in 1933. The papers of 
the Ligue Internationale des Combattants de la Paix and the Association de la Paix par le 
Droit do not seem to exist; were they to be found, they would be of central interest to future 
scholars of French pacifism. Additional archival collections were also consulted, but the 
material gathered therein forms only a small part of the material contained in this thesis. 
A second point is that the reader will perhaps look in vain for detailed practical 
prescriptions for achieving lasting peace, or conversely specific tactical instructions for 
responding to a war situation. There are a number of reasons for this. For the pacifists of 
the thirties especially, all energies were directed to avoiding a recurrence of war. As 
Victor Wric often wrote, when the next war arrived, it would all be too late. For most 
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pacifists, the task at hand was thus largely an educative one, informing people of the 
dangers of war and leaving them to draw their own conclusions. It is also extremely 
important to realise that there was a limit to how specific even the most committed 
pacifist orator could be in advising or exhorting an audience to pick up the pacifist cross. As 
Part II and Appendix I make clear, it was only too easy to fall foul of the Third Republic's 
laws prohibiting propaganda against the army, for example. Pacifist orators had to be 
content with drawing a picture and allowing their audiences to take whatever 
interpretation they chose from it. 
One final criticism might well be that little mention is made of the impact of pacifists 
on French political society. In one sense, it could be argued that it was negligible because it 
is clear that the pacifist voice was not heard. But in another sense, as Appendix I makes 
clear, the goverranent was certainly worried in 1933 about the spread of integral pacifist 
ideas in France. Our purpose in this thesis, though, has not been primarily to examine the 
extent to which pacifism became a governmental issue in interwar France, but rather to 
describe the evolution and the political development of an as yet unexamined, but 
important, peace movement. In so doing, we move into the nebulous and marginal realm of 
the politics of dissent. 
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PARTI 
PACIFISME ANCIEN STYLE, OU LE PACIFISME DES 
PROFESSEURS 
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I. l. Introduction 
Pacifism was not bom in France in the aftermath of the Great War. Despite the 
apparent aversion of modem French historiography to the treatment of the subject, 
pacifism ha sa long and respectable history in the annals of nineteenth and twentieth 
century France. Groups which claimed the achievement of peace as their primary goal are 
to be found well back into the early years of the last century. The earliest French peace 
society on record, according to Roger Chickering, was the Socidt6 de morale chrdtienne 
which was founded in Paris in 1821 by the Duc de la. Rochefoucauld-Liancourt and included 
such luminaries as Guizot, Lamartine and Benjamin Constant in its membership. 1 Later in 
the century, under the Second Empire, Victor Hugo was arguably the most renowned 
pacifist in Europe. But it is above all the period following the initial consolidation of the 
Third Republic which saw a notable explosion in the number of French peace societies. 
Between 1898 and 1902 alone, according to Chickering, twenty-seven new peace societies 
were formed, and the years from 1899 to 1906 represented 'the period of the peace 
movement's greatest influence in France7.2 
In 1902 the French societies began holding regular national peace congresses. By 1900 
the Bureau franqais de la paix, which had been founded in 1896 by Gaston Moch, a former 
artillery captain, and which was to become the Ddldgation permanente des soci6tds 
franqaises de la paix in 1902, already claimed some 400 member organisations, most of them 
admittedly not societies whose primary concern was the achievement of peace. 3 However, 
by the time of the outbreak of the First World War, 'the French peace movement was, 
organisationally at least, an impressive phenomenon. It included in 1913 twenty-eight 
different societies devoted to popularising arms limitation and arbitration'. 4 In 
Chickering's view, the rise of the peace societies in late nineteenth century France is 
1 Roger Chickerin& Imperial Germany and a World Without War. 77te Peace Movement and 
German Society, 1892-1914. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), p. 331. 
2 Ibid, p. 339. 
3 Ibid., see also Obituary on Gaston Moch in PD 45,9 (September 1935), pp. 377-378, see also 
Sandi Cooper, 'Gaston Moch! in Josephson, et al, Biographical Dictionary of Modern Peace Leaders , 
pp. 645-647. 
4 Chickering, pp. 339-340. 
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directly attributable to the crisis of the Dreyfus affair and the growing influence of 
Radical republicanism. This process brought the peace movement in from the cold, as it 
were. The politics of the margins moved much closer to the centre of French political life. 
As Chickering says 
Radicalism and pacifism were closely related phenomena. Like 
the peace movement, Radicals advocated the rigorous application 
of democratic principles, distrusted soldiers, renounced all but 
defensive wars and called for arms limitation and arbitration of 
international disputes. ý 
Of the many pre-war French peace societies, probably the most important and 
influential6 was the Association de la Paix par le Droit, which was formed in 1887 by six 
lyc6ens in Nimes, and which had an unbroken existence spanning more than half a century 
until it finally dissolved in the aftermath of the Second World War. 7 The Association de 
la Paix par ie Droit represents better than any other competing organisation the pacifisme 
ancien style which is the paradigm to which all subsequent developments within French 
pacifism must refer. The APD typifies the bourgeois, liberal, internationalist tradition 
within French pacifism which believed in the inexorable march of humanity towards a 
better future in which war would be banished under the aegis of arbitration and 
conciliation between mutually enlightened powers who would voluntarily disarm and pool 
their coercive forces into a single army under international command. The APD exemplifies 
all that was best in the French 'scientific' approach to peace, in its continuing search for 
what it termed a 'positive' peace which had to be constructed slowly and patiently over 
time. 
This section of the thesis will therefore largely be about the evolution of the 
Association de la Paix par le Droit over the course of the interwar period. Other 
organisations could have been chosen to represent this paradigm, but none so clearly 
epitomises the spirit and methods of traditional French pacifism as the APD. There are 
other reasons, too, for concentrating our attentions on the APD. As an organisation, it 
swallowed up several of the more important pre-war groups and thus established a sort of 
5 Ibid, p338. 
6 This view is shared by Chickerin& p. 337. 
7 On the origins of the Association de la Paix par le Droit see ibid., pp. 337-338; see also J. 
Prudhommeaux, VOrigine, le D6veloppement et le fonctionnement de I'Association de la Paix par 
le Droit', PD, 38,12 (December 1928), pp. 513-518; Henry Babut, 'Les origines de la Paix par le Droit, 
PD 38,4/5 (April-May 1928), pp. 169-175; Ernest Roussel, 'Les Origines de la Paix par le Droit', PD 38,1 
(January 1928), pp. 10-15; Jacques Dumas, 'Les origines de la Paix par le Droit', PD 38,3(March 1928), 
pp. 105-112; see also: Henry Babut, 'Notes br&es sur nos Origines, PD 48,6/7/8 (May-june-july 
1938), pp. 254-256; J. Prudhommeaux, 'Un demi-sikle d'activit6 de la Revue "La Paix par le Droit"', 
PD 48,6/7/8 (May-june-july 1938), pp. 269-277. 
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hegemony over French pacifism in the immediate post-war period. For example, one of the 
oldest French peace societies, the Ligue interhationale et permanente de la paix which had 
been founded in 1867 by FrWric Passy and others, became the Soci6t6 franýaise des arrds de 
la paix and finally in 1888 under the influence of the Englishman Hodgson Pratt, the 
Soci&6 franqaise pour Varbitrage entre nations. 8 When the young lycdiýns of Nimes formed 
their association in 1887, it was to Passy that they looked for an honorary president. 
However, by the immediate post-war years, the Association de la Paix par le Droit had 
overtaken the Soci6t6 franqaise in importance and in 1922 the two associations merged, 
retaining the name of the APD and its orgaO 
So much for the organisational legacy of the prewar years. But what about the 
postwar era? Did the Paix par le Droit retain its position of pre-eminence in the interwar 
period? The answer is almost certainly affirmative within the parameters of the old style 
pacifism with which we are concerned in this section. The victory of the Allied powers in 
1918, Wilson's fourteen points, and more especially the founding of the League of Nations 
created an explosion of societies in France whose raison d'ýtre was to support the work of 
the League. In many ways, these societies, of which there were many, were logical off- 
shoots of the pre-war work of the Paix par le Droit. They represented the culmination of 
all that the APD wished to achieve in international life. And they were not surprisingly 
closely connected with the APD in terms of shared membership, shared ideals, and in the 
case of some, shared organs. For example, Th6odore Ruyssen, the long serving President of 
the APD, was also the Secretary General of the Union Internationale des Associations pour 
la. Soci&6 des Nations. 10 Jules Prudhommeaux, one of the founding six from Nimes, was the 
Secretary General not only of the APD, but also of the Association Franýaise pour la Socidtd 
des Nations. Jules-L. Puech was the editorial secretary of the Association's review, also 
entitled La Paix par le Droit; and his wife was the president of the Union Rminine pour la 
Socidtd des Nations and also vice-president of the APD. In 1931 the APD announced that in 
light of a recent friendly agreement, its review would be open to news and announcements 
from the Association Franýaise pour la Soci6t6 des Nations, the Comitc. Franqais de 
Coop6ration Europ6enne, the Union F6minine pour la Soci6td des Nations and the 
F6d6ration Franqaise des Associations pour la SDN. 11 The APD was thus the nexus 
8 Chickering, pp. 334-337. 
9 On the fusion of the two societies, see Charles Richet and ThWore. Ruyssen, 'Fusion de la 
Soci6td Franýaise pour I'Arbitrage et de I'Association de ]a Paix par le Droit, PD 32,2(February 1922), 
pp. 57-58. For a short account of the links between the two organisations see Jacques Dumas, Ta 
soci6td Franýaise pour I'Arbitrage entre Nations', PD 32,2 (February 1922), pp. 59-65. 
10 Mention is made of Ruyssen's election to this position in Edmond Dumdril and J. 
Prudhommeaux, VAssembl6e Gdndrale de I'Association de la Paix par le Droit', (Poitiers, 31 
October to 1 November 1921) in PD 31,12 (December 1921), p. 404. 
11 Seethe 'Avis' printed on the inside cover of PD 41,2 (February 1931). 
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between the pre-war societies which had worked for the creation of something like the 
League of Nations, and the plethora of post-war groups which sprang up to nurture and 
defend the fledgling Geneva institution. In terms of membership, leadership, intellectual 
content and the pooling of printed resources the Association de la Paix par le Droit thus 
stands out as the most important and influential of the French peace societies which 
collectively make up what we have denoted here as the paradigm of pacifisme ancien 
style. The theme of interpenetration of the French peace societies is one to which we shall 
return later in this section, together with its antithesis, the balkanisation of French 
pacifist efforts. 
For the moment, though, it would be useful to take a brief look at the thorny question of 
membership and circulation figures in order to gain some sort of appreciation of the size of 
the APD. Thorny, because in the history of marginality, even in the case of relatively 
mainstream groups such as the APD, the historian feels very much like the medievalist 
dealing with the imponderables of quantification. Nevertheless, it seems clear that after 
the quite natural slump in membership figures occasioned by the Great War, the APD 
quickly began to climb out of the trough towards a membership which varied between 
roughly 5,000 and 7,000 members for most of the interwar period. Two non-dated reports 
from the interwar period, written in English, apparently for the Society of Friends, and 
contained in the Swarthmore College Peace Collection, put the membership of the APD 
variously at 8,000 and 20,000.12 The latter figure is certainly too high and the former 
might be slightly inflated as well. Combing through the various reports presented over 
twenty years of Annual General Meetings the following figures for membership can be 
gleaned: 6,000 members in 1929, rising to around 7,000 in 1935 and falling to 6,000 again in 
1938.13 This compares with pre-war figures of 1200 in 1902 and about 4000 in 1912.14 The 
pre-en-dnence of the APD within old-style French pacifism is further illustrated by a list of 
the membership charges exacted on the French members of the Bureau International de la 
Paix which had its headquarters in Geneva. Le Mouvement P"ifiste reported that in 1926 
the total contribution of French peace societies to the work of the Bureau, by reason of five 
centimes per member, was just over 151 Swiss Francs. Of this sum, ninety-eight francs came 
from the APD, and a further 5.65 francs from its Paris section directly. Following this line 
of reasoning, the APD claimed (or at least paid for! ) only some 2000 members in 1926. 
Whatever the accuracy of the global figures, the APD's contribution to the RIP was four 
12 'Pacifist Organisations in France! (1928? ) and 'France, both in SCPC, CDG-B (France), Box 2. 
13 An obituary on So6verine mentions 6,000 members. PD 39,6 (June 1929), p. 251; J. 
Prudhommeaux VAssembl6e G6n&ale de la. Paix par le Droif (Marseille, 27 December 1935), PD 
46,2 (February ý936), P. 68; J. Prudhommeaux and J. LahargueVAssembl6e G&6rale et le Congrýs 
du Cinquantenaire, (Nimes, 19-21 April 1938), PD 48,6/7/8 (May-june-july 1938), p. 249. 
14 Chickerin& pp, 337 and 344. 
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times higher than the next largest French contributor. That said, the French total pales 
into insignificance beside the 956 Swiss francs paid by the German peace societies and the 
808 francs paid by the various British groups. 15 
There seems to have been a fairly high turnover in the Associatiores membership, too. 
August Laune, the Association's indefatigable treasurer (and a founding member) 
complained at the 1938 Annual General Meeting of 2,500 memberships or subscriptions to 
the Review which had not been renewed over the preceding five years. Clearly the 
worsening international situation, coupled with the effects of the financial crisis which 
had finally reached France (in 1932), were probably much to blame for this state of affairs, 
but nevertheless it seems that it represented a continuing problem for the APD. In this 
same financial report, Laune noted that over the course of its fifty-year existence the 
Association had lost a total of 30,000 members or subscribers. 16 
Turning to circulation figures for the APD's organs, the situation is broadly similar. 
Not all subscribers to the Review, La Paix par le Droit or to the more popular broadsheet 
Les Peuples Unis created following the 1924 annual general meeting, were necessarily 
members of the Association. That said, the subscription rate for La Paix par le Droit was a 
close mirror of membership figures in the Association. In 1920 the review had a print run of 
about 5,000 copies. This compared with 8,000 copies printed in the first seven months of 
1914 and 6,000 in the last five. 17 By 1924 the circulation figures had risen to 8,000 again, 
falling to 5,500 in 1927, and only 5,3W in 1935, despite a rise to 7,000 in 1931.18 
The above figures give us a rough quantitative idea of the nature of the APD, but they 
tell us very little about the sort of person who was likely to be found in the ranks of this 
association. Unfortunately little information is available which would provide a precise 
and objective analysis of the sort of 'pacifist' likely to join the APD. Still, it is possible to 
paint an impressionistic picture of the APD which will give us at least an approximation 
of the sort of membership it had. 
The first point to be made is that one could almost call the old-style pacifism under, 
discussion in this section the pacifisme des professeurs, such is the level of activity of 
teachers of all grades within the APD. Barnett Singer has written of the extent to which 
the instituteurs of the late Third Republic became imbued with pacifist ideas, and Jean- 
15 'Tableau des Cotisations vers6es en 1926 au Bureau International de la Paix. ' Le Mouvement 
Padfiste (October 1927), pp. 146-147. 
16 Laune in Prudhommeaux, Lahargue VAssemblde Undrale et le Congr6s du 
Cinquantenairie PD 48,6/7/8 (May-june-july 1938), p. 249. 
17 Jules-L. Puech, 'Notre revue!, PD 30,11/12 (November-December 1920), p. 367. 
18 See: J. Prudhommeaux and Georges Cadler, VAssembl6e G6n6rale de la Paix par le Droit', 
PD 34,7/8 Ouly-August 1924), p. 273; J. Prudhommeaux and J. -L. Puech, VAssembl6e G6n6rale et les 
Rtes du Mme Anniversaire', PD 37,12 (December 1927), p. 443; J. Prudhommeaux, 'Notre 
Assembl6e Undrale', PD 41,12 (December 1931), p. 577; J. Prudhommeaux, VAssembl6e G6n6rale 
de la Paix par le Droit, PD 46,2(February 1936), p. 62. 
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Franýois Sirinelli in his recent massive doctorat-d'Etat paints a picture of khfigneux and 
normaliens in the twenties affected by much the same system of ideas-19 The APD was the 
creation'and preserve of academics. A 1932 list of almost sixty local groups of the APD 
provides the following breakdown by occupation of the group presidents or secretaries: 13 
professors, directors of schools and faculties or inspectors of education, one instituteur, two 
pastors, six medical doctors, one industrialist, three present or sometime mayors, one 
premier adjoint (to the Mayor of Nimes), one conseiller-gingral, one conseiller-municipal, 
one retired n-dlitary officer, one newspaper director and one court clerk, for a total of 32 
local group presidents for whom the occupation is given or can be deduced. Another 27 
groups provide no information as to the occupation of their presidents. 20 If one examines 
the APD's executive committee and Conseil de Direction the predominance of the 
professorial element is even more noticeable. Taking 1932 once again as the point of 
reference, in that year the executive committee was composed of people who represented 
the cream of the French intellectual elite. The President, Th6odore Ruyssen, was a 
professor at the University of Brussels, having previously taught at the University of 
Bordeaux. As Vice-Presidents in 1932 were Jacques Dumas, a doctor of laws and barrister at 
the Cour de Cassation in Paris, and Mme M. -L. Puech who was President of the Union 
Fdminine pour la Socidt6 des Nations. The Secretary General was Professor Jules 
Prudhornmeaux, the secretary in charge of propaganda was Edmond Dum6ril who was a 
professeur agregi at the lycle in Nantes, and who was to receive his doctorate in German 
Literature in 1934, and finally the secretary in charge of the reviews was Jules-L. PV2ých 
who held doctorates in law and letters, and in 1934 was to be honoured with the ribbon of 
the Legion of Honour. The Treasurer of the association was August Laune, a businessman. 
Of the three members at large in the Executive committee one finds Georges Scelle, 
professor of international law at the University of Geneva, C61estin Bougl6, at that time 
assistant director of the Ecole Normale Sup6rieure but who was to finish his career as 
director in the rue d'Ulm, and Georges Cadier, director of a newspaper in Nantes. This 
rather long list goes some way to showing the extent to which the APD was very much the 
creation and preserve of part of the French liberal, educated elite. The Honorary President 
of the Asociation was Charles Richet, professor at the Faculty of Medicine of the 
University of Paris and Member of the Institute. Other names of some renown are to be 
19 See Barnett Singer, 'From Patriots to Pacifists: The French Primary School Teachers, 1880- 
1940', Journal of Contemporary History 12 (1977), pp. 413-434; J. -F. Sirinelli, 'KhAgneux et normaliens 
aux ann6es vingt'. Thýse de Doctorat d'Etat, University of Paris - X, 1986,5 Vols. 20 See'Association de la Paix par le Droit'in Nous Voulons la Paix, (Paris, SRIP, 1932), pp. 28-31. 
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found in the list of members of the Conseil de Direction; one example is that of Justin 
Godart, senator for the Rh6ne. And the list could go on. 21 
In terms of the type of pacifist attracted to the APD in the interwar period, more could 
be said about the links between the Association and Ligue des Droits de I'Homme, 
Freemasonry, the Radical party, and the extent to which the APD reflected Protestant 
ideals within a Roman Catholic tradition. More will be said about all of these themes in 
the course of this section, but in ending this introduction to pacifisme ancien style, one 
should point out the intimate relations between it and the official world of French politics, 
in short its central place in an important part of French political culture especially during 
the twenties. With men like Painlevd, Paul-Boncour, Godart, and Pierre Cot - to name but 
four - interested in the work of the APD, it is perhaps not surprising to find that in 1929 the 
Association was given the official accolade of being reconnue d'utiliti publique. 
21 For a list of the members of the Conseil de Direction and the Comitd Executif of the APD, see 
the inside cover of PD 42,6 (June 1932). Additional information on Puech and Dumdril can be found 
in PD 44,7-8 OulyýAugust 1934), pp. 304-305. 
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1-2. The Paradigm Defined. 
It is interesting to note that despite its later 'scientific' or juridical pacifism, the 
Association de la. Paix par le Droit began its existence very much as the result'of an ethical 
and moral rejection of war. The writers of the monthly news column in the PD referred in 
1926 to the department of the Gard as the 'cradle of our association'. 22 As has been 
mentioned above, the APD was formed in the spring of 1887 by six lyciens in Nimes, the 
capital of the Gard, and like a pebble dropped into a still pond the ideas of the APD 
spread out from Nimes across France, following in many cases the careers of the original six 
and their converts to the cause. It is probably'no accident that this association was formed 
in one of the areas of France most imbued with Protestant ideas. 23 The connection between 
the APD and Protestantism was to remain strong over the course of its entire life. Several 
members of the APD's committee were clergymen in the Reformed Church of France. In fact, 
one of the founding six, Henri Babut was the son of a pastor and went on to study Protestant 
theology in Montauban before being ordained himself. We have also noted the influence of 
Protestant ideas coming from England in the formation of the APD. These ideas seem to 
have been transmitted to the young lyclens of Nimes as a result of a voyage undertaken by 
the oldest of the founding six, L. -A. Barnier who became the first President of the fledgling 
association, then called simply the Jeunes Amis de la Paix. As Jules Prudhommeaux wrote 
in 1928, Barnier'had brought back from a trip to England which had placed him in contact 
with several members of the Society of Friends (Quakers) who were committed to ideas of 
peace and arbitration, the new faith which he hastened to share with his comrades'. 24 
Ernest Roussel, writing of the origins of the APD, said that it grew out of an adolescent 
discussion group called'La Gerbe'. For him the pervasive influence of Protestant ideas was 
self-evident: 
22 Charles Rousseau and Jules Prudhommeaux, 'Dans le Gard: A Caveirac, PD 36,5 (May 1926), 
p. 234. 
23 See Brian Fitzpatrick, Catholic Royalism in the Department of the Gard, 1814-1852 
(Cambridge: at the University Press, 1983), pp. 15-17. 
24jules Prudhommeaux, 'L'Origine, le D6veloppement et le Fonctionnement de I'Association de 
la. Paix par le Droit, PD 38,12 (December 1928), pJ513. 
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The Gerbe was Protestant in spirit, for we were in majority of 
Huguenot origin, which was only natural in Nimes. We 
represented different nuances of religious belief. To tell the truth, I 
think that only one of us had a real faith; he has become a pastor 
and an admirable one. But we were all sons of the Reformation, 
through our critical spirit and faith in the value of the things of 
the mind and of the conscienceý5 
The initial programme of the Jeunes Amis de la Paix was comprised of two points: 1. 
'Suppression of permanent armies - creation of national militias to guarantee the internal 
police'; and 2. 'Creation of a tribunal of international arbitration endowed with a special 
code'. 26 Following the suggestion of Frdd6ric Passy, the order of the two points in the 
programme was inverted, the suppression of armies being a result of the creation of 
international tribunals according to him. 27 The name La Paix par le Droit was suggested by 
Pasteur Charles Babut who gave the young association 'in three words, a principle, a 
programme and a hope in a better Future'. 28 Despite the early influence of Quaker 
individualism on the nascent association, it quickly affirmed a measure of conformity with 
Third Republic military demands. After one of its early members became a conscientious 
objector, the APD included an article in its statutes which read that 'Active and ordinary 
[adhftents] members engage themselves morally to submit to the military laws of their 
country, if they have not yet satisfied therre. 29 Thus, without labouring the point, it is 
clear that what began in an Ran of individualistic moral or religious conviction was 
quickly transmuted into an essentially political and juridical programme no less fervently 
espoused for all that. This very early change is important and is one to which we shall 
return, especially in the debates on conscientious objection within the APD in the late 
twenties and early thirties, but it is important to note that almost from the outset the 
paradigm of paciftsme ancien style in France is one which has a social and juridical 
epicentre rather than a religious or primarily ethical one. The insistence on justice or 
'right' in the AssociatioWs rather epigrammatic title is one which was to provide both 
strengths and weaknesses in its approach to the problem of peace in interwar Europe; 
strength no doubt in its perspicacious analysis of the dangers posed by Mtlerian Germany, 
but weakness also in its blurred vision of the world of the 1920s created at Versailles. 
One further point needs to be made in this pre-war introduction to the nature of the 
APD's pacifism, that is to say, its relations with the organised working class. As early as 
1904-1905 the association had become aware of the need to develop some sort of position on 
2-5 Ernest Roussel, 'Les origines de la Paix par le Droie, PD A1 Oanuary 1928), p. 12. 
26 See'Facsimild'of the original programme in PD 37,12 (December 1927), p. 428. 
27 PrudhommeauxVOrigine... ', PD 38,12 (December 1928), ppS13-514. 
28 Roussel, 'Les origines..., PD 38,1 Ganuary 1928), p. 13. 
29 Prudhommeaux, 'L: OTigine..., PD 38,12 (December 1928), p. 515. 
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the pacifism or antimilitarism of large swaths of French syndicalism. Within the pre-war 
French working class the fight against war had overtly mechanistic dimensions with little 
in the way of ethical nuance. The argument was quite simple: rid society of the capitalist 
class and wars would disappear forever. The violence of the syndicalist analysis of war 
and how to prevent it seemed to be peculiarly French. As Prudhommeaux said in a speech 
on the relations between pacifism and the working class delivered at the fourteenth 
international peace congress in Lucerne in September 1905: 
For very diverse political and social reasons (absence of obligatory 
military service, etc), American federationism, and English trade 
unionism have not adopted the violent attitude of French 
syndicalism with regard to militarism and capitalism. 30 
German trades unions, he noted, contained substantial conservative and Catholic elements. 
It was precisely the existence of more conservative elements within the trade union 
movement which dictated the course of action pacifists must follow. 
If we know how to go to these moderates and speak a language 
which is appropriate to their needs and preoccupations, we will 
stop them on the slope which is leading them to extreme 
position0l 
For Prudhommeaux, what was important was to search out a common ground. The end was 
the same for both groups - the bourgeois and working-class pacifists alike - what differed 
was the method or means to achieve that end. For the pacifists of the APD and the 
international congresses it was international arbitration and conciliation, in short the 
growth of a positive international order. For the working class, it was the overthrow of 
capitalism. The answer lay in what Prudhommeaux called 'a voyage of reciprocal 
exploration'. 32 Thus, from almost its earliest days, the APD and its leading. thinkers were 
aware of the existence and ideas of the other main protagonist of peace in the pre-war and' 
later in the interwar period. 
With twenty-seven years of pacifist activity behind it in 1914, the APD was already 
an association of middle-aged men by the time of the Great War. What was its position 
during the cataclysm? And perhaps more importantly, did the experience of the Great 
War produce a dramatic paradigmatic change in the Associations pacifist thinking? 
30 j. Prudhommeaux, 'Les Rapports du Pacifisme et du Mouvement Ouvrier', PD 15,11 
(November 1905), p. 430. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid, p. 433. 
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The answer to the above questions is that in fact very little changed in the APD's 
approach to peace as a result of the Great War. Despite the attacks of the censor's scissors, 
the review continued to appear regularly, albeit in somewhat truncated format. Meetings 
continued to be held, and the men and women of the APD simply waited out the war while 
continuing to publish their prescriptions for a better world. This is not to say that the old- 
style pacifists did not feel the tragedy of the situation. They most certainly did and were 
greatly moved by it. But, like so many other thinking men and women in those bloody 
years, they believed that the war was being fought for a higher ideal and that the world 
which would emerge from the mud of northern France would be a better one. As Charles 
Richet and Thdodore Ruyssen put it in an appeal for 'Peace through Justice' published in 
January 1918: 
Our readers know what our propaganda has been. But it is useful in 
these troubled and passionate times to recall it one more time. It 
can be summed up in one word: we have from the very first day of 
the war and without ceasing advocated the policy which has 
finally brought North America and two-thirds of South America to 
the side of the Allies. Let us dare to say without boasting, because 
it is the simple truth, that we were Wilsonians, not before Mr 
Wilson, but before the President of the United States had 
proclaimed to the universe the doctrine which was to lead to the 
intervention of the New World in the European war. We have 
thought, written and repeated untiringly since the tragic days - 
doubly tragic for pacifists - of July 1914, that the aggression of force 
against justice must be opposed by force without flinching, even at 
the price of the worst sacrifices - but that this force must spring 
from a desire for peace, a just peace, organised, durable, as 
tenacious, as irreducible as the desire for war itself. 
In judging moreover this war of defence and liberation necessary, we 
have abandoned none of our convictions of old. We continue to 
think, for reasons which we have developed ahundred times, that 
between civilised men war is a monstrous anachronism and an 
avoidable evil. Just because it is imposed, we do not believe it 
holy, nor beautiful, nor salutary; we fulfil with firmness, but with 
sadness, a cruel duty, and we preserve intact our desire to struggle 
against the international anarchy from which this war was born. 33 
This long citation defines clearly the APD's position during the Great War. With the 
benefit of hindsight there was certainly nothing subversive about it, although to the 
bellicists of the day (a species we no longer are familiar with) there was no doubt much 
about it that caused concern. The APD was thus thoroughly patriotic during the war. Its 
members did their duty. Ruyssen, though too old for active service worked for a time as A 
sort of volunteer nurse, looking after the wounded in a hospital in Nantes. Micien 
33 Charles Richet and Th6odore Ruyssen, 'Pour "La Paix par le Droit"', PD 28,1/2 Ijanuary 1918), 
pl. 
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Challaye, who was a committee member in the twenties, and of whom much more will be 
heard, served as a simple sergeant in the territorial army, and so on. 34 
If the trauma of the Great War did little to change the APD's basic Weltanschauung, 
it did, however, force it to define its position with regard to other pacifists who drew 
different lessons from the wartime experience, and also with regard to the erroneous, but 
tenacious and damaging conclusions reached by public opinion about the nature of pacifism. 
Taking the latter point first, several writers in the PD were at pains to distinguish between 
pacifism and defeatism on the one hand, and on the other hand to emphaske that the 
APD's programme of positive prescriptions for peace in no way affected its view of what it 
considered to be a just war. In a short article published before the war had ended, Gustave 
Belot protested at the insinuation by the judge in the 116Mne Brion trial that there was 
something subversive about pacifism: 
Whether it pleases him or not, Pacifism in the proper sense of the 
word is exactly the same thing in time of war as in time of peace. 
What do we have to do in order to make people understand that 
the true idea of Pacifism is that of a regime of international law - 
an idea which the state of war cannot annul? 
Pacifism is decidedly not Bolshevism. It has never consisted in 
compromising or obstructing the defence of the nation ... This 
perpetual caricature that is made of pacifism is an intolerable 
calumny .... 
35 
The war experience and public opinion seem to have taken their toll on some readers of 
the PD however. F. Lepine, an inspecteur de 1'enseignement primaire in Reims wrote a long 
open letter to Ruyssen published in the review in which he raised the question of pacifism 
and defeatism. Lepine distinguished between the pacifism of a Passy which had 'nothing 
in common with anarchism or antin-dlitarism', and a certain 'equivocal pacifisrre which 
'cohabits happily with the class war, with doctrines of hatred and civil war' and ends up 
'lowering itself to antinational and antisocial heresies. ' As a prime example of this he 
cited Barbusse who in his view preached violence and did not distinguish between 
anarchism, antimilitarism and pacifism. This attitude could only lead to a situation like 
that in Russia under the Soviets. Ruyssens response was clearly in favour of pacifism as 
opposed to defeatism. He defended Barbusse by arguing that his characters in Le Feu 'curse 
war, but they fight it", and he said that he was still looking for the European pacifists of 
34 Fdlicien Challaye, 'Pour la PaIx sans aucune r6erve, PD 42,4 (April 1932), p. 149; J. -L. Puech, 
'Apro s des Articles Challaye-Ruyssen', PD42,4 (April 1932), pp. 153-154. 
3TOGustave Belot, 'Encore le mot "pacifisme"', PD 28,7/8 (April 1918), p. 109. 
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whom Lepine wrote 'who fail to recognise the necessity of resisting savage. violence by 
force. ' Such pacifists were not to be found in ihe ranks of the APD in any case. 36 
In October 1918 when the Axis demand for an armistice became known, Ruyssen wrote a 
public letter to Clemenceau asking that the war be ended as soon as possible within the 
bounds of what was just. But he underlined the dangers for France contained in what he 
called the 'phobia of peace' which certain public personages seemed to be experiencing - a. 
phobia which saw anyone envisaging peace as either pusillanimous or a traitor. It is 
perhaps indicative of the extent to which the APD was itself sensitive to these charges 
that he underlined to Clemenceau. that 'we are pacifists, we are not defeatists, ren-dnding 
the Tiger that in 1916 he had written to Ruyssen that he 'liked' the APD's'pacifism'. 37 
Richet and Ruyssen saluted the end of a war which they believed ought never to have 
occurred, but for which they believed there were some direct and crushing responsibilities 
as well as other more imponderable, indirect ones. They celebrated the return of Alsace- 
Lorraine, but even more perhaps the remaking of the map of Europe on revolutionary 
principles which the end of the war seemed to promise. Let there be no doubt: Richet and 
Ruyssen did not have a social experiment on Marxist lines in mind. They were referring to 
the revolutionary principles of the early French revolution, the spirit of '92: 
Yes, this war is revolutionary. It achieves the work of our 
ancestors of '92, compron-dsed by Napoleon. In all of central Europe 
crowns are falling in cascades: stunned, the sovereigns are fleeing 
the popular wrathJ8 
La guerre du droit thus assumed at its climax almost mythical proportions for the 
republicans of the APD. It represented the culn-dnation of a revolutionary struggle begun 
and then derailed almost 130 years previously. 
The euphoria brought on by the end of the war died away rather quickly however as it 
became apparent that the peace which was emerging from the ashes was not a perfect one. 
The APD's pronouncements on the state of international affairs, the Versailles treaty and 
the tasks facing post-war pacifism are a mixture of optimism and despair. On the one hand 
the men of the APD saw tremendous hope for progress in the post-Versailles world, but 
equally they could not help but be disturbed by the incompleteness of the post. -War system. 
36 F. Lepine, 'Pacifisme ou dgaitisme?, (letter of 1 January 1918 with response by Ruyssen), PD 
28,3/4/5/6 (February-March 1918), pp. 49-55. For favourable comment on Barbusse, see PD 28,1/2 
(January 1918), pp. 41-43. 
37 'A M. Georges Clemenceau (Lettre adress6e A M. C16menceau au lendemain de la demande 
d'armistice formul6e par les Empires centraux: par le Comitd Directeur de "I'Association de la. Paix 
par le Droif, Bordeaux, 8 Octobre 1918Y, PD 28,21/22 (November 1918), pp332-333. 
38 Charles Richet and Th6odore Ruyssen, 'La Fin de la Guerre, PD 28,21/22 (November 1918), 
p. 330. 
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In a Appel-Programme published at the beginning of 1920 for example, the APD spoke of 
the horrors of the war wlich was finally over, but registered disappointment that what 
had been fought as the war to end all wars already seemed to have given birth to a bastard 
peace: 
Alas! from this grandiose dream to present reality, what a fall! 
Granted, the League of Nations has seen the day: it cries in the 
straw in the stable of the new Bethlehem. It is a triumph of Right. 
But how pale and imperfect this new constitution still is! The 
solemn pact which created it does not even dare to pronounce, in the 
name of organised humanity, a definitive and absolute interdiction 
of war; it admits the possibility of new bloody conflicts in the 
future. The Peace Conference in Paris has succeeded neither in 
imposing an obligatory solution on all disputes by means of law, nor 
in constituting an international police force. Tomorrow, almost as 
much as yesterday, war remains possible in an anarchistic worldý9 
But however imperfect the post-war world n-dght be, it had to be lived in and the APD 
saw the League of Nations as the indirect creation of pacifist hands. Never before had 
they felt so much that they were moving in the same direction as the march of History; 
their 'lifeboat was lifted up by the rising tide'. 40 Whereas before the war the APD's task 
had been the promotion of international arbitration and warning against the coming 
catastrophe, during the war it had been the fulfillment of its patriotic duty, and after the 
war its horizons had to be broadened to go beyond its old formulm to demanding the 
creation of a League of Nations endowed with real powers of international organisation 
including that of an international police force. As Ruyssen reiterated later in the year 
following the APD's first post-war annual general meeting, public opinion was in complete 
disarray because it seemed that the promises made during the war were not to be fulfilled, 
and that two years after the armistice the most the French government could offer was a 
reduction of the length of military service from two years to eighteen months. Added to 
this was the defection of the Americans from the Geneva experiment and the sniping 
attacks of some socialists who persisted in seeing the League as but the tool of imperialist 
oppressors. The pre-war challenge thus remained the same for the APD, although 
amplified and extended by the creation of the League: 
... there is no need to look for a new orientation, nor above all to 
renounce [anything]. Doubtless, the creation of the League of 
Nations obliges us not to revise, but to complete the motto of the 
ancien pacifisme. It is no longer enough to-day to demand 
'arbitration! and 'conciliation'. But the League of Nations is too 
39 'Pour la Paix par le Droit. Appel Programme, PD 30,1/2 (Jan-Feb 1920), p. 2. 
40 Ibid., p3. 
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young, too infirm, too contested not to have need of being defended. 
It lacks the assent of the popular masses... 41 
Thus, despite the adn-dtted problems inherent in the new order born of Versailles, the 
APD saw its mission clearly as the support and extension of an international system based 
upon a desire for peace achieved through respect for law. Within the APD however there 
continued to be some dissension as to the nature the Association's post-war pacifism ought 
to have. Some members thought the Association was going too far in its reconciliation with 
the former enemy; others thought quite the contrary and saw in the APD's reticences an 
unwillingness to move forward in the fight for peace and reconciliation. In 1920 for 
example the review had carried an article about relief to famine-struck areas of Europe, 
especially with regard to saving the lives of young children. Some readers took great 
exception to the fact that the appeal was destined towards saving the lives of German 
children too! Ruyssen replied by saying that he pleaded guilty: 'We admit our pity for the 
starving child, even if his father is guilty, because it is a double misery to be hungry and 
also the son of an assassin or thief. 42 A year later, however, R. NH6, an inspecteur 
d'Academie honoraire, took fundamental issue with the review over its attitude with 
regard to Germany. PM6 argued for more mutual tolerance and forgiveness. The problem 
with the Versailles Treaty was that it was the judgerne nt of men who were prosecutors and 
judges in their own court. The argument over whether or not reparations constituted a war 
indemnity or not was pedantic. PM6 accepted the principle of restitution, but argued that 
in order for it to be valid, and deemed to be valid by the offending party, it had to be the 
result of a judgement handed down by a competent tribunal - 'that of a universal, 
ecumenical League of Nations'. The fundamental issue though was one of attitude towards 
Germany and the reconciliation necessary for the rebuilding of Europe; echoing an 
Englishman who was in no way a Germanophile, P6rid wrote that the Germans 'were not 
born with a double dose of original sirV. 43 
The mild dissent of a P&M was certainly not matched by many readers of the PD. Jules 
Puech, the review's secretary, complained in a 1924 article that 'many readers think that 
the only truth worth repeating is the governmental truth which is disseminated by certain 
more or less official newspapers'. 44 This was fine during the war, although even then the 
PD was not prepared to become a bourreur de cr4nes. But Puech argued that the time for 
such mindless and uncritical conformity had long since passed. The APD and its members 
had to regain their critical faculties and to praise and condemn public policy where 
41 T. Ruyssen, 'Au Travail', PD 30,11/12 (Nov-Dec 1920), pp. 354-355. 
42 T. Ruyssen, 'R6ponsel Quelques Objections', PD 30,5 (May 1920), p. 134. 
43 R. Fdri6, 'Scrupules Pacifistes' (letter to Ruyssen), PD 31,7 Guly 1921), pp. 237-240. 
44 Jules-L. Puech, 'Notre "Sainte Cause"', PD 34,4/5 (April-May 1924), p. 1 65. 
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necessary. The apparent lack of the dissenting spirit amongst the rank-and-file of the 
APD, if PueclVs comments are to be given any credence, reflects the views of wider French 
society on pacifism. One contributor writing in the review in 1922, said that pacifism 
frightened people. During the war it somehow became synonymous withdefeatism!, and 
since the victory, although everyone was in favour of peace, no one wanted to be called a 
pacifist. But a pacifist was merely someone who was a 'partisan of peace', and thus all 
men who earnestly desired peace must be pacifist. On this basis, France and Germany could 
both be divided politically into parties of war and parties of peace. 45 Seven years later 
the problem remained much the same as Ruyssen exasperatedly attacked the 
misconceptions of the popular press about the nature of pacifism. His ire had been raised 
by Louis Lafon - 'this pastor, doctor without charity of a religion of love' - who had 
defined pacifism as a utopian belief held basically by fools. 46 And yet again Ruyssen 
defined to his uncomprehending detractors the pacýftsme ancien style of the APD: 
Is it necessary to say yet again that pacifism is anything but this 
march to the stars, and that it is an attempt to organise peace not 
according to a chimerical plan, but in inspiring itself from a real 
and secular experience, that of civil life? .... Where is the chimera in this? ... In 1914, it was not pacifist idealism which was listened to, but the desperate pessimism of the believers in force, for the 
greatest benefit of the canon founders of all countries. 47 
Ruyssen's pacifism, this pacifism of the APD, showed little sign of self-doubt about the 
rectitude of its position in the twenties. It was a pacifism based on justice, and Ruyssen and 
his fellow pacifists believed they knew what that entailed. It meant condemning those 
who deserted justice and Right for opportunistic reasons. 48 It meant condemning the 
veterans organisations for their equivocal stand on national defence which made the whole 
question one of individual conscience. 49 It meant a rapid end to the honeymoon with 
Barbusse once the latter's conception of peace became evident. Louis Bosse described 
Barbusse's prescriptions for peace as a 'project for a mechanical paradise'. -50 The problem 
with Barbusse's thinking was that it reduced peace to an 'all or nothing' concept. Bosse 
45 Rend Lauret, 'Pourquoi le Pacifisme est D6crid!, PD 32,2 (Feb. 1922), pp. 72-3. 
46 T. Ruyssen, 'Poldmiques, PD 39,10 (Oct 1929), p. 357. Won was director of La Vie Nouvelle 
and also contributed to le Temps. 
47 Ibid., p. 358. 
48' Une id6e ... turque: Ldnine, laureat du Prix Nobel', PD 28,1/2 (Jan 1918) p. 43. Criticism of Lenires nomination by the University of Constantinople for the Peace Prize on the grounds cited. 
49 T. Ruyssen, 'L'Internationale des Anden combattants, PD 30,6/7 (June-July 1920), p. 204. 
Ruyssen's comments are actually just an introduction to a report on the Ceneva Conference by F. 
Couttenoire de Toury which follows. 
50 Louis Bosse, 'Quelques R6flexions sur un projet du paradis m6canique!, PD 31,1 (Jan 1921), 
pp. 3-6. 
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argued instead for the necessity and value of partial steps; Barbusse's method was the 
panacea of a lazy mind. What made such an argument even more strange in Bosses view 
was that the teleology was the same; Ruyssen and Barbusse differed only on means. 
Barbusse was proposing a 'messianic mysticism' in which 'in the final analysis [be] wants 
to create peace out of peace. There will be no more war when we have done away with all 
causes for war... ', 51 With regard to the question of the class struggle and civil war, Ruyssen 
wrote that all members of the APD's committee detested the latter but that at the social 
level, there was no defined doctrine held by members of the APDý2 Notwithstanding 
these divergences with some of the tenants of the as yet unself-conscious and undefined 
pacifisme nouveau style, Ruyssen in 1925 was still affirming that the old style pacifism 
was capable of working with the disparate elements within the pacifism of the twenties 
because the end for all was still the same. 53 As will become clear, it was to take until the 
early thirties before the incompatibilities of new and old-style pacifism became so marked 
as finally to force a rupture. But that is to jump ahead somewhat. Pacifism was beginning 
to change but the 
_men 
and women of the APD could not at this point begin to guess the 
degree. Edmond Vermeil saw the beginnings of this divergence at the 1924 international 
peace congress in Berlin where the pacifist camp seemed to be divided between 'moderates' 
and 'intransigents'. The differences became particularly obvious in the debates on 
disarmament, which led Vermeil to conclude 
... it is clear that in present-day pacifism there is a tendency towards absolutism, towards ideology, towards peremptory and 
definitive declarations which arrange everything in the abstract, 
but solve nothing within the order of present reality - the 
immediate and quasi-tragic realities in which we move, hither 
and thither, today ... 
Nace needs not only to be decreed, but to be 
'organised'... 54 
Kurt Hiller, one of the German 'intransigents' said to Vermeil at the congress in a private 
conversation that the two strands of pacifism must continue to co-exist within the bosom of 
'51 Ibid., p. 5. 
-52 T. Ruyssen, 'Rdponse a quelques Objections, p. 135. 
53 T. Ruyssen, 'Le XXIV Congnýs Internationale de la Paix, PD 35,10 (Oct 1925), pp. 362-363. On 
the growing sense of divergence felt by representatives of the 'other side! in the pacifist movement 
see the letter sent by Henry van Etten of the Society of Friends on behalf of himself and Marianne 
Rauze (a left-wing pacifist) to G. Duch8ne asking for her cooperation in an attempt to prevent the 
bourgeois pacifists from taking over the XXIVth Peace Congress in Paris as they apparently had 
done the year before in Berlin (BDIC, DD, FARds 273/19/129). 
54 Edmond Vermeil, 'Le XXIIRme Congrýs International de la. Paix de BerliW, PD 34,12*(Dec 
1924), pp. 453-54. 
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the same movement, but this was to become an increasingly unattainable, and indeed 
undesirable, ideal by the end of the decade. 55 
Pierre Cot summed up the differences between what he called the'French! conception of 
peace and the 'Anglo-Saxorf idea of peace in an important article at the end of the decade. 
The Kellogg-Briand pact attempted to dispense with war simply by condemning it; what 
shocked the French mind in his view was that this simple condemnation of war did nothing 
actively to organise peace: 
For France the heart of the problem is less to pronounce a solemn 
and platonic anathema against war so much as to work towards the 
organisation of peace. The land of Descartes and of Voltaire 
prefers techniques to canticles ... The Anglo-Saxon, it has been said, tours the world with his Bible and the Frenchmen with his Code. 
Let us not be embarrassed by this natural and national penchant. 
We have a conception of peace which is more juridical than 
mystical. But justice, too, supposes an ideal. 56 
The end of the war had seen these two conceptions of peace confront one another in the 
creation of the League of Nations. The French had held to a belief in a system of positive 
international law in which recourse to international violence would be forbidden and 
nations obliged through a system of sanctions, including that of an armed international 
force, to conform to the new international order. Cot believed that for the Anglo-Saxon 
nations, on the other hand, the question of sanctions assumed an entirely secondary 
importance behind a merely moral condemnation of unjust wars by international public 
opinion, which would express itself through two agencies: a moratorium on wars and a 
public debate on the causes of the conflict. In his view, the Anglo-Saxon conception carried 
the day. There was thus according to Cot a fundamental dichotomy of views within the 
former Allied camp as to the method of achieving peace. 57 
55 Ibid., p. 454. See also Karl Holl, 'Kurt Hiller, in Helmut Donat and K2rl Holl, eds, Die 
FrIedensbe, pegung (Hermes Handlexikon), (Dusseldorf. ECON Taschenbuch Verlag, 1983), pp. 186- 
188; see also Lewis D. Wurgart, The Activists. Kurt Hiller and the Politics of Action on the German 
Left, 1917-1933 (Philadelphia: Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, 1977). The same 
observations on the Berlin congress were also made by another observer from the APD - see L. 
L6ontin, 'Apr6s le Congrbs de la Paix de Berlin', PD 34,12 (Dec 1924), pp. 457-458. 
56 Pierre Cot, 'La Conception Franjaise de la Lutte contre la Guerre, PD, 39,4/5 (April-May 
1929), 164 
5f'Ibid, pp. 164-170. There was, of course, dissent over the nature of French pacifism even 
within the pages of the PD. See, for example, A. Vulliod, 'La Valeur du Pacte Kellogg-Briand, PD 39, 
6 (June 1929), pp. 214-221, in which the author (a professor at the University of Nancy) argued for the 
moral versus the juridical approach to peace: 'A mon sens, cette constatation nous amýne A 
reconnaltre que l'oeuvre de la paix constructive est essentiellement une oeuvre p6dagogique et 
morale. 11 existe sans doute (suivant une faqon de dire qui est en faveur) une technique de la paix; 
mais les organes de cette technique sont command6s par 1'6nergique volontd de paix qui se trouve 
actuellement vivante dans un grand nombre d'ames, sur tous les points du globe... ' (p. 220). 
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This conception of pacifism was clearly inimical to that increasingly espoused in the 
Anglo-Saxon world and by the more avant-garde German pacifists. But it was also 
increasingly at variance with the movement of ideas within French pacifism itself. As we 
shall see later in this section, the challenges of the new pacifism caused momentary cracks 
to appear in the paradigm of the APD's paciftsme ancien style, but by the end of the 
thirties the international crisis had caused the wagons to be pulled into a circle and the 
paradigm to be reaffirmed. What is clear however is that though the decade of the 
twenties represents a period of relative hegemony for the APD and its ideas within French 
pacifism, there were already signs that the pot was beginning to boil. Not for much longer 
would the struggle for the same goal suffice; the question of means and the definition of 
what sort of. peace was being fought for gradually assumed paramount importance. 
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L3. A Decade of Optimism (1919-1929). 
The decade from 1919 to 1929 was largely one of guarded optimism for the tenants of the 
old-style pacifism. There was no ignoring the tremendous upheaval European society had 
to face, but the overall picture was one of an international order which was slowly, 
however imperfectly, rising above anarchy to a state inspired by reason and law. There 
continued to be wars, but the rule of law was increasingly to be seen in action at Geneva and 
elsewhere. We shall examine in this section the nature of the APD's optimism, its reaction 
to the international developments of the twenties, and its position on the question of 
Franco-German rapprochement in the light of the debate over war guilt. 
Underlying the events of the whole decade was the fundamental question of Franco- 
German reconciliation and all of the tangential issues which this topic conjured up. The 
APD was clearly in favour, in theory at least, of a fundamental reconciliation between the 
two former enemy nations, but it will be argued here that precious opportunities for such a 
reconciliation were lost because of the AssociatioWs fixation with what it in all good faith 
considered to be the question of justice and 'Right' in Frances relations with Germany. 
Blinded by this conception of Right and convinced of the entire reVtude of Frances cause, 
the APD was guilty of not providing all the support it could have done to the feeble 
liberal, democratic and pacifist elements within the struggling Weimar experiment. 
As we have noted above, the APD believed implicitly in the rightness of France's role 
in the Great War, a war which had been forced upon it. The question of war origins and 
responsibilities is one which the review continued to comment on during the twenties. For 
example in a 1920 number, Ruyssen debated the question of responsibilities with Louis 
Gudtant of the Clarti group. While recognising that the Central Powers did not bear 
exclusive responsibility for the conflict, Ruyssen nevertheless argued that they bore 
primary responsibility. 58 He continued to hold to this line the following year in a review 
of Les origines de la Guerre published by the Socidtd d'Etudes Documentaires et Critiques 
sur Ia Guerre, in which while accepting that the brochure of Morhardt, Demartial, et al 
58 Louis Gu6tant and Th6odore Ruyssen, 'Les Responsabilitds de la Cuerre I et IF, PD 30,10 
(October 1920) pp. 328-333. 
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was in places 'troubling', he argued nonetheless that the Russian mobilisation Was not war, 
and that'one could not logically construe war guilt from a simple order of mobilisation. 59 
Commenting in 1922 on a polemic which had broken out in the German press between 
representatives of different strands of German pacifism on the question of war guilt, 
Ruyssen came round to admitting that Article 231 of the Versailles Treaty bothered him, 
not because it was an inaccurate representation of what he believed to be the case, but 
simply because Germany had been forced to 'recognise7 its war guilt. 'The moral error, 
which is serious, is of having forced Germany to declare that it recognised that which in 
fact, aside from a clear-sighted minority, it had in no way recognised. In short, a lie was 
extracted from it., 60 When Victor Margueritte published his Appel aux Consciences in 
1925, Ruyssen exasperatedly attacked it for its vanity and naivety. He did not believe 
that the treaties could or would be revised. He did not deny that Article 231 was wrong, 
but argued that in that case Germany ought never to. have signed the Treaty. What 
appeared to shock him greatly was that the Appel was signed not only by the usual names 
of the Soci&6 d'Etudes (Georges Demartial, Charles Gide, Gouttenoire de Toury and 
Mathias Morhardt), but also by more mainstream pacifists such as Victor Basch, Gaston 
Moch, and Marc Sangnier. In his view the continued talk of treaty revision was an 
unnecessary troubling of the waters: 
In my opinion, it is too late, or too early to stir up these memories. 
Too late if one wants to return to texts legally signed and for which 
no procedure for revision which is at once practical and peaceful is 
conceivable; too early if one claims to be able to deliver a 
definitive judgement on Articles 227 to 231... It is surprising that 
the pacifists or ultra-pacifists who composed or signed the Appel 
aux Consciences do not realise the danger that their campaign is 
causing to the present peace; imperfect peace no doubt, unjust peace 
even on more than one point, but real peace, and just peace on many 
points of primary importance ... 
fil 
As an address to German pacifists voted at the APD's annual general meeting in Poitiers in 
1921 put it, the APD 'registered with great satisfaction the assurance it had received that 
numerous were the democrats in Germany and Austria who were resolved to execute the 
treaties insofar as was possible. '62 
'59 Th6odore Ruyssen, Review of Les Orýnes de ta Guerre published by the Socidtd d'Etudes 
Documentaires et Critiques sur la Gueffe, in PD 31,7 (July 1921), p. 267. 
60 Thdodore Ruyssen, 'De quelques poldmiques allemandes sur les responsabilit6s de la 
guerre*, PD 32,3/4 (March-April 1922), p. 113. 
61 Th6odore Ruyssen, 'Encore I'Article 23W, PD 35,5(May 1925), p. 203. 
62 Edmond Dum6ril and Jules Prudhommeaux, 'UAssembl6e G6n&ale de la Paix par le Droie 
(Poitiers, 31 October to 1 November 1921), PD 31,12 (December 1921), p. 408. 
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The equation of liberal, democratic and pacifist Germany with the worst of 
Wilheln-dne Germany was an unfortunate and short-sighted position taken by the APD and 
other French and international pacifist bodies immediately after the War. It is a difficult 
historical judgement to make, but it seems clear in retrospect that for the future good of 
Europe the French pacifists ought perhaps to have 'gone the extra mile' in their first post- 
war contacts with the Germans. In an article in January 1919, however, Ruyssen replied 
negatively to the suggestion of M de Jong. van Beek en Donk, secretary of a group called the 
Organisation pour une Paix Durable, that a conference of pacifists, including the Germans, 
should be held as soon as possible. He was not willing to forgive and forget. He wrote that 
'an attempt at an entente which postulated forgetting or this abstention would be vitiated 
in its very principle. '63 There were certain facts which could not simply be forgotten: the 
invasion of Belgium, the official theory of the 'scrap of paper, submanne warfare, 
inhumane warfare, the destruction of civilian property, etc. 'My first act, ' he wrote, 'in an 
assembly in which I n-dght meet German or Austrian pacifists would be to ask them if they 
totally repudiate all of these acts. '64 Rapprochement and reconciliation should be left for 
a time to allow passions to cool; the time had not yet come for it. The German pacifists, 
liberals and democrats had enough to contend with internally, he thought, and so did the 
French trying to ensure that the domestic chauvinists did not get out of handfi-5 
A manifesto of the Deutsche Frfedensgesellschaft which came to the APD by means of 
an English translation, thus escaping the censor, was treated to the same rejection. The 
German manifesto asked that the new Germany not be treated like the old and insisted 
that something new was happening in the country. The APD, while claiming not to want to 
see unjust measures applied against the former enemy, noted that 1. the German pacifists 
had never, to their knowledge, protested against the declaration of war against France, or 
against the invasion of Belgium; 2. that they had never protested against the 'excesses' of 
the German armies, or more specifically against submarine warfare; I that they had only 
protested against certain clauses of the treaty of Brest-Litovsk; and finally, 4. that they 
had never, neither before nor during the war, recognised. that the Alsace-Lorraine question 
was a valid one. 66 The French attacks centred largely on Ludwig Quidde and Alfred 
Hermann Fried whose attitudes during and since the war were deemed by the Frenc h 
pacifists to have been equivocal if not duplicitous. 67 
63 Thdodore Ruyssen, Te Mouvement pacifiste. Pour et contre la reprise des relations 
pacifistes internationales', PD 29,1 (January 1919), p. 48. 
64 Ibid. 
615 Ibid, p. 49. 
66 'Un manifeste de la Soci6td Allemande de la Pabe, PD 29,1 (January 1919), pp. 54-56. 
67 For attacks on Quidde see'Les responsabilitds de ]a guerre et le professeur Quidde'in PD 29, 
1 (January 1919), p. 56; for the Fried controversy, see Gaston Moch, 'Un r6quisitoire n6cessaire. 
Alfred Hermann Fried', PD 29,4 (April 1919), pp. 155-168; see also'Le Journal de Guerre d'Alfred H. 
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In these early months of 1919 it seemed that for the French pacifists no good thing could 
come out of Germany. Edmond Dum6ril acerbically attacked Mathias Erzberger as a 
convert of la dernWe heure when the latter proposed a 'German project for the League of 
Nations' (the emphasis is Dumdril's), and commented caustically that 'it took four years of 
atrocious war in order for the first project for a League of Nations to be formed in German 
political circles. How can one believe in the sincerity of a conversion the stages of which 
have been the same as those of the defeat? '68 The Erzberger project also provided Dumdril 
with another occasion to wax cynical over the motives behind Erzberger's July 1917 
resolution in the Reichstag calling for a peace without annexations. 69 
Sooner or later, however, French and German pacifists had to meet one another. The 
executive committee of the Bureau International de la Paix which was largely controlled 
by Frenchmen or Belgians, underlined to the German pacifists in late April 1919 that before 
any meaningful reconciliation could occur the German pacifists* would have to recognise 
Germany's preponderant responsibility for the outbreak of the war, and also its present 
responsibility to ensure that full reparation was made for the ensuing damagesP When 
French and German pacifists finally did meet together in Berne under the auspices of the 
BIP for the first time in four and a half years in late August 1919, the meeting occasioned 
some sharp and frank exchanges of views. A resolution proposed by Ruyssen concerning 
Germany's primary responsibility for the outbreak of war was however passed by the 
Council. 71 
The German pacifist camp was divided on the question of war guilt and reparations. 
There were those like Dr Fritz R6ttcher, a principal contributor to the VdIkerfriede (the 
organ of the German Peace Society) who argued for acceptance of the Versailles Treaty. 
Others, such as Fried, who directed the Friedenswarte, attacked the treaty. Fried wrote 
that 'I regret that the victory of democracy has not resulted in a democratic peace... the 
Fried' (comprising two letters, one from Fried to Ruyssen and a response by Gaston Moch) in PD 29, 
7/8 (JulytAugust 1919), pp. 312-325; a final response by Fried may be seen in Alfred H. Fried, 'Un 
dernier mot, PD 29,9/10 (Sept-Oct 1919), pp. 401-402. See also Puech's negative comments on the 8th 
German Peace congress in J. -L. Puech, Te 86me Congri! s Allemand de la Paix', PD 29,7/8 Uuly- 
August 1919), pp. 362-364. 
68 Edmond Dumdril, 'I: Allemagne et la Soci6td des Nations. Le Projet de Mathias Erzberger', 
PD 29,2/3 (February - March 1919), PAS. 69 Ibid. 
70 Correspondence between the BIP and the Socidtd Allemande de , 
la Paix about the re- 
opening of relations between international pacifism and German pacifism can be found in Ta 
Propagande. Le Bureau Internationale de la Paix, PD 29,7/8 (JulyýAugust 1919), p. 357-359. 
71 See Ruyssen's account of this meeting in Th6odore Ruyssen, 'Le renouveau du Pacifisme et 
le Bureau International de la Paixý, PD 29,9/10/11(Sept - Oct 1919), pp. 403-416. This meeting also 
discussed in broad terms the problems created for old-style pacifism by the continued disaffection of 
the working class, the suspicion since the war held by middle classes for pacifism, and the difficulties 
posed by the new doctrines of non-resistance which were especially to be felt in England. 
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treaty is radically antipacifist... 72 In February 1921, the DFG over the signatures of H. 
von Gerlach, Dr L Quidde and Dr H St6cker, appealed to the BIP about the dangers for 
future peace posed by Versailles and especially by the reparations question. They claimed 
that Germany was unable to pay the reparations and that the treaties did not constitute a 
genuine and lasting peace, '... the decisions of the Paris conference do not guarantee peace, 
they compromise it. They will be the source of struggles without end. '73 In the DFGs view, 
the treaty would have as its only result a rise in the activity of Bolshevism and extreme 
right-wing circles in Germany. 74 Even the warnings of a German pacifist such as Hermann 
Fernau, respected by the APD, seem to have fallen on deaf ears. In a 1921 article published 
in the review, Fernau argued essentially the same case as the other German pacifists, 
making the point that without a peace of reconciliation founded on much mutual 
indulgence, the only winners would be the political reactionaries and the German 
communists. He accused France of resorting to the same methods and ideas as Imperial 
Germany in its attempts to have the treaties respected at all costs: 
Speaking too often as a conqueror to the conquered, or as a judge to 
the accused, threatening Germany too often with reprisals, but 
renouncing all the same the things which it demanded yesterday 
(extradition of the guilty parties, Diesel motors, milking cattle, 
etc), French policy not only is in contradiction with the noble 
promises of the French Revolution, but what is worse, is playing 
the game of those in Germany who are the sworn enemies of 
France. 75 
Fernau saw Germany being pushed into the arms of Bolshevism because it was being cut off 
from its occidental heritage. French policy was having as its only effect the discrediting of 
the Versailles Treaty along with nascent German democracy. He called for the creation of 
a dike to stop the rising tide of folly which threatened to overthrow democratic 
civflisation in Germany and he proclaimed that 'Franco-German rapprochement is this 
dike'. 76 
The view taken of the German revolution was also less than warm. M. L. Puech writing 
in 1924 said that'There has not been a German Revolution, it has still to be accomplished. 
72 Cited in 'Chronique. La rdvision du traitd de Versailles - La Paix par le Droit et la guerre - La 
Paix avec la Russie' (letters from A. H. Fried, A. A. Warden and Louis Gudtant, with comments by 
RuysSen), PD 30,3/4 (March-April 1920) p. 90; see also Th6odore Ruyssen, 'Les pacifistes Allemands 
et le Traitd de Versailles, PD 30,1/2 (Jan-Feb 1920), pp. 32-38. 
73 'Message adressd au Bureau International de la Paix par la Soci6td Allemande de la Paix au 
sujet des ddcisions de la Conf6rence de Paris, (with response by Ruyssen), in PD 31,3/4 (March- 
April 1921), p. 119. 
74 Ibid. 




Even more, a large part of the [Gen-nan] nation does not even hate its republic, it is ashamed 
of it'. 77 This, she said, was in contrast to the French revolution which 'glorified the 
victory of the French people over a r6gime and a caste'. 78 
Thus, to recapitulate the argument so far, the first few years of the interwar period 
were ones of intransigence for the men of the APD vis-A-vis Germany. This intransigence 
expressed itself not only with regard to the political nation, but also unfortunately in equal 
measure with regard to those very elements in Germany which were trying to create 
something new out of the defeat. The APD, at least until 1922, failed to take note of these 
attempts and of the danger to be incurred in not supporting them wholeheartedly. The 
APD's shortsightedness can perhaps be forgiven; the hatred engendered by a disaster of 
the magnit-dde of the Great War must surely take years to die down. Jules Puech writing in 
1920 said that three options were open to French pacifists: one was to have nothing 
whatsoever to do with the former enemy; the second was to rush at the Germans with arms 
open in reconciliation; and the third was to have as little as possible to do with them, 
while letting time take its healing course. It was the latter he recommended. 'That is all; 
I shall not suddenly, on command, love en bloc a people whom I regret not having better 
killed when I was a soldier... '. 79 
1922 seemed to be a watershed year in terms of the APD's, or at least Ruyssen's, views 
on rapprochement with Germany. It also marked the return of a healthy scepticism about 
French government policy towards the former enemy. Ruyssen participated in 1922 in the 
first post-war visit to Germany by an offical delegation of the Ligue des Droits de 
Momme. The group visited Berlin, Essen, Dortmund and Bochum, speaking before 
bourgeois and working-class audiences. Generally they were very well received and 
Ruyssen came back with some favourable impressions. Frenchmen living -in Germany 
believed that Germany had disarmed almost to the zero point, and Ruyssen seemed 
convinced that German youth was searching for new paths and was in no way reactionary. 
For all that, the econon-dc difficulties spelled trouble for the Weimar Republic, and he 
reckoned that ninety per cent of Germans did not accept the war guilt clause, and even 
amongst those that did there was great doubt about Germany's ability to pay its 
reparations. All of this led to a net impression of pessin-dsm for Ruyssen. Perhaps as a 
result of this pessimism, the voyage to Germany seemed to produce a sort of 'road to 
Damascus' experience in him. He continued to affirm Germany's guilt, but blamed France 
for not being more indulgent and farsighted in its treatment of its neighbour, a position in 
77 MA. Puech, 'De I'Allemagne, PD 34,9(Sept 1924), p. 333. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Jules-L. Puech, 'Chronique - La Paix avec I'Allemagne, PD 30,1/2 (Jan-Feb 1920), p. 27. 
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sharp contrast to the polemics in which he had previously engaged with German pacifists 
over the question of reparations for example: 
... our country, hated but secretly admired, could conduct a 
magnificent campaign of clarity and conciliation (in Germany), if 
we finally practised with regard to our vanquished neighbour a 
policy different from the detestable methods which we have 
abused for four years... while England tries clearly to deal gently 
with Germany, we continue to talk of 'sanctions' which could very 
well mean a new occupation should Germany fail to fulfill its 
latest promises. That these measures are justified by Germany's 
failure to keep a good number of promises, one can easily agree. But 
what is certain is that they have ulcerated the German people to 
the core without it having any idea of the sacrifices we have 
consented to on our side... What does it profit us to be right in the 
essence of our demands, if we succeed neither in forcing Germany to 
pay, nor in reconciling her to us? 80 
By 1923 and the Ruhr Crisis, the APD was thus far less dogmatic in its support of 
French policy and condemnation of Germany. The Ruhr occupation and the larger question 
of reparations payments which it represented became the focus of criticism on the part of 
the APD. At the Association's annual general meeting in Nantes in February 1923, the 
Ruhr question was debated. Ruyssen both condemned the occupation and upheld the 
principle of reparations at one and the same time: 
... Germany rises up against this occupation; we must bring German 
opinion round to the belief that the present situation is all the 
same motivated by its attitude. The task is a difficult one 
certainly. Will one succeed by the means currently being used? 
Ruyssen does not think soA 
The Assembly adopted a resolution which, while noting that the French interpretation 
of the Treaty was correct, conceded that the French view was not shared by many former 
allies, nor by the Germans. Consequently, it asked that this interpretation be submitted to 
80 Th6odore Ruyssen, 'La Ugue Franqaise des Droits de Momme en Allemagne, PD 32,7/8 
(JulyýAug 1922), pp. 286 and 291; Th6odore Ruyssen, 'Pour le rapprochement Franco-Allemand: La 
Ligue des Droits de Momme et le Bund Neues Vaterland', PD 32,2 (Feb 1922), pp. 90-91 describes 
the visit of a delegation from the Bund Neues Vaterland comprised of von Gerlach, Nicolai, and 
Lehmann-Russbuldt to Paris. 
81 Ruyssen cited in Jules L. Puech, 'Assembl6e CAndrale de la Paix par le Droit, Nantes, 10 et 11 
F6vrier 1923', PD 33,4 (April 1923), p. 142; the Executive committee of the APD had already 
condemned methods of coercion and military occupation in anticipation of the Ruhr occupation at 
its meeting on 18 December 1922, as inefficacious, upsetting to French allies, and damaging to the 
work of German democrats. The committee continued to affirm nevertheless the rectitude of 
France's claims to reparations, and asked the French government to seek redress through the 
League of Nations, and a restructuring of the world economic situation. See: 'La Politique 
Internationale. Deux ordres du jour sur les r6parations: la Paix par le Droit et la Ligue de la 
R6publique', PD 33,1 Oanuary 1923), pp. 29-31. 
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the International Court of Justice for arbitration. On the heart of the matter - reparations - 
the Assembly agreed that the methods used up until 1923 had been largely sterile in their 
success in getting the Gennans to pay up, and that the Ruhr occupation was costing more 
than it was bringing in. The assembly demanded that the Allies give up these ineffective 
methods which were only leading to the danger of renewed war, and that the problem be 
submitted to the League for resolution along the lines of its work in Austria and Upper 
Silesia. 82 Jules Prudhommeaux, writing in March 1923, was even more pessimistic about 
the effects of the Ruhr occupation. He attacked the popular press for brazenly 
misrepresenting the state of French public opinion; there was no unity behind the 
Government's action in the Ruhr. 
The labouring masses in their rough common sense have understood 
since the first day of the military intervention which at the 
present hour is developing over there like the unstoppable flood let 
loose by the sorceror's apprentice, that it would not fail to be 
economically useless, politically dangerous and morally 
discredited. 83 
Far from being a popular move, Prudhommeaux saw nothing but negative results flowing out 
of the Ruhr decision: re-institution of censorship on news coming out of the Ruhr basin, 
France divided against itself to the point were civil war was spoken of, and international 
opinion turned completely against it. He called for pacifists of all nations to join together 
in a united front and to avoid sterile polemics with one another over the French action. 84 
The two events of the 1920s which mark the apogee of the APD's burgeoning optimistic 
faith in the new order created at Versailles were undoubtedly the Locarno Pact of 1925 and 
the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928. Prudhommeaux, writing in the October 1925 number of the 
PD, declared that the Locarno accords opened the way towards the realisation. of the 
dream of a United States of Europe held by Mazzini and Victor Hugo. Locarno also restored 
France to its proper, generous place in the European constellation: 'France regains its real 
face before the world, and Germany, which will be forever honoured in the annals of 
history for having taken the initiative in its memorandum of 9 February 1925, enters at last 
into this society of nations where, as VanderwIde said, "there are no more enemies, where 
there are no more conquerors, nor conquered, but only peoples united under the sign of 
equality". '8-5 The APD congratulated Briand on a pact which 'opened a new era in the 
82 Ibid, pp. 143-44. 
83 J. Prudhornmeaux, 'Le proWme des r6parations et le pacifisme intemational', PD 33,3 
(March 1923), p. 119. 
84 Ibid., p. 122- 
85 Jules Prudhommeaux, 'Le Pacte Rhdnan et la Conf6rence de Locamo', PD 35,10 (Oct 1925), 
p. 387. 
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relations between France and Germany'ý86 Indeed, Prudhommeaux went so far in his article 
as to suggest that in return for the generous gC-sture of the Germans in agreeing to guarantee 
the Franco-German frontier, the French might consider doing something about the 
'unfortunate' article 231 of the Versailles Treaty. 87 Another commentator, writing the 
following month in the PD, stressed the 'capital fact' that the Locarno agreement had 
transformed 'into a state of law, juridically established and modifiable only by legal 
procedure, the pure state of fact Utat de fait) which the European statute of 1919 
cons, jituted with regard to Germany'. 88 Locarno was a victory of 'common sense, of 
international order, of peace founded on the organised forces of justice; a victory, 
consequently, of Republican France. '89 
The Kellogg-Briand Pact produced another 8an of optimism in 1928, despite the 
reserves which Pierre Cot was to express about the conception of peace embodied in it, as we 
have seen above. Prudhommeaux noted with satisfaction that the Pact had as its 
consequence the creation of a solidarity between old world and new for the maintenance of 
universal peace and that it brought the United States in from the cold. 90 Georges Scelle 
wrote that the pact had a juridical importance, and perhaps even more a political and 
psychological value. But its potential impact lay in the ability of public opinion to 
support it: 
The Kellogg Pact is a new step on the path of war against war. It is 
certainly not the last. It depends on public opinion and on the 
development of democratic institutions that the stages which 
remain to be achieved be crossed more or less rapidly. Or better 
said, it depends individually on the will of each one of us to hasten 
the advent of peace. It is entirely a question of civic and moral 
educationYl 
The APD was not immune from the highly individualistic conclusions drawn by many 
pacifists as a consequence of the Kellogg-Briand Pact. Francis Delaisi, in a report on the 
'Internal Guarantees for Peace as a Consequence of the Kellogg Pact', suggested that 
pacifists ought not to count upon Parliament which was 'domesticated and abused' to ensure 
that war remained a crime. Instead he recommended that people attach themselves with 
86 Telegram cited in ibid. 
87 Ibid, p. 386., 
88 Edmond Laskine, 'La victoire de Locarno, PD 35,11 (Nov 1925), p. 431. 
89 Ibid, p. 433. 
90 J. Prudhommeaux, 'La Politique Internationale et la SDN. La mise hors la loi de la guerre. 
Vaccord est fait', PD 38,7/8 (July-Aug 1928), pp. 317. 
91 Ceorges Scelle, 'Le Pacte Kellogg (fin)', PD 38,10 (Oct 1928).,,,. p. 44l. For the first part of this 
article see PD 38,9 (Sept 1928), pp. 356-365. 'l-VII-11 ,4 
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all their strength to the Kellogg Pact in order to oblige governments to take it seriously. 
And taking this argument to its logical conclusion, Delaisi proclaimed: 
Between my mobilisation papers which tell me to march off to 
battle with my eyes closed, and the Kellogg Pact which makes war 
a crime, I choose the Pact - and I also choose the League of Nations. 
It is it and it only which has the authority to designate the 
violator of the Pact, the aggressor. If, as such, it denounces my 
country, I shall abstain from taking arms... The governments 
thought they were signing a 'scrap of paper': we take them at their 
word, and we hide behind their signature. We, too, are for 
conscientious objection, but we transport it from the religious sphere 
to the juridical. 92 
The Kellogg-Briand Pact, by creating what appeared to be a supra-national juridical court 
of last resort in the case against war, sparked off the pacifisme nouveau style which will 
be dealt with in Part Il of this thesis. 
A reaction more in keeping with the APD's usual rather conservative approach to 
peace was that of Georges Scelle in a report and resolution he presented to the 1928 annual 
general meeting on how to bring the French constitution into line with the Kellogg Pact and 
the prescriptions of the League. Scelles motion, adopted unanimously by the assembly, 
envisaged the amendment of articles eight and nine of the 1875 constitution such that all 
future treaties would have to be ratified by the Chamber and the texts deposited with the 
League, and that any declaration of war would have to be in conformity with the 
prescriptions of the Kellogg Pact and the Covenant of the League of NationsY3 
The Kellogg-Briand pact marked in many ways the high-point of the interwar period 
for French pacifists. In 1928 it seemed as if the international order created at Versailles 
was finally beginning to function properly. Locarno had shown a new Germany prepared to 
live in peace with a new France. The legacy of Briand and Stresemann, together with the 
new-found interest of the United States in the affairs of Europe, augured well for the 
future. Another five years would pass before it became impossible to ignore the hairline 
cracks growing and lengthening in the plaster of European peace. In the intervening time 
the elusive goal of a comprehensive disarmament agreement would dance tantalizingly, 
but forever out of reach, before French pacifist eyes. But that is to leap ahead somewhat. 
92 From Francis Delaisi's report, 'Les Garanties intdrieures de la Paix, cons6quence du Pacte 
Kellogg' in J. Prudommeaux, Vassembl6e Gdndrale de la Paix par le Droit, Bordeaux, 2 et 3 
Novembre 1929', in PD, 39,12 (December 1929), p. 458. 
93 See the report and resolution of Georges Scelle'Pourquoi doit-on et comment peut-on mettre 
la constitution fi-anqaise en accord avec le Pacte Briand-Kellogg et les prescriptions de la Soci&d des 
nationsT, 
, 
in Jules Prudhommeaux, VAssembl6e Gdndrale de Nancy (suite)', PD 39,1 (January 1929), 
pp. 7-11. 
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Before concluding this examination of the first decade of the interwar period, however, 
we shall briefly look at the practical measures for peace employed by the APD. In its 
official publications, the APD listed its means of action as 1. the organisation of public or 
private lectures; 2. the creation of local or regional groups for propaganda and discussion; 
3. the publication of brochures, tracts and other works destined for propaganda; 4. the 
publication of the review La Paix par le Droit and the more popular bulletin Les Peuples 
Unis alone or in conjunction with other societies; 5. encouraging the composition of works, 
through competition or otherwise, in connection with its programme; 6. maintaining 
relations with other groups in France or abroad which were interested in the same goalSY4 
This rather general list of the association's activities makes clear the largely educative 
and platonic nature of much of the APD's work. This is not to deny its usefulness, merely to 
point out the obvious, namely that propaganda of this type is very difficult to assess in 
terms of its efficacy. We are dealing here yet again with the unquantifiable 
imponderables of recent history. There is no doubt that such activity was of some use in 
that it contributed towards the creation of a climate of ideas, which by their nature were 
often very slow in coming to fruition. But come to fruition they did. Many of the ideas and 
principles of the APD took shape in the interwar years in Geneva; indeed the very idea of 
Geneva and the League could be said to epiton-dse the goals of the Association. In the dark 
hours of 1938, Ruyssen was to look back to an autumn day in 1922 when he and 
Prudhornmeaux stood on the steps of the Salle de la Rdformation in Geneva which served 
as the provisional seat of the League of Nations Assembly. The Comte Clauzel, then 
Secretary-General of the Minist&e des Affaires Etrang&es, emerging from the hall, 
noticed Ruyssen and Prudhommeaux and cried, 'There are the forefathers of the League of 
Nations'. 95 
The APD's primary method of propaganda after the publication of its two organs was 
probably the public lecture. These varied in topic and number from year to year but they 
were a constant of the Association's activity during the interwar period. In 1928 for 
example some fifty public lectures were given by members of the APD. 96 
Another important aspect of the association's work was its attempt to reach French and 
European youth with the pacifist message. One of the ways this was done was the 
publication each year of a brochure entitled La jeunesse ef 1ý Paix du Monde which was 
given away to targeted groups around the world. In 1933 the brochure had a French print- 
94 See 'Association de la Paix par le Droit' in Nous voulons 14 Paix., Ioc cit. 
95 Cited in Th6odore Ruyssen, la Paix par le Droit. Rapport - Documents de I'Assembl6e 
Gdndrale et du Congrýs du Cinquantenaire!, PD 48,6/7/8 (May-june-july 1938), p. 268. 
96 J. Prudhommeau)ý'I: Assemblde Gdndrale de Nancy, PD 39,1 Uan 1929), pA 
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run of 108,000 copies and a further print-run of about 250,000 copies in Dutch, Polish, 
English, Welsh, Esperanto, Chinese and Malaysian. 97 
With many of the members of the APD belonging to the teaching profession at all 
levels, it is not surprising to find a strong interest in the pedagogy of peace within the 
association. Throughout the interwar period members of the APD participated in 
comn-dssions and international conferences on the problems of peace education. 'Mere was 
also much interest in the task of monitoring both French and German school history texts in 
an attempt to have the bellicist examples removed from school curricula. 98 
During the 1928 election campaign members of the APD were encouraged to present 
motions to election rallies for approval. The 1927 annual general meeting of the association 
proposed three types of motion: one in favour of the League of Nations in which electoral 
candidates pledged to work towards an increase in the League's authority, the provision of 
means whereby the League could effectively fulfill its peace-making role, and the 
engagement to subn-dt, without exception, all conflicts in which France n-dght find herself. 
to the arbitration of the League. A second motion asked candidates and electoral meetings 
to vote in favour of continued efforts for 'gradual disarmament. Finally, a third resolution 
called for the establishment of 'economic peace' through the lowering of tariff barriers and 
the creation of a European customs union. 99 Electoral candidates were also to be sent a 
97 Cited in Jules Prudhommeaux, 'Notre Assembl6e CAn&ale, Paris, 30 et 31 Decembre 1933, 
PD 44,2 (February 1934), p. 54. 
98 For more detailed examinations of this aspect of the association's propaganda which we 
unfortunately do not have the space to deal with here, please see: Roger Uvy, 'Socidtd des Nations et 
Coop6ration Intellectuelle depuis dix ans', PD 40,6 (June 1930), pp. 218-225; Dr Siegfried Kawerau, 
'Les Livres d'Histoire en Allemagne, notamment depuis 1923', PD 37,3 (March 1926), pp. 104-111; Dr. 
Siegfried Kawerau, 'OU en est I'Allemagne dans Vamdlioration de ses Livres d'Histoire? ', PD 41,10 
(October 1931), pp. 449-452; J. Hadamard, 'Un Nouveau pas A faire dans la Voie de la Paix. Les 
Manuels Scolaires, PD 40,1 (January 1930), pp. 14; Jules Prudhommeaux, 'La Paix par VEducation, 
I'l-listoire A I'Ecole', PD 33,2 (February 1925), pp. 61-68 and 35,3 (March 1925), pp. 99-107, Jules 
Prudhommeaux, 'Pour la Paix par I'Ecole', PD 38,7/8 (July-August 1928), pp. 293-306; PD, 38,9 
(September 1928), pp, 366-375; and PD 38,10 (October 1928), pp. 419-431. On the work of the Comitd 
d'Entente des Associations Franqaises pour la Paix par VEducation of which C. Bougld was the 
president, see the reports on its five national conferences which Ruyssen and Prudhommeaux 
participated in: PD 41,3 (March 1931), pp. 129-161; PD 42,5 (May 1932), pp. 201-236; PD 43,4/5 (April- 
May 1933), pp. 125-152; PD 44,4/S (April-May 1934), pp. 145-176; PD 45,3 (March 1935), pp. 116-134 and 
PD 45,4 (April 1935), pp. 172-192. On the two international conferences on the teaching of history, see 
Georges Lapierre, 'La Confdrence Internationale pour I'Enseignement de I'Histoire, PD 42,7/8 Uuly- 
August 1932), pp. 346-349 and Charles Rousseau and J. Prudhommeaux, 'La IMme Conf6rence 
Internationale pour VEnseignement de I'HistoirV, PD 44,10 (October 1934), pp. 399-400. Finally, fbr a 
very thorough set of observations on French and German school history texts which covers the period 
from the French Revolution onwards and is a rare example of collaboration with Nazi scholars, see 
'Les Manuels d'Histoire Allemands et Franqais. Rdsolutions adopt6es par la commission 
d'Historiens Allemands et Franýais, r6unis du 25 Novembre au. ler D6cembre 1935, pour examen 
des rectifications qu'iI y aurait lieu d'apporter aux Manuels Scolaires des deux Pays', PD 47,6 (June 
1937)ý pp. 209-217 and 47,7 (July 1937), pp257-271. 
99 See Jules Prudhommeaux et J. -L. Puech, VAssembl6e G&6rale et les 176tes du XUme 
Anniversiare' (Nimes, 30-31 October and 1 November 1927), PD 37,12 (December 1927), pp. 448-449 
and 464-465. 
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questionnaire asking them if they accepted the APD's programme of support for the League 
and whether they were a convinced supporter of it. The questionnaire had already been 
used with some success in the election campaign of 1924.100 
The final and perhaps most important aspect of the APP's external propaganda during 
the interwar period was its conu-nitment to the idea of Summer Schools in different parts of 
France and indeed elsewhere in Europe. Taking 1932 as an example, the Association ran 
Colonies Internationales de Vacances at Saint-Claude, Boulogne-sur-Mer, and for the fifth 
time at Thonon in the Jura. Sixty-two young girls took part in the summer school at Thonon, 
down from about 130 in 1930. Additionally, the association! s president, Ruyssen, led for 
many years a course in Geneva sponsored by the Union International des Associations pour 
la Socidtd des Nations. This course - which became known as the cours Ruyssen - involved 
272 students in 1930, of whom 80, including seventeen boursiers, came from France through 
the good offices of the APD. Numbers began to fall later in the thirties, but the figures 
given provide some indication of the size and range of these summer schools at which 
several members of the APD were active contributors. 101 
Thus, the A. PD's position towards the end of the 1920s can be qualified as one of growing 
optimism in a new international order which the association believed was partially 
inspired by its own ideas. The distrust for Germany and especially for German pacifists 
began to wane by about the time of the Ruhr crisis and diminished further with the signing 
of the Locarno accords. The Kellogg-Briand Pact capped a decade of achievement for 
pacifists and internationalists and the future began to look brighter than it had for some 
time. During this first decade under discussion there was little to challenge the APD's 
vision of the world and the pacifist's place in it. Germany was clearly wrong, French 
bellicists were clearly not helping the situation, and after 1925 it was equally clear that 
international anarchy was gradually being set aside. The fragile edifice was not to stand 
for long however. Later sections will examine how cracks began to appear in the APD's own 
vision of what constituted pacifism, as well as in the paradigm of international relations, 
upon which this view was based. But first let us briefly examine the APD's conception of 
and connection with French political society. 
100 Ibid., p. 448. 
101 See Jules Prudhommeaux, 'Notre Assembl6e d6ndrale', PD 44,2 (February 1934), p. 55; see 
also J. Prudhommeaux, 'I: Assembl6e G6ndrale de Boulogne-sur-Mee, PD 41,1 (January 1931), p. 25. 
The numbers of students attending the international summer school in Geneva had fallen by 1933 to 
129 students, albeit from 18 different countries. Madame Prudhommeaux organisea the T'horion 
school and in Geneva Mile Angles, Mme Thibert, Jacques Dumas, Andrd D. Tol6dano, Ruyssen and 
Prudhommeaux took part. 
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1.4. The APD and French Political Society 
The extent to which the APD upheld in general terms the French case regarding the 
origins of the War has already been noted, and the way in which this attitude created a 
barrier initi ally between them and the pacifist, democratic elements in Germany to which 
they were naturally attached. The Association quickly regained its critical sense 
especially following the Ruhr debacle which really marked the definitive rupture with 
post-war French policy. As Puech pointed out, too, the Association had never allowed its 
organs to become instruments for the'bourrage de crdnes'of the war years. 102 The APD was 
composed of the best of the liberal, democratic, pacifist, radical elements of Third 
Republic France. In this brief section we shall examine how the APD saw French political 
society in the interwar period, and the extent to which it, too, was infected, albeit mildly, 
with some of the same prejudices as other political groupings in France. 
The extent of the APD's anti-German and by extension, pro-French stance during and 
immediately following the Great War has been noted already. This national hubris 
extended into the first years of the interwar period ai well. For example, in late 1918 a 
writer in the PD was referring to France's 'mission as the moral prep school teacher of the 
world' in connection with the formation of the League of Nations. 103 When it came time to 
choose an official language for the new League, Alphonse Aulard, in a report on behalf of 
the Association Frangaise pour la Soci6t6 des Nations ýould think of none better than 
French. He noted that 
French has been used up until now in diplornatics as the language of 
clarity; [Frenchmen] like this custom and this privilege; they are 
proud of it, they are attached to it as to an adornment of the 
national patrimony, they do not wish to let the friendship of the 
peoples forget this secular honour rendered to the language of a 
nation which is today the victorious champion of humanity. 
But if they desire that the future League of Nations should adopt 
the language of the Rights of Man for speaking to the world, it is 
102 See note 44 above. 
103 Comment in'Pour la Socidtd des Nations, PD 17/18/19/20 (September-October 1918), p. 298. 
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not national pride which motivates them, it is the sentiment of the 
conu-non good... 104 
Before the war had ended, Aulard had also claimed the very idea of a League of Nations 
as Frances. Even a German such as Immanuel Kant became a sort of 'honorary Frenchman' 
in Aulard's account of the French origins of the League idea: 
It was a foreigner, Immanuel Kant, one of the purest disciples of 
the French Revolution, who most clearly expressed, in terms that 
were almost French, the idea of a League of Nations in 1795 in his 
Essay on Perpetual Peace. It is the compatriots of Kant who are 
today the enemies of a League of Nations, the enemies of the law of 
peoples, the enemies of the French Revolution. 105 
Pride in the French Revolution and republicanism not surprisingly did not extend at all 
to Napoleon whom Puech called in 1921 on the occasion of the centenary of his death, 'at 
least as odious as ... Wilhelm 11'. Puech and the APD were thoroughly republican, but 
staunchly anti-Bonapartist, and they found the projected ceremonies commemorating 
Napoleon offensive. The latter's militarism was the negation of everything the good 
bourgeois republicans of the APD stood for. As Ren6 Viviani ren-drided his audience in a 
speech in honour of Lkon Bourgois cited by Puech, 'the French government has always had, 
except under the Empire, the cult of Law'. 106 
But it is to Charles Richet that one must turn for the clearest expression of the duality 
of old-style pacifism and a sort of cultural or spiritual patriotic imperialism. In a speech 
delivered at the 1924 Banquet de la Paix, Richet defined his pacifism as one in the long 
line of illustrious French pacifist writers: Rabelais, Montaigne, La Bruy&e, Bossuet, 
F6nelon, Montesquieu, Voltaire, Lamartine, Victor Hugo and Pasteur. These 'ardent 
pacifists' incarnated the French pacifist tradition and he threw their names back at those 
who claimed that he and his colleagues were somehow disloyal to the nation's cultural 
and political heritage. Waxing lyrical about the French soul and attacking those on the 
Right who dared to arrogate the Nation to themselves, Richet said 
The French soul, infatuated with justice, ideals and pity, is by its 
very nature, profoundly pacifist. And yet there are energumens, 
friends of the war and of wars, who dare to entitle their newspaper 
VAction franqaise'. But we are French action. It is we who are 
104 Extract from a report made by A. Aulard to the Association franqaise pour la Soci&d des 
Nations cited in'La langue de la Soci6td des Nations', PD 29,4 (April 1919), p. 192. 
10-5 A. Aulard, Ta Socidt6 des Nations et la Rdvolution franqaise, PD 28,17/18/19/20 
(September-October 1918), p. 278. 
106 Jules-L. Puech, 'Le centenaire de Napoldon, PD 31,3/4 (March-April 1921), p. 110. 
57 
loyal to the French tradition, and in spite of their blasphernies, we 
shall continue. 107 
Richet went much further, however, in defining his country a priori as an intrinsically 
pacifist nation in a 1932 article on the'true face of Francle. He was responding to a wave of 
anti-French feeling in the foreign press, articles provoked no doubt by 'some instinctive 
jealousy' and which claimed that France was the obstacle to general happiness, a country 
given over to militarism, imperialism, and hoarding gold in its banks while the rest of the 
world suffered the effects of the Depression. Richet rejected all of these arguments, 
claiming that France was the most pacific of nations. Neither peasants, nor workers, nor 
bourgeois suffered in the slightest from militarism. France had no desire to rule the world, 
and as for the economic argument, Richet dismissed it by saying that France was still in 
economic ruins from the effects of the war. He insisted that 'it is evident that there is only 
one face to France: there are not two Frances, as there are most certainly two Germanys: a 
generous Germany and a bellicose and hateful Germany'. 108 
Richet's obviously ill-thought-out argument, if it was even that, was challenged by 
one reader who insisted that the APD had to see its country as it was, without entirely 
condemning it. Francies policies of imperialism and political hegemony in Europe were the 
result of specific situations but there was no point, according to Robert des Rotours, in 
denying that they were there. As to the idea that France presented only one face to the 
world, this was patently absurd given the fundamental opposition of groups like the Action 
Franýaise and the nationalist leagues both to the democratic nature of France and to its 
foreign policies. 109 Richets rather bizarre response to this was to dig his hole even deeper 
and argue that 'even those with whom I hardly share an opinion, whether it be M Coty, M 
Laval or-M Tardieu, have no dearer idea than that of peace. 110 
These rather inconsequential articles, written by the Honorary President of the APD 
are useful, not for their intellectual content and analysis of pacifism's place in French 
society, of which they contain little, but rather as conduits for a largely indefinable and - 
latent chauvinism on the part of some representatives of old-style pacifism. 
107 Charles Richet, 'Soyens tous les Enfants de la Pabe, PD 34,3 (March 1924), p. 107. This is the 
text of Richet's speech to the annual Banquet de la Paix held in Paris on 22 February 1924. The 
Banquets de ]a Paix were an event organised by Lucien Le Foyer and which brought together the 
leading figures of French political life and old-style pacifism. 
108 Charles Richet, 'La vraie figure de la France', PD 42,7/8 auly -August 1932), p. 323. 
109 Robert des Rotours, 'Sur la WrakFigure de la France"', PD 43,2 (February 1933), pp. 5"1. 
110 Charles Richet, 'La vraie figure de la. France, PD 43,3 (March 1933), p. 97. 
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Paradoxically, they exist in a review which also published several short pieces 
announcing the dangers of nascent French fascism-111 
111 Prudhommeaux announced the arrival of fascism in France in 'A propos du Fascisme 
franqais', PD 35,12 (December 1925), pp. 486489. The following year he commented briefly on the 
neo-pacifism of Drieu's jeune Droite in PD 36,2 (February 1926), pp. 89-90. 
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1.5. Cracks in the Paradigm (1928-1933). 
Modris Eksteins has commented on the approximate ten-year time lag between the end 
of the Great War and the explosion of war literature describing the event. 112 The same 
slow process of internallsation and subsequent expression can be seen in the development of 
pacifist ideas in France in the interwar period. Preceding sections have shown how, 
despite the impression of some tenants of the old-style pacifism that it had changed, the 
principles espoused by the APD remained relatively constant during the first decade of the 
interwar years. The APD and its ideas retained the vestiges of their pre-war hegemony in 
French pacifism at least until 1928 when the approach to the question of peace began 
noticeably to change as more radical, integral methods of tackling the problem arose. It is 
not the purpose of this chapter to examine in a systematic way the content of the paciftsme 
nouveau style which began to appear in significant form from about 1928 onwards - that 
will be left to Part H of this thesis - but what Will be discussed here is the extent to which 
these questions of methods, principles and goals were discussed within the confines of old- 
style pacifism. Finally, in addition to examining the changing nature of pacifism within 
the APD, the changes in the international situation will be examined insofar as they 
impinged upon the world of growing optimism inhabited by the liberal, bourgeois pacifists. 
Probably the most important development in the five-year period under discussion here 
was the 'individualisation' of pacifism. We have noted in preceding chapters of this 
section that from almost its earliest days the APD was much concerned to avoid 'negative' 
approaches to peace such as conscientious objection, and instead to concentrate on the 
development of 'positive' measures for peace, primarily through juridical and educational 
means. The essential point was that the conquest of peace was a social goal, pursued 
collectively and not individually as such. The first crack therefore in the paradigm of 
peace practised by the APD and the old-style pacifists was the increasing attempt after 
1928 to make peace a question requiring a response purely on the individual level. In most 
cases this meant conscientious objection. 
112 Modris Eksteins, 'All Quiet on the Western Front and the Fate of a Wall, Journal of 
Contemporary History 15,2 (1980), p. 345. 
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Of all the pacifist doctrines developed in the interwar period, conscientious objection 
was probably the'least FrencW. As a concept it originated in the Anglo-Saxon world and 
although it did have its adherents in France, it never became a widely recognised method 
of resistance to war. The French pacifist preference was always for the creation of large 
movements (which paradoxically they rarely achieved) with an emphasis on the 
collective conquest of peace. Nevertheless, it is true to say that conscientious objection did 
occupy the French mind (and certainly its government) for much of the interwar period. As 
Ruyssen noted in 1926, the French had been impressed to see that even with the Great War 
in full swing, the British authorities had not hesitated to adn-dt cases of conscientious 
objection, and so from a position of intransigent refusal, French opinion was gradually 
evolving to the point where people were asking 'Why not? '. 113 Ruyssen argued for 
acceptance of objection if it could reasonably be proved that the person in question was 
sincere in his beliefs and willing to accept a longer, harder, and perhaps personally more 
dangerous service in place of his military duties. The bottom line for the APD seems to 
have been to ensure that social duties were performed. Discussing the differences between 
the Anglo-Saxon and the French, essentially Latin, approach to conscientious objection, 
Ruyssen wrote that the former sprang 'from a moral and religious individualism' and that 
its greatest obstacle in France was quite simply that 'the average Frenchman is not 
tolerant'. 114 This together with the nation's long tradition of Catholicism and 
authoritarian centralism combined to make the acceptance of objection very difficult. 
Interestingly, Ruyssen recognised that the root of the problem might well be the idea of the 
'nation in arms' which constituted a strong and established revolutionary tradition in 
France. As an indication of Ruyssen's essential conservatism and cautious conformism, he 
did not however see conscientious objection as a legitimate means of lessening this 
militaristic hold over the nation's soul. 11-5 
The APD considered the question of conscientious objection for the first time in the post- 
war period at its annual general meeting in Paris in late December 1925. Paul All6gret, the 
director of the Ecole de Droit de Limoges, presented the main report on the subject to the 
assembly along with some ideas about how to resolve the issue to the contentment of all 
concerned. He gave an historical overview of the question, going back to the 1904 Congrýs 
National de Nimes, at which he had also been charged with presenting a report and 
motion on the same subject. His main concern then, as now, had been to ensure that there 
was no 'attack on patriotic sentiment, nor on the dignity of the law, but only the 
113 Th6odore Ruyssen, TObjection de Conscience, PD 36,9/10 (September-October 1926), 
p. 331. See also Ruyssen, Uldolitrie Patriotique, PD 35,1 (January 1925), ppl-4, in which he likened 
the plight of COs to that of the Huguenots who went into voluntary exile under Louis XIV. 
114 lbid, p. 332. 
115 lbid, pp. 333-337. 
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manifestation of sympathy for those who are guilty only of interpreting to the letter the 
ma)dm "Thou shalt not kill". 116 The question of conscientious objection had also been on the 
agenda of the Congr6s Universel pour la Paix held in Paris in September 1925. The Ligue 
pour la reconnaissance 16gale de I'Objection de conscience had presented a motion in favour 
of it, and in the comn-dssion charged with preparing a resolution on disarmament, Georges 
Pioch had managed to have a motion adopted in favour of the abolition of obligatory 
military service, and the acceptance as an interim measure of the right of objection. When 
it came time for the full congress to vote on the resolution, however, it was defeated by a 
vote of 193 to 144 in favour of a substitute resolution proposed by Ferdinand Buisson. 117 
With this as a backdrop, A116gret argued in favour of accepting conscientious objection but 
with severe conditions atttached: he could not support a motion such as PiocWs which he 
thought anarchic. Even the proposal that CO's should serve a period of duty one-third 
longer than ordinary conscripts appeared too easy to him, too much a temptation for 
cowards. Instead, he proposed that conscientious objection be recognised on condition that 
the objectors perform their duties in times of peace either abroad in the colonies, or else in 
very dangerous work such as the care of people in infectious disease wards of hospitals. In 
time of war, the objectors would be used as stretcher-bearers in the most dangerous part of 
the line, in the forward trenches and between the barbed wire in No-Man's Land. Only 
thus could the state ensure that objection did not become the easy way out for cowards. 118 
Anticipating the conclusion which many pacifists would draw from the Kellogg-Briand 
Pact by some three years, A1166gret proceeded to add a further distinction to his argument. 
He believed that there were many young men who were prepared to fight if the cause were 
just, but who categorically refused to shed their blood in a war of colonial conquest or 
continental aggression. The concept of a just war was thus of paramount importance. But 
how to define such a war? The Geneva Protocol of 1924 had declared that all wars of 
aggression were crimes. All6gret saw this as the first manifestation of the new 
international republic which the members of the APD had been striving for. It was 
therefore up to the League of Nations in all future conflicts to pronounce on the rightness of 
any war. This put the convinced pacifist in the position of having potentially to choose 
between his minister of War and the League. There was only one choice possible, the 
League. 
It is the lesser evil which must be chosen, and the lesser evil is 
that of not allowing oneself to become an accomplice of an 
116 Paul All6gTet, 'Le Devoir Militaire, et le Scrupule de Conscience. Avant et aprýs la Grande 
Guerre - Une solution. Rapport p4sentd i FAssembl6e G6n&ale de la "Paix par le Droit-, PD 36,4 
(April 1926), pp. 145-146. 
117 lbid, pp. 149-153. 
118 Jbid, pp. 155-156. 
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aggressor, it is opposing injustice. One can say that this is a 
defeatist and antipatriotic teaching. I respond: is it not in reality 
really defending one's country? Do we conceive it, do we wish it to 
be anything but an instrument and a force for justice? 119 
At the 1925 AGM Pierre Urdsole, the Swiss engineer behind the creation of the 
International Civilian Service which sought to send young men to disaster-stricken areas of 
Europe in a non-military form of active service to society, spoke to the A116gret report. He 
optimistically foresaw the day when by their sheer number the example of conscientious 
objectors would have a pacifying effect on the world. The question of objection thus assumed 
not merely an individual importance, but also a social, collective value in the fight against 
war. This idea.. already present in French pacifism in the n-dd-twenties, was to find fuller 
expression in the debates over the efficacy of conscientious objection in the thirties. 120 
The traditional French argument against a special regime for those whose conscience 
forbade them to take arms, was argued 'vehemently' by Cdlestin Bougl6, who said that it 
was totally inadmissible for an association which had 'law' at its base to demand 
recognition for those who flouted it. In Boug16's view, the proposals in favour of objection 
were 
pure anarchy. The League of Nations that we wish to build is 
founded on respect of the law, a respect that it must guarantee 
through force: nothing could be more dangerous than to ask it to 
intervene in favour of those who deny the law in favouring, despite 
their good faith, cowards and deserters ... [franc fileurs]121 
The discussion became so agitated that the Nancy Group proposed to adjourn it to the 
following year. It was finally decided however to accept a compron-dse resolution from 
All6gret which emphasised the necessity of adopting the principles enshrined in the 
Geneva Protocol thus permitting general disarmament and in the long run an end to 
obligatory military service. In the meantime, it asked the League of Nations and the 
International Court of Justice to define specifically the limited number of cases in which a 
country could legitimately defend itself so that there could be no equivocation on the 
subiect. 122 
There to all intents and purposes the subject lay for another five years until the full 
debate on the theory and practice of conscientious objection at the 1930 annual general 
meeting. In the meantime there was some discussion of the subject in the review. One 
119 [bid., p. 156. 
120 See J. -L. Puech, 'L: Assembl6e Gdn&ale de la Paix par le Droit', PD 36,1 Ijanuary 1926), p. 17. 
121 Ibid., p. 18. 
122 Ibid, pp. 18-19. 
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reader wrote to ask whether, given his stand as an objector in 1904 and again in 1913, he 
might legitimately remain a member of the association. Ruyssen replied that he could 
because although he had refused to carry arms, he had always remained at the disposal of 
the military authorities and in fact served as a nurse and stretcher-bearer during the Great 
War. 123 
In the autumn of 1926 the review also ran an enquite on conscientious objection which 
elicited. far fewer responses than the inquiry earlier in the year on the alleged dangers of 
toy soldiers to childreifs growth and development. 124 Four out of the seven responses were 
in favour of the legal recognition of objection, one was rather confused, and two were 
completely against the idea. L. Uontin, a regular contributor to the journal, wrote strongly 
against conscientious objection for the usual French republican reasons, primary amongst 
them being the fear of a 'pretorian' army which he seemed to think Britain suffered 
from. 12-5 The review continued to publish short notices from other pacifist groups about 
conscientious objection, too. A manifesto sent out by Runharn Brown of the War Resisters' 
International merited simply the comment that the APD did not believe the WRI's 
ap proach actually solved the 'grave' problems posed by conscientious objection. 126 jules 
Prudhommeaux and his wife also attended the Bierville congress organised by Marc 
Sangnier at which two resolutions in favour of sharply delimited conscientious objection 
were passed. 127 
The first of the trials of conscience to receive public attention, that of Georges Chev6 in 
1927, caused the APD to pause and reflect however. Prudhommeaux, writing in early 1928 
after Chev6's sentencing in Rouen, saw clearly the potential conscientious objection had if it 
should ever develop into a 'movement' as such. He pointed out that the verdict solved 
nothing for the authorities because the question would re-pose itself in six months' time 
when Chev6 left prison. 
But how to keep from oneself a troubling thought: if only fifty 
thousand Chev6's in France stood up one after the other, and as 
many in the other militarised countries, who cannot see that the 
governments, moving by degrees from disquiet to terror, would 
123 E. Guiton, Thdodore Ruyssen, 'A propos de l'objection de conscience, (2 letters), PD 36,2 
(February 1926), pp. 68-69. 
124 'Enqu6te sur I'Objection de Concscience, PD 36,9/10 (September-October 1926), pp. 337-341 
(5 responses); TS A I'Enquke sur I'Objection de conscience' (2 responses), PD 36,12 (December 
1926), pp. 439440; for the enquite on toy soldiers see 'Les Jeux de Soldats, PD 36,5 (May 1926), 
pp. 193-213; and PD 36,6 (June 1926), pp. 253-255. 
12-5 lbid, PD 36,12 (December 1926), pp. 439-440. 
126 'Un manifeste pour I'abolition du service militaire obligatoire, PD 36,12 (December 1926) 
p. 472. 
127 'Le Congr6s de Bierville, PD 36,9/10 (September-October 1926), pp. 369-372. 
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suddenly realise that international disarmament had something 
good about it? 128 
But the APD contented itself with calling for Chev6 to be given the benefit of the 
#political' regime in prison, instead of being classed as a common crin-dnal. 
Two years later when Eugýne Guillot was condemned along with another CO to a one- 
year prison sentence the APD's reaction was much the same. Prudhommeaux criticised the 
Conseil de Guerre which condemned them as being composed of career officers and a 
magistrate who by reason of their 'd6formation professionelle! were incapable of seeing 
beyond the letter of the law. It is interesting to note that once again an intelligent man like 
Prudhommeaux pointed out the logical inconsistency of such a policy on the part of a 
government which was one of the originators of the Kellogg-Briand Pact. 129 This demand 
on the French govem,, ment to be consistent with its own proclamations was thus not one used 
only by other pacifist groups less intellectual than the APD. 
A discussion on European political union at the 1929 AGM of the association showed to 
what extent some French pacifists were confused about the motives behind conscientious 
objection. R6gis de Vibraye suggested that a federated Europe would provide a way out of 
the moral dilemmas posed by objection because it would allow for the creation of an 
international police force to take the place of national armies. Each nation would furnish a 
contingent of its own which would be filled entirely through voluntary subscription. But as 
a Mr Lowery from the Society of Friends pointed out in the ensuing discussion, it was not the 
character of the army - be it international or national - that was called into question by 
objectors but rather the simple fact of being obliged to kill one's fellow man. With either 
sort of army, the problem remained. 130 
The 1930 AGM of the APD saw the question of conscientious objection debated most 
thoroughly, however. The two rival tendencies in the debate were represented by Pastor 
Henri Roser, the secretary of the Mouvement International de la R&-onciliation (the French 
branch of the International Fellowship of Reconciliation based in London), and by the 
president of the Association, Th6odore Ruyssen. Roser made an eloquent case for both the 
'humanitariaW objectors and those, like him, of the radical Christian persuasion. Ruyssen 
countered by inviting the audience to 'come back down to earthy reality' and opposed 
Roser's arguments by saying that one must render to Caesar the things that are Caesaes. 
However noble the motives of the conscientious objectors might be they constituted a 
'disastrous romanticism!: 
128 J. Prudhommeaux, 'L: Objection de conscience: Georges Chevd', PD 38,3 (March 1928), p. 142. 
129 J. Prudhommeaux, 'Guillot et Perrin, objecteurs de conscience7, PD 40,4 (April 1930), pp. 137- 
138. 
130 See J. Prudhommeaux, 'L'Assembl6e G6ndrale de la Paix par le Droit, Bordeaux, 2 et 4 
novembre 1929', PD 39,12 (December 1929), pp. 451-453. 
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We live in a world in which violence still rules: against it Law 
must prevail. Let us remember the phrase of Pascal: 'Justice is 
impotent without Force and Force is tyrannical without justice. 
Since we cannot make Force just, let us at least make sure that 
justice is strong. 131 
Ruyssen maintained that the problem of Peace was insoluble from the purely individual 
point of view and that only a juridical statute regulating the relations of nations would 
establish peace in the world, thus rendering the question of conscientious objection 
irrelevant. Three resolutions were presented to the assembly: that of Roser, Ruyssen and 
also one by Rend Valfort and F61icien Challaye, which was similar to Roser's. A composite 
resolution was drawn up which was passed unanimously. Despite Ruyssen's apparent 
objections to conscientious objection in his speech to the assembly, the final resolution called 
for an end to universal and obligatory military service which was called 'a heritage of the 
Napoleonic regime which could not 'be considered an essentially democratic institutiore. 
The resolution demanded instead the creation as soon as possible of a statute regulating the 
situation of the conscientious objectors, and as a temporary measure in this direction 
proposed the creation of a civilian form of service in France. 132 
The assault on obligatory military service continued the following year with another 
report by Henri Roser, this time on 'The Equivalents of Obligatory Military Service: 
International Civilian Service and the Volontary Rescue Service% Roser argued that the 
resolution proposed by the APD was the logical outcome of the previous year's resolution at 
Boulogne. Using Pierre Cdrdsole's International Civilian Service as his example, Roser 
demonstrated the successes this idea had enjoyed since the war, having helped enormously 
at the scene of several major natural and human disasters in Europe. 133 This type of 
civilian service had its opponents in France, however. 
... the anarchists reject it energetically, because for. them, a civilian 
service is still the State domesticating the individual ... military 
service that is ashamed of itself, hidden, camouflaged by the 
131 Cited in J. Prudhommeaux, UAssembl6e Gkndrale de Boulogne-sur-Mer (suite)', PD 41,2 
(February 1931), p. 75. 
132 Ibid., p. 77. For Roser's resolution see 'Pour notre Assembl6e Cdn&ale7, PD 40,10 (October 
1930), pp. 373-375. 
133 See Roser's report in Jules Prudhommeatt)e 'Notre Assembl6e Cdndrale', PD 41,12 
(December 1931), pp. 573-616. Roser listed the areas in which the Service Civil International had 
provided assistance since the war: 'AL Esnes, prýs de Verdun; aux Ormonts, dans le canton du Vaud, 
en 1924; A Someo, dans le Tessin, la mime ann6e; dans les Grisons, en 1926; dans le Liechtenstein, 
en 1928, et enfin, pour la plus grande gloire du service civil et le plus grand profit de notre pays, en 
1930, A Albefeuille-Lagarde, pr& de Montauban, au lendemain des terribles inondations dont vous 
n*avez pas perdu le souvenir. Cýtte ann6e mime, Cdr6sole et ses vaillants sont all6s A Bryn-Mawr, 
au secours du Pays de Galles ravagd par le ch6mage, pour essayer, par la mise en train d'industries 
nouvelles, de rendre A des malheureux la volont6 de vivre. Un autre groupe travaille en Argovie. 
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State which in time of war would quickly transform it without a 
care for the agreements undertaken. There are others who argue 
that with modern warfare, the distinction bi etween the two 
services is an illusion since everything, the road that one rebuilds, 
the wool one weaves, the tree one cuts down in the forest, 
immediately finds its wartime use once violence is let loose. 
Finally, one last objection: Civilian service, affirms M Alexis 
Danan, has the unfortunate effect of diverting integral pacifists 
from the only attitude which is logical, that recommended by the 
great Einstein: total resistance, the categorical refusal to play any 
role in the drama. 134 
Roser saw, however, two advantages to the institution of a Civilian Service. First, it 
would give legal sanction to the refusal of military service, thus reconciling it to the law 
and social order. Personally, he was not entirely convinced by this argument, because in 
good primitive Christian manner, he believed that a little martyrdom now and again did 
not hurt the cause. Secondly, though, he argued that if a civilian service were instituted in 
the manner of Urdsole's project, it would become a beneficial 'school of solidarity, 
something the obligatory military service was not. In order for it to have this virtue, 
however, it would have to be voluntarily consented. 135 He objected to the APD's motion 
because it proposed that CO's should serve a longer term of civilian service than military 
service. If CO's themselves had the right to demand this extension, it seemed to him that 
an external association such as the APD did not. Moreover, the extended service idea was 
not logical. If one accepted that a civilian service was superior to military service, in terms 
of dignity and educative value, then logically the association ought to have the courage of 
its convictions in demanding its institution pure and simple. 136 
The discussion on the resolution exposed the equivocal nature of some pacifists' 
attitudes to conscientious objection. Rend Valfort argued that incorporating objectors into 
the nursing and stretcher-bearing corps of the army still made them supporters of war. 
'What they demand', he declared, 'is to make war impossible, and not to occupy a place 
which shelters them from the obligation of killing their fellow n-an'. 137 This is one of the 
strands of the CO argument which highlights the contraditions within pacifist theory on 
it. The point to be made about the APD's discussions of conscientious objection is how 
disparate the thinking was and how unconscious the APD seemed to be of its internal 
contradictions. On the one hand there were those who believed that military service was 
a social obligation but could not see beyond this to a civilian service which would fulfill 
134 Ibid, p-5W. 
13,5 lbid, pp. 599-600. For a personal analysis of the degradations of military life in the twenties, 
and a critique of the social utility of this experience and its effects on young men, see Andr6 Trocm6, 
Autobiographie pp. 140ff. in SCPC DC-107 Acc. No. 79A-52. 
136 Ibid, pp. 600-601. 
137 Ibid, p. 601. 
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the same role. There were those who advocated a civilian service on humanitarian or 
religious grounds, and wavered between a belief in the necessity of a substitute service for 
social reasons, and those who took the 'esoteric quasi-pacifist'138 position, close to 
anarchism, that no demands could be made of certain objectors. There were also those 
within the APD who argued simply in favour of obligatory military service on grounds of 
equality before the law, the needs of national security, and the imperative in republican 
France of avoiding the creation of a'praetorian' army. Still others, like Ruyssen, seemed 
prepared to vote in favour of the legal acceptance of conscientious objection out of scruples 
more at home in the 11gue des Droits de L'Homme. For these pacifists there was no question 
of objection being a method of fighting war: what they were concerned to do was purely and 
simply to protect the wounded individual conscience. Finally, there were those like 
Prudhommeaux who began to see the potential effects an organised campaign of 
conscientious objection would have on the military system in France and elsewhere, but who 
lacked the courage or conviction to draw the necessary logical conclusions. Others in this 
camp, such as Ren6 Valfort, did grasp the nettle of collective objection but in so doing 
CJ objection became a mere method (amorVt many presumably) of resisting war, and no longer a 
matter of individual conscience alone. 
The connections were never established in the APD between conscientious objection, 
moral disarmament and the nascent integral pacifism. The former was accepted to the 
limited extent that it was perceived to be a question of human conscience and dignity with 
no direct connection to pacifist theory. When this connection was established by some 
pacifists, objection was rejected as a method of fighting war. The same can be said of moral 
disarmament, which was preached throughout the interwar period. The connection 
between the individual or people who are morally disarmed and a conscientious objection to 
killing other people in similar circumstances was never fully developed. Finally, in the 
period up until at least 1933, there seemed to be no inkling on the part of the APD's 
leadership that both of these positions, taken to their logical conclusions, essentially, 
spelled integral pacifism. Thus, in the same year in which the APD passed resolutions in 
support of a special statute for conscientious objectors and recognised tl# objection was 
C, 
'respectable' and a method of resisting war, it also categorically rejected the idea of 
integral pacifism. 139 Conscientious objection was always viewed as an essentially negative 
approach to peace and therefore of little value. To the extent to which CO's were 
defended, it was for purely humanitarian reasons. 
The failure to draw logical conclusions, to force the issue, to go beyond what might be 
called the rather anodyne pacifisme des pantouflards can be seen in Prudhommeaux' 
138 The typology is Ceadel's, see Padfism in Britain, p. 10. 
139 This subject is dealt with fully later in this chapter. 
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comments about the recidivism of Eug6ne Guillot at the end of his first prison sentence for 
objection. Prudhommeaux wrote that the Kellogg-Briand Pact seemed to have created a 
new and essential fact in law and in logic with regard to the COS. By making war a crime, 
it also made the preparation of war a crime. Having taken this step, Prudhommeaux could 
go no further, however, than to say that the pact had thus created a civic conscientious 
objection. But 
the individual refusal of military service, in France at least and 
given the present state of things, would not resolve the enormous 
problem of War and of Peace: this Guillot will never be the 
shepherd of a flock large enough for one to hope for* that ... 
140 
At the 1932 AGM the topic re-appeared under different guise, this time as a debate on 
the relative merits of obligatory military service versus a permanent 4Tmie de mitier. 
Andr6 Lecomte of the Jeune R6publique presented a report in favour of the permanent army, 
but in the end the assembly pronounced itself incapable of taking an enlightened 
decision. 141 
In 1933 Henri Roser tried to distinguish between conscientious objection per se as a 
function of conscience, and objection based upon the desire to find a way of combatting war. 
He was responding to allegations printed in the PD that Pastor Nick in the C6tes-du-Nord 
was running a sort of 'academy of objection! in which young men were being encouraged and 
organised to refuse their rtýdlitary service. This allegation was completely untrue according 
to Roser, who saw in it an occult attempt to make conscientious objection seem a threat to 
the security of the state. Roser also responded to the stories in the press about the 
mutilation of a statue of DdroulWe in Paris by G6rard Leretour, a sometime objector, and his 
(and others') use of the hunger strike as a weapon. Roser wrote that though he understood 
the motives of desperation behind these acts he could not condone them. Most importantly, 
however, Roser distinguished between what he considered genuine conscientious objection 
and an ersatz objection which saw itself as merely one tactic among others in the fight 
against war - an attitude epitomised by the hunger strike: 
I understand well that one can say here that attention must be 
drawn to the extremely grave peril of war and of conscription. But 
let us recognise that in this case we are no longer concerned with 
conscientious ob)ection as such. A tactic, a technique of opposition to 
140 J. Prudhommeaux, 'Un r6cidiviste de l'objection de conscience: Eugbne Guillot', PD 41,2 
(February 1931), p. 108. 
141 See 'Notre Assembl6e Cdndrale, Pau, 29 octobre - ler novembre 1932, PD 42,12 (December 
1932), pp. 535-5536 and 541. 
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war, perhaps, but no longer the unconditional submission of the 
conscience to an ineluctable truth. This distinction must be made. 142 
Whatever the specific motives of most objectors, conscientious objection continued to receive 
support, not as a method of resisting war so much as a question of pure conscience, until late 
in the 1930s. In 1936 for example, the review published a petition written by Andr6 Philip, 
then Professor in the Faculty of Law at the University of Lyon, demanding the reform of 
the law regulating the penalties meted out to convicted COs. Under ex: isting legislation, it 
was theoretically possible for a convinced objector to spend his entire life from the age of 
twenty to forty-eight in prison for his beliefs if the law were applied rigourously. Ruyssen 
signed the petition, and readers of the PD were invited to do the same. The appeal was for 
signatures from people irrespective of their attitude towards objection as such, and the list 
of luminaries who signed the petition is impressive. 143 
Thus, it can be seen that the APD hardly presented a unanimous face to the world on 
the question of conscientious objection. Within the association there were several strands of 
thinking on the subject, all of them at least initially under the delusion that they were 
talking about the same thing. But it is clear that the conception of objection held by these 
different strands varied enormously. These differences gradually became more and more 
apparent. Officially, the APD was in favour of legislation which would attenuate the 
harsh penalties inflicted upon genuine objectors, but equally it could never bring itself to 
pronounce in favour of conscientious objection as an efficacious method of war resistance. 
Having said all that, it is clear that Ruyssen (and perhaps by extension, the APD as a 
whole) had progressed markedly since his speech in the early twenties to the Congm-s 
142 Henri Roser, VObjection de Conscience et la L6galitd. Lettre ouverte A M. le R6-dacteur de 
"La Paix par le Droit"', PD 44,1 (January 1934), pp. 22-23. The article containing the erroneous 
allegatons is J. Prudhommeaux, Ta condamnation de "Vobjecteur" Philippe Vernief, PD 43,10 
(October 1933), pp. 402-403. Roser developed this distinction even further in his response to the 
'EnquC-te sur la Crise du Pacifism& in PD 44,2 (February 1934), pp. 71-73 in which he argued that the 
logical conclusion of pacifism was conscientious objection. He differentiated, however, between 
genuine' CO with its emphasis on the imperatives of the individual conscience, and CO used merely 
as a tactic by other pacifists. He underlined forcefully the religious conception he had of pacifism 
and argued that the spiritual side of the question must be predominant. For Roser no progress ever 
occurred without a spiritual origin. In this sense Roser comes very close to making pacifism an 
example of Weber's 'ethic of ultimate ends' - an idea developed further in the case of British 
pacifism by Martin Ceadel. 
143 For the text of the petition, see 'Pour la r6forme d'une Ioi inhumaine', PD 46,2 (February 
1936), pp. 97-98. Amongst early signatories of the petition were inter alia: R6gis de Vibraye, Paul 
Langevin, Jacques Maritain, Michel Alexandre, AndrA- Gide, Jean Cudhenno, Georges Guy-Grand, E. 
Mounier, Elie Counelle, Thdodore Ruyssen, Andrd Philip, Wilfred Monod, Paul Rivet, Alain, Andr6 
Chamson, Joliot-Curie, J. -R. Bloch, Albert Bayet, Jules Isaac, Georges LaPierre, Jean Giono, Ren6 
Maublanc. 
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belge pour le progrýs des iddes morales, in which he had exalted the moral value of war 
and attacked those who had shirked their duty in the hecatomb. 144 
The second and more important challenge to the APD's view of pacifism in the early 
thirties was that of integral pacifism. If conscientious objection constituted a crack in the 
paradigm, then integral pacifism represented a veritable fissure. The discovery of such 
irreducible differences of outlook and doctrine within pacifism was even more shocking in 
that the debate burst upon the APD from within in the form of the Trojan horse, Micien 
Challaye, who until 1932 was a member of the ComitL& Directeur. 
The debate on integral pacifism within the APD originated in a discussion between 
Jacques Hadarnard, professor at the College de France, and Challaye in the pages of the 
Cahiers des Droits de Momme in 1928 and 1929.145 The discussion centred on the question 
of what the Serbian reaction ought to have been to the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum of 23 
July 1914. Hadamard argued that the Austro-Hungarian action constituted a refusal of all 
arbitration and an attack on Serbian independence which had necessarily led to war. 
Challaye on the other hand argued that while he in no way condoned the Austrian action, 
the rest of Europe ought to have had the sense to abstain from getting involved in what was 
to become so catastrophic a generalised war. 146 This quite naturally evolved into a more 
theoretical discussion of what Hadamard referred to as the Tolstoyan doctrine of non- 
resistance to evil. The humanitarian development of this argument in the thirties was 
that anything was better than a new bloodletting on the scale of the Great War. 147 
Hadamard reduced the 'Tolstoyan' proposition to two arguments. First that anything 
was preferrable to another war, and secondly, that faced with a nation which refused to 
defend itself, the aggressor would not dare to execute his crime. It was particularly this 
latter argument which Hadamard sought to combat. He demonstrated that international, 
juridical progress founded upon universal and obligatory arbitration of conflicts was 
fundamentally incompatible with the idea of non-resistance. In a Tolstoyan universe, he 
argued, arbitration would become a nonsense as the aggressors would simply refuse 
arbitration in favour of immediate gains. Taking the argument from another angle, he 
maintained that non-resistance would spell the end of all progress. The adversaries of the 
144 See Thdodore Ruyssen, 'La Guerre et la morale (Extrait d'un discours prononcd A l'ouverture 
du Congr& belge pour le proos des id6es morales)', PD 33,2 (February 1923), pp. 49-52, in which 
Ruyssen said: 'Nous rtýaurons garde, quant A nous, de m6connaitre la grandeur morale de certaines 
heures du temps de guerre. Cest I'honneur du caract&e humain de s! dlever, sous I'aiguillon de 
Upreuve, au-dessus du m6diocre niveau de I'humanitd moyenne. Speaking of the duty which all 
men felt to fight in the Great War, he said '... h6las! H West pas vrai que tout le monde ait fait son 
devoir. II ya eu, en petit nombre, il est vrai, mais Hya eu quand m6me en tout les pays des 
r6fractaires, des d6serteurs, des lAches et des traitres: il ya eu les mauvais prophkes du d6faitisme..: 
14,5 See J. Hadamard, 'Pacifisme Intdgral? ', PD 41,2 (February 1931), p. 57, notes 1 and 3. 
146 lbid, p57. 
147 Ibid, p. 60. Martin Ceadel calls this the'humanitariaW inspiration for pacifism - in his view 
the most important intellectual development of interwar pacifism. See Ceadel p. 13. 
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French Revolution and of liberty still existed, and non-resistance in the civil and 
international domains meant in the final analysis a return to despotism. But despotism 
contained within it the seeds of war. Non-resistant pacifists might avoid war in refusing 
to fight the despot, but they would 'then have the pleasure of fighting for the despot'. 
History abounded with examples of thisj48 The progress realised by the Geneva Protocol 
in determining the aggressor in any conflict would be rendered null and void by the doctrine 
of non-resistance: 
... this so-called avant-garde doctrine would mark a step backwards. This is perhaps our principal reason, sufficient of 
itself, for repudiating it. 
International peace cannot be founded at the same time on the 
definition of the aggressor and on the theory of non-resistance of 
the attacked. Between one and the other, one must choose, and our 
choice is made. One cannot avoid the question of knowing if one 
wishes to renounce liberty and justice deliberately in favour of 
peace or if, as we believe, peace, justice and liberty are inseparable 
things, one not being able to exist without the others. 149 
Challaye responded in the November 1931 issue of the PD with an article in favour of 
'peace with no reservations'. 1,50 He underlined that he was only concerned with war 
between peoples, that is to say, nations: civil conflicts were beyond the parameters of his 
argument and his pacifism. Challaye defined three attitudes possible in the face of 
international war. The first was the bellicist position, embodied by those who proclaim 
war to be morally beneficial and socially productive. Secondly, there were those who 
believed peace to be superior to war, but considered war to be necessary in some cases, and 
therefore legitimate. These he called the belli-pacifists. Finally, there were those who 
condemned war in an absolute sense, whatever the circumstances. These demanded peace by 
any means, these were the pacifists, the tenants of integral pacifism. 151 
Challaye also defined the sources of pacifism. These were two. On the one hand, 
pacifism could arise from egotism pure and simple, 'an egotism which is in itself 
legitimate: it is reasonable to safe-guard one's own existence, and to sacrifice it only to a 
cause which is worth it'. 152 But clearly this egotism could also lead to bellicism or belli- 
pacifism as well. Thus, pacifism arose more from moral ideas than from egotism. 
148 Ibid., pp, 59-61. 
149 Ibid, p. 67. 
1,50 F. Challaye, 'Pour la Paix sans aucune rdserve, PD 41,11 (November 1931), pp. 489-497. 
151 Ibid, p. 489. 
152 Ibid. 
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Challaye argued that it represented the application to relations between peoples of the 
commonplace commandment: 'Thou shalt not kill'and'Love thy neighbour as thyself. 153 
While it was true that integral pacifism sprang from the application of this morale 
courante, it was absolutely false that it was logically tied to the Tolstoyan conception of 
non-resistance to evil according to Challaye. 
Certainly the Tolstoyan must be an integral pacifist, but the 
integral pacifist is not necessarily a Tolstoyan. The integral 
pacifist, he who demands peace at any price between the peoples, 
can very well accept legitimate familial and individual defence. 
Legitimate individual or familial defence has nothing but its name 
in common with the national defence, the so-called national 
defence. Legitimate individual or familial defence has as its goal, 
and often with success, the saving of several precious lives; the so- 
called national defence always has as its consequence the 
destruction of innumerable precious existences. 154 
Thus, for Challaye, the integral pacifist would not hesitate in using force to defend his 
mother, his wife or his child. He would run to the aid of someone attacked in the streets. 
H*ould defend to the best of his ability Jews atttacked in pogroms, and he would be free 
to participate in a revolt against an oppressor. 'Civil war, social war are essentially 
different from foreign war ... It is war between peoples, only, which is forbidden by integral 
pacifism as it is here defined. 15-5 
There were three primary reasons for Challaye's belief in integral pacifism. The first, 
what he called the decisive reason, was essentially that of Bertrand Russell, namely that 
the 'evils of war are infinitely greater than any other solution applied to conflicts between 
peoples. ' He claimed that viewed from this angle, integral pacifism was not a 'tissue of 
abstractions', or a utopia, but rather a living doctrine taken from 'contact with reality, and 
nourished by experience. ' And the experience was that of the last war. Secondly, there 
was the aspect of suffering which a modem war brought about - an infinity of suffering. 
Warfare in the twentieth century no longer could limit its effects, horrible that they were, 
to the combatants. All members of society were now affected by war, and therefore by its 
terrible sufferings. And finally, the new means of warfare made war the worst of evils, in 
fact absolute evil. To this absolute evil an absolute remedy needed to be applied and that 
remedy was integral pacifism, 'peace without the slightest reservation'. 156 
Challaye foresaw the arguments which the belli-pacifists would marshall against his 
, conception of 
integral pacifism. The best would be that war can safe-guard national 
153 Ibid. 
154 Ibid, pA90. Challaye expressed his debt for this idea to his friend, the pacifist Rend Valfort. 
155 Ibid, pp. 490-491. 
156 Ibid, pp. 491-93. 
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independence. To this Challaye replied that armed defence and wars are not necessary or 
even sufficient for the maintenance of national sovereignty. Examples of this were 
Andorra, Luxembourg, Switzerland, Denmark, and so forth. Perhaps more important, war 
in no way guaranteed national independence. Wars could be lost and with them national 
sovereignty. But even if war could be proved to be one hundred per cent effective in 
preserving national independence, one had to ask at what price. This led Challaye to his 
major conclusion that 
Rather a foreign occupation than a war - the acceptance of this 
formula could be the criterion separating the real pacifists from 
the belli-pacifists ... 
157 
Challaye believed that modem warfare made the defence of the nation the death of the 
nation. That did not imply however a total abdication in the face of aggression. If 
national defence were impossible by means of arms, there were other ways of resisting 
aggression: passive resistance and non-cooperation such as Gandhi was using in India; the 
appeal to the conscience of the invading people; the appeal to the conscience of other 
nations who could then organise an economic and financial boycott against the aggressor, 
and so on. The integral pacifist was thus called to resist, but not by force of arms. Integral 
pacifism called therefore for pacifist action on the individual level first -a personal 
renunciation of war as in the Einstein declaration; and secondly, a social renunciation of 
war through total and if necessary, unilateral, disarmament. 158 
The counter-attack was not long in coming. The editors of the PD Wrote in the next 
number of the review that Challaye's article had caused them no small amount of grief, not 
only from a very hostile press, but also from many members of the association'who were far 
from sharing his views. 1-59 Ruyssen challenged Challaye's pacifism in a clash of the 
philosophers. The differences between the two men were irreducible. Ruyssen clearly 
believed that certain things - justice and law, incarnated in the right of peoples to dispose 
of their own destinies - were most definitely worth fighting for. To Challaye's claim to be 
speaking from the cold experience of reality, Ruyssen threw back the undeniable facts of 
recent history: Belgium resisting the Kaiser's army in 1914, the Danes heroically fighting 
the Prussians in Schleswig in 1864, imposing the plebiscite on Bismaxk which he was trying 
to avoid; and he recalled to mind the visceral importance of national identity and self- 
detem-dnation, reminding Challaye of 'the little peasants of Posnan who, around 1910, 
were whipped because they could not recite the catechism in GermaW, to say nothing of the 
157 Ibid., p. 494. 
l-"8 Ibid., pp494-497. 
159'La Paix sans R&, erve?, PD 41,12 (December 1931), p. 561. 
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old men he had seen sobbing in Colmar, Strasbourg and Mulhouse in 1913, such was the 
depth of their feeling at being separated from France. 160 Ruyssen charged that Challaye 
was being illogical in limiting his concept of legitimate defence to the individual or fan-dly 
level; just as at these levels, so the sense of national solidarity led men to defend the social 
collectivity called the nation. Ruyssens attack finished on a decidedly ad homine? n note. 
He accused Challaye of reducing the whole problem of war to one of fear, of producing a 
'dry theorem, of being a'prudent bourgeois' who was teaching cowardice, of putting a long 
and comfortable life above all other values. 
In one word, you affirril, you desire, with swagger: 'peace without 
any reservations', even if it be an unjust peace, a dishonorable 
peace. We demand, on the contrary, peace in justice and in dignity. 
We wish to see to it that force, which up until now has been bound 
up with the law of men only by accident, should be so by rule and 
without exception, as it is already in 'a large measure within 
human communities. 161 
Challaye's response to Ruyssen's attack heightened the personal nature of the debate. 
He accused Ruyssen of cowardice himself for having spent the war as a non-combatant, 
while he, Challaye, despite his age, served as a sergeant in the territorial infantry and 
was wounded slightly. This is the classic distinction made during and after the war by 
those who fought at the front vis-A-vis those who remained behind the lines as non- 
combatants, or perhaps shirkers. 162 Challaye affirmed that he was profoundly attached 
to the idea of national independence, but he still maintained that to fight for this 
independence given the state of modem warfare would mean the annihilation of the state 
in any case. There was nothing 'utilitarian' about his argument at all, said Challaye; he 
made the case for integral pacifism from the moral point of view. True courage was being 
prepared to sacrifice one's life for a cause that merited it, not in causing the deaths of 
innocent men and women in a war. He summed up his conception of courage in Bossuefs 
dictum that one must 'reserve for real service the action of an extraordinary bravery. 'l 63 
The editorial secretary of the review, Jules Puech, intervened at this point in the 
debate and tried to smooth over the differences between the two men, by arguing that in 
fact Challaye's conception of pacifism was not that different from Ruyssen's. He did this 
160 Th6odore Ruyssen, 'La Paix sans r6serves? Non! ', PD 42,1 (January 1932), pp. 10-12. 
161 Ibid., pp. 14-15. The attack on Challaye continued the following month with Charles Richet, 
'La Paix sans r6serve est un r6ve! '. PD 42,2/3 (February-March 1932), pp. 70-71. 
162 F. Challaye, 'Pour la Paix sans aucune rdserve (RO-ponse AVarticle de M. Ruyssen)', PD 42,4 
(April 1932), p. 149. On the distinctions drawn by the war veterans between ceux du front and ceux de 
Varritre, see Antoine Prost, Les Anciens Combatfants et la Sociifif Frangaise, III, Mentalitis et 
Idifologies (Paris: Presses de la FINSP, 1977), pp. 78-81. 
163 Ibid, Challaye, p. 152. 
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by quoting from several of Challaye's books on moral philosophy which certainly seemed 
to lend credence to his argument. He alsb cited a patriotic lecture which 'Sergeant' 
Challaye had given to the 109th territorial infantry regiment during the war, expressing 
in perfect form the patriotic pacifist sentiments of the APD. There is thus little doubt that 
Challay&s pacifism had changed remarkably since the war, evolving rapidly in the late 
twenties from one quite similar to that held by the APD to one of intransigent integral 
pacifism. 164 
The sense that a divorce was in the offing remained strong throughout 1932 and 1933. It 
is hard to escape the impression that French pacifism was indeed traversing a crisis, a 
fundamental parting of the ways between pacifist forces which until then had been content 
to rely on the assumption that all pacifists were struggling towards the same peace. But as 
L. Emery charged in a 1933 article published in the PD, there were equivocations within 
pacifism which needed to be rectified. He wrote that in reading the recent articles of 
Ruyssen and especially Richet he felt that he no longer understood. 'What they call 
"pacifism" hardly coincides any longer with what we define by this wor&. 16-5 He defined 
his conception of pacifism on two levels. First, it was necessary to see that the Europe 
created by the treaties of 1919 was 'agonising' and that justice had not been done. France 
164 Jules-L. Puech, 'A propos des articles Challaye-Ruyssen', PD 42,4 (April 1932), pp. 153-156; 
see also Challaye's war-time lecture in F61icien Challaye, La Signification Morale de la Guerre 
actuelle (Confifrence faite au Cours d'Instruction Complimentaire pour les sous-officiers du 109e 
Rigiment Territorial d'Infanterie le 29 mars 1916 par le Sergent Filicien Challaye), (Paris: Comitd de 
Propagande Socialiste pour la D6fense Nationale, 1916. ) Similar sentiments were expressed in a 
letter to Romain Rolland written in April 1915. Challaye told Rolland that he shared the sentiments 
expressed by the latter in articles in the journal de Geným, but went on to say: 'Je suis en ce moment 
sur le front, depuis le d6but d'octobre, et mime, maintenant sur la ligne de feu. Ma compagnie 
territoriale ya tour A tour creus6 des tranch6s, occupd des tranchds, entretenu une route stratdgique; 
maintenant elle travaille ý" I'assainissement du champs de bataille". Je crois avoir fait, et je suis 
d6cidd A faire, jusqu'au bout, tout mon devoir militaire; ce n7est point un liche qui vous 6crit. -Mais 
c'est un soldat que la guerre n'a pas fait renoncer A son id6al de bont6 boudhique, chr6tienne et 
socialiste. Si je me bats, si je meurs, ce sera sans aucune haine. 
Je crois que nous devons vaincre, A tout prix, pour sauver notre inddpendance nationale; pour, 
permettre aux Alsaciens-Lorrains authentiques soit de revenir A la patrie A laquelle ils sont si 
longtemps fid6les, soit d'obtenir une enti&e autonomie; pour rdaliser une Europe oýL les peuples 
auront enfin le droit de disposer d'eux-m8mes librement. Mais aprýs la victoire je souhaite et je 
r6clame une paix d6finitive bas6e sur la justice international, sur le respect des droits de tous, sur 
une mutuelle fraternitd. Je adsire ardemment que ce r6gime de paix soit rA-alis, 6 A la fois dans les 
esprits et les coeurs et dans les institutions internationales que n'6crasent ni n'humilient aucun 
peuple. Je considkv qu'un devoir urgent eimposera tout de suite apr& la paix: r6tablir le contact 
entre les peuples divisds par la guerre; entre les savants, entre les chr6tiens, entre les socialistes, 
entre les ouvriers, entre les gens du monde des pays actuellement en lutte. Puis, chez nous, sauver 
des dtroitesses chauvines le droit A une culture vraiment gdndrale, A laquelle ne manquera point 
l'importante contribution de'lAllemagne; sauver le droit & Goethe et A Heine, le droit A Kant et A 
Nietsche, le droit A Beethoven et i Wagner. -Nous aurons de belles luttes A soutenir. 
Je me r6jouis A l'idde d'y participer, si f6chappe aux petites balles sifflantes et aux 6clats des 
bruyants obus. Nous aurons, pour ce combat aussi, besoin d'un chef. vous serez le n6tre, n'est-ce 
pas? ... ' And the letter was signed Fdlicien Challaye, Sergent au 109e territoriale, I#%-re compagnie, Secteur portal 140. Letter is in BN MSS Fonds RR, F Challaye to RR, 26 April 1915. 
165 L. Emery, 'Les Equivoques du Pacifisme', PD 43,7 quly 1933), p. 239. 
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had to be prepared to accept a reduction in her political hegemony and prestige. A 
pacifism which clung to the treaties was one based upon conservatism and French national 
advantage, not upon justice: 
Thus, we arrive at the first line of division: we refuse categorically 
to recognise as a pacifist anyone who poses, as a prerequisite 
condition, respect of the existing international order and the 
refusal by France of new concessions. We believe on the contrary 
that the integration of France into a pacified Europe cannot be 
achieved without the abandonment of its present privileges. A 
definitive equilibrium is at this price. 166 
The second point of division was over the nature of modem warfare and what this 
implied for the pacifist case. This had nothing - or at least not necessarily - to do with 
religious ideas or'quakerism'. But it had everything to do with the fact that the game 
had changed: 
The idea of Placing force at the service of justice, and if need be, of 
accepting a war of national defence as the ultima ratio was 
reasonably compatible with a sincere pacifism as long as there 
existed an acceptable relationship between the ruins caused by war 
and the values which it could save. Defending a nation was then 
shedding a tenth of its blood with a view to a superior interest. 167 
1914 had changed all this. War was now totally out of proportion to the values which it 
claimed to be saving. The military defence of a nation had become a verbal relic: 'the 
expression no longer coincides with the reality'. 168 This in no way implied the 
abandonment of the nation, the acceptance of all injustices. What it did imply however 
was the need to rethink the way in which a nation would defend itself. No doubt many of 
the substitute methods of national 'defence' were insufficient, but there was no other 
alternative, argued Emery. The Geneva disarmament conference was a chicanery because it 
spoke of disarmament and security in the same breath. Pacifism had lost its way according 
to Emery and in order for it to regain its credit and its strength, it needed to redevelop a 
programme, and become again an ideal and a moral imperative. 169 
Responding to Emery's article, Richet admitted and defended the idea that he 
represented a vieux pacifisme in contradistinction to what he called Emery's 'neo-pacifisrW 
which he likened to that of the Nazis in terms of its content. He defended the Versailles 
Treaty as having finally created a Europe in which minority and national aspirations were 
166 Ibid., p. 240. 
167 Ibid, p. 241. 
168 Ibid. 
169 Ibid., pp. 242-244. 
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realised. As far as disarmament was concerned, he believed that Germany was far from 
disarmed, although he did agree with Emery that any future war would be a disaster for 
victor and vanquished alike. Richet concluded that there were therefore no equivocations 
in pacifism. Old pacifists and neo-pacifists alike, he believed, were struggling towards 
the goal of peace. But he insisted that it was through obligatory arbitration that this 
peace would be achieved. 170 
Ruyssen, too, responded to Emery's article. He declared that the APD's doctrine had 
not changed in its essential aspects. He was not fanatically attached to the boundaries of 
Europe as laid down by the Treaties, either, but he did believe that the European situation 
in 1932 was much more equitable in terms of national identity than certainly had been the 
case in 1914. To revise the treaties would lead straight to war. This did not mean though 
that the map of Europe created by the Treaties was perfect in all respects. But the main 
point of -Emery's essay was the same as that argued by Challaye the year before, namely 
that any future war would be so ruinous, so costly, so dangerous for civilisation that it ought 
simply not to be fought under any circumstances. Submission rather than destruction was 
how. he summarised Emery's argument. Ruyssen argued that since Emery was prepared to 
accept the justice of some wars up until 1914, his neo-pacifism. therefore reduced itself in 
the final analysis simply to a calculation of risks involved in a modem war. The answer 
Emery arrived at was that these risks were too high and spelled doom. The notion of 
justice was totally absent from the calculation. Ruyssen invited Emery therefore to spell 
out in precise terms at what level of destruction a war became immoral, and what measure 
of 'justice could be sacrificed without remorse'. 171 Thus, Ruyssen, despite the definite fact 
that a future war would be ghastly beyond belief, did not believe that one could 
confidently extrapolate from it the end of civilisation. Pacifist thinking in this area fell 
into the realm of hypothesis and conjecture, and not of fact. But beyond this argument on 
the magnitude of destruction, Ruyssen argued that to declare in advance that one would not 
defend oneself, far from preventing a war, actually encouraged aggression. The only, 
sensible path lay in building up the notion of international law and arbitration whilst at 
the same time seeking to arrive at the highest level of general disarmament possible. 172 
A third crack in the paradigm of optimistic, positive pacifism espoused by the men of 
the APD was undoubtedly the amazing dispersion of efforts for peace in interwar France, 
and the apparent immunity of the French peace movement as a whole to any attempt to 
bring order out of the organisational (and doctrinal) chaos. The problem had existed for 
170 Charles Richet, 'Y-a-t-fl des Equivoques du Pacifisme?, PD 43,8/9 (August-September 1933), 
pp. 285-288. 
171 Thdodore Ruyssen, 'Y-a-t-il des Equivoques du Pacifisme?, PD 43,8/9 (August-Sýptember 
1933), pp. 288-289. 
172 Ibid., pp. 289-290. 
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many years, but the Challaye/Emery controversy likely helped to bring it into focus for the 
APD. As we have seen earlier in this section, right from the outset of the interwar period, 
the APD felt crowded by the advent of new groups with the League of Nations as their 
object. The association felt that many of its members or potential members were being 
poached away in the early twenties either by the League of Nations associations or 
sometimes by the Ligue des Droits de Momme. 173 As we have seen, however, the APD 
was able to establish itself in the early twenties as a kind of bridge between the world of 
pacifism and the new groups formed in support of the League. Even within the APD the 
two tendencies existed; Ruyssen described them in 1922 as the tendency in favour of peace 
and that in favour of the League of Nations. 174 The problem of balkanisation remained 
however. Prudhommeaux spoke at the 1924 annual general meeting of a 'crisis of pacifism! 
engendered by the dangerous and wasteful multiplication of efforts amongst French 
pacifists. An example of this existed within the APD itself. At the 1922 AGM Lucien Le 
Foyer and the Paris group he headed were attacked for lethargy; the real reason behind 
the attempt to unseat Le Foyer from the President's chair in Paris seems to have been the 
latter's creation of a rival pacifist organisation called the Union Populaire pour la Paix 
Universelle. 175 No love was lost either between the APD and the D616gation Permanente 
des Socidt& Franqaises de la Paix which was described by Ruyssen as a chief without any 
Indians. 176 
173 See for example, Edmond Dumdril, J. Prudhommeaux, and Thdodore Ruyssen, 
VAssembl6e G6ndrale de la Paix par le Droit', PD 30,11/12 (November-December 1920), p. 371. 
Ruyssen spoke of the problem of competition from the League of Nations associations: '... il s'agit 
avant tout de savoir comment nous pourrons vivre et d6velopper notre Association sans nous 
heurter i la. propagande des groupements, n6s depuis la guerre et qui poursuivent un but semblable 
au n6tre sous le pavillon de la Socidtd des Nations. ' Georges Cadier for the Poitou group said that'... 
la concurrence de I'Association fi-anýaise pour la Soci6td des Nations nuit A notre propagande, car 
notre public ne comprend pas cette dualitd. De plus, la Ligue des Droits de I'Homme recueille dans 
beaucoup de localitds les adh6sions de personnes favorables A nos id6es. ' (pp. 370-371) 
174 Ruyssen cited in Jules Prudhommeaux, 'Conseil Directeur de I'Association de* la Paix par le 
Droit', PD 32,10 (October 1922), pp. 426-427. 
175 In his 'Rapport Moral' for the 1924 AGM, Prudhommeaux said that 'Notre mouvement 
traverse une dangereuse crise de croissance. Aimez-vous le pacifisme? On en a mis partout, et cest 
partout la confusion et le ddsordre. Entre les anciennes socidtds de la Paix et celles qui ont pour 
objet la SDd&d des Nations, les, divergences persistent. 11 ya trop d'oeuvres, trop de soci", trop de 
journaux, et la belle 6mulation qui enchantait d'abord les optimistes, risque d'aboutir A 
l'incoh6rence et A l'impuissance. ' - cited in J. Prudhommeaux, and Georges Cadier, VAssembl6e 
G6n&ale de la Paix par le Droit', PD 34,7/8 (julyýAugust 1924), pp270-276. For the attack on Le Foyer 
see Th6odore Ruyssen, VAssembl6e G6n&ale de I'Association de la Paix par le Droit, PD 32,6 (June 
1922), pp. 237-246. A short description of the Union Populaire pour la Paix Universelle can be found in 
Lucien Le Foyer, VUnion Populaire pour la Pabe, in Nous voulons la Paix, (Paris: SRIP, 1932), pp. 55- 
56. 
176 On the D616gation permanente, see Thdodore Ruyssen, 'A propos du 9me CongrZs national 
de la Paix, PD 31,5/6 Wayý-June 1921), pp. 219-220. Ruyssen wrote '... qu'est-ce donc la Dp? ... Peu de 
choses; une faqade A laquelle sont accroch6s quelques noms biens connus, mais derri6re laquelle il 
n'y aA peu prbs rien, ni effectifs, ni activitd, ni ressources..: 
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These fissures and disagreements could only worsen as the twenties flowed into the 
thirties. The number of groups continued to grow and the doctrines 
ýpoused by them moved 
increasingly in the direction of 'int6gralit6' whether for sentimental or for humanitarian or 
religious reasons. It is not our purpose here to examine in detail the nature of the pacifism 
of some of these groups in that they define the paradigm of paciftsme nouveau style which 
will be discussed fully in the next section. However, insofar as they represented the 
beginnings of a break with the old-style pacifism typified by the APD, the Ligue 
International des Combattants de )a Paix was condemned for its integral pacifism, the 
Ligue Internationale des Fernmes pour la Paix et la Libert6 was criticised for its naive 
approach to international affairs, and the Volont6 de Paix likewise was attacked for its 
sentimental approach to the problem of peace. 177 
The APD's reaction to the Amsterdam Congress against Imperialist War was both 
positive and negative. Initially Prudhommeaux had taken a very negative line because of 
the increasingly evident attempts of the Communists to take over the congress for their own 
ends. 178 Right up until the eve of the congress his apprehensions about the reception likely 
to be reserved for 'bourgeois pacifists' grew, but after attending it, he wrote that 'this 
congress will remain... an important event of the post-war era'. 179 The credit for this 
success was largely due to Henri Barbusse who had managed to see that the pact of mutual 
toleration between the multifarious strands of world pacifism was respected. 180 That said, 
the organisation of the congress was chaotic and in no way designed for constructive work. 
The unity of tone achieved at Amsterdam was the result of an abdication on the part of 
many pacifist groups which allowed the Moscow obedience to impose its conceptions on the 
177 On the LICP see Ruysseres comments to Rend Valfort in the debate on the crisis of pacifism 
at the 1933 AGM in J. Prudhommeaux, 'Notre Assembl6e G6ndrale, Suite et fin, PD 44,3 (March 
1934), p. 101. See also Prudhommeau)e comments in J. Prudhommeaux, 'La Ligue des Combattants; 
de la Paix - Le Congriýs de Montargis - Les Dissidents', PD 44,6 (June 1934), pp. 244-245, in which 
Prudhommeaux calls the LICPs propaganda 'ardent and courageous', but reminds readers that the 
PD has some fundamental reserves about the LICP programme. On the LIFPL, the APD had both 
positive and negative Vttws. In 1922 Ruyssen condemned the 'empty rhetoric' of the LIFPL 
international congress at the Hague which sought what he called the 'ardent, at times fanatical, 
demolition' of the treaties of 1919 but seemed to offer little to put in their place. See Th6odore 
Ruyssen, 'Un Congrbs f6minin pour la Paix A La Haye, PD 33,1 (January 1923), pp-34-5. Later in the 
twenties however the Pl) applauded the work of the LIFPL in its investigation of the effects of 
chemical warfare. See Jules Prudhommeaux, 'La guerre chimique et l'opinion: un article de M. de 
Kdrillie, PD 40,11 (November 1930), pp. 451-452. With regard to Madeleine Vernet and the Volontd 
de Paix, as far back as 1921, Ruyssen had attacked Vernet's 'Appel aux femmes' as 'pathetic' and an 
appeal only to sentiment. See Th6odore Ruyssen, 'Les femmes contre la guerre, PD 31,3/4 (March- 
April 1921), pp. 140-141. In 1928, after the founding of the Volontd de Paix, Prudhommeaux put the 
readers of the PD on their guard against the 'extremists of peace' to be found in the VPs ranks. See 
J. Prudhommeaux, Tacifisme d'avant-garde, PD 38,3 (March 1928), pp. 137-138. 
178 J. Prudhommeaux, 'Un Congrýs de la Paix qui s'annonce mal: Gen&e ou Moscou? ', PD 42, 
7/8 aulyýAugust 1932), pp-150-3,51. 
179 J. Prudhommeaux, 'Le Congrýs Mondial contre la Guerre impdrialiste, PD 42,9 (September 
1932), p. 405. 
180 Ibid, p. 406. 
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assembly and its resolutions. 181 Later on in 1932, when local Amsterdam corrunittees began 
to be formed in France and elsewhere, it liecame apparent to Prudhommeaux that the 
movement had been taken over by the Third International. 182 Despite all this, it is 
surprising to note how measured and friendly Prudhommeaux' reaction to his experiences at 
the Congress itself actually was. 
The APD participated in efforts in the early thirties to remedy this balkanisation of 
French peace efforts. Jules Prudhommeaux was most actively involved in this work and 
propagandised tirelessly for the creation of Cartels de ]a Paix which while not limiting 
the independence of their constituent members, would provide a force for unity in French 
pacifism. We have already noted his concerns as early as 1924 at the dispersion and waste 
of French peace efforts. 183 By the mid-twenties some cartels had been formed and the 
movement towards some form of loose unity seemed to gather momentum by the late 
twenties. 184 The formation of local peace cartels seemed to take off however in 1931, 
largely under the influence of a tour of France made by a mobile museum on war and peace 
organised by the Jeune R6publique. Prudhommeaux estimated that during its two-week 
stay in Bordeaux alone, some 110,000 to 120,000 people saw the museum's display. 185 The 
purpose of the mobile museum was to raise the population's consciousness about the 
problems of war and peace until the time of the Geneva Disarmament conference in 
February 1932 and the French general elections in May of that year. In provincial France it 
seems to have had some major successes. In Bordeaux a Cartel Girondin de la Paix was 
formed which numbered almost 200,000 members within its constituent organisations. The 
Cartel rouennais de la paix contained thirty-three member organisations on 1 November 
1931. Unfortunately, Paris seemed to remain immune to this flurry of cartel formation and 
Prudhommeaux wrote that the 'dispersion of efforts (in the capital) is a scandal'. 186 
181 Ibid, pp. "409. 
1,82 J. Prudhommeaux, 'Les lendemains du Congrýs d'Amsterdarn!, PD 42,11 (November 1932), 
pp. 494-495. Prudhommeaux formulated many of the same criticisms with regard to the 
Rassemblement Mondial des Femmes contre la Guerre et le Fascisme which was held in Paris in 
August 1934. It was an impressive congress - some 1500 delegates were present - but it was over-run 
by the Communist and Muscovite element and was totally chaotic in terms of organi*ion with 
decisions, and more importantly, the final Manifesto imposed from above. In a strange speech for a 
'pacifise to make, Barbusse attacked the religious, non-violent pacifists and called women to the 
fight, to the Revolution, to violence, if need be. See J. Prudhommeaux, 'Le Rassemblement mondial 
des Femmes contre la Guerre et le Fascisme7, PD 44,9 (September 1934), pp. 343-347. 
183 See note 175 above. 
184 On the formation of the Lyon cartel in 1925 see J. Prudhommeaux, 'Le cartel Iyonnais pour la 
Paix et la SDN, PD 36,1 qanuary 1926), pp. 39-40. See also J. Prudhommeaux, Ters lunion des forces 
pacifistes: Cartels et Semaines de la Pabe, PD 39,11 (November 1929), pp. 425-430. 
18-5 J. Prudhommeaux, Te Tour de France du Mus6e "Guerre ou Paix"', PD 41, -7 (July 1931), 
p. 320. 
186 lbid, p. 318. See also 'Les Cartels de la Paix' in op. cit. Nous voulons la Paix, pp. 88-90. See 
also J. Prudhommeaux, 'Petite histoire des Cartels de la Pabe, PD 42,4 (April 1932), pp. 179-182. For a 
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Paradoxically, the new-found or at least growing unity of 1932 was. to be difficult to 
maintain in the face of the Amsterdam movement which,. too, had claims on being a 
unifying force in French pacifism. 187 The inspiration for the creation of peace cartels in 
France undoubtedly came from across the Channel where the example of the 'powerful' 
League of Nations Union served to highlight the insufficiencies of the French movement. 
Despite the very real progress made towards some form of unity in 1931-32, however, 
French pacifism remained divided unto itself. In 1935, for example, Prudhommeaux 
engagea in a discussion with Fabien France 188 in which he argued that aside from 
problems in the French national temperament which produced a splinter effect within the 
peace movement, there was also another difficulty. This was without doubt the 
politicisation of the question of peace: 
... there exists an extreme right, a right, a centre, a left and an 
extreme-left in pacifism. M. Herriot is a pacifist just as much as 
comrade Andrd Marty, the anarchist S6bastien Faure and the 
objector Ren6 Gerin. Le Temps (but yes! ) has the pretension of 
serving peace just as much as Le Barrage, but of serving it better. 
Hence the rivalries, the incompatibilities, the antagonisms of 
doctrines, or groups, or persons that make it most difficult to 
achieve the desired unity within the movement. 189 
Fabien France responded to Prudhommeauxý invitation to show the way forward to 
unity, by arguing that unity was impossible right across the entire spectrum of French 
pacifism. Moreover, he believed, the diversity of tendencies was not an obstacle as such. It 
was clearly impossible to group together in one society nationalists who were not gerl'ainely 
interested in peace for its own sake, on the one hand, and on the other, the army of 
Nextremist pacifists, Tolstoyans, conscientious objectors and anarchists of all sorts'. 190 He 
thought that French pacifism could do without people who wanted to preserve peace 
while preparing for war, and people who thought that individual or collective refusals to 
fight any war were sufficient. In France's view, there came a time when the divergence on 
methods signified practically-speaking a divergence on principles. 191 
more general analysis of the need in France for a unification of peace efforts, see Ernest Archdeacon, 
'Pour l'unification des Socidtds pacifistes', PD 41,7 Ouly 1931), pp. 313-314. 
187 See Part III of this thesis for comments on the trouble caused to local cartels by the 
machinations of local Amsterdam committees. 
188 Tabien France! was apparently the pseudonym, according to Prudhommeaux, of a 'pacifiste 
tr6s averti du mouvement d'id6es contemporaines, collaborateur appr6cid de la Jeune Wpublique'. 
See J. Prudhommeaux, 'La grande pitid du Pacifisme franqais - Pour I'Unit6 et la Coordination des 
Efforte, PD 45,10 (October 1935), p. 391. 
189 Ibid., p. 393. 
190 Fabien France in ibid., p. 394. 
191 Ibid. 
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But that is to jump ahead a couple of years. The point, which ought to be clear, is that 
French pacifism by the onset of the thirties was experiencing a crisis of growth coupled 
with a crisis of confidence in the values it proclaimed. In the face of a worsening 
international situation, French pacifists began to arrive at increasingly radical answers to 
the problem of peace. Or at least, some did. For the old-style pacifists of the APD, the 
doctrine and methods remained the same, despite the temptations and hesitations of the 
years under discussion. 
The final crack in the paradigm of pacifisme ancien style was therefore the 
deteriorating international situation in the early thirties. This situation can be reduced to 
three main events: the Sino-Japanese conflict in Manchuria and the apparent impotence of 
the League of Nations to resolve it, the general disappointment caused by the increasing 
failure of the Geneva Disarmament Conference to reach any substantial agreement on arms 
reductions, and finally, the rise of Nazism in Germany which riveted French eyes once 
again on events outre-Rhin. 
Disarmament had always been an important plank in the APD's pacifist platform. 
Ruyssen saw success in disarmament as absolutely necessary if public opinion was to be 
convinced of the efficacy of the League of Nations. This disarmament would take three 
forms: moral, economic and military. He believed that moral disarmament was making 
great progress. Economic disarmament was a slower process, but it would be realised soon 
that it was necessary because in it lay Europe's future. Military disarmament was the most 
difficult to achieve, because it was dependent on success in the other two areas, but Ruyssen 
believed that it, too, would see its hour come. 192 Paul Painlevd's new policy of re- 
armament in 1927 prompted the Comitk Directeur of the APD to ask bluntly in a public 
statement, 'Why these armaments? '193 - especially at a time when Germany was finally 
beginning to accept the post-war world and had signed the Locarno accords. The Geneva 
Disarmament conference disappointed pacifists because itwas never able to reach beyond 
the concept of limitation to that of reduction of armaments. In April 1934 Ruyssen rather 
bitterly attacked its failure. He registered the sense of deception pacifists felt at the 
German walk-out in October 1933, but sharply criticised the French approach to the whole 
question of disarmament as well: 
The day that France brings to Geneva something other than a 
juridical dialectic and theoretical plans, the day on which, 
confident of its present military superiority and of its alliances, it 
spontaneously offers the sacrifices that it can certainly consent to 
192 Thdodore Ruyssen, 'Ddsarmement? ou ddsarmements? ', PD 39,12 (December 1929), 
pp. 441-442. 
193 Le Comitd Directeur de la Paix par le Droit, 'Pourquoi ces Armements? 'PD 37,6 Uune 1927), 
pp. 185-187. 
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without putting its security in danger, that day it will restore the 
confidence today so lacking, and will recover through the 
collective solidarity, an ample compensation for the wager that it 
will have given to the cause of peace. 194 
The APD cannot be accused of short-sightedness with regard to its analysis of the 
situation in Germany preceding the Nazi Machtergreifung. From at least 1930 onwards, the 
writers of the review were very much aware that something perhaps catastrophic was 
occurring in Germany, and after the Nazi seizure of power, they lost no time in denouncing 
the regime to their readers. Our interest is not here in a detailed analysis of the stages of 
the APD's prise de conscience with regard to Nazism, but merely to indicate that the 
association could not be accused of political naivet6 with regard to Hitler. 195 
It is hardly surprising given the length and breadth of some of the cracks in the 
paradigm of old-style pacifism, that the APD should feel it necessary to institute an 
enqu9te on the crisis of pacifism. The review printed responses from a selected group of 
French pacifists whose views were thought to be fairly representative of the strands 
within the movement. 196 
Fascinating and varied as these responses are, our interest here must be limited to the 
development of this debate within the association itself, and the decisions it came to with 
regard to its brand of pacifism. The issue of a crisis in pacifism was thoroughly exposed 
and debated at the APD's 1933 annual general meeting in Paris. This AGM was really a 
stock-taking on the part of the association of its activities since the war in the face of a 
deteriorating national and international situation which caused everyone to ask whether 
pacifism had failed in its quest. Prudhommeaux' description of the meeting reads like a 
veritable litany of woes delivered in what he called an 'atmosphere singularly charged 
194 Th6odore Ruyssen, 'La nouvelle Crise du d6sarmement', PD 44,4/5 (April-May 1934), p. 186. 
19-5 See Henri Simondet, 'Les Elections Allemandes, PD 40,10 (October 1930), pp. 376-382; Henri 
Simondet, VAllemagne dans le gfichis', PD 43,2 (February 1933), pp. 62-67; Wilfred Monod, 
VAntisdn-dtisme et la Notion de Race, PD 43,6 (June 1933), pp. 198-200; Jules Prudhommeaux, 'Les 
paroles et les actes, PD 43,6 (June 1933), pp. 218-219 (about the divergence between Hitler's words of 
peace and the treatment being meted out to pacifists within German3ý- Jules Prudhommeaux, 'Et si 
I'Allemagne r6siste? - les sanctions 6conomiques', PD 43,11 (November 1933), pp. 458-460 ( in which 
Prudhommeaux envisaged the use of economic sanctions if Germany should refuse to rejoin the 
international community). Ruyssen can be forgiven for taking a view shared by many other people 
in late 1932, namely that the Nazi menace had reached the high tide mark in Germany and would 
now subside. See the account of Ruyssen's speech at the public meeting held during the 
association's AGM in Pau at the beginning of November 1932, In 'Notre Assernbl6e G&6rale, Pau, 
29 Octobre - ler Novernbre 193T, PD 42,12 (December 1932), pp. 518-520. 
196 The responses to the enquite were published in PD nos 43,10 to 44,3 (October 1933 to 
March 1934). The following people submitted responses to the question of what was the definition, 
the mission, and the very programme of pacifism: C. Bougld, Uon Brunschvicg, Max Hdbert, 
Georges Michon, Ch. Braibant, Mgr. E. Beaupin, Thomas Barclay, Paul Passy, Georges Guy-Grand, 
Gaston Richard, Henri La Fontaine, Maxime Leroy, C. -G. 'Picavet, Charles Rousseau, Mlle M. 
Angles, Georges Hoog, Andr6 D. T616dano, M. le Pasteur Roser, Jacques Bois, Marcel Ddat, M. le 
Pasteur J&equel, Roger Picard, and Charles Rist. 
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with bad electricity'. 197 The international situation wherever one looked offered nothing 
but irritation and disquiet. He enumerated the problems as follows: an inability on the 
part of nations, after the failure of the London Conference, to move beyond the most'sterile 
and deceiving of dogmas, that of economic autarchy'; the 'visible decline of the League of 
Nations attacked not only in its prestige but in its very existence, through treasons and 
repeated desertions'; the impending failure of the Disarmament Conference which after 
two years of discussions 'goes from one prorogation to another in order to hide its 
impotence7; and finally, the repeated failures and defeats of democracy in a Europe which 
seemed to be 'three quarters submerged by the rising tide of fascism998 The concept of 
'peace through justice' seemed at once an old and a still very young slogan to 
Prudhommeaux. The worst of it all was that the international situation was reflected in 
extraordinary divisions in the pacifist camp at a time when unity was of paramount 
importance. 
If only in France and in the world pacifists knew how to make a 
common front against the enemy in order not to be overcome! But 
never amongst us has the dispersion of efforts been larger in the 
domain of practical action, and never more profound the divisions 
in that of doctrine. 199 
Ruyssen presented the main report on the Crisis in Pacifism. He began by outlining the 
psychological reasons for pacifist confusion. Before the Great War, pacifist goals were 
modest and timid. The League had not yet been created. Pacifists fought war, according to 
Ruyssen, with a purely sentimental ideology and they had only one remedy to propose: 
voluntary arbitrations laid down in purely bilateral pacts. Two experiences completely 
overturned the world of primordial pacifism: the first was the Great War and the second, 
flowing out of it, was the creation of the League of Nations. These two events lay at the 
heart of the present pacifist confusion according to Ruyssen: 
From there the opposition which divides pacifists according to 
whether their thinking is don-driated by the one or by the other of 
these two experiences. For the first, it is the fact of the monstrous 
war which obsesses them, with its slaughter, its ruins, its 
abominations which renew every day for us the inexhaustable, 
ineluctable consequences. And thus, they feel rise in them a horror, 
a revolt, which obliges them to shout: 'Never again! Peace at any 
price! '. The others, on the contrary, are attached to the League of 
Nations, to its promises and its acts. And thence yet another new 
division in peoples' minds: certain of our members, shocked by the 
197 Jules Prudhornmeaux, 'Rapport Moral' in Jules Prudhornmeaux, 'Notre Assembl6e 
Cdndrale, Paris 30 et 31 d6cembre 1933', PD 44,2 (February 1934), pp. 53-58, also p. 49. 
198 Ibid, p. 49. 
199 Ibid. 
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impotence and the failures of the Geneva institution, denounce it as 
a dupery and look elsewhere. - in a return to the state of things 
before the war or in the 'dictatorship of the proletariat' - the 
solution to the problem. Others, the 'juridically! -Minded, seek to 
perfect, to complete, to reinforce the LoN, to draw out of it the 
super-state which will create Humanity. 200 
Ruyssen thought that there were three possible objections which could be made to the 
association's device Ia paix par le droit". The first was that there was an equivocation in 
the very definition of what droff stood for. This argument had been developed in Gaston 
Richard's response to the EnquNe and was one made by. AJain. 
If you only adn-dt of peace within justice or law, they say to us, you 
are throwing yourself outside reality, into a complete chimera. 
Because life is made of injustices ... To correct these abuses, you will take the beati possidentes to task - and it will be war, generator of 
new injustices. When will this eternal flight from justice end? One 
speaks of the right to love, of the right to happiness:. These are but 
aspirations, as chimerical as the absolute right of peoples to 
dispose of themselves. Understood thus, the right to peace is a 
fen-nent of revolt, of anarchy and of war... 201 
Thus, for Ruyssen, one had to content oneself with a peace founded upon positive law, 
always changing, always imperfect, always referring back to rules, to codes, to a sort of 
unwritten law. There was nothing absolute or metaphysical about this law; it was in 
constant evolution. And it was necessary in this system of law to have more than a judge. 
Sanctions were needed, in the first instance moral or economic sanctions, but in the final 
resoýt, force had to be there as a deterrent. 'This is, ' said Ruyssen, 'my totally realistic 
conception, in a still barbarous world, of peace through law'. 202 
There were two other approaches which could be taken. The first was conscientious 
objection which he said had been debated thoroughly enough at the Boulogne AGM. The 
APD's position was essentially that of the Ligue des Droits de Momme, namely that the 
conscience of the objector must be respected, but that conscientious objection as an organised 
movement was wrong and inefficacious in the struggle against warý03 
The final approach was the generalised version of a politicised conscientious objection, 
namely collective non-resistance in the face of aggression, or essentially the Challaye- 
Emery case discussed above. Ruyssen's argument against this option was simply that the 
case for this was based purely on opportunistic calculations of the potential risks entailed 
by a modem war. Challaye and Emery had both fought in the last war apparently 
20() Thdodore Ruyssen, 'La Crise du Pacifisme, in ibid, pp. 62-3. 
201 Ibid, p. 63. 
202 Ibid., p. 64. 
2D3 Ibid. 
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without any qualms. Ruyssen asked, therefore, whether one was not permitted to wonder if 
the risks of a modem war were not being exaggerated, and if so, at what level of destruction 
a war became unfightable. The advocates of non-resistance also made much of the 
difficulty of knowing who the aggressor was in a modem war, but Ruyssen responded that 
the League ought to be able to develop some competence in this area, and that nations ought 
to agree not to pursue any war beyond their own frontiers. But the clinching argument, in 
his mind, was that by disarming totally and announcing in advance that one would not 
fight, far from lessening aggression, one was actually encouraging it in a very fallen 
world. 204 
The debate was lively to say the least. There seemed to be a general tendency at this 
AGM to blame the Treaties of 1919 for all of the problems faced by Europe. Jeanne Mdlin 
came right out and said that Hitler was the result of Versailles. 205 A-M. Bloch argued 
that Ruyssen was too willing to accept the insufficiencies of 'positive law', and that what 
the association must continue to do was proclaim the ideal or 'pure' state of law to which 
international relations might attain. The hardline minority group was led by Jacques Bois, 
a professeur agrigi de philosophie, and Rend Valfort, who argued that it was a nonsense to 
try to achieve peace through law. Either peace was one's dominant concern, or else the law 
and justice were the primary values. One could not have it both ways. If justice were 
predominant in the mind of the APD, then logically one had to admit that the 
associatiores device could easily become, in times of international tension, la paix par la 
guerre or le droit par la guerre. Bois argued in his brilliant, if a little sophistical, response 
to the enquate on the crisis of pacifism, that the only strictly logical approach for a 
pacifist was to believe in the achievement of peace through peace. 206 
In addition to the polarity which existed between Ruyssen and the tenants of the old- 
style pacifism on the one hand, and the proponents of a more integral pacifism on the other, 
there was an intermediate position typified by Jules Prudhommeaux who argued that 
pacifists should lead the way towards the acceptance of the rule of the League of Nations, 
in cases of international aggression. He proposed that the League should constitute a sort of 
#mutual assistance society' which by its international authority would pronounce on the 
rights and wrongs of international conflicts and organise an 'immediate chastisement' 
against any nation attacking another. He believed that this chastisement could very well 
204 Ibid, pp. 64-65. 
205 Cited in Jules Prudhommeaux, 'Notre Assembl6e Gdndrale (Suite)', PD 44,3 (March 1934), 
P. 99. 
206 lbid, pp. 97-99; see also Jacques Bois, 'Enqu6te sur la Crise du Pacifisme, R6ponse de M. 
Jacques Bois, PD 44,2 (February 1934), pp. 74-77. 
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consist of economic sanctions which if effectively and unanimously applied would bring any 
nation quickly to its knees. 207 
But as one member pointed out,, Prudhommeaux' proposal did nothing to resolve the 
problem of how to respond to aggression in the hic et nunc. The organisation he envisaged 
did not ye t exist, or at least only in embryonic form. Georges Cadier remarked that 
Ruyssen's analysis was completely realistic, but that Prudhommeaux had his eyes turned 
towards the future and the ideal. And Ruyssen intervened to say that if he and 
Prudhommeaux appeared to be in opposition, they were in fact in agreement in essentials. 
It was only in their respective approaches to the present reality that they differed: 
On fundamentals we are in agreement. But we approach the 
problem from different levels of reality. If the great problem of 
the organisation of peace were resolved, if there existed a 
universal League of Nations, controllin& in a completely disarmed 
world, a force which could impose itself on everybody, then, fine, 
the national defence would be useless. But M. Bloch has said it: 
the repugnance of the great nations for undertaking agreements of 
mutual assistance is the sad fact which must be taken into account. 
There are still - Japan is an example - governments -of prey. 
Aggression is still possible, that is the present; the league of 
nations, super-state, obeyed by all, that is the future .... 
208 
A composite resolution was hammered out which took into account A. -M. Bloch's 
arguments about the need to bring existing 'positive' law more into line with the 
association's vision of an 'ideal' law. The resolution was divided into three sections. The 
first proclaimed that the Association remained true to its device and its traditional 
programme. By'Droit', it understood the 'ensemble of positive international institutions, 
anabgous to those which assure a relative order within states, comprising 1. 'precise rules 
governing the relations between states, ' 2. 'appropriate procedures for the handling 
without exception of international differences', and 3. 'an international system of sanctions 
capa . ble of quelling any attempt made by a state to pursue its national policies by force,. 209 
The second section underlined the Association's view of the world and the style of 
pacifism appropriate to it. Far from considering the present system of international law as 
the definitive expression of the 'needs of human society', the association recognised that 
above the present positive law, there existed an ideal state of international law which 
had yet to be achieved. More particularly, it recognised that the treaties of 1919 were not 
intangible and that a revision of certain articles thereof was necessary. It believed 
furthermore that. the League of Nations was a partial realisation of the state of ideal law, 
207 lbid, (Assembl6e Gdndrale), pp98-99. 
208 lbid, pp. 99-101. 
209 Ibid, p. 107. 
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and it remained resolved to seek its further development and improvement. It noted that 
the League had been greatly weakened by the failure to resolve the crisis in the Far East, 
by the indefinite adjournment of the disarmament idea, by the withdrawal of Japan and 
Germany, and that as a result it found itself in 1933 in a weakened position incapable of 
guaranteeing respect for law in the world. As a consequence of this it was only natural that 
the peoples would continue to seek their salvation elsewhere. The continuing inequality in 
national armaments nevertheless created a system in which no state could be sure of its 
security. This led states to seek security in offensive alliances and in an arms race which 
could lead directly to war. The Association saw no possible solution for law or for peace 
outside a revivified and widened League of Nations, a League which would be capable of 
constituting a genuine 'mutual Protection Society against War' for its members. For this to 
be possible, not only moral and economic sanctions, but also an international police force 
would have to be instituted. 210 
Finally, in a third section, the Association declared that while it was the duty of all 
pacifists to hasten the glad day when the international regime described above would 
become reality, in the interim it was necessary to support the idea of the national defence, 
despite the insufficiencies and perils it enshrined, because it 'constituted in a world still 
subjected to the evil forces of the past, a vital necessity, carrying with it for all citizens the 
exercise of their duty of national solidarity'. 211 
The first section of the resolution was passed unanimously minus one vote. The second 
and third sections were passed by eighty-four votes to eight, although as Prudhommeaux 
took pains to remark in his account of the Assembly, the vote was taken purely as an 
indication of feeling within the association and was without binding value. 212 
Thus ended the pivotal period of 1928 to 1933 for the APD. It had faced and dealt with 
the challenges posed to its conception of the world and the pacifist's place in it by 
reaffirming in its essentials the doctrine it had nearly always held. There was dissent - of 
varying degrees - within the association but in terms of its outward programme little had 
changed. It had encountered, examined and rejected conscientious objection as an acceptable 
method for pacifism, while at the same time demanding the recognition of the rights of 
conscience of individual objectors. In this it followed the same course as the Ligue des 
Droits de Momme. Closely allied to the problem of objection, but quite distinct in the 
APD's mind, was the question of integral pacifism. This was rejected outright as a position 
likely to lead to war rather than prevent it. In the face of an increasingly splintered, 
balkanised French peace movement, the APD continued to believe strongly in the necessity 
210 Ibid., pp. 107-108. 
211 Ibid, p. 10& 
212 Ibid, p. 106. 
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of union, but it came to see in the period under discussion that differences in method between 
the various strands of French pacifism necessarily precluded such an arrangement. As we 
shall see in the next chapter, even within the confines of old-style pacifism, of the 
pacifism which saw as its reason for existence the support of the League of Nations, there 
was hesitancy and finally refusal on the part of the APD to consider outright union with 
other like-minded groups. ýut more importantly, the period 1928-1933 marked the parting 
of the ways between the old approach to the problem of peace and the integral pacifism 
which was creating for itself both a doctrine and a programme in those years. Finally, the 
period under discussion in this chapter clearly shows the impact the worsening 
international situation had upon the pacifist optimism of the twenties. The post- 
Versailles world was breathing its last, French hegemony in Europe had passed, and the 
spectre of Nazi-inspired revanchisme across the Rhine was beginning to produce a certain 
degree of Angst in France. We turn now to an examination of the impact of the rise of 
pessimism on the pacifism of the APD in the period from 1933 to 1938. 
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1.6. The Rise of Pessimism (1933-1938). 
If one can speak of changing paradigms within the peace movement in the interwar 
period, it was even more the case that the Nazi seizure of power represented a sea-change 
of such proportions that'after 1933 it was no longer possible to discuss European politics in 
the same manner as before. The arrival of Hitler in the German Reichskanzlei s thus an 
event of conspicuous importance to a study of French pacifism. It changed the nature of the 
Franco-German political debate and in so doing it fundamentally altered the content and 
boundaries of the pacifist response to that debate. The tenants of the old-style pacifism 
were much quicker to realise the importance of the Nazi seizure of power and to adjust to it 
accordingly than were the proponents of new-style pacifism, as we shall see in the 
following section. This is not to say that they immediately understood the Nazi menace. 
They did not. But their political prise de conscience in the post-1933 world of international 
politics was much quicker than that of some other pacifists. This was undoubtedly a 
function of the APD's fervent attachment to the cause of justice. The Association, much like 
the Ligue Internationale des Fernmes pour la Paix et la Libert&, was a bicephalous entity. 
If, during the twenties, this attachment to justice produced a narrowness of spirit and a 
certain rigidity of approach to the problem of peace, it became in the thirties a source of 
strength and insight when faced with the dubious proclamations of peace proffered by the 
Nazis. Running parallel to this clear-sightedness, however, was a tendency for some 
members of the APD wittingly or unwittingly to allow Fascist Italy and Nazi Germay to 
set the tone of the political agenda in Europe for the latter half of the interwar period. 
Let us begin this section by exarniýng briefly the reaction of the APD to the Nazi 
seizure of power and the changing evaluation of what Nazism meant for the peace of 
Europe up until about 1938. It is clear that Ruyssen especially recognised the dangers posed 
by Hitler very early on, although equally there seemed to be surprise that he had been 
successful in his bid for power. In his first comment on the Machtergreifung, Ruyssen set the 
tone for much of his future commentary by arguing for a cautious, careful, but far from 
pessimistic approach to the new Germany. He believed war to be possible, but not probable 
given the general economic distress then reigning and the stiII-fresh memories of the last 
war on both sides of the Rhine. But equally, it was clear that the peace was in danger. The 
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rise of Nazism was largely a function of what Ruyssen now recognised to be the negative 
aspects of the treaties of 1919 'which have imposed on the vanquished bad borders', 
together with the economic crisis and the weakness of the democracies. 213 He remained 
convinced of the need for Franco-German reconciliation as 'the essential condition of the 
pacification of Europe'. 214 It had to be frankly adn-dtted however, that conciliatory 
gestures from across the Rhine were few and far between. One could not be a pacifist alone. 
Peace was a communal effort, and if the desire for peace were not reciprocated across the 
Rhine then that left the peace-loving countries two alternatives: a war of defence or else 
peace in servitude. 'Choose who dares', he said! 215 What was needed was a pacifist sang- 
froid in the face of the challenges of Fascism and Nazism. He believed that general and 
simultaneous disarmament should continue to figure on the pacifist platform but it could 
never be a question of unilateral disarmament. Above all, the League of Nations needed to 
be supported and strengthened. 216 
.A co uple of months later, Ruyssen addressed the issue of whether Hitler could be taken 
at his word. In his speech to the Reichstag on 17 May 1933 Hitler had made the usual 
attacks on the Versailles Treaty but had also made some conciliatory statements designed 
for public consumption outside Germany - assurances that war was unthinkable. Ruyssen 
thought there were the best reasons in the world to doubt Hitlees sincerity given that but 
four days previously, von Papen had revealed to the world that the word 'pacifisrn! had 
been struck from the German vocabulary. German pacifists were either in prison or else in 
exile abroad. Thus, for Ruyssen, the olive branch extended by Hitter had to be treated 
with the utmost caution. It was no longer good enough to maintain that there were two 
Germany's - one peaceful and the other bellicose. The most that could be said was that 
within the newly united National Socialist version of Germany, there were two competing 
tendencies. He thought he saw the tempering hand of the Wilhelmstrasse behind Hitler's 
speech and that was a good omen. In answer to his question, 'where are we going then? ', he 
replied that 'all depends on the solidity of the moral front which Germany, to its great 
surprise, has just re-established against herself', 217 and he put his faith in the 
Disarmament Conference. 
The APD certainly did not lack for warnings about the situation in Germany from 
German pacifists. Hellmuf von Gerlach, writing in the June 1933 number of the PD, 
discussed the idea of a preventive war against Hitler which some 'pacifists' apparently 
were advocating. Von Gerlach rejected such a notion categorically as against the pacifist 
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ideal. He underlined that Hitlerism was a danger to peace, 'but it is not a guaranteed war; 
this must be the line taken by all pacifists,. 218 That said, he warned French pacifists 
about the dangers posed by weak thinking in opposing Hitler. 'He who preaches the 
doctrine of Tolstoy today in a country like France would assume a terrible responsibility; to 
apply it to a Hitler would be an invitation to the use of force. 2-19 
There was a fine line separating calls for Franco-German rapprochement with the eyes 
wide open, and the calls of some pacifists for a rapprochement with Nazi Germany maýgri 
tout. Ruyssen exemplified the former position with his early insight into t. he nature of 
Nazism and his continued hope in a peaceful future for Europe, contained within the 
parameters of a cautious modus vivendi with the Third Reich. The latter position, 
however, was typified by R6gis de Vibraye at the association's 1933 AGM. De Vibraye 
presented a report entitled 'Is an entente with Germany impossible?, 220 which by virtu. e of 
its political myopia seemed to open the way to the collaborationism of Vichy. De Vibraye 
was too willing by far to exculpate Hitler, to the point of claiming that Mein Kampf was 
an aberration of youth, written in the heat of the Ruhr crisis. 221 He warned against 
accepting the 'unintelligent' and 'nefarious' policies proposed by German imigris. He 
qualified Blurn! s desire to put Germany in quarantine as 'dangerous, and viewed the threat 
of German expansionism in eastern Europe with equanimity. France, and not Germany, 
according to Vibraye, had become the anomaly in Europe with its rotten parliamentary 
institutions. As far as a potentiý. al Anschluss with Austria was concerned, de Vibraye 
S declared that if 'the Aqchluss occurred with our participation, it would consolidate the 
peace. Let us be arbitrators and not adversaries'. 222 Small comfort for democratic 
Austrians. 
Von Gerlach attacked de Vibrayes naivetd and declared that he could not share his 
views on Hitler's sincerity. In his view, it was clear that Hitler spoke two messages: one 
for internal German consumption, and the other for the listening world outside Germany's 
borders. Between Nazi Germany and democratic France there e)dsted a'redoubtable moral 
antagonism'. 223 Wolfgang Hallgarten, another German present at the AGM, took a much 
softer view, arguing that Hitler should be given time to evolve in the more anodyne 
direction of a Mussolini. All dictators want to retain power, and in his view this meant 
that Hitler would gradually become more amenable. 224 De Vibraye finished the debate by 
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calling for France to put 'her reason, her logic, her experience of revolutions' to the service 
of Hitlerian Germany, and thus work, 'without dangerous illusion but also without a 
discouraged pessimism, towards a Franco-German rapprochement. '22-5 
There are other examples of this multiplicity of attitudes towards the conditions of 
Franco-German rapprochement within the APD. They made clear that for some pacifists 
the betterment of relations between France and Germany had become an end in itself, 
devoid of moral and political content. Mlle Hdlene Lhoumeau, the daughter of Pastor 
Lhoumeau, president of the Poitou federation of the association, wrote in a letter published 
in the review that after a prolonged period spent abroad working as an official of the 
League of Nations, she had the impression on her return to France that the pacifist 
movement had been'chlorofonned' and 'emptied ... of all dynamic force. 
226 'Me bottom line 
was Franco-German rapprochement and she believed that it was founded upon a 
misunderstanding. Instead of trying to understand Germany as it was, France was trying to 
impose upon it a democratic face which conformed to its own conceptions. She believed, on 
the contrary, that if a rapprochement with Germany was desired (and she certainly 
-desired it), then it would have to be with Hitlerian Germany, and not with an exiled 
minority. 227 
But German voices continued to be raised against the idea that a rapprochement on 
Germany's terms was possible or desirable. Friedrich Wilhelm Foerster, the veteran 
German pacifist, pleaded in an 1935 article published by the review for a 'pacifism 
without illusions'. 228 Foerster warned the French of the dangers they faced in Nazi 
Germany, predicting with amazing prescience the return of the Polish territories to 
Germany, the Anschluss, the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, the colonisation and 
penetration of Russia, and finally the consolidation of an Eastern Bloc which would turn 
against the WesL229 If some of the points of this prophecy were never fulfilled it was 
surely only providential. Foerster's prescriptions for pacifist action were three-fold; first, 
stop any thought of treaty revision; secondly, it had to be demonstrated that the Corridor 
and the other limitations placed upon the German borders by Versailles were just and 
necessary and designed to repair historical damage from earlier wars; and thirdly, with 
regard to disarmament, Foerster said that it was an outright lie to say that Germany was 
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disarmed - the Allied powers needed to seek some clarifications from Germany and pursue 
an energetic policy. 2M 
There was thus much debate within the APD about the proper course to take in dealing 
with Nazi Germany. On the one hand was the Ruyssen camp which seemed to exhibit 
remarkably clear-sighted opinions on the nature of Nazism, and on the other hand were 
the occasional writers, perhaps representing a minority view within the association, who 
continued to press for a more indulgent approach to the new Gen-nany. It is instructive to 
consider just how much the entire commentary of the APD in these years - from both 
tendencies within it - was in fact determined by the pronouncements of Nazi Germany, or to 
a lesser extent, Fascist Italy. One has very much the impression that the pacifist camp, 
and other elements of French political society as well, had been reduced to the underdog 
role of reacting to events across the Rhine ratheK than determining them. 
A further example of this is the way in which Fascist claims of the need for more 
living space, more markets, more primary materials and so on became part and parcel of the 
pacifist debate within the APD at the time of the buildup to the Ethiopian War. For 
example, at the 1935 AGM, two well-meaning reports were presented, one on the division of 
primary. materials in the world, and the second on the problem of over-population in 
certain countries. In both cases Italy was cited as a prime example of a country which was 
relatively over-populated and had access to very limited supplies of primary 
materials. 231 None of the statements made, nor for that matter the conclusions reached, 
can be reproached in the slightest for illiberality or obvious fascist content as such, but it is 
surely not coincidental that in a year in which Germany was beginning to flex its muscle, 
and more importantly, Italy was beginning to embroil itself in Ethiopia for precisely the 
issues raised in these two reports, the Association should have chosen to discuss them at its 
annual congress. In a completely unconscious way, the associatiorVs political agenda was 
being subtly set by forces well outside, and antithetical to, the pacifist camp. 
Even someone as astute as Ruyssen, however, could be misled by the Nazi propaganda 
machine. Certainly up until 1935 or 1936, the APD's analysis of Nazism tended to oscillate 
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from rejection of what Hitler said, to scepticism, through to acceptance. No doubt the 
desire for peace was so strong that it conditioned to some extent the response the tenants of 
old-style pacifism made to German peace overtures. In late November 1933, 
Prudhommeaux could write rather contemptuously of Hitler's Pacifism oratoire, taking a 
sceptical attitude towards his sincerity but arguing at the same time that France should 
take Hitler at his word and see how far meaningful discussions could actually proceed. 232 
In 1935, to give some measure of the oscillation which beset the APD in these first years of 
the Third Reich, Ruyssen responded quite warmly to Hitler's speech to the Reichstag of 21 
May, declaring that it was a 'categorical affirmation of peac&. 233 He took a similar line 
at the time of the Saw - plebiscite. He was disappointed that the vote went in favour of 
Germany, but declared that it had to be respected. Other problems remained to be sorted 
out with the Hitler government - the disarmament problem, Austria, Poland and so on - but 
Ruyssen saw in Hitler's speech after the plebiscite results became known, a declaration of 
his peaceful intentions: 
Assuredly, the declaration made by M. Hitler as soon as the result 
of the plebiscite was known, constitutes a precious element of 
appeasement. There is no longer, the Fuehrer affirms, any 
territorial argument between France and Germany; let us take note 
of that and let us not push away the hand that reaches out to us. 234 
A. Bloch, the vice-president of the Lorraine group of the APD, wrote an article in 1934 
in which he argued that in the world as it was, pacifists would be obliged to work with 
men who despised and hated the very ideas they stood for. The interwar years had been 
ones of mistakes: Versailles, the failure to disarm when the opportunity was there in the 
twenties, and the failure to negotiate more agreements with Weimar Germany which now 
left France in the position of having to treat with Hitler. Opportunities had been lost and 
now one had to do business 4h Hitler. It was a 'mortal folly' to think that this could be 
done with one's eyes closed, using the ideas of Tolstoyan pacifism. He expressed the desire 
that 
our friends in the minority, our brothers in the ideal, might leave 
their dream world and rally around us on the basis of our resolution 
of last December: that of a vigorously non-conformist and 
revisionist pacifism, energetically set against the injustices, the 
hypocrisies of the treaties, but no less resolved to resist all 
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attempts at violence, that is to say of injustice, for violence is unjust 
in its very principle. 235 
This seems to embody the central point in the APD's response to early Nazism: the 
necessity of negotiating and working with the Nazi regime in good faith, but without any 
illusions or false ideas about the sincerity of its statements. 
The fervent desire to believe Hitler's words was gradually shattered by his actions. 
The events of the thirties, far more than the pacific platitudes of Hitler, caused the scales 
to fall from pacifist eyes. The three crucial events up until 1938 were undoubtedly the re- 
militarisation of the Rhineland which spelled the end of post-Versailles Locamo Europe, 
the Abyssinian war which brought international fascism aggressively out of the closet, and 
finally, the trauma of the Spanish Civil War which became a trial. of conscience for many 
pacifists everywhere. 
The growing sense of an impending conflict in Ethiopia preoccupied the APD in mid- 
1935. The review published a number of articles and appeals in connection with what was 
occurring in Africa. Charles Rousseau in an article examining the juridical side of the 
conflict concluded that Italy had no business whatsoever in Ethiopia on the basis of the 
tripartite agreement of 13 December 1906, the bilateral Italo-Abyssinian friendship treaty 
of 2 August 1928, and more to the point on the basis of the League Covenant and the 
Kellogg-Briand Pact of which both nations were signatories. 236 The Executive Committee 
of the Association, in a meeting on 21 July transmitted to En-dle Borel, the president of the 
FWration Franqaise des Associations pour la Soci6t6 des Nations, a resolution on the 
nascent conflict in which it recommended financial, economic and if need be, military, 
sanctions against Italy. 237 Likewise, at the end of August, Ruyssen in his capacity as 
president of the association, sent a message to the Conference for the Defence of the 
Ethiopian People held in Paris on 3 September. He underlined that the APD gladly 
associated itself with the efforts of other groups to defend Ethiopian independence against 
Italian aggression. The association 'categorically condemned the attack against the 
system of collective security and the League of Nations' by the actions of a member state 
against another member state before any peaceful means had been sought to resolve the 
conflict. 238 But as another indication of how fascist demands cloaked under the guise of 
imperialist equity were being allowed to set the agenda for the APD, Ruyssen then went on 
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to weaken his argument by stating that the juridical aspect of the problem was only one 
side of it. The other aspect which had to be considered was Italy's need for more living 
room and access to more raw materials and markets for its industry. Thus, while 
'categorically' condemning the Italian position, Ruyssen had in a sense justified it. He 
recommended that the League explore ways of extending the mandate system 'to all 
territories in which th e population is not yet in a state to administer itself according to the 
principles of civilisation'. 239 Similar sentiments were contained in a letter addressed to 
Pierre Laval on behalf of the association by Ruyssen and Prudhommeaux on 3 September. 240 
In October 1935 the APD published the text of an appeal to the French people by the 
English League of Nations Union in favour of a common front and collective action against 
Italian aggression in Ethiopia. A French umbrella group, the Comit6 d'Action pour la SDN 
responded with a similar text underlining that it was happy to see the British finally won 
over to the collective security argument which France had been propounding for years. 241 
The APD welcomed the British initiative whole-heartedly, but emphasised. the dangers 
for France if it should refuse to go along with the British proposals: 
The French must not hide from themselves [the fact] ... that at this 
truly crucial hour, what is being proposed in reality is the 
prevention by a timely intimidation of an aggression in Europe or in 
any other part of the world .... France is at the cross-roads. Which 
part will she choose? .... For if Great Britain, decided today to 
serve with all her energy and all her power the cause of peace and 
of justice, were not to be, as she expects, followed right to the end by 
our country in this work of communal salvation, for which she has 
assumed the greatest risks, would it not result from this in a more or 
less immediate future, a 'withdrawal' of English policy which 
would have the most serious consequences for France? 242 
When war finally did break out, the APD was pleased to see that the sanctions 
mechanism of the League appeared, at least initially, to work rather well. What was of 
most concern, however, was the effect the crisis had had on the Entente Cordiale. The 
British government had seen its position in Africa supported at best only lukewz6y by the 
French, whom Rousseau reproached for having done what Stresemann had been accused of 
239 lbid, p. 340. 
240 Tettre A M. Pierre Laval, prdsident du Conseil, ministre des Affaires Etrangýres, PD 45,9 
(September 1935), pp340-341. 
241 Both texts are contained in La Paix par le Droit, 'Un Appel a I'Opinion Franqaise. Que fera 
la France? ', PD 45,10 (October 1935), pp. 386-390. The French were happy to see the British finally 
accepting the collective security argument. It will be remembered that Pierre Cot had underlined 
this as one of the fundamental differences between the French and the British conceptions of the 
organisation of peace. See Pierre Cot, 'La Conception Franqaise de la Lutte contre la Guerre, PD 39, 
4/5 (April-May 1929), pp. 164-170. 
242 lbid, 'Un Appel-, p. 389. 
98 
doing in the past: 'on a finassg'. 243 The English had asked for naval support in the 
Mediterranean, and the French had replied by demanding assurances of support in a future 
potential conflict with Germany over Austria or Czechoslovakia. This only displaced the 
problem and irritated the British without resolving it. Rousseau warned that the two 
essential planks of French foreign policy, the Entente Cordiale and the League of Nations, 
were in danger of be6g lost in the Ethiopian affair. 244 In a retrospective look at the crisis 
Georges Scelle concurred with this analysis and condemned the Laval government for 
reneging on the policies of collective security pursued by France for fifteen years at the very 
moment when Britain seemed to have come round to a French view of this issue. 245 France's 
moral position as one of 'fidelity to the defence of justice' had been lost: 
Henceforth, it is understood in Geneva that France, in defending for 
fifteen years the thesis of collective security, has been thinking 
only of saving herself against the renascent and dreaded power of 
Gennany. 246 
What is interesting in all of these analyses of the Ethiopian conflict is precisely the 
straight-forward res ponse to Italian aggression by the writers of the APD. In an earlier 
time, this insistence on 'justice' and the necessity of defending it, if necessary by arms, 
would have been the province of the Right, and hardly of a 'pacifist' journal of largely 
Radical inspiration. But times had changed and with them the norms of political 
behaviour. Rousseau noted the confusion the Ethiopian conflict had caused in the French 
nationalist camp, where it had been expected that the aggr+ to be faced in the thirties 
would be Germany. Candide had asked, 'Do you want to die for the Negus? '. but as 
Rousseau pointed out, Frenchmen had not been asked in 1914 if they wanted to die for 
Sarajevo, and it was now becoming questionable what the attitude of the Right would be if 
asked to die (potentially) for Memel or Austrian independence tomorrow. 247 
The Ethiopian conflict was the subject of a report and resolution presented by Georges 
Scelle to the Association's Marseille Congress in late December 1935. Scelle argued for the 
rigorous application of the Covenant and the defence of justice, which coincided exactly 
with France's interests in his view. 248 He declared that the situation far surpassed the 
confines of a purely Italo-Ethiopian conflict; the complete 'organisation of peace was in 
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danger'. 249 The 200-odd persons present at the Congress agreed with his analysis. A 
resolution, 'voted by acclamations', expressed the congress'alarm at the confusion in French 
public opinion on the Ethiopian war, and went on to demand the firm application of the 
League Covenant in order that other nations considering aggression n-dght be deterred 
therefrom. 2,50 
The re-militarisation of the Rhineland and the abrogation of the Locarno accords 
which it spelled, brought the growing threat of expansionist international fascism closer 
home to most Frenchmen. It came at a time of deepening ambiguity in the attitude of the 
French Right to Hitler. Ruyssen noted this growing equivocation in the interview accorded 
by Hitler to Bertrand de Jouvenel and published in Paris-Midi on 27 February: 
An effort at clear-sightedness is all the more necessary since as a 
result of a reaction as curious as it was spontaneous, the remarks of 
the Fuehrer were received with marked favour by the same 
nationalist milieux which a couple of years ago applauded the 
occupation of the Ruhr and regarded the Weimar Republic with an 
incurable suspicion. Now, one finds in general nothing but 
reservations and scepticism in the so-called leftwing papers which 
for so long regarded Franco-German rapprochement as the surest 
means of guaranteeing the security of France against the perilous 
uncertainties of the present. 2-51 
The de Jouvenel interview was remarkable not for what Hitler said, but for the 
questions which de Jouvenel left unasked and hence unanswered. Ruyssen presciently 
predicted that on one issue, the future status of the west bank of the Rhine, the Nazis 
would soon move. They did, even as Ruyssen was writing his article. 
Ruyssen condemned the remilitarisation of the Rhineland as completely against 
international law and as the first step leading to war, in the East if not in the West. He 
saw clearly that Hitler was trying to neutralise the help France could give to the USSR 
and its other allies in Eastern Europe, 'in a word, take as many guarantees as possible for 
the success of the next war, to which the Reich is here and now resolved'. 252 It would, of 
course, also facilitate greatly the Anschluss of Austria. What to do? Simply take 
Germany at its word and demand that as a proof of its oft-trumpeted desire for peace, it 
withdraw its troops from the Rhine and then negotiate in good faith a solution to all of the 
outstanding treaty problems. And if Germany should refuse this proposal, Ruyssen 
advocated not instituting a system of sanctions against it which would almost surely lead 
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to war, but rather of watching Germany's every gesture and of refusing to have the 
slightest meaningful diplomatic contact with it. The problem was, as Ruyssen now 
realised, that Hitlerian Germany no longer had the same concept of international law as 
the rest of the world. For it, the only valid law was now national law, and that emanated 
not from evolving juridical concepts, but rather from the person of the Fuehrer himself. He 
realised that on this basis it had become impossible to have meaningful conversations with 
the German government because the two systems of legal thought now represented 
completely distinct and non-interlocking sets. 253 Ruyssen's conclusions about what to do in 
response to the Rhineland crisis were simply the following: 
Neither repression, nor concessions; let us avoid war, but let us not 
offer to a partner from whom everything separates us the 
guarantees of a negotiated peace; no economic blockade, which 
would only cause the innocent to suffer, but a sort of moral 
quarantine, that it would be most profitable to organise within the 
framework of the League of Nations - the reaction of nations 
resolved to maintain the peace against any positive aggression by 
Hitlerian Germany. 254 
Prudhommeaux once again took a much softer line than Ruyssen. He 'begged' the 
French government not to take an irreparable step, and he called on Britain to make its 
voice of moderation heard. Clearly for Prudhommeaux, the time to stop negotiating with 
Hitler had not yet come. He admitted that there was much in the Nazi system that was 
repulsive but he urged an examination of the German position to see what constructive 
policies for general European peace might emerge from it. 2-55 
Charles Rousseau, too, rejected the arguments of some parts of public opinion and of 
some pacifists, that Hitler was after all merely demanding equality for Germany in the 
international sphere. This was a very simplistic and therefore very dangerous view of the 
situation. He asked rhetorically whether 'the existence of a demilitarised zone has 
therefore become a dishonour? '256 'Like Ruyssen, Rousseau centred the problem on the 
completely different conception of international law held by the Nazis. Locarno had been 
a glimmer of hope in the regulation of European affairs, but now he foresaw Nazi 
aggression in the East as a result of its abrogation. The blame for the Rhineland disaster 
had to be laid at the feet of the French nationalists who were complaining now about the 
lukewarm English reaction, while only six months previously they had been unwilling to 
support British action in Ethiopia. The man on the street was incapable of an objective 
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254 Ibid, p. 142. 
255 Jules Prudhommeaux, 'France et Allemagne. Le P&W, PD 46,3 (March 1936), pp. 143-145. 
256 Charles Rousseau, 'La ddnonciation des Trait6s de Locarno devant le Droit International', 
PD 46,4 (April 1936), p. 196. 
101 
view of the situation and completely uninterested in collective security, and the 
government did not have the courage or the intelligence to seek to convince him 
otherwise. 257 He underlined, too, the differences between the Hitlerian and Geneva 
conceptions of peace. The former put the 'vital rights' of the German people above 
everything, and Rousseau found it difficult to see how this could be reconciled with the 
ideas of the League. He concluded by reiterating his belief that peace and justice must be 
linked: 
For us - and despite the fact that one French journalist has gone so 
far as to write that peace took precedence over justice258 - we 
believe that to refuse today to base peace upon the force of law is to 
resign oneself tomorrow to suffering a peace imposed by the law of 
force. 259 
The rise of pessin-dsm was capped in 1936 by the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War. 
The first comment in the review came from the pen of Charles Rousseau who argued in the 
early autumn of 1936 for strict non-intervention and neutrality in the Spanish conflict. 'In 
this powder-keg which is the Europe of 1936', he wrote, 'the hour has not come for 
proselytism but for prudence'A0 The desire of some extreme left-wing circles and indeed of 
some 'pacifists' for intervention in Spain had created an 'intervention mystiqu&. 261 In his 
view the over-riding concern had to be that the general European situation was highly 
inflammable, no matter what one's sympathies were for the Popular Front or the fears one 
might have at the thought of a third Fascist state on France's borders. The only sane 
policy was strict non-intervention and he ren-dnded Frenchmen that the war of 1870 had 
also begun in SpainA2 
There is no doubting where the APD's sympathies lay in the Spanish Civil War. For 
the good republicans of the association the Spanish dilemma was nothing short of tragic, 
but the general consensus seemed to be that Spain was not worth fighting for, that the 
ostensibly civil nature of the conflict had to be respected and that, above all else, Spain's 
trauma must be prevented from becoming a generalised European conflict. The latter point 
especially was the essential concern. Very early on, however, the writers of the review 
knew full well that the democracies' attempts at non-intervention were being made a 
mockery of by the Axis powers. Even in Rousseau's early article cited above, fears were 
257 Ibid, p. 197. 
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voiced at the 'one-way abstention' in the provision of arms to the combatants. 263 There 
was thus no illusion about the possibility of isolating the Spanish conflict from the rest of 
European society. The decision that had to be taken was whether or not to support the 
Spanish government knowing that it might lead to an escalation of the conflict. This the 
APD decided it could not do. 
The Association debated the Spanish question at its Congress held in Clermont-Ferrand 
in late December 1936. Henri Guernut, honorary Secretary-General of the Ligue des Droits 
de Momme presented a report and resolution on Spain, which was supplemented by two 
further resolutions from Ruyssen and J. Lahargue. Guernut said that France had bravely led 
the way in non-intervention, but it had not been followed. In the face of Italian and 
German duplicity, the question of intervention raised itself once again. It was heartily 
supported by the CGT and the Communists, but Guernut argued against it because to go back 
on her word would only serve to alienate France's ally Britain. The British, he ren-dnded 
his listeners, had sympathy for neither one side nor the other in the Spanish Civil 
War. 264 Guernut's resolution which was passed unanimously by the Congress did not have 
the courage of its convictions however. It admitted that the French government had 
subordinated 'its concern for the law, international usages, political friendship and 
military advantage! to the higher goal of Peace. 265 It had asked other nations to do the 
same, but had not been followed by the fascist powers. Rather than draw the obvious 
conclusions from this sorry state of events, however, Guernut went on to recommend that 
Italy and Germany be given one more chance to come round to the French view. The policy 
of non-intervention, organised internationally, was to be attempted yet again, and then, 
and only then, if Germany and Italy refused to play according to the rules, sanctions might 
be applied. But that was some way down the road, and in the meantime, the APD (along 
with many other Frenchmen) hoped against hope that the Axis would see the light and co- 
operate. 266 Ruyssen's resolution called for an armistice to be arranged under the aegis of 
the League, and followed by a popular consultation in Spain. 267 The third resolution, that 
by J. Lahargue, reflected again the concerns for the economic arguments justifying fascist 
aggression which have already been noted in connection with the Ethiopian conflict. It 
spoke of taking the legitimate economic needs of these powers into consideration and 
reaching an economic arrangement which would 'relieve the econon-dc distress of the less 
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well-favoured peoples'. 268 This sort of attitude on the part of the APD implied an 
unfortunate and unconscious acceptance of the attempts at rationalisation employed by the 
Nazi and Fascist regimes in order to justify their expansionist and aggressive policies. 
Ruyssen had already pressed this idea in a letter to Yvon Delbos, the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, together with the idea of creating areas of sanctuary in Spain for the disarmed 
and innocent populationý69 
1936 was not a good year for the pacifists of the APD. The international situation 
seemed to be cracking apart at the seams and no one seemed quite sure what to do about it. 
As Ruyssen lamented at the end of the year, 'We have not changed, despite the treason of 
men and of events'. 270 In early 1937 he issued an invitation to the association's members to 
join in celebrations of the APD's fiftieth anniversary. This provided him with the 
opportunity to reflect on the changes pacifism had undergone in the last half-centry. First, 
it had grown enormously. There were far more pacifists in 1937 than there had been in 
1887. But in growing, it had also suffered from increasing diversity, not to say increasingly 
strange 'incoherences. 271 The end remained the same for all pacifists, but the inspirations 
. behind pacifism and the methods envisaged for achieving peace were so different that the 
various tendencies were often mutually antagonistic. He saw the basic division as that 
between two opposing poles. At one extreme was 'a pacifism which is primarily 
sentimental in its motives and negative in its conclusions'; opposing this was a pacifism 
'above all rational in its principles and active and constructive in its methods. 272 This 
latter pacifism, which he called the 'most constant tradition' of the APD was one which 
recognised in war an historical reality which one could not stamp 
out simply by means of imprecations, meetings and verbal 
resolutions, and which could only be overcome if one integrated the 
life of nations into a general system of law, of complete law, 
implying an international law, institutions and judicial procedures, 
and if necessary, sanctions - because peace has its price which must 
be paid. 273 
That was the pacifism of the APD, but Ruyssen recognised that there were many 
people within the association who held views better typified as sentimental pacifism. It 
is clear from this that although the lid had been kept on the theoretical debates of the 
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early thirties, the issues were still very much alive for the APD. If the pacifism of the 
association had been discussed and 'defined' like so many articles of faith at the 1933 
AGM, the faith had not really been completely intemalised by all of its members. As 
Ruyssen said, the treason (if treason there had been) was most certainly that of men and 
events. The ideological attacks on the APD's conception of pacifism came at a time when 
the international situation and France's place in it were both worsening by leaps and 
bounds. As will become clear in Part H of this thesis, the new-style pacifism was providing 
a strident alternative which became more and more attractive to some pacifists as the 
ultima ratio of the old-style juridical pacifism increasingly appeared hide-bound, dusty 
and incapable of resolving the problem of peace without resort to force. As in the case of 
the LIFPL, whose commitment to freedom gradually took pre-en-dnence over the fight for 
peace, so for the APD the attachment to the cause of justice gradually assumed over-riding 
importance over the question of peace. The final divorce between justice and peace occurred 
in the period from 1938 to the outbreak of war in September 1939, and it is to that final 
period that we turn now. 
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1.7. The Paradigm Reaffirmed (1938-1940). 
The age of the Association's leadership, if not of its membership, combined with the 
disappointments of the thirties seem to have produced a period of sharp introspection for 
the APD in 1937 as it considered its future within French pacifism. In 1934 the executive 
committee of the association had examined and rejected a proposal for union of most of the 
groups belonging to the F6ddration Franqaise pour la SDN. It was felt that the APD 
represented an old, established and central position within French pacifism which 
surpassed the johnny-come-lately groups whose sole purpose was support of the League of 
Nations.. The Nantes group defined the association's role in French pacifism as a 'central 
position ... between the extreme-left, pacifist at any price, and a Right too ready to see in 
the League of Nations as it was, the ultimate stage of pacifism. 274 By contrast the APD 
had been only too willing to participate extensively in the Rassemblement Universel pour 
la Paix organised by Lord Cecil and Pierre Cot; indeed Prudhommeaux served as a 
comn-dttee member of this organisation. 27-5 The n-dd-thirties were marked, then, by the 
continuing concern at the dispersion of pacifist efforts, and a willingness to participate as 
fully as possible in combined efforts for peace which did not infringe on what the 
association considered to be its independence, and its central place in French pacifisrn. 
But to return to 1937, the APD seems to have undertaken in this year a quiet stock- 
taking and actually briefly considered merger with another association or else the 
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cessation of its activities. There are subtle indications that something serious was 
happening at the top. For the first time ýince 1920, the association did not hold an AGM or 
congress in 1937. To be sure, many of its members were active in the French Congress of the 
RUP and other activities, the review continued to be published and so on, but the 
announcement in the review that the Fiftieth Anniversary Celebrations in Nimes, no less, 
were being postponed has a faint air of implausibility about it. 276 This impression is 
reinforced by the 'pressing appeal' addressed by Ruyssen to the members of the association 
and the readers of the review in late 1937. He described the executive comn-dttee meeting 
in Paris on 24 November at which the first question discussed was precisely whether or not 
the Assoc iation should disappear or perhaps merge with another pacifist body. The 
violent reaction against this idea of those members consulted by the Committee convinced 
it to go ahead with the Fiftieth Anniversary congress in the conviction that the 
Association de la Paix par le Droit would continuO77 Secondly, it was very apparent that 
the APD was suffering a'crisis of age, as Ruyssen called it. Several of its most pron-dnent 
militants had either been present at its birth in Nimes in 1887, or else were of the same 
generation. It was time for young men and women to step forward and take the torch from 
the old and increasingly tired hands which had held it for so long. Many local groups also 
seemed to be faltering and Ruyssen appealed to the young to take over. 278 
1937 was thus a pivotal year. It ma rked the beginning of the prise de conscience of most 
of the leadership of the APD, a sudden realisation that no more could be conceded to the 
fascist powers. The two crucial events of 1938 were undoubtedly the Anschluss and the 
Munich crisis. Sandwiched between them was the association's Fiftieth Anniversary 
Congress in Nimes. But as we have argued above, the realisation that war n-dght not be 
avoidable began to penetrate the pages of the review as early as January 1938 . In the first 
number of that year, Georges Scelle published an article in which he separated the two 
ideals contained in the association's device, and spoke of peace and of justice as two distinct 
entities. It seemed clear to Scelle that the democracies had searched for peace outside of 
justice and had not found it because the dictators had cynically violated every legal 
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precept and had prepared and waged war. The abdication of the democracies could be 
clearly seen in successive stages: the Japanese incursion 
* 
into Manchuria in 1931 began the 
dismantling of collective security; the problem of unanimity demanded by article M of the 
Covenant of the League created the hole through which demands for collective action went 
unfulfilled; the third stage was the continuance of Japanese aggression in China which 
went essentially unchecked; the fourth was the failure of sanctions against Japan, and the 
fifth was the Italo-Abyssinian conflict. All of these, he wrote, were 'the result of the a- 
juridical policies of M. Laval and several of his successors'. 279 He condemned public 
opinion for lethargically accepting the remilitarisation of the Rhineland. Spain however 
was the big crisis and still no action had been forthcoming from either the British or the 
French governments. Important fractions of French public opinion, he wrote, were blinded 
to the real issues of legality, freedom, civilisation and pacification - all of which 
remained very much in the background - because of the ideological divisions caused by the 
Spanish Civil War. The whole policy of non-intervention was wrong-headed, he believed, 
based as it was upon a n-dsconception of what law and justice were really about. He 
remained 'profoundly convinced that if the governments of Paris and London had had the 
energy to oppose a categorical veto to the intrigues of the totalitarian governments while 
there was still time, these governments would have withdrawn..., 280 The goverrunents hid 
behind what they claimed to be public opinion, an opinion which refused to envisage the 
slightest risk. This 'infantile' public opinion, he wrote, now needed to be guided towards 
accepting the fact that no more could possibly be conceded to totalitarian threats. The line 
had to be drawn, and for Scelle*it had become necessary to affirm a slogan which he had 
hoped as a pacifist to see banished forever from human political discourse: Si vis pacem, 
para bellum. 281 
Scelle returned to the attack in an article written just before the Anschluss in which he 
castigated the 'defeat of the democracies'. - a defeat which 'annihilated almost completely 
the results so dearly bought in the war of 1914-1918'. 282 This defeat existed on three 
levels. First, there had been a juridical defeat. The League of Nations was dead because it 
had lost what Scelle considered to be the three essential components of the Covenant: 'the 
guarantee of the governmental and territorial competence of its members (Art. X), the 
principle of respect due the treaties and rules of international law; and finally, the 
principle of the abrogation of the right to wage war, and the obligatory recourse to pacific 
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procedures,. 283 Flowing out of the juridical defeat, was the diplomatic defeat, essentially 
the failure of collective security. Finally, there was the 'moral defeat, and the prime 
example of this was the policy of non-intervention in Spain. 284 The big question was 
whether or not it was too late to limit the damage done and save the situation. The choice 
seemed to lie between the policies of Eden or Chamberlain, firmness or continued pliability 
in the face of threats. For Scelle, the choice was clear, but he feared that it would not be 
taken: 
The virile choice would be the choice of the immediate danger, 
compensated by an energetic attitude and feverish effort at 
armament. We persist in believing that this would be the lesser 
risk. 
But we are under no illusions. The democracies will choose the 
long-term peril, even if it be the peril of deathý85 
When the Anschluss finally did occur in March 1938, Charles Rousseau wrote that it 
had proved easier to accomplish than the formation of a French cabinet. 286 Perhaps the 
: worst aspect of the crisis was the incredible extent of French disunity which it showed up; 
the intransigence of the so-called 'national' parties was most to blame in his view, and he 
darkly concluded that 'a 1938 Sadowa has occurred. Between Sadowa and Sedan there 
were but four years'. 287 
The Fiftieth Anniversary Congress held in Nimes from 19-21 April 1938 was thus a 
time of reflection on a glorious past combined with debate on a depressing present. 288 The 
question of colonialism and the economic bases of peace continued to figure largely in the 
association's deliberations, the former topic being covered in a report by M Hubert de 
Monbrison, and the latter by Edgard Milhaud, Professor of Political Economy at the 
University of Geneva. 289 But undoubtedly the core of the Congress was a discussion of the 
'present tasks of pacifisrn'. This essential topic was covered in a report by Jacques Lambert, 
a professeur agrigi and the holder of the Chair of Peace at the University of Lyon, and in 
Ruyssen's report on 'Peace through Justice'. 290 The tone of both reports and indeed of the 
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resolutions springing from them was the bitter-sweet mixture of pessimism and optirnism - 
pessimism for the immediate future, but clearly optimism in the long-term success of the 
APD's goals for building a better world. 
Lambert emphasised in his report that it was not the League of Nations which had 
failed as such, but rather the governments which had broken with the Geneva institution 
and the moral obligations which it represented. The doctrine of collective security 
remained a sound idea, but its implementation had failed. He insisted that the famous 
trilogy - arbitration, security, disarmament - was still valid and the day would come when 
it would impose itself on international politics. 291 The extent to which the pacifist debate 
had subconsciously accepted many of the Nazi/Fascist arguments about the nature of post- 
Versailles Europe, was once again demonstrated by Lambert's musings on the need for 
conciliation even in 1938. Sadly he chose Czechoslovakia as his example and argued that 
while it would be 'odious' to abandon it, nevertheless the Czechs themselves had to admit 
that their state contained many internal contradictions which required the moral 
disarmament of its ethnic minorities. 292 This was the Achilles heel in an otherwise 
excellent report. Lambert's resolution spoke of preparing the public for the acceptance of 
the necessity of a temporary policy of re-armament. 293 Ruyssen's resolution remained 
firmly attached to the League and collective security and declared itself willing to defend 
these principles by force if necessary. 294 Needless to say, there was tremendous debate 
both on the reports and the resolutions which arose from them. One speaker declared that 
fear was at the basis of French pacifism, but saw the greatest danger of the present hour in 
the continued bloodletting in Spain, rather than in the danger posed by Italy and Gerinahy. 
Another speaker, Emile Giraud, condemned French pacifism! s'incoercible terroe of war, but 
Mine Prudhommeaux sharply defended the principle of not accepting any war until it was 
actually upon the nation: 
Let us remain loyal to our past; let us refuse today any declaration 
implying acquiescen6e, even conditional, to war. The day on which 
the methods of law will have failed, the war will be inevitable, 
and may each one of us act according to his conscience. But until 
then, let us not proclaim that the next 'last' will be a 'war of 
justice'. We thought so, we said so for four years, from 1914 to 1918. 
And we rectived, in recompense, these nefarious Treaties of 1919 
wlich created more injustices than they repaired. And since we are 
speaking of 'feae, she concluded with emotion, the mother that I 
am rebels against the ignoble realities of today's aerial warfare: 
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yes, I have the right, I would say even that I have the duty, to I>e 
afraid for my children! 295 
P. M. Masson, a professor at the Sorbonne, proposed an amendment to the resolution 
which would have seen an active preparation undertaken in French schools against the 
eventuality of war. This provoked in the audience what was 'discreetly called in 
parliament "des mouvements divers"', and the idea was quickly rejected. 296 It is clear from 
all of the above, then, that the last pre-war congress of the APID was rent with the same 
divisions as usual when faced with the the question of pacifist tactics. Undoubtedly, the 
majority of the members present remained true to the Ruyssen conception of the 
association's task, that is to say, of the necessity of peace being laboriously constructed in 
justice, and if that proved impossible, the necessity of fighting to defend it. But it is also 
clear that many members - the Prudhommeaux' foremost amongst them - were terribly 
unwilling to grasp the nettle before them. No doubt they would have been horrified at the 
idea of 'peace at any price', but in their unwillingness to see that the Europe of Versailles 
was dead and even the cadaver threatened by Hitler, they unwittingly came close to the 
intigraliti they professed to combat. It is clear from the account of the congress that there 
were other subtle currents representing variations on these two main themes as well, but the 
majority sense of the deliberations and vote was certainly in fayOur of the national defence 
against any further affronts by the fascist states. 
There remained but one more major crisis in European affairs before the outbreak of war: 
the two-step dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. The APD's response to the Czech crisis 
can hardly be characterised as wholeheartedly munichois. Once again, the association 
seemed to revolve around two fixed reference points: Ruyssen's hardline anti-Munichois 
attitude and Prudhommeaux' softer approach. The official pronouncements made by the 
association condemned outright the attack on Czech territorial sovereignty. A press 
communiqud congratulated the initiative taken by Paris and London to resolve the problem 
peacefully, but bitterly attacked these same governments for 'imperiously' putting aside 
the attempt made by the Czech government to arbitrate the situation according to the 1926 
Germano-Czech treaty. It nevertheless congratulated the Czech government for its 
'sagacity' and sense of sacrifice in putting the European good before the Czech. 297 The title 
of Ruyssen's article on the crisis, 'Peace outside the Law', said it all - he saw nothing but 
further trouble coming out of the Munich d6bAcle. 298 Prudhommeaux took the opposite 
view, however. He defended the government's actions at the Ligue des Droits de I'Homme 
295 Md., p. 234. 
296 lbid, p. 236. 
297 Thdodore Ruyssen, 'Notre Effort pour la Paix, ' PD 48,11 (October 1938), pp. 338-339. 
298 Th6odore Ruyssen, 'La Paix hors du Droit, PD 48,11 (October 1938), pp. 341-350. 
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and in the pages of the PD. 299 The divisions within the APD were further underscored by 
the publication of two essentially munichois articles by Maurice Lacroix and Henri de Man 
in the review. 300 
The end was definitely now in sight. The January number of the review contained three 
articles all of which presaged the war which was only eight months away. P. TeissonniL%re 
enumerated the failures of collective security over the past twenty years and argued that 
justice had to have force on its sideý01 Ruyssen was already addressing an article to 'our 
friends of tomorrow', in which he rejected categorically the four main political 
developments pacifism had made in the interwar period: conscientious objection which 
while to be respected on the genuine, and individual level, in no way resolved the social 
problem of war; non-resistance to war; the purely negative and sentimental pacifism based 
merely upon a horror of war; and finally, unilateral disarmament. 302 The most important 
of the three pieces, though, was that by A Bloch, on the 'necessary adaptations pacifism 
must make' in the wake of Munich and the ideological upheavals it had suffered. 303 Since 
1933 events in Europe had succeeded in turning the world of ideologies and politics upside 
down. Right and left seemed to have lost their traditional meanings as French nationalists 
supported Munich and refused to fight, while what he called the 'pacifists of the 
resistance' found thern%ves in general agreement with the Communists (who had always 
castigated pacifism as a 'petit bourgeois' ideal), and some renegades froni the Right. 304 
He, too, examined the mistakes of the past twenty years, but insisted that the time was not 
for recrin-tinations, but rather for new ideas. Disarmament and even the League of Nations 
were now mere cadavers. What had to be recognised was that the kague had always been 
an instrument, a means to an end, and not the end in itself. In this sense, the. APD was 
undoubtedly in a stronger position morally than the groups which had the support of the 
league as their sole reason for being. For the APD the ideal could and would live on. For 
the moment, he argued in favour of energetic rearmament as a first measure, followed by an 
attempt at a European agreement, disarmament and a return to the principles of collective 
security if possible as long term goal005 
299 Jules Prudhommeaux, 'La. Ligue des Droits de I'Homme et la Paix en pftiV, PD 48,11 
(October 1938), pp-359-363. 
30OMaurice Lacroix, Henri de Man, 'Les lendemains de Munich: faisons la Paix! ', PD 48,13 
(December 1938), pp. 404-410. 
301 P. Teissonni6v, 'Faut-it r6sister aux. violentsT, PD 49,1 (January 1939), pp. 12-14. 
302 Ih6odore Ruyssen, 'A nos amis de demain', PD 49,1 (January 1939), pp. 1-3. 
303 A. Bloch, 'Adaptations n6cessaires de la Doctrine Pacifiste!, PD 49,1 (January 1939), pp. 4-7. 
See also the suggestive essay on the ideological changes occurring within pacifism: Joseph Folliet, 
Pacifisme, de droite? Bellicisme de gauche? (Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1938). 
304 lbid, p. 4. 
305 lbid, p. 7. Cf. Georges Scelle, 'Pdril de mort, PD 49,3/4 (March-April 1939), pp. 81-86 in which 
the author described the European situation in terms similar to those of Bloch. Scelle's article also 
contains the seeds of the ipuration mentality in its search for someone to blame for the mess France 
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The final dismemberment of Cechoslovakia in March 1939 put the last nail in the lid of 
the APD's remaining optimism. Georges Scelle informed 
, 
readers that from a purely logical 
point of view, no one could now say that war was not inevitable. The final capitulation of 
the Czechoslovakian republic meant war in the long or short term. The only hope was that 
the coming of war would in the long run bring about the downfall of the dictatorship&ý 
found her-self in. He said that Munich ought never to have taken place (p. 82), and blamed a 'certain 
pacifisme id6ologique et passif qui nous a men6s ott nous sommes'(p. 81). 
306 Scelle, 'Pdril de Mort'. 
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1.8. Conclusions. 
This first section of the thesis has attempted to show the nature of the old-style 
pacifism in France. The paciftsme ancien style of the Association de la Paix par le Droit 
represents better than any other competing organisation, the type of pacifism from which 
the new-style integral pacifism of the late twenties and thirties was to evolve. The APD 
was important because of its relative size within the French peace movement, the quality 
of its membership and leadership, and the consistently high level of political comment it 
was able to make in the period under discussion. Because it antedated by some twenty-five 
years the associations and societies which sprang up in the immediate post-World War 
One period to support the idea of a League of Nations, it had obvious claims to pre- 
en-dnence within French pacifism. It was also a society which embraced a surprising 
spectrum of dissent and variance of views on the nature of pacifism. This spectrum was not 
apparent in the immediate post-war era, but it began to become an issue by the late 
twenties with the rise of challenges to the hegemony of political thought enjoyed within 
French pacifism up until then by the APD. 
The APD's raison d'etre was not bound up inextricably with the fate of the League of 
Nations. To be sure, the League represented the highest attainment so far in the realm of 
international political and juridical development, but unlike the societies which were 
wedded intellectually to the League, the Association had existed before the League and it 
would exist after it. This is not to say that the APD was not terribly disheartened by the 
apparent failure of the League idea in the late 1930s. It was. But as Bloch pointed out in 
the article cited above, the League was above all an instrument in the implementation of 
an idea, and if the instrument failed, or rather if men and events failed it, then another one 
could always be constructed: the important thing was the essential truth contained in the 
ideaý307 
At the 1938 AGM, en pleine crise between Anschluss and Munich, Ruyssen had 
meditated on the essence of the APD's work in his report to the Congress. As we have seen 
many times, the APD considered its pacifism above aH else to be posiHve and constuctive in 
307 Bloch, 'Adaptations..., p. 6. 
114 
its prescriptions for peace. Flowing from this general philosophical- position was its 
comn-dtment to social, collective action as opposed to individual gestures which, while 
often deserving of respect, were essentially negative in their practical effect. These 
positive, constructive measures for peace could be divided, broadly speaking into two areas: 
the political and the pedagogical. On the political level, the APD acted as a pressure 
group, a think tank, speaking out during times of decision and crisis and trying by means of 
article, propaganda, public meetings, and letters to appropriate political figures, to 
further the idea of internationally organised peace. The effect of this programme of action 
on the political level is impossible to measure accurately. 308 So, too, is the effect of the 
second plank in the APD's platform, the pedagogy of peace. It was only natural that in an 
Association comprised of so many people in the teaching profession, the teaching of peace 
should occupy such a major part. With its summer schools, its contributions to international 
symposia on history, education, textbook reform, and its propaganda effo rts; once again, the 
APD undoubtedly left its mark on French and European society. How deep a mark it is 
impossible to say. There is much truth, though, in. Ruyssen's comment to the 1938 congress 
that it was not inconsiderable- 
I spoke above of the first of our tasks: the psychological 
preparation of peace, the education of minds. How to contest that 
in this respect we have realised a considerable work in 
collaboration with the other Peace Societies? If the French people 
whose armies have ploughed through Europe over the course of 
centuries, are today hostile to adventures and desirous of living in 
peace with all its neighbours, we have the conviction of having 
contributed to that. We have also certainly played a role in the 
penetration of the spirit of peace, equity and respect for other 
nations into public education in which we are proud to count so 
many friends. 30 
1939 closed the circle for the APD, bringing it back to the unflinching affirmation of the 
primacy of justice and law over peace in its device, which had been its position during the 
Great War. The APD's thought evolved from initial suspicion of Germany in the early 
twenties to a gradual conviction of the need for Franco-German rapprochement. Along the 
way, the association was forced to debate and deal with the demands of the new, 
'negative' pacifism which made its appearance in France in the late twenties. While often 
308 Ruyssen, in his report Ta Paix par le Droit', to the 1938 Fiftieth Anniversary Congress in 
Nimes, said as much: 'Or, en face de ce f1dau de violence collective qu7est la guerre, les pacifistes 
peuvent blen jouer le r6le de l'ingdnieur, de I'hygidniste; ils peuvent proposer les plans d'une 
meilleure socidtd humaine; mais aprbs tout, ce West pas d'eux que Upend directement 
Mlimination de la guerre: les artisans, en 1'espke, ce sont les Gouvernements. Tout notre r6le, en 
face de la catastrophe imminente, se bome A offrir nos plans aux Couvernements et A les adjurer de 
faire leur devoir'. Cited in Prudhommeaux, Lahargue, VAssembl6e Gdndrale et le Congrýs du 
Cinquantenalre, Nimes, 19-21 Avril 1938!, PD 48,6/7/8 (May-junouly 1938), p263. 
'309 Ibid, pp. 267-268. 
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showing tremendous sympathy for the individual cases which the new pacifism produced, 
or even sometimes for the ideas behind it, the association nevertheless consistently 
affirmed its attachment to the positive ideal of peace through law. One senses that it 
came close at times to being seduced by the charms of the new-style pacifism, but always at 
the last minute held back. The arrival of Hitler to power in 1933 changed the political 
map of Europe and with it the mental universe of the APD which was quicker than many 
pacifist groups to understand the meaning and the threat of Nazism, although even here 
there was dissent within the association. 
The APD represents the dashing of the reasonable hopes of reasonable men in a most 
unreasonable world. But the inherent optimism behind the view of moral and political 
progress held by the men and women of the APD precluded anything other than temporary 
pessin-dsm. about the final victory of their ideals. As Ruyssen, once again, said in closing 
his remarks to the 1938 congress: 
As to the future.... I don't know what it will be. Will peace be 
saved? The League of Nations, after a passing crisis, win it regain 
confidence in itself? I do not know. Only one thing is certain: that 
is that peace will not be achieved if in the tempest pacifists 
themselves deny their ideal or despair. In order that the work of 
peace may be achieved little by little, the desires for peace must 
remain alive. For a half-century La Paix par le Droit has affirmed 
this desire. It cannot, far from it, claim to have realised all its 
dreams; but it is proud to have portended, and in a certain sense, 
marked, beaten, levelled the track on which humanity, weary of so 
many horrors and acquainted with so many sufferings, can finally 
wend its way towards a better destinyý10 
310 jbid, p. 268. 
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DISSENT 
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11.1. Introduction: The Origins of the New Pacifism. 
Part I showed how traditional pacifism developed within French political society 
from the end of the Great War onwards. This evolution followed an ascending curve in 
terms of pacifist commitment, culminating in the early thirties with the debate between 
Ruyssen and Challaye on the latter's contentious thesis in favour of 'peace without 
reservations'. Having reached this high-water mark, pacifisme ancien style began a 
retreat into a defence of justice and law as opposed to peace -a retreat which coincided 
with, and indeed was largely shaped by, the Nazi seizure of power and the succession of 
European crises which followed it down the decade to September 1939. The new pacifism 
which superseded it was integral or absolute, one which rejected and condemned all foreign 
wars. It was not synonymous with conscientious objection, nor with absolute non-violence, 
although these elements were certainly prominent within it. On the contrary, it 
occasionally espoused violence, or at least accepted it in cases of civil as opposed to 
international conflict. The new pacifism did not pretend to homogeneity either, but rather 
sought to group together all those who were opposed absolutely to any external war, and 
who were prepared to fight against such wars. with a variety of means. In broad terms, it 
emerged from three types of dissent: historical dissent about the origins and nature of the 
First World War, a deepening divorce from French political society, and finally a growing 
conviction that modem warfare had become untenable by virtue of the magnitude of the 
destruction it could wreak upon society. 
Historical Dissent 
Mathias Morhardt, in a letter to Georges Demartial in the spring of 1936, wrote that 
For the past twenty-two years, you and I have suffered an 
unspeakable moral and intellectual martyrdom. The atmosphere of 
imposture in which we live has poisoned all our joys. And we no 
longer have before us the hope of seeing the fog of hatreds 
dissipate, in which minds and spirits are so furiously agitating. 
This is because we are expiating the honour of belonging to a class 
of Frenchmen that is far too small. We are those, in effect, who 
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suffer more from an injustice conunitted by France than from an 
injustice committed against her. 1 
This 'moral and intellectual martyrdorn' of which Morhardt wrote was the fons et origo of 
the new pacifism. While the pacifists of the Association de ]a Paix par le Droit had 
accepted the need to fight the Great War, held it to be a just war which had been forced 
upon an unwilling France, and saw much good in the Versailles Treaty and the new Europe 
which it founded, the fundamental tenet of the new pacifism was a complete rejection of 
post-Versailles Europe and of all the pren-tisses upon which it was built. 
Fifteen years before pacifisme nouveau style finally emerged in the French body politic 
as a corpus of coherent and developed ideas, its foundations were laid in what was 
perceived by a small group of intellectuals to be the lies of the Great War. The primary 
critique was a rejection of Article 231 of the Versailles Treaty and the thesis of unique war 
guilt. This was followed closely by a rejection of the political and demographic nature of 
post-war Europe. In the minds of the new pacifists, the second flowed logically out of the 
first. If Europe continued to seethe with political problems which might lead to war, this 
-was precisely because of Versailles and the war-guilt 'lie'. As Renc. Gerin wrote in the 
introduction to a brochure he published in 1933: 'The question of responsibilities for the war 
has not ceased to be current since the end of hostilities, it is becoming even more so because it 
is on this question which are hung all of the problems of world politics of our times'. 2 
The foundations of historical dissent were laid in Paris in January 1916 when a small 
group of men met together to discuss the origins of the War as they could then be known. 
This group, known as the Soci&6 d'Etudes Documentaires et Critiques sur les, Origines de la 
Guerre, quickly discovered discrepancies in the French government's case against the 
Central Powers as the breakers of the peace. 3 The Society included in its number eminent 
men such as the economist Charles Gide, professor at the Colfte de France, Mathias 
Morhardt, formerly secretary general of the Ligue des Droits de I'Homme, and Georges 
Demartial, a former under-secretary of state in the colonial office. None of these men was a 
political extremist, but they all shared a passionate desire for truth and justice, and they 
were appalled at what they saw happening around them in France as men and women of 
1 M. Morhardt, 'Le respect des trait6s' (letter to Demartial dated Capbreton, 19 March 1936), Le 
Barrage 91 (26 March 1936), p. 3. 
2 Rend Gerin, Les Responsabilit& de la Guerre de 1914 (Paris: Editions de la LICP, 1933), p. 3. 
See also Georges Demartial, 'Les responsabilitds de la guerre. Une rdponse de G. Demartial A M. 
Camille Bloch', PH 105 (2 March 1934), p. 2. See also Fdlicien Challaye, 'Raymond Poincard, Rend 
Gerin, et les responsabilitds de la guerre, Le Barrage 1,26 (8 November 1934), pp. 1-2. In late 1934 
Challaye also published a series of articles in Le Barrage on 'Les responsabilit6s russes et franýaises% 
and beginning in No. 36 of Le Barrage, General de Montgelas began a series on Vexplosion de la 
Guerre de 1914'. 
3 See the account in Fdlicien Challaye, Georges DemrtW. $a Vie, Son CEuvre (Paris: A. Lahure, 
n. d. [19501), pp. 6-7. 
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all political hues threw themselves into the Union Sacrie. With the war over, the group 
continued to publish harsh criticism of the Versailles Treaty and French foreign policy, 
especially with regard to their insistence on the total guilt of the Central powers. 4 
In 1925 Georges Demartial published an article in the American journal, Current 
Affairs, contesting the Poincar6 version of events in 1914. For his pains, he was expelled for 
five years from the Lkgion d'Honneur for having brought the French nation into disrepute5 
He joined Victor Margueritte in the ranks of the victims of the Legion's purges. Ren6 Gerin, 
a former normalien, an infantry captain mentioned in despatches in the Great War and 
decorated with the ribbon of the L6gion d'Honneur himself, was scandalised by the 
treatment meted out to Dernartial and began his own investigations into the origins of the 
war. As an agrigi des lettres, he was eminently well-qualified to pursue these researches, 
which culminated in a book published in 1930 containing fourteen questions by Ren6 Gerin 
together with fourteen answers by Raymond Poincard. This, together with his subsequent 
pacifist activities, earned Gerin, too, an expulsion from the L46gion d'Honneur. 6 
In 1926, Victor Margueritte, together with Armand Charpentier, founded the journal 
Evolution, whose contents and subtitle ('revue mensuelle des questions intftessant 
I'apaisement international et le rapprochement des peuples') really underscored the 
developing nexus between new pacifism and the question of war guilt and war origins. 
Evolution was one of the primary journals of comment in France on the question of war 
origins, and attracted not only French commentators, but also German and American scholars 
and journalists as well. 
By 1930, it was thus a well-established fact in the mental universe of integral pacifists 
that the Great War had been an unjust war, fought under false pretences, and that the peace 
which had resulted from it contained the seeds of a future conflict. Ii was the duty of 
pacifists to. enlighten the public about these matters and in so doing put pressure on the 
French government to adopt different policies, primarily towards Germany. For right or 
wrong, this historical Weltanschauung provided the new pacifism with an anti- 
establishment political orientation which would last well into the Second World War. 7 
4 For a bibliography of Demartial's articles and books, 'see ibid., pp. 28-54. 
-5 For Challaye's account of the affair, see ibid., pp. 14-15. For an account of the inquest and 
expOsion, see 'Le Dossier Demartial (Ddfense, Tdmoignages et plaidoirie)' in Evolution 30 (June 
1928), pp. 34-50. 
6 Rend Cerin, Les responS4bilit, 4s de la Guerre. Quatorze questions par Rend' Gerin, Ancien 
E12ve de I'Ecole Normale Supirieure, AgrIgi des Lettres. Quatorze RJponses par Raymond 
Poincari de IAcadimie Frangaise (Paris: Payot, 1930). On Gerin's expulsion from the Ldgion 
d'Honneur, see Rend Gerin, Honneur et Patrie ou Comment j'ai &I exclu de la Ugion d'Honneur 
(Paris: Editions de la LICP., 1934). 
7 See for example, Georges Demartial, La Ligende des dimocraties pacifiques (Paris: 
Rieder/Presses Universitaires de France, 1939); and 1939. La Guerre de l'Imposture (Paris: Editions 
Jean Flory, 1941). 
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Causes of the Present Discontents. 
The historical dissent over the question of war guilt and the origins of the Great War 
quite naturally manifested itself in the growing sense of estrangement which the nascent 
integral pacifists felt with regard to French political society. With the signing of the 
Kellogg-Briand Pact in 1928, integral pacifists tried to take governments at their word in 
their claim to have made war a crime. Conscientious objectors began to use this argument as 
one of the planks in their defence after 1928. By 1932, however, it had begun to become 
apparent that nothing much had really changed. The Geneva Disarmament Conference 
which opened in February of that year had been hailed by many pacifists a§ the one last 
chance they had of imposing their wills upon governments and of bringing national policies 
into line with the provisions of the Kellogg-Briand Pact. 
It soon became clear, however, that nothing of the sort was happening in Geneva. In the 
four years from Kellogg-Briand to Geneva, the world situation for pacifists had swung 
sharply from one of optimism to one of pessimism. The deepening world depression 
combined with increased political turmoil in Europe conspired to wreck the hopes of many 
pacifists who began a retreat from participation in political society, and began to speak in 
extra-parliamentary, if not anarchist, terms of peace being an issue which the peoples had 
to impose upon their governments. All hope seemed to be lost in governments which were 
increasingly viewed as corrupt, unrepresentative, and completely in the hands of the 
capitalist class. 
There was thus very much a socialist analysis of peace in the new integral pacifism, but 
it was coupled with a political anarchism which waxed and waned according to 
circumstances. In the 1933-1934 period, French integral pacifists became convinced that the 
greatest danger to peace was an internal one, in the form of French fascism. The conviction 
that Frenchmen had to 'sweep before their own doors' grew and provided a mirror image in 
the domestic sphere of the ideas held with regard to the question of responsibility for the 
Great War. 
The enemy was within. As Michel Winock commented recently, 'the French expended 
much talent and energy during the thirties in a cold civil war'; this produced a 
'francocentric myopia' which permitted the temporary reconciliation of the irreconciljible: 
antifascism and pacifism. 8 But the antifascism was directed at an internal danger and not 
so much at the outward manifestations of fascism in Italy or Germany. From the pacifist 
perspective, there were, initially at least, good reasons to be primarily concerned about the 
internal danger. Pacifist meetings were regularly the target for the excesses of right-wing 
8 See Michel Winock, 'Le Fascisme passera... Pourquoi? ', Le Monde Aujourd'hui (Suppldment 
du numdro 12852 du Monde [Sunday 25-Monday 26 May 19861), p. V. 
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thugs, especially in the period up to 1934 and integral pacifism was the subject of continual 
vilification by the organs of the right-wfng press. 
Integral pacifism was also squeezed from the extTeme-left. In the early years of the 
Ligue Internationale des Combattants de la Paix, Victor Wric, the League's founder, often 
complained in the columns of the Patrie Humaine of attacks by the Communists. The split 
became even more pronounced after the Laval-Stalin pact of 1935 which once again made 
Communists patriotic Frenchmen by rehabilitating military service for them. Integral 
pacifism in France was, then, subjected to a pincer movement between an extreme-left and a 
virulent proto-fascist Right which is probably unparalleled in the history of other modem 
peace movements. This was partially due to the extreme polarisation of Third Republic 
political society, but also to the political nature of much of French pacifism. Thus, 
paradoxically, while appearing to reject French political society, French integral pacifists 
were actually intimately bound up in it in an antipolitical movement whiýh expressed 
itself in uniquely political terms. The result was that, shunned by the bien pensant middle, 
attacked by the extreme right and vilified by the extreme-left, French integral pacifism 
had nowhere to go. By 1939, the politics of marginality had become in France the politics 
of No-MaWs Land. 
Trakhe et Gazeuse - Fears of a Coming War 
The third strand in the origins of the new pacifism was the increasing sense that 
another war could destroy civilisation because of the progress made by science and 
technology since the end of the Great War. The 'bombing aeroplane' and gas warfare 
constituted the aton-dc weapons of the 1920s and 1930s. Writers were convinced that they 
spelled the end of civilisation if ever they should be released upon an unsuspecting 
humanity. Professor Paul Langevin provided the Ligue Internationale des Femmes pour la 
Paix et la. Libert6 with his considered scientific opinion that another war would be the last,, 
given the progress made in the delivery of death by science and technology since 1918.9 
In Paris, Victor M6ric, a journalist on Le Soir conducted an enquRe on aero-chemical 
warfare in 1930 which led to the foundation of the Ligue Internationale des Combattants de 
la Paix. He published a book on his findings the following year with the evocative and 
darkly amusing title Frafthe et Gazeuse. 10 The theme of terrible destruction was a common 
one in the editorials of M6ric and others in his newspaper L4 Patrie Humaine. It is also to 
be found in the league's more official newspaper, Le Barrage, from 1934 onwards. In fact, Le 
9 Langevin! s'D6claratioW, together with the accompanying petition organised by the LlFPL and 
a list of the original signatories are to be found in BDIC/DD/ FAR6S. 235/4/3. 
10 Victor Mdric, Fratche et Gazeuse! La guerre qui revient (Paris: Editions 'Sirius', 1932). 
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Barrage carried a citation from Bertrand Russell on its masthead which gave utterance to 
the deep belief of pacifists that war could never be justified because of the destructive 
forces it would unleash: 'Not a single evil that one should like to avoid by war, is greater 
than the evil of war itself'. This is what Martin Ceadel has called the single important 
moral or philosophical advance of interwar pacifism: the enunciation of an apparently 
value-free rejection of war based purely on humanitarian or utilitarian grounds. 11 
It is difficult to say whether the impetus for this development in France came from 
abroad or not. It seems likely that the same train of thought was being followed by 
pacifists in several European countries at the same time. Whatever the case, fears of the 
next war allowed the integral pacifism of some intellectuals to be broadened'into a pacifist 
campaign attracting mass support. If people were sometmes unwilling or unable to 
understand the complexities of the historical arguments about war origins, or to take sides 
in the politics of dissent with regard to late Third Republic political society, they most 
certainly were able to understand the inflammatory rhetoric of the propagandists of the 
LICP who fanned out across the length and breadth of France beginning in the winter of 
1930-31. This croisade de la paix, as it was called, brought home to hundreds of French 
towns and villages the pacifist message that the next war would be the last. It is probably 
true to say that it was this fear which contributed largely to the initial successes of 
integral pacifism at a time when it was manifestly clear that not much could be expected of 
governments at the Geneva Disan-nament Conference. 12 
To summarise this brief introduction to the new pacifism, it was based upon three lines 
of thinking which began to converge around 1928 and were united in a fairly coherent way 
by about 1931. 'The first was the continuing sense that the Great War had been fought under 
false pretences in France, and that the peace which flowed out of it was iniquitous and 
furthermore based on the lie of the unique war guilt of the Central Powers. Secondly, there 
11 Martin Ceadel, Pacifism in Britain, 1914-1945: The Defining Of 4 F4ith (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1980), pp. 13-15. Ceadel cites Bertrand Russell's adage in slightly different and later form: 
'Modern war is practically certain to have worse consequences than even the most unjust peace'. 
This version is taken from Russell's 1936 book Which way to Peace?, cited in ibid, p. 216. 
12 The government was particularly concerned at the spread of ideas relating to conscientious 
objection. The LICP was singled out as the organisation having the most impact across France in the 
spread of integral pacifist ideas. A report dated 19 April 1933 in the files of the Ministry of the Interior 
reads: Ta propagande pour la reconnaissance Idgale de l'objection de conscience et pour la 
lib&ation des objecteurs de conscience emprisonnds a pris en France un grand d6veloppement 
depuis quelques mois, sous l'impulsion des associations pacifistes, en particulier de la Ligue 
Internationale des Combattants de la Paix. Non seulement les manifestations pacifistes se 
multiplient mais encore elles rdunissent des auditoires de plus en plus nombreux. Elles attirent 
courament plusiers centaines de personnes et il n'est pas de ville de quelque importance qui n'ait 6t6 
le si6ge d'une de ces manifestations% See report entitled Ta propagande pacifiste et le mouvement 
en faveur de lobjection de conscience en France! in AN F7/13352. See also Appendix I of this thesis. 
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was a growing feeling of divorce from French political society; the new pacifism embodied a 
belief in the efficacy of direct action by the masses upon corrupt parliamentary 
governments. Finally, the realisation by the end of the twenties of the terrible destruction 
the next war would bring, acted as the humanitrarian/utilitarian catalyst necessary, in 
company with the other two factors, to give birth to a new type of pacifism. This section of 
the thesis will examine the growth and development of this new type of pacifism in France 
from 1928 to the outbreak of war. 
Precursors of Integral Pacifism 
Integral pacifism emerged as a coherent, developed movement in the period from 1928 
to 1930, but its origins go back much further than that. Isolated individuals and 
numeiically insignificant groups were precursors, voices crying in the wilderness, 
proclaiming the advent of a new pacifism which would respond to the growing aspirations 
of many people for a categorical rejection of war. 
Probably the most important precursor in the French context was Romain Rolland, who 
in the dark days of the Great War defined almost single-handedly the nature of the new 
French pacifism already gestating in the minds of a generation marked in the trenches of 
northern France. Because of his courageous, albeit essentially elitist, stand during the war, 
Rolland was viewed as the grand old man of French, if not European, pacifism in the 
twenties. But his political evolution away from absolute non-violence, his flirtation with 
and then gradual embracing of a Soviet-oriented view of peace and pacifism, gradually left 
behind many of the people who had seen in him the John the Baptist of the new pacifism. 13 
For all that, his influence remained strong through-out most of the period under discussion, 
and it was with sorrow that French integral pacifists in the mid-thirties felt themselves 
obliged to leave behind the man who had been their spiritual guide for much of the pacifist 
pilgrimage. 
There were, of course, other precursors to the new pacifism. One such was Marianne 
Rauze who published a number of small books and brochures on pacifism in the twenties. In 
one of these she defined the essence of the new pacifism as follows: 
Antimilitarism - real antimilitarism - can only be achieved 
through absolute pacifism. It is in order to cause war to disappear 
immediately and definitively that the antiwarrior is 
13 See Norman Ing-ram, 'Romain Rolland, Interwar Pacifism and the Problem of Peace' in 
Charles Chatfield and Peter van den Dungen, eds., Peace Movements and Political Cultures 
(Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, in press). A copy of this chapter may be found in Appendix 
11 of this thesis. It is largely based on the author's M. A. major research essay at the University of 
Toronto, and was read as an invited paper at the American-European Consultation on Peace 
Research in History, held 24-29 August 1986 at Stadtschlaining, Austria. 
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antimilitarist. To be an antimilitarist is to work towards the total 
suppression of all the institutions that are instruments of death. 14 
Rauze prefigured many of the concerns of pacifists in the thirties. She underlined, for 
example, that antimilitarism must be collective and active. 'Emotions and feelings are 
nothing', she wrote, 'action is everything'. 15 Isolated, individual gestures were of little 
value, but they could become effective if they were organised into a mass movement. This 
concern for collective action was a predominant theme in all of French interwar pacifism. 
The individual gesture was usually respected but not recommended if it could not play a 
part in a larger collective movement. 16 Finally, Rauze argued that in order for 
antimilitarism to be effective, it had to be international. Antimilitarism. on the national 
level would be 'foolishness' because, far from being an obstacle io war, it would encourage 
the covetousness of neighbouring nations which had not disarmedj7 This latter insistence 
on international action gradually gave way in the thirties to an emphasis on unflateral 
national pacifism, even in the face of Nazism. 
Another theme in Rauze's book which was to become a commonplace of integral 
pacifism was her view of the League of Nations. She had nothing but scorn for people who 
expected general disarmament from this 'powerless' body. She also attacked the old-style 
pacifists who continued to believe in defensive wars; and interestingly, she condemned the 
new 'revolutionary' pacifism which sought to justify a war fought for revolutionary reasons. 
The only real pacifism, she proclaimed, was that which refused all wars. 18 
Conscientious objection, which was a sub-set within interwar French pacifism, also 
began to attract its exponents and defenders in the twenties. Paul Bergeron founded a Ligue 
pour la reconnaissance l6gale de l'objection de conscience in Lyon in 1924, which after 
publishing a few tracts, seemed to lapse into lethargy. T"he twenties also saw the first of 
the rather spectacular trials of objectors in France which sent men of varying religious or 
pol-itical persuasions to prison for terms of six months to a year. Conscientious objection in 
France initially drew much inspiration from the example set in Britain during the First 
World War. Only in the thirties did it begin to find its own theoreticians in France, such as 
Ren6 Gerin. The connections between anarchism, libertarianism, and conscientious objection 
were always strong. For example, Le Semeur, a libertarian newspaper published in the 
Calvados, supported COs from at least 1924 onwards. 19 
14 Marianne Rauze, L'Anti-guerre. Essai d'une doctrine et d'une Philosophie de 
I'antimilitarisnie en 1923. Suivi d'une post-face de Romain Rolland. Pr6faces de W. Wellock et Dr. 
Stoecker. (Niort: Imprimerie du progrýs, 1923), p. 3. 
15 Ibid., p. 4. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid, pp. 9-10. 
19 See Appendix I for more details on the origins of conscientious objection in France. 
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Integral pacifism also had its Christian voice in France in the 1920s. The French branch 
of the International Fellowship of Reconciliation began publishing its Cahiers de la 
Riconciliation in the n-dd-twenties. Some of the most famous C. O. 's of the period, including 
Philippe Vernier and Jacques Martin, came from its ranks. 20 
The Kellogg-Briand Pact provided much of the impetus to the development of 
pacifisme nouveau style. Many pacifists, and certainly not only the least educated amongst 
them, wanted to take the pact at its word and declare war a crime. Thus, for example, 
Francis Delaisi could declare at the annual general meeting of the rather staid APD in 
1928, that forced to choose between his mobilisation papers and the Kellogg-Briand Pact 
which made war a crime, he would not hesitate to choose the latter. It was this kind of 
independent thinking which worried the authorities. 21 
La Volonti de Paix, the organ of the peace movement of the same name, started by 
Madeleine Vemet in 1928, took much the same view. In its Manifesto it demanded that war 
be declared a crime, that immediate and total disarmament take place, and that all war 
mat6riel'be destroyed and the public or private production of arms abolished. This 
manifesto gathered 10,000 signatures in France and 3,000 in Belgium by the late summer of 
1928, but these numbers paled into insignificance beside the results obtained by similar 
petitions in England and Germany. By early 1931, the Volont6 de Paix was claiming 30,000 
signatures for this petition - still not an impressive number over a three-year period. 22 
Madeleine Vernet and the Volontd de Paix are important as examples of the nascent 
integral pacifism, but the movement never really became very large and its influence was 
limited accordingly. The group's organ appeared regularly at first, and then more and more 
intermittently, until finally, in 1936, the Volontd de Paix folded up and merged with the 
larger and more influential Ligue Internationale des Combattants de la Paix. 23 
But that is in the future. What is important is the fact that the Volont6 de Paix was 
one of the first examples in France of the new style pacifism, albeit in rather limited and 
sentimental form. Probably its most important act over the course of its existence was the 
organisation in Paris in 1932 of two Conf6rences Libres du Ddsarmement, which brought 
together people who despaired of ever seeing anything significant come of the Geneva 
process. 24 The VdP's pacifist experience was, in effect, bounded by the two formative 
20 See for example, Prods de Jacques Martin (Aubervilliers: 'La Rdconciliation', 1932); and 
Procas de Philippe Vernier (Aubervilliers: 'La R6conciliation', 1933), 
21 See note 92 of Part 1. 
22 See 'Manifeste de la Volont6 de Pabe, La Volonti de Paix (August-September 1928), p. 4. See 
also 'Lettre ouverte aux 30.000 Signataires, de notre Manifeste', La Volonti de Paix Ganuary -February 
1931), p. l. 
23 'Volontd de Paix et L. I. C. P. ', Lee Barrage 99 (28 May 1936), p. 1. 
24 There is some material on the two Confdrences Libres du Ddsarmement in 
BDIC/DD/FARds 273/8. For the report on the first one, see Pour un dofsarmement Wel. Compte- 
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experiences of Kellogg-Briand and the Geneva Disarmament Conference. In 1928, the Pact 
had given it the tremendous boost of opiimism it needed to proclaim an end to all wars. By 
1932, however, it was clear how little had really changed in the world situation and the 
VdP sank into lethargy after one last burst of pessimistic activity in organising the 
independent disarmament conference. 
By the beginning of the thirties, the hope expressed by the German pacifist Kurt Hiller 
to Edmond Vermeil at the 1925 Universal Peace Congress in Berlin, that the two 
'tendencies' within pacifism might continue to work together towards their common goal, 
was becoming manifestly impossible to sustainA The means began in essence to define the 
end - the type of peace envisaged by the different strands of pacifism. Thus, for the old- 
style pacifists, peace and pacifism were functions of law and justice. Later on in the 
thirties, the integral pacifists would also have to refute the arguments of those who sought 
to make peace a function of the social revolution. What was new and exciting in integral 
pacifism was its insistence on peace as the ultimate end. This ultimate end was to be 
achieved either through an individual rejection of war - conscientious objection in one form 
or another - or through concerted collective action which might involve the use of civil 
violence. The clearest nexus for the multifarious strands of thinking which defined it, and 
the most important new-style pacifist group in interwar France, in terms of numbers, 
intellectual depth, and certainly of radical commitment, was the Ligue Internationale des 
Combattants de la Paix, to whose examination we now turn. 
rendu de la Confirence Libre du Disarmement tenue A Paris les 23 et 24 avril 1932 (Levallois-Perret: 
Edit6 ar la Commission de la Conf6rence, 1932). ýl 
See Part 1, note 55. 
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11.2. Years of Growth (1930-1934) 
The Ligue Internationale des Combattants de la Paix was the most important and 
influential of the new style pacifist groups in interwar France. This significance was based 
upon a variety of factors. First, the LICP was a numerically large pacifist group by French 
standards. Two and half years after its creation, Victor M6ric claimed that it had almost 
20,000 members. 26 Secondly, the LICP was important because it provided a consistently 
high standard of comment on French political affairs for the nine years immediately 
preceding the Second World War. Thirdly, it was a remarkably heterogeneous group 
composed of people from varying political, philosophical, and religious traditions, 
although the anarchist and socialist elements were always strongest within it. 
Mdric was the Dick Sheppard of French pacifism. The LICP was his creation, the 
response to his series of articles on the dangers posed by aero-chemical warfare. He almost 
single-handedly founded the Ligue in October 1930,27 and some four months later, the 
Patrie Humaine, which was the league's semi-official newspaper until 1933. Like Dick 
Sheppard and the Peace Pledge Union, Victor Mdric and the LICP relied initially on an 
emotional response from a population pre-occupied by the rising political unrest in Central 
Europe and the fear of a coming war. The LICP sought to group together all those people 
who were resolutely prepared to fight against the fatality of war. But there the 
similarities end because M6ric's league was essentially secular in character and was not 
explicitly non-violent in nature. 
In his book Fraiche et Gazeuse, written between November 1930 and February 1932, 
M6ric described the formation of the LICP. He elaborated the reasons behind the creation 
of yet another pacifist league in France. There was certainly no lack of pacifists, he wrote. 
There were those who remembered the horrors of the Great War; there were others who 
condemned war through a sort of sentimentality, still others based their rejection of war on 
a 'cold' rationality which detested the periodic and criminal massacres which humanity 
inflicted on itself. Ms purpose, he wrote, was to 'gather together all of these scattered 
26 Figure cited in Victor Mdric, 'Pour tuer la guerre, PH 54 (4-11 February 1933), p. 1. 
27 See Victor M6ric, 'Rapport Moral', PH 59(11-18 March 1933), p. 5. 
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energies, to assemble them in a solid bundle and throw them irresistably against war ... 
*28 
There were certainly many other pacifist groups in France. ' But they acted in isolation one 
from another, and 'the battle is carried out in dispersion'. 29 What he wanted to create was 
a 'vast movement, a powerful association, brimming over onto the international level, 
capable of imposing its will on politicians and diplomats'; this organisation remained still 
to be createdýO Wric's desire in creating the LICP had been to found a group which would 
draw together pacifists of all origins, inspirations, backgrounds and political persuasions. 
The leagu&s first appeal called for the union of 
all energies, with no concern whatsoever for political, 
philosophical, or religious creeds. Believers or atheists, socialists 
or bourgeois, revolutionaries or conservatives, whosoever is decided 
to fight for peace is one of ours. No distinctions of class or of 
caste ..... Only one thing counts: Peace. 
31 
The LICP sought therefore to group together pacifists from all backgrounds. But Mdric 
laid down one condition which he viewed as essential to the new group. The LICP was only 
interested in absolute pacifists, integral pacifists. Wric recognised that 'pacifism can be a 
vague aspiration towards peace' and in this sense, 'everyone is pacifist and it is the 
eminent C16ment Vautel who is right'. 32 But Mdric rejected out of hand this vague pacifism 
which at the first call to arms would collapse in the heat of nationalist fervour. In 
contradistinction to an insipid pacifism, Wric defined integral pacifim, as follows: 
One is really, thoroughly, pacifist only on condition of having 
rejected, once and for all, the extravagant nonsense with which we 
have been brainwashed. I suggest in principle that for the true 
pacifist: 1. there is no national defence and 2. peace is only possible 
and lasting by total and rapid disarmament, without concerning 
oneself about the neighbour. 33 
Wric underlined the disaffection from the official diplomatic and political worlds of 
Paris and Geneva felt by the new pacifists. The tone of pessimism in his conclusion was 
paramount. Asking rhetorically what tomorrow would bring, he wrote that despite all the 
pacific palaver and talk of 'Guerre hors la Ioi', war still went on around the world. His 
view of political society was scathing in its denunciation of the abdication of leadership in 
France and elsewhere. 'Our leaders are mediocrities', he wrote, 'and the leaders of an 
nations are mediocrities'. 34 But he provided no concrete answers to the problems he raised. 
28 Victor Mdric, Frafrhe et Gazeuse, pp. 239-241. 
29 Ibid., p. 241. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid, p. 246. 
32 Ibid., p. 247. 
33 Ibid, p.. 249. 
34 Ibid, p. 254. 
129 
The pessimism of his approach to peace and politics was overwheln-dng. The vague calls to 
undefined action, the continual anathemas pronounced against war, gave voice to a pacifist 
nihilism of despair. In the early years of the LICP this cry was sufficient to rally 
thousands of people across France to the pacifist cause, but under the cold douche of post- 
Machtergreifung reality, the angry rhetoric began to appear slightly sterile and empty. 
Practical well thought-out approaches to integral pacifism became necessary and were 
increasingly formulated within the LICP from about 1934 onwards. But in this chapter we 
shall be primarily concerned with the House that Wric built, the LICP in the years of 
growth from1930 to 1934. 
The LICP's first appeal spoke in apocalyptic terms of the approaching catastrophe 
hovering over everything, of 'cities destined to incendiary bombs, assassinating gases, and 
annihilation', in which the population would succumb to 'mortal panic, terror and 
n-dsery%35 The choice open to people was that between'Devastation, Ruin and Madness'on 
the one hand, and Life on the other - all capitalised in shades of the religious tract. In 
political terms, the Appeal called for an individual response couched in antipolitical 
terms: 'We must rise up against the Masters and those Responsible, against the bellicist 
Insanity, against the Hatreds which throw the Peoples against one another%36 M6ric 
ended with a call to pacifist militant action. Peace had to imposed, and readers were 
invited to join the 'combat formation' of the LICP. A complete break was needed from 
sterile political debates, from the games that egos played, from the 'human intelligence 
which is spinning aimlessly, and applying itself desperately to a masturbation as 
conscientious as it is infinitei. 37 
Wric's appeal seems to have struck a responsive chord in France. The LICP grew 
quickly, as did the readership of La Patrie Humaine. A financial statement for the year I 
December 1930 to 31 December 1931 showed a total income for the league of 135,199 francs, of 
which some 61,000 francs had come from memberships, a further 18,000 from a voluntary 
subscription, and 39,500 francs which were raised at meetings across France38 - these are 
impressive sums for so young an organisation. By issue number eleven, the Patrie Humaine 
had become a weekly, and in early 1932 it was reported that 6,200 membership cards for the 
league had already been distributed for that year. 39 A report about the LICP's first 
congress in Angers later in 1932 claimed that 200 delegates took part in the debates. This 
35 M6ric, Frafthe et Gazeuse, p. 244. 
36 Ibid., p. 245. 
37 Ibid., pp. 245 and 255. 
38 'Comitd Central de la Ligue, PH 10 (30 January - 14 February 1932), p. 8. 39 A note on p. 4. of PH 12 (20-26 February 1932), gives this information. 
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included representatives of sixty-five sections numbering 7,000 league members, as well as 
the mandated representatives of a further 5,000 individual leaguers. 40 
The local sections grew rapidly, too - especially those in the provinces. In February 
1932 the Avallon section reported that it had 200 members, and at Limoges during a 
demonstration for peace, the section seemed disappointed to have collected only fifty new 
members. 41 Two months later, the Saintes section numbered 200 members, and at a meeting 
held on 2 April at which Marcelle Capy, Rudholf Leonhard and Roger Monclin spoke, there 
were 400 people present. This was exceeded at St. Jean d'Angely, where 1200 people heard 
the league's propagandists speak in a converted hangar. 42 These meetings were not without 
their troubles. At Poitiers, the Camelots du Roi tried to prevent Leonhard from speaking 
but were given a thrashing instead by the pacifists and had to retreat to a local pharmacy 
to plaster their wounds33 
By the time he wrote his New Year's editorial in 1933, Mdric was claiming that the 
LIPC had almost 16,000 members. The Patrie Humaine had a readership of about 20,000, of 
whom 6,000 were subscribers. 44 A year later, after the trauma of the schisms between the 
LICP and the Patrie Humaine, further exacerbated by Wric's death in October 1933, Robert 
Tourly noted with satisfaction that all of that notwithstanding, the paper had irýeased its 
print run from 18,000 in January 1933 to 22,000 copies in 1934.4-5 And a year after the schism, 
the LICP still claimed a membership of 12,000.46 As has already been noted, Wric had 
claimed in early 1933 a membership of just under 20,000.47 
Clearly the numbers game is a dangerous one, but the LICP was indubitably a 
numerically important group in the first four years of its existence at least. As a rather 
alarming report in the files of the Ministry of the Interior put it in May 1933: the LICP 
#estimates at 300,000 the number of mobilisable men who, touched by the propaganda of 
this organisation in France, are liable to return their mobilisation papers or destroy them in 
the event of a direct threat of armed conflict'. 48 Another, slightly earlier, report from an 
informer who appears to have been present at the LICP congress in early March 1933, 
reported that the LICP estimated its membership at 40,000 across France, although the 
40 '200 ddl6guds participent aux d6bate, PH 11,31 (2-9 July 1932), p. l. 
41 Ta Vie de la Ligue, PH 12 (20-26 February 1932), p. 4. 
42 'La Vie de la Ligue, PH 19 (9-16 April 1931), p. 4. 
43 Reported in ibid. 
44 VictorMdric, 'Nos Souhaite, PH 49 (31 December 1932 -7 January 1933), pl. 
45 R. Tourly, 'Bilan et Souhaits, PH 97 (5 January 1934), p. l. 
46 'Pr6cisions n6cessaires', Le Barrage 1,13 (9 August 1934), p. l. 
47 See Part 11, n. 23. 
48 'D'un correspondent, Paris, 2 May 1933. Pj. /5 A-3870 in AN. F7/13352. See pp. 19-20 of 
Appendix 1 (n. 35). 
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money for only 5,000 memberships had so far been received by the Paris office. 49 The latter 
point highlights the organisational' confusion which attended the LICP's early 
development. Perhaps because of lack of staff, but more likely because of Wric's inherent 
distaste for organisations and centralised control, the LICP in its early years showed 
astonishing growth and an equally amazing capacity for self-immolation and 
disintegration which came to a head at this same 1933 congress. More will be said about 
that in due course. Suffice it here to say that the LICP was a major pacifist organisation by 
French standards in terms of the size of its membership. It had grown very rapidly and 
spawned a newspaper which had quickly become a weekly and was being distributed across 
France by Messageries Hachette. 
For all that the LICP began life as a Paris-based organisation in which Parisian 
intellectuals played a preponderant role, it quickly developed a large base of support in the 
provinces. As the Interior Ministry report mentioned above made clear, by 1933 there was 
hardly a village of any importance in France which had not been the site of a pacifist 
meeting for which the LICP was held largely responsibleýO The provinces began to outstrip 
Paris in importance, and this was likely one of the factors which led to the effective 
seizure of power by a group of provincial pacifists at the 1933 congress. The most important 
regional federations were undoubtedly those of the Calvados, Angers, and Algeria. All 
three of these regional federations were strong numerically, and their leaders - Emile 
Bauchet, Marcel Fouski, and Edouard Lemddioni respectively - played important roles in 
the development of the League after 1933. But that is to jump ahead somewhat. 
The organisational weakness of Paris became apparent in the communiqu6s from the 
Paris sections in 1932. Parisians could be depended on to turn out for a mass meeting at the 
Salle Wagram or the Palais de la Mutualit6, but the week to week work in the sections 
seemed difficult to sustain. Perhaps as Drevet remarked in 1938, the rural masses were 
more easily organised than the highly politicised urban populations5l For whatever 
reason, Paris seemed to provide the head to the organisation (although even this was 
disputed), and the rest of France the body. Thus, for example, the section in the 11th and 
12th arrondissernents in Paris somewhat bitterly complained in the autumn of 1932 that 'for 
almost a year now, we have tried to unite all of the Leaguers in our arrondissement into a 
section,... Unfortunately, our efforts have not been a great success, since at our meetings we 
scarcely gather forty comrades, even though some 250 are on the books'52 The reporter from 
49 Uun corrspondent, 25 April 1933. A/3624 G115 in AN F7/13352. 
-50 See note 12 above. 
51 See Camille Drevet, 'Rapport Moral', Le Barrage 125 (17 March 1938), p. 3. 
52 'La Vie de la Ligue: He et 12e arrdt. ', PH 40 (29 October-5 November 1932), p. 4. 
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the section in the 7th and 8th arrondissement echoed this criticism when he wrote that 
there was too much 'carelessness' in the section. 53 
What is clear is that the LICP organised a very effective propaganda campaign across 
France in the winters of 1931-32 and 1932-33. It is impossible to ascertain the aggregate 
number of Frenchmen who heard the League's speakers, but the number must run into the 
tens, if not hundreds of thousands. For example, in June 1932, the Patrie Humaine reported 
that more than 3,000 people attended a public meeting in St. Etienne at which Pierre Scize, 
M6ric, and Georges Pioch spoke on behalf of the League. Henri Jeanson, 'foujours 
fantaisiste', was also supposed to speak but missed his train and arrived at midnight. At 
Morlaix, in the FinistLt-re, 1,000 people turned out to hear M6ric, Leonhard and Robert Tourly 
on 4 June. 54 In early 1932, Marcelle Capy spoke for the League at meetings in Hamburg, 
Munich, Berlin and elsewhere in Germany and Switzerland, and the Patrie Humaine 
reported that 'despite the Hitlerians' all of these meetings were successful demonstrations 
of fraternity between the two peoplesý5 Georges Pioch spoke before 30,000 people at the 
Palais des Projections in Barcelona, and later before an audience of 5000 people in the small 
city of Geronne. As a result of his Spanish tour, a Spanish section of the LICP was formed56 
In Angers, M6ric, Maurice Gilles and Louis Lor6al spoke before 3,000 people in the Cirque- 
Th6Atre. M6ric was clearly elated at the growth in the Angevin region; two months before, 
Angers had been completely ignorant of the league's existence, but now there was a section 
of 400 members active in the city57 In Brest on 19 February 1932, Marcelle Capy addressed 
1500 people in the Salle Peloutier of the Maison du Peuple; the same edition of the Patrie 
Humaine reported meetings of eighty people in the small village of Sainte-Lazaigne 
(Indre), 250 people at a meeting held by Roger Monloin at Meudon, 600 present for a meeting 
at Quimper, and 1700 attending a meeting at LorienL58 
Clearly something extraordinary was happening. Sections and federations were 
springing up across France and growing rapidly. One of the fastest areas of growth seems to 
have been the Calvados. A report on the Patrie Humaine in March 1932 on the Grande 
Semaine de manifestations pacifistes internationales outlined how quickly the Calvados 
federation had grown. The first LICP section in the department was formed on 3 January 
1932. Twenty-four members contributed forty-five francs for a propaganda campaign. With 
this small sum as seed money, 400 posters and 20,000 prospectuses were printed and 
distributed across the department. The League's speakers were shuttled around in one of 
53 Ta Vie de la Ligue, PH 38 (1-15 October 1932), pA. 
54 'Notre Agitation', PH 28 (11-18 June 1932), p. 4. 
-55 'Marcelle Capy en Allemagne et en Suisse, PH 10 (30 January-14 February 1932), p. 2. 
56 See short report in PH 10 (30 January -14 FEbruary 1932). 57 Victor Mdric, 'La PAN est en Marche, PH 10 (30 January -14 February 1932), p. 2. 58 Figures given in'La Vie de la Ligue, PH 13 (27 February-4 March 1932), PA. 
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Bauchet's motor coaches, and although the whole campaign cost some 3,000 francs, the 
outlay was recovered by voluntary collections at the meetings. The result was that from 
being a section of forty-seven leaguers in January, the Calvados had grown to over 1000 
members by March59 
The Algerian federation also recorded spectacular growth. By late 1932, after a 
speaking tour by Pioch, Capy and Lem6d! oni during which a profit of 2,000 francs was 
made, the Federation reported that it now numbered fifteen sections. The speaking tour 
had seen fifty-three public meetings held, and the writer claimed that the LICP's 
propaganda had reached more than 200,000 people in Algeria. This might well be one of 
the reasons for which Gerin later in 1933 was forbidden by the authorities in Algiers from 
preaching the pacifist message to the indigenous population there. 60 
Normally one might well be rather sceptical about the strict veracity of these figures, 
but they seem to represent a realistic assessment of the LICI's initial development. It will 
be remembered that the police and Interior Ministry reports cited above all came to the 
conclusion that the new pacifism, and especially the LICP, was making tremendous 
-headway in towns and villages all across the Hexagon. 61 The period 1930-1934 was one of 
growth for the LICP, but its flowering was to be short-lived. It remained an important 
organisation right down to 1939, but it began to shrink in size from about 1934 onwards. 
At the time of the schism at the 1933 AGM, Mdric claimed that the League had 18,000 
members and the Patrie Humane about 6,000 subscribers; this he contrasted to the Leagues 
first winter (1930-1931) just a little over two years previously, during which the 
organisation had grown from nothing to about 2,000 members. 62 Of these numbers only 
10,056 league members were represented at the congress by 253 mandates. 63 By the 
following year at the Montargis Congress, Ren6 Gerin reported that the number of leaguers 
was only about 11,000- although it was difficult to be more precise because of some sections' 
unreliability in reporting their membership figures to the office in Paris. In any case, it was 
a far cry from the figure of 18,000 quoted the previous year at the Paris Congress. " 
These figures were called into question by the League itself only two years later at its 
1936 Congress when Emile Bauchet revealed in his Rapport Moral that in 1933 the LICP 
had had 7,868 members, 7,617 in 1934 and 7,481 in 1935. He had arrived at these figures by 
-59 R. Henry, Un bel exemple A suivre, PH 16 (19-26 March 1932) 
60 See 'La Vie de la Ligue: Alger, PH 47 (17-24 December 1932), PA. See also Appendix I on 
Gerin's adventures in Algeria. 
61 See Appendix 1 for further corroboration of the size of LICP meetings. 
62 Victor Mdric, Rapport Moral', PH 59 (11-18 March 1933), p. S. Robert Tourly, in his report on 
L: Activitd de la Ligue' in ibid. claimed 'almost 20,000 members' and 'hundreds of thousands of 
sympathizers' in France. 
63 'Congrbs National de la LICP, 16-17 avril 1933', U Combat pour La Paix I (May 1933), p5. 
64 Ren6 Gerin, 'Rapport moral sur I'activit6 de la Ligue de Piques 1933 A Piques 1934 qui sera 
prdsent6 au Congrýs de Montargis', Le Combat pour la Paix 10 (March 1934), pp. 4-5. 
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the only effective means, that of counting the francs which arrived at the Paris office as 
the percentage of the membership subscription that was its due. 65 While these figures are 
doubtless accurate, they probably do not reflect the total number of LICP members across 
France. It is clear from the reports published in Le Barrage and elsewhere that one of the 
perennial problems faced by the organisation was the unreliability of its local sections in 
the matter of sending the Paris headquarters the requisite percentage of the membership 
subscriptions they received. The 1938 Congress did not provide global membership figures 
but only fifty-eight sections containing 2,560 members were actually represented when the 
meeting opened in Arras. 66 To give some idea of the magnitude of the decline, at least in 
terms of. the numbers of league members and sections represented at the Congresses, it is 
worth noting that in 1936 at the Congrýs de Bernay, 107 sections comprising 5,728 league 
members ha d been represented. 67 
If not an entirely accurate representation of the Leagues size, these figures nevertheless 
give some indication of the downward trend it was experiencing. Given the political 
situation, the 1939 reports on the League's health are surprisingly optimistic. Camille 
Drevet reported that there had been a surge in membership following the Munich crisis and 
most of the new members had remained loyal to the League. She believed that the number 
of members would exceed that for 1938, but unfortunately gave no precise figures. 68 In the 
report on the 1939 Congfess, however, it was reported that only forty-three sections or 
federations were represented, and these contained a total membership of only 2,023 
leaguers. 69 Once again, it is clear that these numbers do not indicate the full extent of the 
LICP's membership because not all sections or individual members would be represented at 
any one congress. But it is equally apparent that the general trend in terms of membership 
was downwards from about 1934 on. 
Further indications about the size of the League can be gained from an analysis of the 
number of sections, public meetings held, and subscribers to the Barrage reported every year. 
In 1933, Roger Monclin claimed that more than 600 meetings had been held across France, 
Algeria and Morocco since the previous congress. In the process some 500 cities or towns had 
been visited, and 200 LICP sections created. 70 In 1934, Gerin noted that there were 180 
active sections with a further twenty or so which had fallen dormant. Six sections had been 
dissolved for a variety of reasons. There were also approximately 120 localities in which 
small groups of leaguers existed which had not yet been able to consolidate themselves into 
6-5 Emile Bauchet, 'Rapport Moral', Le Barrage 87 (5 March 1936), p. 4. 
66 Cited in'Les Travaux du Congrýs d'Arras', Le Barrage 127 (28 April 1938), p. 4. 
67 Reported in'Les Travaux du Congrýs de Bernay, Le Barrage 94 (23 April 1936), pp. 3-4. 
68 Camille Drevet, 'Rapport Morar, Le Barrage 145 (16 March 1939), p. 4. 
69 'Les Travaux du Congrýs de Marseille!, Le Barrage 147 (20 April 1939), p. 4. 
70 Roger MonclinVactivit6 de la Ligue!, PH 59 (11-18 March 1933), p. 5. 
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proper sections. 71 The following year showed a slight increase in the apparent level of 
activity with 191 active sections, and a further hundred in the process of formation. The 
year ending in February 1935 had also been a good one for the League's propaganda; Bauchet 
reported that some 300 public meetings had been held. In this same period the LICP had 
alsoldistri. buted some 100,000 copies of its Tract/Programme, 3,000 copies of its brochure, 
Programme, Tactique et Moyens d'action, 30,000 copies of the tract 'Enfants, ne jouez pas A la 
guerre', 20,000 copies of the tract 'Aux Travailleurs', and a large number of propaganda 
posters and post cards. In addition Bauchet estimated that about 400,000 copies of 
theBarrage were circulating in the country. 72 
1936 produced another strong showing on the propaganda front with about 180 lectures 
or meetings held over a five month period in forty or forty-five departments. 150,000 copies 
of the Leaguels tract 'Nos principes' were distributed. The number of sections seemed to 
have fallen, though. It will be remembered that 1936 marked the beginning of a slump in 
the membership figures. It also saw the number of sections decrease to 158 with an 
additional twenty-nine in either dormant or embryonic stage. In 1938 no global figures are 
given, but apparently the League had lost five sections, while gaining seven. Having said 
that, Camille Drevet acknowledged that the work was more difficult in the highly 
politicised. urban areas than in the countryside. The Paris office had organised more than 
200 lectures or meetings, though, in the period ending March 1938. The number of subscribers 
to the Barrage was slipping however; in 1937-1938, only 2,300 league members held 
subscriptions, along with about 300 non4eaguers. 73 
Because of the Munich effect, the 1939 Marseille Congress was vaguely optimistic about 
the League's future. Although only forty-three sections comprising 2,023 league members 
were represented at the Congress, Gerin reported that Munich had created a great upsurge 
in subscriptions to the journal which now stood at approximately 3,000 league members, and 
a further 350 non-league members. If nothing else, the last figures show that the number of 
sections represented at the Congresses had little bearing on the aggregate number of league 
members, at least not in the latter half of the decade. 74 
The above figures give some impression of the numerical size of the LICP and the extent 
of its propaganda. The growth of its financial side was also rapid. In the financial year 
71 Gerin, loc. cit. 'Rapport Moral', Le Combat pour la Paix 10 (March 1934), p. 4. 
72 Emile Bauchet, 'Rapport Moral', Le Barrage 43 Q March 1935), p. 4. Bauchet listed the 
departments which were 'relatively untouched' by the LICP's propaganda as: Manche, Morbihan, 
Vend6e, Eure-et-Loir, Oise, Ardennes, Meuse, Seine-et-Marne, Aube, Cher, Niývre, SAone-et-Loire, 
Creuse, Allier, Cantal, Aveyron, Pyrdn6es Orientales, Var, Basses-Alpes, Hautes-Alpes. All other 
departments had been reached. 
73 Camille Drevet, 'Rapport Moral', Le Barrage 125"(17 March 1938), p. 3. See also Rend Gerin, 
'Rep rt sur Ie "Barrage"', Le Barrage 125 (17 March 1938), pA. V4 
Figures cited in 'Les Travaux du Congrýs de Marseille', Le Barrage 147 (20 April 1939), p. 4.; 
and Rend Gerin, 'Rapport sur le "Barrage", Le Barrage 145 (16 March 1939), p. 4. 
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ending 28 February 1934, the LICP had receipts totalling 137,132 francs. 75 The following 
year at the Agen Congress, the Leagde itself had receipts totalling 117,127 francs; the 
separate Barrage account had an income that year of 106,525 francs. 76 By 1936, the LICP's 
financial outlook was once again improving. The league account showed a surplus of 25,000 
francs on an income of 151,214 francs. The Barrage took in some 110,000 francs but had an 
outlay of 118,000; the situation for the Barrage was actually much worse because it was 
carrying a deficit of about 106,000 francs. 77 The 1938 financial report does not distinguish 
between league and newspaper, total receipts of 166,063 francs are recorded. 78 The 1939 
Congress reports gave no financial details whatsoever aside from the impressionistic claims 
mentioned above about the league's membership rising substantially after Munich. 79 
The composite picture, then, is one of an organisation which experienced enormous 
initial growth, in terms of membership, subscribers, financial returns, and in the extent to 
which its ideas were spread across France. This was followed by a levelling off from about 
1934 to 1936, followed by a gradual downward spiral thereafter, only partially off-set by 
the Munich effect in late 1938 and early 1939. Even at the end, though, the LICP probably 
had claims to being the largest and most influential pacifist group in France - either old- 
style, or new. 
The Nature of the LICPs Pacifism. 
The preceding pages have given some idea of the extent of the LICP's propaganda 
campaigns during the thirties in France. But what of the intellectual content of these 
campaigns? What sort of pacifism was the LICP propounding, and what sort of tactics did 
it envisage in its fight against war? 
The answers to these questions are complex, especially for the initial period (1930- 
1934) under discussion here. In the general intellectual effervescence in which the league 
appeared there were many apparently contradictory approaches to integral pacifism, for 
all of which the LICP tried to provide a home. The spectrum spanned everything from 
absolute non-violence to a revolutionary pacifism which, while eschewing external war, 
was not all averse to a little civilian blood-letting now and again. The predominant 
elements within the LICP were those of socialism and anarchism. There was also a 
minority of Communists, but they were discouraged by their party from having too much to 
do with petit-bourgeois pacifism like that of the LICP. As far as the Christian community 
75 Emile Bauchet, 'Rapport Financiee, Le Combat pour la Paix 10 (March 1934), pp. 5-6. 
76 Louis Uger, 'Rapport Financier', Le Barrage 43 QMarch 1935), p. 4. 
77 Emile Bauchet, 'Rapport financier, Le Barrage 87 (5 March 1936), p. 4. 
78 Y. Dandieu, 'Compte-rendu financier, Le Barrage 126 (31 March 1938), p. 4. 
79 See Camille Drevet, 'Rapport Moral', Lee Barrage 145 (16 March 1939), p. 4. 
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is concerned, the LICP did attract a variety of Catholic and Protestant members, but the 
marriage between the political avant-garde and the churches was always rather uneasy. 
M6ric had originally envisaged the League as a haven for all forms of absolute 
pacifism. In his mind, -the sole qualifying characteristics of the integral pacifist were a 
complete rejection of the idea of the national defence, and a commitment to working towards 
total, rapid, and if need be, unilateral disarmament. 80 Within this very broad framework, 
anything was possible. There were thus LICP members who advocated absolute non- 
violence, those who believed in armed insurrection, advocates and opponents of civil war, 
proponents of judiciously planned assassinations of those 'responsible', and the list goes on. 
By early 1932, M6ric had expanded the two first principles of the LICP into four: 1) 
negation of. the idea of the national defence, 2) struggle against war by all means; 3) 
pacifism to be placed above the political parties and governments, and 4) the struggle for 
the union of the PeoplesX The Appeal disclaimed any interest in creating an organisation 
of 'followers' - LICP members were to be free individuals making a collective statement 
against war. It also underlined the eclectic nature of the LICP and its willingness to 
consider a very broad spectrum of tactics under the general rubric of pacifism: 
If, taking no account whatsoever of the popular desires for peace 
some lunatics were to let loose the massacre, the peoples thus 
placed before the fact of war would, have to resist by all possible 
means: general strike, individual or collective revolt, passive or 
violent, according to the individual decision, freely taken, of each 
man placed before his duty and his responsibilities... We must 
teach men to be MEM82 
The propensity to consider anarchist tactics and revolutionary violence as legitimate 
pacifist methods is one of the distinguishing characteristics of French absolute pacifism 
which sets it apart from the primarily ethically inspired pacifism of the Anglo-Saxon 
world. There were certainly those pacifists in France who were integrally pacifist in the 
British sense of the word (the members of the small Mouvement International de la 
Mconciliation spring to mind). These pacifists existed within the LICP as well. But what 
is interesting is the juxtaposition of non-violent and violent pacifism in mainstream French 
integral pacifism. 
Largely under the influence of Mdric, the LICP in its first few years of activity 
embodied this eclectic approach to the politics of peace. Under the effects of the pincer 
movement from Left and Right discussed briefly above, the LICP developed a 'rhetoric of 
80 See note 28. 
81 'Apper, PH 20 (16-23 April 1932), p. 6. 
82 Ibid. 
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violence' in its discussion of pacifist tactics and political problems. In so doing, it created a 
semantic reflection of the violent abuse of which it was itself the object - primarily at the 
hands of the extreme-right-wing press. No doubt some of th is rhetoric of violence was due 
to the anarchist analyses underpinning much of the LICP's world view, but equally one 
could argue that it is yet another example of the extent to which the fabric of late Third 
Republic political society was frayed, and the political temperature rising, The vitriol 
which was so liberally splashed about in the course of the pacifist debate was in some 
respects a warm-up to the ipuration mentality. 
Examples of this rhetoric of violence abound in the LICP's language of political 
discourse. In early 1932 the LICP held a large rally at the Salle Wagram, in Paris at which 
Pioch, back from his Spanish tour, and Marcelle Capy, back from Germany, were the 
featured speakers. Pacifist meetings in the Paris area especially, had been the target of 
attacks by right-wing extremists83 and at this meeting at Wagram all of the leaguers who 
had been wounded in clashes with the Camelots du Roi and their ilk were collectively 
made the honorary chairmen. Maurice Gilles, who chaired the meeting, warned the 
'gigolos du Roy', -Taittinger's little boys, and the 'Croix de Feu in the pay of Coty' that 
interruptions and an uproar would not be tolerated. Mdric was more explicit, warning that 
'we are determined, if need be, to get rid of those responsible'. 84 Demonstrating his 
essentially non-conformist, anti-political stance, Wric wrote in the same number of the PH, 
that honest, ordinary people were in a state of legitimate self-defence vis-a-vis the 
government: 
We shall draw up a list - the red list. We will give their names, 
their professions, their biographies. It is necessary to know against 
whom one is fighting, the day on which by their filthy 
provocations they succeed in precipitating the catastrophe. 
We, too, will have our'Carnet B' ... we will take our precautions 
and pillory them, ... while waiting to line them up against the 
wall.. 85 
A few weeks later, Mdric urged LICP members to exan-dne their consciences and prepare 
themselves for any eventuality. He said it was absolutely essential to know where the 
embassies of the imperialist powers were located, so that action could be taken in an 
emergency. The implication was clear enough. 86 
83 See some of the examples given from 1933 in Appendix 1. See also a note on p2 of PH 12 (20- 
26 February 1932) in which is described the setting up of a 'Caisse de Solidaritd' for Leaguers 
wounded or hospitalised in fights with right-wing thugs. To date 1570 francs had been raised, of which 
891 had been dispersed. 
84 'Notre Meeting & Wagram', PH 12 (20-26 February 1932), p. l. 
85 Victor Mdric, 'Du Bon Travail', PH 12 (20-26 February 1932), p. 1. 
86 'Pacifistes, tenez-vous prits! ', PH 21 (23-30 April 1932), p. l. 
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The direct link in rhetorical style between M6ric's editorials and those of some of the 
right-wing papers, was made startlingly clear in June 1932 in a review of the press in the 
Patrie Humaine. Commenting on an article in LAmi du Peuple in which Franýois Coty 
fulminated against the 'financiers who run the world', and darkly threatened that names 
and addresses were known and thus would be called to account, the PH responded that'this 
time ... the masses know where to find those responsible. We know their names, where they 
live ... The 'red list' has been drawn up and on it is the name of the Coty of Cotys'. 
87 In 
January 1933 when the conscientious objector G6rard Leretour lay dying in a hunger strike in 
prison in Paris, M6ric threatened that 'we will not let one of ours be assassinated with 
impunity. If, through inertia, cowardice, even through ignorance, they let Leretour die, 
pacifists will know how to establish responsibilities. And they will move on to other 
options., 88 
. 
The above examples indicate how the LICP rather carefully and ambiguously raised 
the possibility of reprisals against those whom it considered responsible for the problem of 
war. In a broad sense, this meant envisaging attacks on those members of the capitalist, 
governing political class who might embroil France in a war. It also meant, in a more 
immediate way, responding by threat of. violence, or even violence itself, to the 
provocations and attacks of right-wing zealots. To this end, the LICP established what it 
called the 'Young Pacifist Guard' in early 1932 which was termed a 'combat group par 
excellence', designed to protect LICP meetings and 'if necessary to pass to the offensive'. 89 
The Camelots du Roi and Taittinger's boys' had thus found their pacifist equivalent. 
The fact that the latent violence of the LICP remained ambiguously camouflaged most 
of the time, in no way lessened its importance as an undercurrent of values in the new 
pacifism. Occasionally, however, the 'rhetoric of violence' bVcame abundantly 
transparent. This occurred just before the fractious 1933 Congress in an editorial in which 
M6ric enjoined pacifists to 'remember the days when dynamite brought fear to bourgeois 
stomachs and sowed the "green terroe. Science in the service of the powerful sets itself 
against the individual. It is up to the individual to use science against the masters and the 
assassins. '90 On a motion from the Algerian federation, the Congress of the LICP 
unanimously underlined that this article represented Mdric's personal views and not those 
of the whole league. 91 
87 'Ce que disent les Autr&, PH 28 (11-18 June 1932), p. 3. 
88 Victor Wric, 'On Assassine un Hommel'. PH 52 (21-28 January 1933), p. l. 
89 'Une Jeune Carde Pacifiste7, PH 10 (30 January -14 February 1932). 
90 Cited in 'Congrýs National de la LICP, 16-17 avril 1933', Le Combat pour la Paix 1 (May 1933), 
p. 8. 
91 Ibid. See also Roger Monclin, 'Violence ... ou soumissionT, PH 21 (23-30 April 1932), p. 3. Monclin raised the question of violence as a means of legitimately reacting to the violences of society 
and the attacks of the nationalist camp. He listed three cases of pacifists either beaten up by the 
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Wric's pacifism was essentially negative. It did not attempt to provide positive 
answers to the problems of peace, but contented itself instead with increasingly sterile 
anathemas hurled at French political society. He balanced on the fine line between total 
despair - announcing that war was imn-dnent and inevitable - and calling the French to 
resist its fatality. Wric's negative pacifism was incapable of envisaging action in the 
event of war, however. He called for resistance to war in the peaceful hic et nunc - once war 
began it would be too late, and he did not have a coherent plan to offer his followers. As he 
wrote in August 1932: 
How many times will it be necessary to repeat that what matters, 
is to fight war - while it is not upon us - by every means: the spoken 
word, the written word, demonstrations, education, violence... and 
to create a coalition of people across borders, across the nations. 
Afterwards, it will be too late. When war is upon us, it will become 
vain to seek the best way of avoiding it... The day that war falls 
upon us, despite all our exhortations, our bleatings and our 
bellowings, knowing that we can do nothing and that we are 
irredeemably condemned, we will suffer our fate. 92 
But, he added menacingly, 'before falling victim to human stupidity and bloody 
covetousness, we will settle a few scores'Y3 
Wric seemed to see no contradiction between the veiled anarchism of these statements 
and his position against all wars, including civil wars. Discussing the Einstein Declaration 
in April 1932 and the fact that too many people were trying to water down the int6graliM 
of their pacifism, he declared that it was 'absolutely essential to define pacifism as we 
understand it'. 
For the convinced pacifist, there can be no pretext, no excuse for 
war, whatever form it might take, even if its apostles baptise it 
'ýivil'. War is the enemy which must be killed. War must not only 
be outside the law, but be von-dted by real pacifists. 94 
This pacifist prise de conscience had to be achieved by a complete re-thinking of how 
society operated. Pacifists had to see that there were occult forces as well as human 
police or harrassed, and concluded: Tevant la rdpression fasciste qui s'abat sur les meilleurs 
militants, nous n'avons plus le droit de rester inactifs. Nous comprenons trbs bien que nombre de 
nos amis, tolstoiens, gandhistes, objecteurs de conscience (encore que tous les; objecteurs ne soient 
pas des non-violents), des chrdtiens, entendent lutter par les moyens qui leur semblent les meilleurs. 
Mais nous leur demandons de ne pas considdrer tous ceux qui reont pas exclu. la violence de leurs 
moyens commes des fanatiques de la bagarre. 11 est des moments otL H est n6cessaire, il est des 
iniquitds scandaleuses qui nous tracent notre devoir: il est normal qu'A la violence on oppose la 
violence'. 
92 Victor M6zic, 'Celle d'hier, celle de demain', PH 23 (6-19 August 1932), pp. 1-2. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Victor M6ric, 'Le Writable Pacifisme. Le Postulat d'Einstein, PH 19 (9-16 April 1932), p. l. 
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weaknesses at play in the creation of wars, but once rid of their old 'prejudices', pacifists 
could begin to see clearly. 95 Having jiist rejected the idea of civil war, however, Wric 
concluded, 
Against war, first of all, and by all methods, including, if events 
permit it and if our skin is in danger, violence and reprisals, 
exercised against the assassins. Against war, whatever one may 
say, whatever one may imagine, whatever may happe06 
A few months later, he had arrived at the point of admitting that for the integral pacifist 
either his life or his liberty might have to be lost in a warý7 This reflected the position 
already taken by Micien Challaye that a foreign occupation of France was more desirable 
than war. 98 
Fortunately, there were more nuanced analyses of what constituted integral pacifism in 
the pages of the Patrie Humaine. Pierre Cuenat discussed the problem in an article in late 
1932, taking as his point of departure the postulate that everyone in France was a 
pacifist. 99 He distinguished two broad categories of inspiration for pacifism: fear, and 
philosophical or political conviction. There was nothing the matter with fear, but a 
constructive pacifism needed to be based on more than that. He thought that one could 
divide the population up into three categories on the question of peace. First, there were 
those who found war exalting and beneficial - these people were mercifully getting rarer. 
Secondly, there were those who accepted war through 'amorphisny, naivety and fatalism. 
Cuenat believed this category to be the most ripe for pacifist propaganda. Thirdly, there 
were the pseudo-pacifists, those who accepted the idea of defensive wars. Recognising the 
difference between the LICP's brand of pacifism and this latter form of pseudo-pacifism, 
Cuenat wrote that 'the only pacifism is a total pacifism'. 100 As far as methods and tactics 
were concerned, he distinguished two tendencies. The first was the'democratic' tendency 
which believed people had a duty to elect pacifist governments, support the League of 
Nations, and so on. Their method of propaganda was education. Secondly, there were the 
revolutionary pacifists who offered a 'little more variety', but who shared a belief in the 
total rejection of war. Revolutionary pacifism could be further broken down into two 
strands: on the one hand, there was 'individual revolt' or conscientious objection which had 
tremendous propaganda value, but which was weakened and strengthened paradoxically 
95 Ibid. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Victor Mdric, 'Pour tuer la guerre, PH 54 (4-11 February 1933), p. l. 
9'3 See the discussion of Challaye's thesis in favour of peace without reservations in Part 1. 
99 Pierre Cuenat, 'Du Pacifisme A la Pabe, PH 46 (10-17 December 1932), p. 2. 
100 Ibid. 
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by its very individuality. Finally, there was revolutionary pacifism based upon the belief 
that peace was a function of economic and social considerations-101 
There were certainly also those who saw the need to elaborate specific tactics for 
avoiding war. S6bastien Faure, to take one example, subscribed to the Einstein declaration 
but argued that pacifism needed to go beyond it to the prevention of war by all suitable 
means. The most efficacious of these he believed to be total and unilateral disarmament. 102 
The Geneva process represented the opposite of this unilateral disarmament, and was 
viewed with a jaundiced eye by the LICP. The desire for general disarmament was 
certainly not strong enough in the men charged with representing France in Geneva; 
moreover, general disarmament was well-nigh impossible in the European situation created 
by the Versailles Treaty. In a review of an article by Professor Edouard Guyot in which it 
demonstrated that Europe could only be genuinely pacified if the treaties were revised, the 
Patrie Humaine concluded that 'it is perfectly clear that the road to Geneva must pass 
through Versailles. For the moment, it passes through Le Creusot,. 103 Another writer in 
the PH declared that the world situation was like that of 1912 all over again. He 
demonstrated the militaristic character of the French government and said that Michelet's 
dictum about France declaring peace to the world was a sham. 
When our officials perorate, they never fail to speak about the true 
face of France; they give us credit for intentions which the facts 
put the He to. We are wasting our resources in armaments, we are 
provoking war through our attitude and we justify to our neighbours 
the armaments to which we give the example. As Delaisi says, we 
give 'the strange spectacle of peoples who arm because they scare 
themselves, and who scare themselves because they are armed. ' 
The true face of France does not appear crowned with the laurel 
wreath on which the symbolic dove comes to rest; our features are 
those of the old trooper, our face has the sinister mouth of 
Militarism. 104 
The LICP's integral pacifism thus embraced a broad spectrum of ideas about what 
constituted pacifism. In terms of the league's orientation towards French society, one can 
only term it non-conformist, anti-establishment, antipolitical. The LICP incarnated the 
politics of dissent in the pacifist debates of the thirties. As opposed to the old-style 
pacifists of the Paix par le Droit, those of the LICP had no faith whatsoever in the slow 
march of juridical and social Progress. As one commentator in the Patrie Humaine put it in 
early 1932, with regard to the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the League of Nations: 
101 [bid. 
102 S. Faure, 'Avant tout et A tout prix il faut empkher ]a guerre, PH 20 (16-23 April 1932). 
103 'Ce que disent les Autres', PH 12 (20-26 February 1932). 
104 Bernard An&6, '136sarmement', PH 10 (30 January - 14 February 1932), p. 7. 
143 
They promise us a juridical organisation of the peace; but we don't 
want scholarly texts, we want facts. It is vain to dream of 
legislating Peace - before having created peace in fact and having 
sculpted it in social reality, before having disorganised the 
administrative, economic and military apparatus of war and 
having elin-dnated its essential and fundamental causes. 
Facts always precede the law... We have a Bastille to storm and to 
destroy: it is ' Capitalism which creates wars. Afterwards we 
will legislate ... 
105 
Gabriel Gobron was even more caustic in his attack on the old conceptions of pacifism 
and by clear implication, on the APD later in 1932. He referred to the 'good untroubled 
bourgeois, official and decorated, ' whose organisation is 'reconnue d'utilitd publique' and 
who enjoins his fellow countrymen to reject wars of aggression. Such a suggestion in 1932 was 
enough to make one laugh. Those who advocated such beliefs were 'intellectual 
crustaceans'. 106 
The LICP's pacifism in this initial period from 1930 to 1934 was thus largely a negative 
one. It contented itself with verbal polen-dcs against war which contained an implicit 
critique of capitalist society, but little in the way of concrete prescriptions for peace. There 
were some exceptions to this rule; the advocacy of unilateral disarmament is one. 
Generally speaking, one can say that the LICP was initially an organisation incarnating an 
unstructured, sentimental revolt against the threat of a con-ting war. It balanced on the 
knife edge between total despair which could produce no effective results, and calls to 
resistance against the fatality which it came close to proclaiming itself. To the extent that 
tactics and methods were envisaged in this initial period, the spectrum of. the possible 
embraced everything from the most violent attack on those held to be responsible, to 
complete non-violence. Only with the passage of time, as the rhetoric began to appear a 
little empty and wom, did the league begin to evolve specific policies for action. It did this 
largely as a result of challenges to its view of pacifism and as it became necessary to 
respond to specific political issues. 
The first of these challenges to the LICP's world view came in the form of the 
Amsterdam Congress against Imperialist War which convened in August 1932 on the 
initiative of Romain Rolland and Henri Barbusse. In an appeal to the LICP, Romain 
Rolland laid out three steps to peace as he saw them: individual refusal of war, collective 
refusal, and finally collective action. Collective action meant 'taking Bastilles' and he 
recommended to the UCP the forthcon-dng world congress. 107 The question of whether or not 
105 jean Temp6te, 'Propos Incisifs: Ugislation, PH 15 (12-18 March 1932). 
106 Gabriel Cobron, 'Les Crustac6s Intellectuels', PH 44 (26 November -3 December 1932), p-3. 
107 Romain Rolland, 'Appel de Romain Rolland aux Combattants de la Pabe, PH 31 (2-9 July 
1932), pp. 1-2. This appeal is also reprinted in Romain Rolland, 'Appel A la Ligue des Combattants de 
la Paix'in Par la F-Avolution, la Paix (Paris: Editions Sociales Intemationales, 1935), pp3l-36. Rolland's 
144 
to attend the Amsterdam congress greatly divided the League, although Wric's negative 
view eventually prevailed at the LICPs first congress in Angers in late June 1932.108 
Mdric's primary reason for wanting the LICP to steer clear of the Amsterdam congress 
was that the latter seemed to have been taken over entirely by the Communists: 
... it is not just a question of Barbusse and Rolland. There are also 
our old friends the Communists ... In reading Mumanit! we note that it is all a question of defending Soviet Russia against 
imperialist aggression, and also that they are preparing to debunk 
the false pacifists. 109 
He took great exception to the notion that the LICP was comprised of false pacifists. He 
reminded league members of the nefarious campaign conducted against the LICP by 
Mumaniti when the league was still struggling to establish itself. In three or four'copious 
articles', it had been explained that the LICP was composed of 'bourgeýpis pacifists, sold to 
the government and playing the game of fascism, duping the masses-'110 The League could 
not forget that Communist speakers would arrive at its meetings to spread these lies, 
causing an uproar and fights. All of that could perhaps be forgiven, but M6ric underlined 
that an even greater obstacle remained. The LICP had been founded on very strict 
principles: 'negation of the national defence, repudiation of all ideas of fatherland, and 
war against all wars'. But the upcoming congress was trying to establish the idea of a 
necessary defence of the 'patrie socialiste'. This was a dangerous illusion which would 
lead straight to the just War, War-to-end-all-Wars mentality of 1914. There was thus a 
definitional problem involved in the Leagues repudiation of the Amsterdam movement. 
The LICP was against all wars, and not just against imperialist wars. Furthermore there 
was a fundamental question of tactics to be considered. Mkric wrote that the methods 
original appeal for the Amsterdam congress, dated 1 June 1932, is also in this collection. See Rolland 
'Contre la Guerre. Rassemblement! 'in ibid., pp. 29-30. 
108 See reports on the Angers Congress of the LICP in PH 31 (2-9 July 1932), p. l. The LICP 
congress decided after a long discussion that the League would send a message to the Amsterdam 
Congress expressing its point of view, principles, and methods and that members would be free to 
participate on an individual basis. In the wake of the Angers congress, there was much discussion 
however in the pages of the Patrie Hu? mine about the LIC11s decision not to attend. See PH 32 (9-23 
July 1932) and 33 (23 July -6 August 1932). 109 Victor Wriq, 'Nous Mrons plus au Bois-, PH 30 (25 June -2 July 1932), pp. 1-2. 110 Ibid. See also PH 33 (23 July -6 August 1932), p. 4 on whichis reprinted an article from Mumaniti which attacked 'le verbalisme stdrile des pacifistes A la Victor Mdric et Georges Pioch' as 
well as Taction paralysante des individualfstes et anarchistes qui croient lutter contre ]a guerre par 
'Tobjection de conscience" et autres fadaises impuissantes. ' The PH pointedly asked what Romain 
Rolland thought of these 'autres fadaises impuissantes' of which conscientious objection formed a 
part, and it concluded emphatically that 'on ne peut collaborer avec des gens qui non contents de 
nous insulter, tentent de jeter le discr6dit sur des actes qui prouvent, tout de m6me, la conscience 
des hommes qui les accomplissent'. 
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envisaged by the Communists for fighting against war are really 
completely fantastic. These pacifists, who are not petit-bourgeois, 
invite their militants in times of peace to go to the barracks and 
take up their rifles. It seems that in the barracks, under the 
sympathetic eye of Adjutant Flic, they will do some excellent 
propagandising. In time of war, they will ask their militants to 
join their regiments. There, they will wait patiently for the hour 
to arrive when the foreign war can be transformed into a civil war. 
And, in waiting for that to happen, they will fire their rifles, 
shoot their canons, and use their machine-guns against other 
partisans of the same civil war. 111 
Romain Rolland finally intervened directly in the debate within the LICP in his role 
as Honorary President. In a letter of 12 July 1932 to Mdric, he wrote that it was agreed that 
he and the LIU sought the same goal: the achievement of peace by efficacious means. 
Having said that, there remained three questions which required f, urther clarification. 
First, he wanted to know what Mdric would do if asked to contribute, either directly or 
indirectly, to war. Would he refuse absolutely, even to the point of facing the firing squad? 
Romain Rolland was prepared for this possibility, but was M6ric? Secondly, Rolland 
argued that it was all well and good for intellectuals to refuse to fight because they had 
little to lose in so doing. But what about the working class? In Rolland's view, it was only 
the working class that was capable of stopping the outbreak of war. But if the working 
class revolted or refused service, it could instantly be declared part of the national defence 
structure and therefore in mutiny. Romain Rolland called that civil war. What did Mdric 
call it? Finally, Romain Rolland wrote that war had become internationalised to the point 
that it n-dght well not occur in Europe in future, but rather be fought by proxies hundreds of 
n-dles away. What did M6ric plan to do to prevent such transplantation away from French 
foyers? What did the LICP say to its members who were part of the 'infernal machine'? 
Rolland saw civil war at the end of every path. The origins of the debates later in the 
thirties over collective security and the idea of an indivisible peace are clearly to be seen in 
this letter. Rolland concluded that he was horrified by the idea of civil war, but saw no 
other hope in the West: 
I know of only one great tactic of non-violence which might be 
capable, maybe, of bringing war to its knees. It is that of Gandhi 
and of his people in India. But we still don't know how that 
experiment will end. 
I should be ready to use it in the West. But who is interested in it 
here? Who is concerned about any tactic at . _: all? Words, words... What will remain on the day of battle?... We must achieve social 
111 ibid. CNous Wirons plus au Bois') 
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justice without which war is perpetual. Whatever the bridge may 
be - non-violence or violence - it must be crossed. 112 
In his response to Rolland's questions, Wric replied that he was personally willing to 
face execution for his beliefs. As far as conscientious objection was concerned, he agreed 
with Rolland that in itself it was not enough, despite its great moral value. The con-dng 
war would make no distinction anyway between combatants and non-combatants, so in some 
respects the question was irrelevant. He agreed that the people who had to be reached 
were the working class, those who produced the chemicals and armaments necessary for 
modem warfare. The working class needed to be ready to prevent war by sabotaging 
equipment, going on strike and refusing to participate in the crime. Hundreds of thousands 
of workers needed to be committed to this action, but that would mean civil war or 
insurrectional violence. Wric thought Rolland was in contradiction with himself on the 
possibility of violence having to be used, but this merely indicated the direction Rolland's 
thought was travelling away from absolute non-violence. As far as the massacre of distant 
peoples in surrogate wars was concerned, Mdric was as opposed to this as Rolland. But he 
categorically rejected the Communist tactic of preparing civil war by sending young 
Communists to the barracks to do their military service: 
Romain Rolland accepts civil war with a sort of fatality. ' He goes 
so far as to doubt the efficacy of the Gandhian movement. And he 
proclaims his dislike for the aforementioned civil war which, as 
Georges Pioch has rightly commented, exists already in fact. If it 
is a question, as the Communists demand, of joining the army, 
taking up a rifle, fighting, while waiting for the right moment, we 
will not march. Our entire difference is there. A civil war with 
canons, machine guns, tanks, airplanes, bombs, gas, officers and 
soldiers? No. It would be too like the other. 113 
Returning to his anarchist theme, Wric asked what Rolland for his part thought of the 
individual violent gesture, that is to say of the violent act of doing away with one of those 
responsible for war should it ever break out? And on a larger scale, what did Rolland think 
of the idea of organising pacifists to commit reprisals in self-defence against the criminals 
who caused wars? 114 
Georges Pioch, who had decided to attend the Amsterdam Congress, took pains to 
explain why he did so and how his conception of pacifism differed fundamentally from the 
crude Leninist view that an imperialist war could be turned into a civil war and hence lead 
to the Revolution. Pioch ridiculed those old-style pacifists who still believed that a 
112 Romain Rolland, 'Le Combat pour la Paix. Romain Rolland intervient dans le d6bat', PH 33 
(23 July -6 August 1932), p. l. 
- 113 Victor Mdric, 'Le Combat pour la Paix. R6ponse de Victor Mdric', PH 33 (23 July -6 August 
1932), p. l. 
114 Ibid. 
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coherent pacifist doctrine could be erected on shifting national ideas of what constituted 
justice. He believed that capitalism could cause wars, but equally that war was the result 
of the 'lies and megalomania of certain men', the 'apathy, obedience and submission of the 
peoples'and thatcupidity was not the monopoly of one social regime only'. There existed 
therefore the possibility of wars other than of capitalist origin. And in this sense, he 
attacked the Communist notion of turning imperialist wars into civil wars. He accused the 
Leninists of attempting a social experiment; pacifists on the other hand just wanted to live. 
He revolted against the idea that war could be inevitable; the whole core of his pacifist 
belief was incarnated in an'intelligent and certain ... Non-Acceptance'. 
115 
The debate dragged on into 1933 and beyond. Romain Rolland resigned his position as 
Honorary President of the LICP at the League's Easter Congress in 1933.116 In the 
meantime, the Amsterdam Congress came and went. Its final Manifesto condemned 
conscientious objection among other things, and provoked even a negative response from 
Romain Rolland himself who had been prevented from travelling to Amsterdam because of 
illness. 117 Gustave Dupin, wTiting in the Patrie Humaine shortly thereafter, attacked the 
itatisme and the negation of individual values and action contained in the Amsterdam 
manifesto which he called a phantasme verbal. 118 Mdric for his part had already rejected 
out of hand the accusation that the LICP was composed almost entirely of anarchist 
elements: 
We are not followers. And doret let anyone say that the anarchist 
spirit reigns in the League. Lies! There were many anarchists who 
wanted to participate in the Communist practical joke in Geneva 
[the originally intended site of the Amsterdam Congress]. Those 
who understood were the 'Party-less', the 'outsiders', professors, 
teachers, intellectuals, petits bourgeois, civil servants, all opposed 
to war - against all wars - and who have put their trust in us to 
lead the battle. 119 
In his message to the UCP's 1933 Congress, Rolland rejected the notion contained in the 
league's statutes that pacifism was to be placed above all other considerations and that 
league members should comn-dt themselves to working towards the unique goal of peace. He 
also attacked Wric's strange affirmation that the LICP's statutes were intangible; more 
115 Georges Pioch, 'Paix dans notre Ligue, d'abord! 'PH 33 (23 July -6 August 1932), pp. 1-2. 116 His resignation speech is contained in Romain Rolland, Te Pacifisme et la R6volution 
(Adresse du 15 mars 1933 au Congrbs National de Piques de la Ligue Internationale des 
Combattants de la Paix)' in Par la MvIution, la Paix (Paris: Editions Sociales Internationales, 1935), 
pp. 119-123. 
117 Romain Rolland, 'Lettre A Henri Barbusse sur la place qui doit L-tre faite aux Objecteurs de 
Conscience et aux Gandhistes, dans le mouvement r6volutionnaire, issu du Congrýs d'Amsterdam' 
in Par la Rholution, [a Paix (Paris: Editions Sociales Internationales, 1935), pp. 61-64. 
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will be said about that in due course. The thrust of Rolland's message was that 
revolutionary concerns and the righting of injustices were just as important as pacifism, and 
indeed defined the essence of the longed for goal of peace. Pacifism in Rolland's view had 
to be social and not exclusively individual and introspective. He wrote, 
I will not admit that the League should limit its preoccupations to 
the salvation of the individual, under whatever form it may be 
conceived, whether it be in the most noble form of Conscientious 
objection for moral or religious reasons, or whether it be in the 
lowest form of the save-your-own-skin egoist. I find it natural that 
these preoccupations exist and that account should be taken of 
them. But if they claim to be exclusive and divorce themselves 
from the social salvation, from the protection of the humarr 
community, they would be shamefully insufficient and I should tax 
them with indignity. 120 
But the LICP declined to follow Rolland in his evolution away from his former pacifism 
as an ethic of ultimate ends. In a Manifesto published after the congress, the LICP rejected 
Rolland's questions as outside the Leagues competence. It reaffirmed that the LICP had 
been formed 'outside and above the political parties, to fight against war by all means, and 
to struggle for peace with no reservations'. 121 The questions posed by Rolland and the 
connections he made between peace and the struggle for political and economic social justice 
were the province of political parties, labour unions, and philosophical or revolutionary 
groups, but not of the League. The LICP did go some way to answering his criticism, 
however. It changed its statutes to eliminate the old formula of 'Pacifism above all else' 
and 'against all wars' to read 'Against wars imposed by governments on the peoples, in the 
name of a so-called National Interest'. 122 This was done in order to realise a greater unity 
between those pacifists who rejected the notion of the national defence, and those elements 
which considered themselves revolutionary wi thin the Leaguej23 
Wric contributed his views to the debate in an article published in late April 1933 in 
which he sought also to defend his own conceptions of the pacifist struggle which had been 
partially censured by the Congress. Responding to what he called Rolland's 'sort of 
messag& to the Congress, Mdric wrote that Rolland was 'bolshevising' himself more and 
more. 
This is his right. It is also ours not to follow him. And if he wants 
to drag us into what he calls a 'civil war' (one needs to define one's 
120 Rolland, loc. cit. 'Le Pacifisme et la Rdvolution, p. 121. For an analysis of Rolland's changing 
conception of pacifism see Norman Ingram, 'Romain Rolland, Interwar Pacifism and the Problem of 
Peace' in Charles Chatfield and Peter van den Dungen, eds, Peace Movements and Political Cultures 
(Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, in press). This is reprinted in Appendix II of this thesis. 




terms) and the defence of the oppressed, it is understandable that 
we should hesitate. 
In this paper we have always said that we are against all wars, by 
whatever means, and we accept no excuse for them. We shall no 
more march in a war against Hitlerism or Mussolini than in the 
social war of the proletariat. All of these wars are prepared by 
the profiteers of canons and munitions who leave it to their bought 
press to create and develop the indispensable psychosis and to 
agitate one people against another. 124 
In terms of pacifist methods in peacetime, Wric recognised the most passive to the most 
violent. But what about in time of war? He responded to the criticism he had faced at the 
Congress in the form of the motion from the Algerian section condemning an overtly 
anarchist leader he had written a few weeks previously. The pacifist despair of his 
position came through clearly. For Wric there were no effective means of fighting against 
a war once it had started - and he included the whole spectrum of pacifist tactics from 
conscientious objection to insurrection. Nothing would be effective. And so, in the last 
resort, in the event of war, the only course open to the pacifist was that of individual 
action, carefully left undefined. 125 
There to all intents and purposes the debate ended. Romain Rolland returned, as he put 
it, to his place amongst the rank and file, although to 'the extreme left of actioW, and the 
League went its separate way. The friendly divorce between the LICP and its former 
Honorary President marked the first of the significant challenges to the integral pacifist 
position which the League was to fight off before 1939. Rolland, and to an even greater 
extent the Amsterdam movement, had tried to make pacifism and the achievement of peace 
a strict function of other social goals - economic change, social revolution, and one specific 
sort of political outlook. Despite all protestations to the contrary, it is clear that the " 
of pacifism espoused by the Amsterdam movement was a very limited one whose 
parameters were defined by the exigencies of the Soviet world view. The LICP rejected this 
consequentialist definition of pacifism and clung tenaciously to the view that the 
achievement of peace was an end in itself. 
Having said that, it is clear from the discussions within the LICP that its conception of 
pacifism was far from an exclusively non-violent one. At one end of the spectrum there 
existed within the League men who were quite prepared to envisage the most violent tactics 
as methods of preventing war. Even in the case of its libertarian elements, the definition of 
pacifism within the LICP seemed to take on overwhelmingly political overtones which 
masked the ethical point of departure for many of these pacifists. This is probably one of 
the major differences between Anglo-Saxon and French absolute pacifism. It is perhaps an 
124 Victor Mdric, 'Nos moyens de lutte, PH 66 (29 April 1933), p. l. 
125 Ibid. 
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extension of the dichotomy already noted by Pierre Cot in part I with reference to old-style 
pacifism. The distinction between the British old-style pacifist's Bible and the Code 
Napolion of his French counterpart was mirrored in the new pacifism of the thirties by the 
continued insistence of the French integral pacifists on the political aspect of pacifism. 
Once again, it is probably a comment on the deeply divided nature of French political 
society in the thirties that the question of peace should take on such fiercely political 
colours in an antipolitical movement which expressed such deep-seated resentments against 
the recent course of French political history. 
The paradoxes within the LICP's integral pacifism abound. The extent to which the 
League sought to provide a refuge for both non-violent and violent pacifists has already 
been observed, as has its propensity to define itself as an antipolitical movement in 
uniquely political terms. Its rejection of Arnsterdam-Pleyel was largely based upon its 
refusal to define pacifism in purely collective terms according to just one view of political 
society. But the opposite position was not necessarily true within the LICP; it did not 
embrace conscientious objection wholeheartedly as a means of resisting war. Officially, the 
LICP supported COs and applauded their moral courage but did not see in objection an 
effective way of preventing war. 
1932* and 1933 saw a great upsurge in conscientious objection in France which elicited 
both a governmental response126 and a tactical response from the LICP. Within the League 
could be distinguished three currents of opinion on objection. The first, repres ented by M6ric, 
was that objection was inefficacious as a means of fighting war but that objectors should be 
honoured for their moral courage. The second, epitomised by Ren6 Gerin, was that objection 
was a personal decision made by the individual pacifist; because of the nature of the 
penalties for conscientious objection by young recruits, Gerin would only go so far as to advise 
older men like himself, who had fought in the war, to return their mobilisation papers, 
thus incurring merely short disciplinary sentences in the local gaol. The hard line position 
was that taken by Eugýne Lagot and Urard Leretour who wanted the LICP to organise a 
massive return of deserters and objectors from abroad and the concerted return of 
mobilisation papers to the Ministry. 
Thus, for example, Victor M6ric in late 1932 saw repression coming for pacifists because 
of the great increase in conscientious objection. As long as pacifism had remained 'bleating', 
governments had had little to fear, but it was now becoming active. Men were showing 
their resolve to reject war by a variety of means and this brought disquiet to the 
authorities. Conscientious objection was one of these means and M6ric wrote that, 
We accord a high moral value to these acts. We do not -believe 
they have any practical value, given the form the next war will 
take against civilian populations.... we do not believe we have the 
126 See Appendix 1. 
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right to give advice to our younger brothers which will put them 
gravely at risk ... 
127 
There was thus much respect for objection in the League, but little belief in its practical 
effects. In view of the coming debate with Leretour over generalised conscientious objection, 
it is important to note that Wric was against advising young men to become objectors 
because of the much severer penalties imposed on those who had not yet fought in a war. 
Armand Charpentier expressed this duality explicitly in an article on Leretour in early 
1933. He had met Leretour just before he turned himself in to the authorities and had been 
most impressed. But he thought that despite the moral grandeur of the objector's act, it 
would remain essentially sterile because of the complete indifference of the press and the 
more important fact that modem warfare meant that both civilians and military would be 
attacked and annihilated in a few short hours: 
This means that the conscientious objectors will not even have the 
time to show themselves. They will be asphyxiated and roasted 
with the rest of the citizens. In these conditions, I believe that the 
struggle for peace must pass from the individual level of 
conscientious objection to the collective level of non-resistance. I 
take that to mean that our propaganda must evolve more and more 
in the direction of making the unsuspecting masses understand that 
with aero-chemical warfare all of the armaments and all of the 
arn-des are completely useless. As a consequence, the only means 
whereby a people can save itself, its property, its patrie, is to 
disarm totally, to thereby refuse all war. That is the true 
propaganda position on which pacifists must stand. 128 
Ren6 Gerin was the most visible exponent of conscientious objection in the higher 
echelons of the LICP. He paid for his commitment to this form of pacifism in several 
disciplinary sentences of short duration and one long sentence passed on him by virtue of the 
newly strengthened law of July 1934 on conscientious objection. Gerin was careful, however, 
to emphasise to his audiences that he advised no one to become a CO. Rather, he placed 
before them the various options open to pacifists and left them to make up their own minds. 
As he pointed out in a 1934 editorial, the Comitd Directeur of the League refused to counsel 
conscientious objection to young men of twenty years because they believed it to be an 
individual question eliciting a very personal answer. Perhaps more to the point, they 
believed along with Gerin that those who advised objection should be the ones to pay for 
it. 129 Having said that, Gerin was a very successful propagandist with the anciens 
combattants and it was to this group that he held up the example of his own successful 
127 Victor M6ric, 'Vers la r6pression', PH 40 (29 October -5 November 1932), p. l. 
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objection at least until the change in the law in 1934. To these men who had shared the 
trench experience with him, Gerin showed the possibility of making a pacifist statement at 
relatively little personal cost. In an open letter to Edouard Daladier in April 1933, Gerin 
reckoned about one hundred men had so far followed his example; just over a year later, he 
put the number in the hundreds if not thousands. To the veterans he said, 
To begin with, we want the legal recognition of conscientious 
objection, and we believe that it is above all the veterans who 
should be fighting for the realisation of this first point in our 
programme. 130 
In the summer of 1933 Gerin also recommended a way around the problem of the long 
prison term for young men who nevertheless wanted to affirm their integral pacifist beliefs. 
Rather than becoming one of the 130,000 Frenchmen who had either left France or assumed 
a false identity in order to avoid military service, Gerin suggested a third alternative. He 
advised young men to do their military duty in time of peace, but before joining their 
regiment for the first time, to send a letter to their regimental commander and to the 
Minister of War outlining their conscientious objection and making it clear that they would 
not serve in time of war. 131 But this tactic raised the ire of Alphonse Barbe, sometime 
editor of the libertarian newspaper Le Semeur in the Calvados, who protested that Gerin 
as an ex-officer could not imagine what a young recruit 'deuxiýme classe' writing such a 
letter would be put through. Gerin completely underestimated the brutal stupidity and 
sadism of the non-comn-dssioned officers if he thought such a plan would work. For Barbe it 
was better to affirm an all-or-nothing stance; either declare oneself an objector and take 
the consequences or else do one's military service as quietly as possible. In Barbes view, the 
more honest and effective approach was that taken by Leretour: the organisation of a 
massive return of deserters, objectors and insoumis from abroad and from internal e)dle in an 
attempt to paralyse completely the Army's judicial system. 132 
Leretour and Lagot advocated the creation of a vast collective movement of 
conscientious objection which would force the French government to change the law on 
conscription. The publication of the Chautemps, circular in the press in early May 1933 had 
convinced them that the government was weakened and the time had come to strike while 
the iron was hot. They attempted to persuade the LICP to back them in this campaign, but 
the League's Comitd Directeur refused, prompting Lagot to respond in his article ' Sous le 
signe de la Peur' that the LICP did not have the courage of its pacifist convictions. 133 
130 Rend Gerin, 'Lettre ouvertei M Daladier, PH 63 (8 April 1933), pp. 1-2. 
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Instead, Lagot and Leretour created a Ligue des Objecteurs de Conscience and appealed for 
COs, deserters and insoumis to come forward in droves, go to prison and begin a hunger 
strike. 134 Later that summer, Leretour wrote that the main reason for its creation had been 
the almost total incomprehension faced by COs within the wider pacifist movement in 
France. He underlined that he wanted to create a collective movement of objection and was 
tired to death of hearing that objection had no practical impact - one had only to look at 
the Chautemps circular to see that it did. 135 But in the generally received opinion of the 
LICP that would be to assume a collective responsibility of conscience which by definition 
had to remain the decision of each man. What the League did promise was to remain 
faithful to those who rebelled and this it did. 136 
The first. three years of the LICP's life saw, therefore, major definitional debates on the 
nature of the new pacifism. Wric had sought to create an organisation which would be as 
broad as possible in its intake; political, social and religious preferences were to be left in 
the vestibule as he liked to say. Thus began an uneasy marrige of different strands of 
absolute pacifism. The most difficult dichotomy to be bridged was undoubtedly that 
between the partisans of non-violence and violence. Amsterdam-Pleyel highlighted some 
of these contradictions but the League was able to maintain its organisational independence 
by insisting on the purity of its pacifism and its application to all wars. Conscientious 
objection provided the next challenge to the League's position but was easily accommodated 
within the LIC7s world view. The third and final crise de croissance came at the League's 
second national congress in 1933. 
By 1933 it was clear that more was needed than sterile anathemas hurled at the spectre 
of a war which Mdric proclaimed imminent, almost inevitable, and impossible to resist once 
it had arrived. Pacifist despair undoubtedly succeeded in grouping together the thousands 
of men and women who joined the LICP in its first three years, but increasingly it became 
necessary to offer these leaguers specific policies for fighting war. A further problem was 
the deepening perception within the league, especially in the provincial sections, that the 
LICP was being run like a tin-pot dictatorship by Mdric and a few friends in Paris. The 
League's accounts were mixed up with those of the Patrie Humaine, and were in a state of 
considerable chaos. There was also the question of the Patrie Humaine. Many people 
thought that an organisation like the LICP ought to have its own independent organ. The 
- 
134 G&ard Leretour, 'Debout, les Objecteurs! ', PH 71 (2 June 1933), pl. 
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136 Robert Jospin, 'Pr6cisions nouvelles', Le Combat pour la Paix 4 (August -September 1933), 
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question had been raised at the Angers congress in 1932 and Mdric had explained that the 
'PH is completely at the disposition of the League but does not belong to it'. 137 
All of these issues came to the boil in the Congress which convened at Easter 1933 in 
Paris. It is clear that Wric felt control of the League slipping from his grasp; there was a 
violent altercation between him and Emile Bauchet, President of the Calvados Federation 
and chairman of the commission charged with organising the congress, over what would and 
would not be published in the Patrie Humaine concerning the congress. 138 As the writer of a 
report on the Congress quite rightly pointed out, Wric's Rapport Moral was more an 
exercise in self-exculpation and justification of past errors than a report as such. 139 M6ric 
spoke at length about the origins of the LICP and about the complete intangibility both of 
the League's structure and its statutes. The League under Wric had a committee of 
patronage at the top, composed of eminent writers, professors and intellectuals. This 
committee designated a president and a secretary general. Wric also outlined the League's 
principles - and it was these, or rather their wording, which prompted Romain Rolland's 
intervention as we have seen. What is clear is that Mdric viewed the LICP as akin to the 
law of the Medes and the Persians. This dogmatism asserted itself even down to the section 
and federation level where no dissent would be brooked: 'It has never been a question of the 
sections and federations intervening in the general propaganda of the League or of claiming 
to modify in the slightest its directives'. 140 It is unclear from all this exactly what the 
members, sections and federations of the League were supposed to do if they were barred 
from any active role either in policy formation or in spreading the good word. In a man of 
such obvious anarchist inclinations as Mdric, there was a surprising degree of 6tatisme when 
it came to the running of 'his' league. Undoubtedly, part of the reason for the grass-roots 
revolt in 1933 was due to financial n-dsmanagement. Mdric referred in his report to the 
Od6on Incident; Pierre Oddon had been taken on to help run the league after his release 
from prison for conscientious objection. Without going into the sordid details and defending 
Od6on's probity, Mdric nevertheless acknowledged that a debt of some 70,000 francs had 
been run up before Od6on had finally been let go. M6ric ascribed the subsequent'malaise' in 
the League to this incident. 141 
With regard to the Pdrie Humaine, Mdric refused to give it up, ostensibly to protect it 
from becoming the journal of just one tendency within pacifism. He was also afraid that it 
would quickly collapse if not run by professional journalists like himself. All of this was 
137 See the account of the Angers Congress in PH 31 (2-9 July 1932), p. 2. 
138 See'Bulletin Officiel de la LICP. Autour du Congr& de PaSques, PH 61 (25 March 1933), pS. 
139 See Bauchet's comments in 'CongT?! s National de la LICP, 16-17 Avril 1933, in Le Combat 
pour la Paix 1 (May 1933), p. 4. 
14() Victor M6ric, 'Rapport Moral, PH 59 (11-19 March 1933), p. S. 
141 Ibid. See also'Congrýs National-, loc. cit, p. 5. 
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probably just a smokescreen for Wric's real desire to hold on to a paper which despite its 
debts was increasingly widely read in France. It also guaranteed him a continued voice in 
French pacifism. 142 
Finally, Wric argued vehemently against the idea of declaring the LICP at the 
Pr6fecture de Police, a move which would have the advantage of giving the League legal 
status. He foresaw problems because of the Leagues potential advocacy of illegal means in 
the fight against war. 143 Marcel Fouski of the Angers section, who had written the report 
in favour of declaring the League, said that such fears were groundless. Instead, 
declaration would protect the League financially, permit it to sue those who defamed it, 
and protect individual members from the effects of a lawsuit. 144 
Ren6 Gerin read a report on the League's propaganda which sought to define the LICP's 
position within the peace movement and in relation to the political parties. The LICP had 
no doctrine as such, and was neither a movement (like Amsterdam), nor a political party. 
Gerin defined it rather as simply a league -a society of study, propaganda and information. 
Having said that, it was necessary to delimit those parts of the political spectrum with 
which the LJCP could have nothing to do. On the right, this meant rejecting all persons or 
groups who accepted the idea of a national defence through arms. On the left, he admitted 
that definition was much more difficult because the Leagues formula 'Against war by an 
means' implied an acceptance of revolutionary tactics. Given the problems the league 
would face at the time of Munich over the question of the neo-pacifism of the Munichois 
extreme-right, it is worth noting that as early as the 1933 Congress, the LICP seemed 
unprepared to share its political bed with just anybody. 145 
When the Congress closed, it was clear that the House that M6ric built had been 
redecorated, if not redesigned, from top to bottorrL He had been censured in a resolution from 
the Algerian section for advocating violent anarchist tactics, the League had decided to 
declare itself officially at the Pr6fecture de Police, a paid treasurer (Bauchet) had been 
designated, the Comit6 Directeur was henceforth to be elected and the old committee had 
been turned into a Comit6 d'Honneur. Individual leaguers were to be attached obligatorily 
to a local section. The PH remained Wric's property. The League's statutes were also 
changed to reflect a more nuanced definition of the type of pacifism espoused; henceforth 
142 Ibid. (Rapport Moral). See also Andrd Dumas, 'Ligue, "Patrie Hwmine" et Librairie, PH 58 
(4-11 March 1933), pA See also'Congr& National... ', loc. cit., p. 7. 
143 Ibid. (Rapport Moral). See also 'Congrýs National... ', loc. iEt-, p-5- 144 Marcel Fouski, 'Rapport sur la d6claration de la Ligue, PH 58 (4-11 March 1933), p-3- See 
also'Congrýs National... ', loc. cit., p. 5. 
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the UCP was to fight against wars'imposed by goverru-nents, on peoples in the name of a so- 
called national interest,. 146 
In the debate on Romain Rolland's message to the congress and in the continuing 
discussion on adherence to the Amsterdam movement, the amazing spectrum of pacifist 
values within the LICP was once again evident. Mdric was censured, as has been seen, for 
his overtly anarchist prescriptions for a violent approach to peace. But Pioch agreed with 
Rolland that in the con-dng struggle 'conscientious objectors, organised non-violents and the 
armed proletariat' should coalesce in the LICP. In almost the next breath, however, Victor 
Margueritte announced that the League agreed with Romtxin Rolland but was in favour of 
non-violence. Han Ryner and Armand Charpentier both thought that no distinction should 
be made between civil and foreign wars. S6bastien Faure was against the Gandhian method 
and announced himself a partisan of violence every time one was a victim of it. The 
Toulouse group wanted to draw up lists of those responsible for wars as future 'hostages for 
peace' and was in favour of armed resistance to any war. The Toulouse resolution was 
approved by a majority of the Congress. Gerin continued to believe that if the masses knew 
what the LICP knew about the origins of the Great War, they would flock to pacifism - an 
indication that the question of war responsibilities continued to be important in the. pacifist 
debate. Even on the question of conscientious objection there was incoherence. A motion from 
the St-Denis section demanding that the Comitd Directeur officially support the 
'movement of collective conscientious objection proposed by comrade Leretoue was adopted; 
but strangely a resolution from the section in the fourteenth arrondissement demanding a 
collective return of mobilisation papers was rejected. 147 
The 1933 Congress was important, therefore, bcause it marked a break from the Mdric- 
dominated past of the L eague, which while fecund in membership growth, had 
increasingly come to be seen as undemocratic and imbued with a sterile nihilism incapable 
of developing specific policies for pacifists. 1933 also re-affirmed the League7s position on 
the Amsterdam movement and began a debate on conscientious objection which would 
broaden into a discussion on pacifist tactics generally. That said, the Congress continued to 
show up the divisive nature of the League and the uneasy alliance which existed between 
its disparate constituent parts. A police report on the congress underlined the 'great 
doctrinal confusion' as well as the 'strong personal rivalries' which existe d within the 
League, mostly between Mdric and Pioch, and concluded, 
146 'Chez les Combattants de la Paix. Le Congr6s de Piques', PH 66 (29 April 1933), p. 4. See also 
Vongrýs National de la LICP, 16-17 Avril 1933', Le Combat pour la Paix 1 (May 1933), pp. 4-10. See also 
'Rdunion du Comild Directeur, Lee Combat pour la Paix 1 (May 1933), pp. 10-11. 
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To sum up, no precise policy directives given, no political line laid 
down. Each section and each member of a section is left free to act 
as he pleases. This is anarchy. 148 
The anarchy evident in the League as a whole was apparently even more extreme in the 
Paris federation. It led finally to the resignation of three early members, J. Bardin, A. 
Dumas and 0. R. Monod. These three published a manifesto explaining their decision to 
leave the League in November 1933. It castigated the TJCP's inability to put its house in 
order. They thought that the Easter congress had succeeded finally in clarifying the 
League's principles and providing it with a sound and democratic administration. But the 
situation in Paris was even worse: 
At the Easter Congress, the vast majority of the Paris sections, 
under the direct influence of anarchist elements, declared 
themselves against the majority of the League, represented by the 
provinces and for the continuation of the 'methods' and the 
fantasies of the old adn-dnistration. 149 
The manifesto writers criticised the sterile gesture of Leretour and Daunay in decapitating 
the statue of D&oulMe, and the folly of the armed attack made on a meeting of the Amis 
de la Patrie Humaine. In response to these criticisms, Gerin had apparently said that the 
Paris region was of little interest to the League because of the minimal possibilities for 
action there. Part of the problem for the League as a whole was its attempt to be all things 
to all men: 
We know now that it is vain and sterile to gather together in the 
same pacifist league, for action, Tolstoyans and revolutionaries, 
individualists and socialists, religious pacifists and Marxists. In 
order for such a unity, based on confusion to continue, it is necessary 
for each tendency to renounce the enunciation of its own points of 
view, it is necessary for the most active elements to take a vow of 
immobility. 150 
This the minority refused to do. Since action within the LICP was proving impossible, they 
had decided to leave. They rejected the sterile, inflammatory rhetoric of the League and 
opted instead for a 'methodical documentation and systematic education of the masses' on 
the causes of war and how to fight it. They insisted on the need to maintain a close unity 
between. study and action. The Paris federation seemed to be interested in nothing more 
148 See the Report 'D'un correspondent, 25 April 1933. A/3624 GB5 in AN F7/13352. The 
chronology in this report is a bit ambiguous. It refers to a 'congriýs f6d6ral' taking place in the first 
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context of the report, it is clear that the informant or the person taking down the report was confused 
about the dates, and it must refer to the National Congress, rather than a meeting of the Paris 
Federation. 
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than the 'action' of 'the demagogues of the "green teffor"I the fanatical monument attackers 
and the professional hunger strikers'. 151 
Thus ended 1933 for the LICP. M6ric died of a stomach cancer in early October, leaving 
the running of the Patrie Humaine to Robert Tourly and Roger Monclin. 152 With M6ric: gone, 
French integral pacifism had undoubtedly lost one its greatest visionaries and leaders, a 
man who had almost single-handedly created the largest French integral pacifist group 
whose influence was being felt by the government. M6ric represented the politics of dissent 
to his core, but his vision and work were tragically flawed by an unwillingness or inability 
to see beyond the increasingly sterile polemics which had caused thousands to flock to him 
initially, but which were incapable of keeping them at his side without the inducement of 
sound pacifist policies. M6ric the anarchist finally triumphed over M6ric the pacifist to 
the detriment of the LICP. 1933 marked the revolt of clear-thinking, democratic forces 
imbued with just as much vision as Mdric, but with organisational sense as well. 
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11.3. Challenges to Integralite (1934-1938) 
The LICP's pacifism in the period 1930-1933 was largely negative. Its rejection of war 
owed more to sterile anathema than to sound and practical policies. In the period from 1934 
to Munich it began, however, to develop an intelligent approach to pacifism which was 
reflected in a deeper analysis of internal and external political problems, and in the 
discussion of pacifist tactics. 
If the LICP under Wric had been slow to come to grips with concrete political reality, 
this was not the case in the post-schism League. In May 1933, immediately after the 
tumultuous Easter Congress, the League created its own journal, Le Combat pour la Paix 
which was published monthly until April 1934, after which it was replaced by the weekly 
and then bi-weekIy newspaper, Le Barrage. Both of these publications contained more in 
the way of political analysis than had the Patrie Humaine under Mdric. 
Germany 
The primary political problem of the thirties was undoubtedly that of Germany. The 
LICP was consistently in favour of a revision of the Versailles Treaty in order to arrive at a 
more equitable European situation. Before the Nazi Machtergreifung the League's 
propagandists defined the danger posed by Flitler purely in terms of internal German 
politics. Thus, for example, Rudolf Leonhard, a German 6n-dgrd and a member of the Gruppe 
Revolutiondrer Pazifisten, propagandised tirelessly in 1932 and 1933 for the LICP to which 
his organisation was twinned in an amicable accord. Leonhard had this to say about 
HiRer: 
It is not you who have to fear this imbecile Hitler, but 1. Hitler 
isWt war, he is civil war. He is the white terror. If he comes to 
power - and this may well come to pass and the other States will 
tolerate him there - Germany's foreign policy will not change. 153 
153Rudolf Leonhard, L'Allenwgne et la Paix (Paris: Editions de la LICP, 1932), p. 12. 
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This analysis found its echo in that other indefatigable propagandist of the first hour, 
Marcelle Capy, who along with Pioch and Leonhard traversed France in two successive 
peace crusades in the winters of 1931-32 and 1932-33. Capy, who knew Germany well but 
apparently spoke little German, shared *Leonhard's prognosis on the political situation 
there and what it might mean for France: 
Hitlerian nationalism is a fact - moreover an imposing and grave 
one. It is the arm that heavy industry uses to flatten German 
democracy and to tear from the working class the union freedoms 
which were so dearly bought. 
Hitler's troops form the counter-revolutionary army of the 
interior... 
Hitler is in truth not an exasperated chauvinistic Germany 
showing its teeth to France, but instead big German capitalism - 
and behind it big international capitalism - showing its teeth to 
working people and to German republicans. 154 
Before 1933 there were also those within the LICP who did not believe that Hitler 
would be successful in his bid for power; and if he was, that he would be able to retain it. 
Robert Tourly, writing in March 1932, thought that it 'was not possible, despite the crazy 
excitations of the passions, so strangely helped until now by events, to believe in the 
decisive and durable victory of a party, or rather a movement, whose ideology is nothing 
but a bric-a-brac of pLRrile demagogies. '155 
Wric, writing a few weeks later, saw nothing surprising in the Nazi election gains; 
they were almost inevitable given Hitler's financial backing. He seemed unconcerned at 
the thought that the Nazis might succeed in taking power, and in a ghastly n-dscalculation 
of the nature of Nazism, wrote that 'Hitler in power, will do neither worse nor better than 
the others'. Mdric not only underestimated Hitler, but also showed no small amount of 
political naivety in equating Nazism with other poli tical systems. He placed his hope in 
the 'other Germany' which was pacifist and wanted neither Hitler nor war. Wric thought 
that this other Germany would succeed in keeping Hitler in his place. The bottom line was 
that Hitler represented no more than a passing crisis on the lines of the Boulanger or 
Dreyfus affairs, crises 'which bring Democracy within a hair's breadth of disaster'. But he 
insisted that the trouble would pass and the German people would return to calm reasonj56 
Obsessed as they were with the perceived threat from an internal fascist foe in France, 
the pacifists of the LICP seemed unable to conceive of the danger posed by Nazism in any 
other terms. This view seemed to prevail within the League from top to bottom. A grass- 
roots pacifist, one comrade Dumont, returned from a trip to Germany in 1935 to announce to 
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his local section that Germans, like people anywhere, were pacifist. He concluded that 
while the Hitler regime was a danger *to the internal situation in Germany, it posed no 
threat to the outside world. Those who argued otherwise were playing the game of French 
chauvinists and should be denounced. 157 
A note of antisernitism crept into some of these analyses of the new Germany. Gustave 
Dupin attacked the 'Jewish press' for. contributing to the war psychosis which was being 
fostered by the French General Staff after the Nazi seizure of power. He likened the 
horror stories coming out of Germany to the atrocity propaganda of all belligerents during 
the Great War, and rejected the fears being whipped up through 'the exploitation of 
Dictatorship (in other nations), Fascism and the bluff of antisen-dtisnV. 158 
Pierre Cuenat addressed the question directly in October 1933 when he asked whether 
in fact Hitler had changed anything. French public opinion seemed to have swung round 
dramatically to acceptance of the potential for another war. Cuenat wrote that he was 
under no illusions about the dangers to peace represented by Hitler - he, unlike some 
subsequent writers in the Barrage, did not believe in Hitler's pacific disposition, - but he 
posed the essential question, 'has anything changed for the integral pacifist? ' His answer 
was that for integral pacifism any notion of legitimate wars of defence had to be rejected. 
Frenchmen would perhaps have hesitated to give their lives for the post-Versailles 
system, but Hitler seemed to be providing a casus belli. It was now once again possible to 
speak in terms of a war to defend liberty and democracy against barbarism and fascism. But 
this was a false trap: 
Frenchmen need these metaphysical hoists in order to accept a war. 
Hitler has allowed war to be disguised under this mask. Against 
this brainwashing, our duty is to proclaim loudly that nothing has 
changed; French imperialism against German imperialism doesnt 
interest us. We will not defend this cause no matter what label is 
attached to it. ... We denounce those who identify French hegemony with peace and proclaim the French army the only 
guarantor of peace, those who (Rem des Deux Mondes, etc) make 
of internationalism a treason against peace, and of French 
nationalism the only intemationalism. 159 
The position taken by most writers in the LICP's newspaper in 1933 and 1934 was that 
Hitler was an unsavoury character but that for the good of world peace one had to do 
business with him. The idea was also prevalent that Nazism and Hitler were not really 
that much different from the capitalist ruling classes in the democracies. Thus, for 
example, G6rard de Lacaze-Duthiers, reviewing Challaye's brochure Pour la Paix 
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d&armie mbne en face de Hitter was of the opinion that Hitler should be taken at his 
word in his stated desire for peace: 
... Whatever may be the atrocities conunitted by the Hitlerian 
regime in its first state - and anyone with a little humanity in 
them could not but disapprove of the anti-Jewish massacres, the 
hatred of intellectuals, the auto-da-f6s of works which are the 
honour of our species - this medieval night which has rung the 
knell of a complete civilisation - one must agree that we must have 
confidence in such a language [of Peace] and try to respond with 
something other than a complete rejection. 160 
The idea that there was little to choose from between Hitler and some representatives 
of the western liberal democracies was evident in an article written later that year by 
Gerin. He compared a speech made by Churchill demanding more armaments for Britain 
and denouncing the Nazi menace with an interview with Hitler published in Le Matin of 18 
November 1934. Hitler came off much the better of the two: - 
... even if Hitler is not sincere, it remains a fact that each time he has been plebiscited, it has been on the question of peace. He could 
not have imposed himself without this Policy of renunciation of 
war; he is only obeyed because he declares that he has rejected a 
bloody settling of accounts... 161 
Thus, although Gerin recognised that Hitler's regime was odious and that Germany was 
rearmin& he refused to believe that Nazism was any more dangerous than Italy, France or 
Britain. 162 
Sylvain Broussaudier, a member of the Leagues Comit6 Directeur, former normalien, 
and a professor at the Lyc6e in Oran wrote in 1935 that he did not understand why it was no 
longer possible or correct to seek a rapprochement with Germany. Paul Faure had recently 
criticised in the pages of the Populaire, the creation of a Franco-German society under the 
patronage of important Nazis and the French ambassador in Berlin. Yet, just a few years 
previously, Faure had been the first to castigate the French government for its consistently 
anti-German policies. For Broussaudier, whatever repugnance one might feel for Nazi 
Germany, he though it 'infinitely preferable' to make peace with Hitler rather than war 
with Germany. And this was not just because'peace is infinitely preferable to war, but also 
because all danger of war reinforces at one and the same time both German and French 
fascism'. 163 
160 Gdrard de Lacaze-Duthiers, Tivres, Revues, joumatue (Review of Fdlicien Challaye, Four la 
Paix disarm&, m1me en fiwt de Hitler), Le Barrage 1 (17 May 1934), p. 3. 
161 Rend Gerin, 'Un Discours et un entrefieW, Le Barrage 28 (22 November 1934), p. l. 
162 Ibid. 
163 Sylvain Broussaudier, 'Nous demandons A comprendre, Le Barrage 72 (21 November 1935), 
p. 3. 
163 
At its most basic, then, the LICP's general position on the danger posed by Nazism and 
Fascism was that these were internal problems which needed to be resolved by the countries 
concerned, however much one might sympathise - and there was much sympathy - with the 
victims of atrocities and oppression in Germany and Italy. Hitler was a political fact and 
the LICP argued that France needed to do business with him. The desire for peace with 
Hitler, rather than war with Germany, was an overriding concern. This did not mean that 
the League was oblivious to the external dangers posed by Nazism. On the contrary, it was 
very aware that Hitler could spell war. But what it sought to do was underline the need for 
a modus vivendi with Hitler, a defusing of potential conflicts. And because in the integral 
pacifist Weltanschauung France and the Allied powers bore a share of unexpiated and 
unconfessed guilt for the present European situation, that meant agreeing to many of the 
revisions of the European political map first demanded and then taken by Hitler. There 
was no question of sympathy for the ideas and methods of Nazism in the LICP. It is true 
that a rhetoric of violence did insinuate itself into the League in the period from 1930-1934. 
It is also true, as we shall see, that the League at times spoke an antiparliamentary 
language in its analysis of French politics. It is also true that it saw rapprochement with 
Nazi Germany in the foreign sphere as the best policy for France to follow. But it is 
completely false to suggest that the LICP was in any way 'soff on Nazism. The League 
consistently condemned without reservation the atrocities committed by the German 
regime. What it can be accused of is political naivety, myopia, and a distorted historical 
vision. But for all the world-weariness with which the LICP viewed the decay of Third 
Republic society, it never separated the struggle against fascism from that against war. It 
is the tragedy of its vision that all of this good will directed against a perceived fascist 
threat found its expression almost solely in the internal political domain. 
Thus, Pierre Cuenat, writing soon after the Nazi seizure of powercondemned utterly the 
idea that war was inevitable, and that responsibilities for this situation lay unilaterally 
with the Nazis. It was too easy to say simply that Hitler was responsible for everything. 
That allowed Frenchmen to forget 'the unjust Versailles system, France's policy of 
hegemony after the war, to say nothing of the econon-dc system which. had caused the 
present collapse which gave rise to conflicts and fascism. '164 Harking back to 1914, Cuenat 
asked whether the responsibilities were in fact one-sided. He believed that Hitler had 
come to power essentially on a platform of bastard socialism; the nationalism in his 
programme was still in the larva stage, but would certainly emerge if the policy of 
encirclement of Germany did not stop. Peace with Hitler did not mean, therefore, remaining 
silent about fascism, but it did mean realising that any foreign intervention would only 
strengthen the Nazi regime. Cuenat defined instead the task for French pacifists as 
164 Pierre Cuenat, '1914, deuxibme 6dition?, PH 71 (2 June 1933), p. 3. 
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foRows:. 'For us, the task which is incumbent on us, is to struggle against our own fascism, 
against our own nationalism. "Sweep before our own door". No union sacrie, even against 
Hitler, if we wish to spare ourselves another 1914965 
Pacifism and Antifascism 
All of this points back to the idea that the enemy was 'withiný. French Pacifists were 
antifascist, opposed to the Hitler regime, but they clung firmly to their belief that for the 
overriding good of international peace they had to concentrate on fighting the perceived 
fascist menace in France and leave Nazism to the German antifascists. The enemy in France 
was at various times described as the capitalist governing class, the military caste, or 
simply as the politicians of the Third Republic. In its latter form, the idea carried with it 
definite antiparliamentarian connotations. Gerin, for example, writing in December 1934 
about what he perceived to be an improved international situation, wrote that the real 
enemies of peace were inside France. They were the parliamentarians: 
Our real enen-des who are here in France are neither the Mains, 
nor the Babrys, nor the La Rocques, nor the Maurras' and the other 
vociferous Doumergue types, who are more or less sincere and 
maladroit. Our real enemies are the pikes and swindlers of the 
present ministerial team. They arent politicians. They are 
making money. And we are the ones who are paying. They are 
ready to do anything, even to declare themselves men of the 'left' 
and even to dishonour fascism, in order that their plots succeed. 166 
The notion that there was something rotten at the very core of Third Republic 
democracy is a resonant chord in much of the LICP's political analysis during the thirties. 
In general - and there were exceptions - the League's position was not so much 
antidemocratic as one of dissent, opposed to what it viewed as the machinations and 
corruption of the Third Republic. Thus, for example when plans were mooted in 1934 for a 
reform of the constitution, Gerin wrote, 
It is not we who will sing the praises of a Parliament which for a 
long time has been in disrepute. Its cowardice, particularly since 
the 6th of February, has shocked those citizens most attached to 
'democratic7 institutions. The parliamentary regime is worth what 
it is worth, that is to say, little. Such as it is, sold as it is to the 
economic and financial powers, it allows, nevertheless, an 
opposition to make itself heard, if not to be victorious. It justifies, 
in any case, the great word 'republic'. 167 
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He said that men of the 'left', revolutionaries and pacifists, were indiscriminately accused 
of working towards disorder. 'Order'must not be confounded with subjection or servitude, 
though. Gerin believed that it was not the product of tyranny or the complementary 
resignation in the governed that this required. Rather, he thought, it was liberty and a 
search for progress on the part of both governments and governed. 168 
The LICP nevertheless enjoined its members to put the pacifist case before the public at 
the time of elections. In 1935, Gerin wrote that pacifists and Frenchmen generally, had been 
terribly disappointed at the lack of progress made towards peace in the Chamber elected 
under the 'sign of peace' with Briand at the helm in 1932. In the upcoming elections, 
candidates had to be forced to take positions on the question of peace, and if possible straw 
candidacies should be run in order to give the League access to the French electoral 
billboards. Having said that, Gerin held no illusions about the success of pacifist 
propaganda in the present state of French democracy: 'In the LICP we do not have great 
confidence in the elected to maintain the peace. We count much more on the governed rather 
than the governors to kill war'. 169 
In 1937, just before the Congress of the Ligue des Droits de Momme which had as its 
theme 'how to defend both democracy and peace', Gerin addressed the question directly in 
Le Barrage. He began by emPhasising that not all members of the League were democrats in 
the 'Present, unfortunately precise meaning' of the word. But, if one were to restore 'to the 
word democracy its broader sense, which is the liberation of individuals, equality of rights, 
justice, etc... there is no doubt that we all aspire to the same idea, because this means to 
aspire at the same time to peace970 It seemed to be increasingly the case that friendship 
between nations was a function of similarity of their regime, a fact which made it difficult 
for pacifists to urge peace with all peoples. The LICP did not condone dictatorship, but it 
did seek peace with the dictatorships, believing that nations must have the right to 
manage their own affairs. With regard tD France and the other democracies, the LICP did 
not confuse their pale reflections with the higheddeal of true democracy. Nor did it confuse, 
the totalitarian regimes with the democracies. In this sense, Gerin wrote that it would be 
preferable for the world political situation, if all nations were 'democratic'. At least in the 
democracies a sufficient level of freedom existed for people to express themselves. He 
envisaged the possibility of war betweqn democracies and the fascist states. Hitler had 
said on 30 January that no further disputes between Germany and France were'humanly' 
possible. For Gerin, 
This word 'humanly' says too much. It is because the Germans and 
the French are men who are equally pacific, but unequally free, 
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above all unequally concerned about freedoms, in a word unequally 
democratic, that there will perhaps continue to be disputes 
between themj71 
But the distinction which Gerin admitted existed between democracies and the fascist 
states in no way implied an acceptance of war as the means to resolve these differences. To 
defend peace, it was necessary to defend democracy such as it existed in France after 
centuries of struggles, but it had to be done by example and not by force. 172 
It has already been noted that the LICP was convinced from the outset of the danger 
posed by fascism in France. In the first years of i ts, existence, this was often the result of 
personal - experience since LICP meetings were 
frequently the target for the 
excesses of right-wing thugs. The crisis of 6 February 1934 in France, however, served to 
convince the League even more of the danger posed by indigenous fascism. It strengthened 
its belief both that France's sickly parliamentary democracy had to be defended and that 
the first duty of integral pacifists was to fight the war psychosis by fighting French 
fascism. 
In a press communiqu6 of 10 February 1934, the LICP called for unity against French 
fascism: 'More than ever, an end to political discussions. Accept, and even advocate the 
organisation of a common struggle of all of the popular masses against the fascist 
hordes! '173 Edouard Lemddioni, a barrister at the Court of Appeal in Algiers, wrote shortly 
thereafter that 'peace is less threatened today than is liberty'. He said that the present 
situation in France 'resembles, alas, only too much that of Italy and Germany a little before 
the advent of fascism and Nazism. '174 He laid a large part of the blame for the crisis 
precisely at the feet of the democrats, socialists, pacifists, communists, syridicalists and 
libertarians, none of whom had reacted early enough to the situation. The problern with 
the parties of the left was that they spent too much time tearing one another apart and too 
little time fighting the real foe. Lem6dioni could not overstate the seriousness of the 
situation: 
We must not hide from ourselves the importance of the present 
events. The proletariat and with it the democrats and pacifists, 
has just suffered a redoubtable setback. The so-called Ministry of 
National Union or of the party truce is making a bed for the fascists 
if we do not know how to react. 175 
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He called for the creation of local antifascist committees across France and with them the 
establishment of militias designed to defend Republican France by force of arms. 176 
In the wake of the events of 6 February, the LICP reviewed its statutes and revised its 
goal to include the fight aganst fascis! n as well as war. A Manifesto read to the League's 
1934 Montargis congress and passed unanimously condemned fascism- and war in equal terms, 
but suggested that the more immediate danger came from fascism. In the LICP's view, 
fascism in France, which was defined as the triumph of capitalist, military, clerical and 
police reaction, greatly aggravated the dangers of war. The signatories of the manifesto 
were careful, however, to define the League's struggle as against internal fascism and 
external wars, the conjunction of these two phenomena being the paramount danger. 177 The 
position taken by the Manifesto writers was enshrined in a rewording of the Leagu&s goal 
so that it now read: 
[The League] will use all means of action (lectures, publications, 
demonstrations) against wars imposed by governments on the 
Peoples in the name of a so-called national interest, and against 
fascism which, destroying our liberties, leads inevitably to war. 
Against fascism and against war by all means, that is our motto. 178 
Six months later, Gerin declared, however, that fascism had failed in France, and was 
in retreat in the rest of Europe. In his view, France had never really known fascism; instead 
there were only the usual reactionaries who sought to exploit social problems in an attempt 
to create a 'renovating' regime on foreign lines. The two forces which had coalesced in 
creating Italian and German fascism had been a strong need for national unity and the 
misery created by economic collapse. With regard to the first, it had proved impossible to 
resuscitate the nationalist passions in France necessary for the creation of an indigenous 
fascism. As for the second, France had mercifully been spared the full effects of the 
Depression. In Gerin's view, the events of 6 February had in the final analysis merely 
shown the impotence of French fascism. 179 
The LICP remained committed to this policy of internal antifascism right up to 1939. It 
also continued to condemn the atrocities of the Nazi regime but increasingly as the thirties 
drew to a close, the LICP became concerned that antifascism'for external usemight lead to 
war. The League's insistence on the somewhat paradoxical need to take a moral position on 
Nazism - and at the same time to eschew any unnecessary stirring of troubled waters with 
the Nazis - is the hallmark of the LICP's approach to the problem posed by the external 
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threat of fascism. In this sense, the LICP drew its historical inspiration from 
Robespierre-180 Georges Michon, for example, writing about Robespierre's position on the 
external, essentially imperialist wars of the French revolution, compared Robespierre's 
opponents with their latter-day equivalents: 
May our little politicians draw inspiration from this great 
example of civic virtue. But they do not like the Incorruptible who 
would have nothing to do with a R6publique des camarades. They 
prefer Danton. One understands how M. Herriot not long ago 
sharply criticised, the idea of erecting a statue to Maximilen, and 
that he afterwards figured at the head of an honorary committee 
constituted to commemorate the centenary of Napoleon 1 (1921). Do 
we not also see the Communist party celebrating the centenary of 
Rouget de l'Isle, and waxing lyrical on posters about Danton - 
whose venality was proven rnany times - without even mentioning 
Robespierre or Babeuf. 181 
Fdlicien Challaye expanded this view eighteen months later in a review of Michon's 
book, Robespie"e et 14 Guerre Wvolutionnaire (1791-1792), arguing with Michon and 
Robespierre that war does not serve the interests of the masses. He denounced the'criminal 
and anti-revolutionary character' of war and wrote that 'we shall repeat that war is 
incapable of sowing a love of liberty; because "no one likes an armed n-dssionary",. 182 
This historical position easily translated itself into a justification of the league's 
oppositon to external antifascism and its views on German refugees in France. In early 1936 
Challaye expressed concern at the actions of 'certain refugees' in France who seemed to be 
pushing towards a war with Germany. He had all the sympathy in the world for the 
vicitims of Nazism who were in France - the Jews, Communists, Socialists and democrats - 
but he was alarmed at the anti-German, or pro-war propaganda bdng spread by these 
people. It was essential in his view that the ire of these refugees not be allowed to be 
added to the traditional hostility already existing between the French and German 
peoples. The refugees must not be allowed to foment a war that would enable them to return 
victorious to Germany on the backs of the French army. Connecting present events with 
historical antecedent, Challaye drew his conclusion: 'the action of the German refugees of 
1935 calls strangely to n-dnd that of the foreign refugees of 1792, pushing France into a so- 
180 It is interesting to note that Albert Mathiez, the historian of Robespierre, was one of the first 
members of the old Comitd Directeur of the LICP under Wric. See James Friguglietti, Albert 
Mathiez, Historien rifuolutionnaire (1874-1932), translated from the English by Marie-Franqoise 
Perrot (Paris: Soci6t6 d'Etudes Robespierristes, 1974), pp. 226-227. 
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called war of liberation of the nations'. 183 This general position on the dangers of an 
antifascism directed exclusively at external threats was echoed by Gerin, who at the same 
time recognised the tactical discomfiture felt by integral pacifists in defending a political 
position shared only with the right in France: 
We must warn our comrades against the possible excesses of 
antifascism, however legitimate it might be; we ren-dnd them 
forcefully that our hatred is directed against the tyrants and not 
against the people, and we regret that it should be only the French 
Right today which is favourable to ideas of Franco-German 
rapprochement. 184 
The LICP thus trod a very narrow line at times between an ethically acceptable, left- 
wing pacifism and ideas which seemed on the surface to be more at home on the extreme- 
right in France. The League was consistently antifascist within France but tended to limit 
its external antifascism. to condemnations of Nazi racial attacks in Germany. As far as the 
claims of the Nazi regime to a complete restructuring of the European political map were 
concerned, the LICP was often acquiescent, believing these claims to be justified by the 
'n-dstakes' made at Versailles. The LICP condemned antisemitism. both in France and in 
Germany, but equally attacked those Jews it felt were pushing France towards another 
guerre du droit. The fundamental tenet of its belief was that one could be both a convinced 
antifascist and a pacifist at the same time. 
Thus, for example, Victor Wric in April 1933 wrote that there were 'Jews and Jews'. He 
condemned those who sought to embroil France in a war with Gen-nany by rushing to the aid 
of German Jews. He warned them not to 'be more royalist than the King himself; instead 
he called them to align themselves with their natural friends, the socialists, 
revolutionaries and pacifists. Together they would defeat the enemy within France. 185 
In 1934 an anonymous writer warned readers of Le Barrage against what it considered 
the extremist position of the Ligue internationale contre I'antis6mitisme (LICA). There 
was a great danger that the heightened campaign against antisemitism would only serve to 
increase the chauvinism and Germanophobia which the writer thought the French 
government was trying to encourage. 186 
Having said that, the LICP consistently condemned the attacks on Jews both in France 
and in Germany. Gerin, writing in the wake of the assassination of the German diplomat 
Von Rath in Paris in 1938, said that the League and the Barrage 'condemned with the 
183 Fdlicien Challaye, 'La Pr6paration de la Guerre et I'action de certains rdfugids allemands', Le 
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greatest indignation the persecutions and diverse acts of antisen-dtism in which the Genman 
government is indulging, in the wake of the assassination, odious in itself, of Counselor Von 
Rath. '187 
The LICP's insistence on a division between its internal and external antifascism, 
coupled with its essentially non-interventionist view of European politics based on 
Robespierrist principles and a conviction that many of the political claims of Nazism in 
the European sphere were either justified or understandable, led in 1936 to the final break 
with Romain Rolland. In the period from the Amsterdam congress to 1936 Rolland had 
become increasingly convinced of the need for what he called an 'indivisible peace' which 
basically meant collective security. 188 This was rejected categorically by the ideologues of 
the League. Rolland had argued that the most pressing danger was that from without; he 
had called for a moral and material resistance to Nazism. Georges Pioch agreed with the 
idea of a moral resistance but wondered whether material resistance did not mean war. 
Nations, like people, could no more be forced to be free than to be happy. Italy and 
Germany had to free themselves from the tyranny of fascism. He did not personally believe 
that a Franco-German rapprochement was likely but if one were possible he believed that 
for the cause of peace pacifists would have to swallow their disgust of the Nazi regime. 189 
The differences in approach to the problem of external fascism were largely due to the 
different perspectives held about Nazi Germany and Hitler's intentions. F61icien 
Challaye protested that Romain Rolland could not possibly know what Hitler's future 
plans were or that he was lying - to claim the contrary was simply not logical. Much of the 
dispute seemed to centre around the anti-French passages in Mein Kampf and whether a 
book written during the Ruhr Crisis should be taken seriously in 1936. Challaye argued 
that it should not. It was understandable that it was widely distributed in Germany where 
it helped to 'create a maximum of national cohesion' and also that it was not freely 
available in the West where in Challaye's view it would merely risk 'increasing the 
hostile incomprehension of which Germany is the victim'. 190 Instead of a 'material 
resistance' to Nazism, Challaye proposed general disarmament. If that failed and war 
broke out between Germany and the Soviet Union, then France should attempt to localise it 
and not get involved. If Germany should attack France, then the true interests of the French 
people lay in avoiding participation in such a war. The only sane strategy, according to 
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Challaye, was to avoid the destruction of war at all costs and wait for the internal revolt 
against Nazi rule to begin. 191 
In a further analysis of Rolland's evolution away from integral pacifism, Challaye 
wrote that the author of Liluli and Stalin's friend were fighting within Rolland, 'just as 
Jesus and Dionysos fought within the soul of Nietzsche'. 192 The ambiguity of Rolland's 
position was obvious to ChalIaye. He was clearly no longer in agreement with Bertrand 
Russell that war was the ultimate evil. Instead, the worst evil had become the debasement 
of a people. Challaye disagreed, arguing that social justice is a necessary goal but that it 
could not emerge from a war. Secondly, Challaye challenged the assumption that Nazism 
was, in fact, the ultimate evil. He pointed out that concentration camps existed in Italy, 
and indeed that France used them in Tunisia and Indochina. And what about the Soviet 
Union under Stalin? His third point was that Rolland's desire to see treaty revision 
negotiated from a position of strength for the western democracies was ridiculous; for 
fifteen years after the Great War the West had enjoyed this superiority and had not used it 
wisely. Germany would never agree to negotiating on such a basis. Finally, Challaye 
distinguished yet again between external and internal antifascism: 
The struggle against internal and external fascism presents, despite 
everything, very different characteristics. The struggle against 
internal fascism is the civil battle which we accept. Idea against 
idea, truncheon against truncheon. The fight against Hitler and 
Mussolini is, for a Frenchman, the fight against the Colonel-Count 
de la Rocque and against Charles Maurras. This is the national 
front which we must occupy in the international struggle against 
fascism. But the struggle against external fascism takes on 
necessarily the aspect of a war. We want nothing to do with war, 
even that which is baptised antifascist and revolutionary. We are 
convinced, moreover, that one does not bring freedom on the tip of a 
sword, nor democracy in foreign troop carriers [fourgons de 
1'6trangerl. 193 
Pacifist Tactics 
The preceding pages have attempted to define the diversity of the LICP's approach to 
pacifism, and to describe the League's position on violence, antifascism, antisemitism, and 
French parliamentary democracy. We have also shown how the League developed an 
approach to the problem posed by the Nazi seizure of power. As will no doubt be clear from 
the above, the LICP was an intellectually amorphous organisation. comprising many 
191 Ibid. 
192 Fdlicien Challaye, 'Seconde rdponse A Romain Rolland', Le Barrage 90 (19 March 1936), p. 2. 
193 Ibid. 
172 
different strands of thought on pacifist definitions and tactics. The one underlying theme 
common to all of these different orientations within the League was a complete rejection of 
foreign wars. 
At its yearly congresses from 1934 to 1939, the LICP debated a series of reports which 
defined its views on the nature of pacifism, the causes of war, its political orientation 
within French society, and the ever-present dilemma for pacifists of effective tactical 
responses to the problem of war. 
At its third annual congress in 1934, and the first since the schism with the Patrie 
Humaine, Edouard Lem6dioni prepared a lengthy report on the tactics which the LICP 
should adopt in its fight against war. The time had come to elaborate specific policies and 
to attempt to create a truly mass organisation drawing members from both the working class 
and the mid dle class. Lem6dioni, perhaps referring to Mdric's style, wrote that demagogy 
was worthless; what was needed was propaganda and education. In his view there were 
three essential points which had to be made to the public. First, the League had to 
demonstrate to its audiences the shameful reality of the munitions trade, before, during and 
after the Great War, a question 'which engages the crowds' and which Lem6dioni 
considered essential. Secondly, the LICP must emphasise the horrors that another war 
would bring with the advances since 1919 in military science. And finally, it was important 
to ren-drid audiences of the responsibilities for the war of 1914, thus proving to the masses 
'that the peoples are always fooled by the governments which are dominated by the 
powers of money, and that it is impossible to designate an aggressor when a conflict breaks 
out,. 194 With regard to the League of Nations and a 'certain pacifisrre which sought to 
establish peace through purely juridical means, Lem6dioni believed that the LICP had to 
put the masses on their guard; the League of Nations was nothing more than an association 
of imperialist governments, some of them under the thumb of heavy industry. On 
conscientious objection Lem6dioni believed strongly that the LICP could not recommend it as 
A tactic because it was an individual act with such personal consequences; however, the 
League had an obligation towards COs to aid them materially and morally. Fascism had 
to be opposed, but he underlined that it was not the only regime which practised a policy of 
expansionism; he believed that imperialism could be just as great a danger to peace as 
fascism or Nazism. In any case, the League had to reject any notion of a preventive war of 
the democracies against Germany. With regard to economic sanctions against German 
goods, he argued, together with the minority group on the Central Committee of the Ligue 
des Droits de Mornme, that these sanctions were ineffective and would only accentuate the 
194 Edouard Lerriddioni, 'Rapport sur la tactique que la Ligue doit adopter afin de rendre 
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hatred between the peoples and 'weld the German people more closely to its 
govemment'. 195 
Having outlined his position on the above matter, tem6dioni proceeded to elaborate a 
series of steps towards what he called a positive pacifism. This positive pacifism had to 
be supple and capable of responding even to half measures in the political sphere. As a first 
measure, he suggested demanding clarification of positions from politicians at election time 
and support for a bill giving freedom of conscience to conscientious objectors. Secondly, he 
pressed for the nationalisation of the armaments industry. Thirdly he demanded the 
abrogation of the 'lois sc6l6rates' of 1893 and 1894. Finally, he thought the league should 
press for the abrogation of the law of 31 July 1920 which punished anticonceptional 
propaganda -a law of which several of the LICP's speakers had fallen afoul already. In 
the wake of the crisis of 6 February, he also went on to prescribe a series of measures to 
respond to the perceived fascist threat which has already been discussed above. 196 
LemMoni's report was passed almost unanimously by the Montargis Congress, and the 
Comitd Directeur of the League was charged with drafting a programme which would 
reflect concrete policies for pacifists. It should be stressed, though, that in the wake of the 
events of 6 February, the Congress took the position that the most pressing danger was that 
posed by fascism which had to be fought on the domestic level. 197 
The 1935 Agen Congress was another fractious one for the LICP. Lem6dioni, Marcelle 
Capy (who was President of the League in 1934-5), and Henri Guilbeaux all left the League 
for reasons which are not entirely clear. Guilbeaux had been writing a weekly column for 
some time on international affairs and had been charged with the drafting of the first 
edition of the League's brochure, Programme, TacHques et Moyens dAction. He also 
prepared a report for the 1935 congress on the idea of a Franco-German-Soviet union and the 
struggle against fascism. This report was printed in the Barrage, but strangely appears 
never to have been presented or discussed at the Congress; Guilbeaux resigned from the 
League in an apparently discourteous letter before the congress opened. 198 From the 
Congress proceedings it appears that part of the reason for these multiple departures was 
the League's consideration of a report by S6bastien Faure on unilateral disarmament. 
Lem6dioni attacked it as a 'chimerical idea', 'inoperative' and liable to 'upset public 
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opinion', He accused Faure of making an 'anarchist profession of faith' in arguing for 
unilateral disarmament. 199 
Guilbeaux' report, which was never voted on, was a logical continuation of his column in 
the pages of the Barrage. He argued against any policy of encirclement of Germany which 
could only lead to war. He was opposed to the League of Nations because it was an 
association of imperialist powers which 'by definition! could only foster wars. On the other 
hand, he was in favour of the nationalisation of war industries as a useful first step towards 
eliminating war. Undoubtedly, Guilbeaux' favourite project, though, was the idea of a 
Franco-Soviet-German union. He declined to call this an alliance or a bloc, because these 
all led inevitably to war, and denied that the idea had an anti-British flavour to it. The 
logic behind his thinking, difficult though it is to conceive, was that the three powers that 
mattered in continental Europe were France, Germany and the Soviet Union. Any other 
constellation was likely to be dangerous because the ideological dimension might create 
friction; but in the arrangement proposed by him, liberal democracy, fascism, and 
communism would, supposedly, harmoniously cancel one another ouL He also wanted the 
League to differentiate between imperialism and fascism which were both dangerous for 
peace, but in different ways. 200 
Lem6dioni's report on an obligatory popular referendum before any declaration of war 
was not presented to the Congress. A report by Robert Jospin on the nationalisation of the 
armaments industry was passed by the Congress. It seemed to contradict the conclusions 
reached the year before which had been favourable to such a move. Jospin argued that 
while nationalising weapons manufacture could perhaps be interpreted as a first step, in 
reality such a move would change little or nothing for the integral pacifist. A nationalised 
arms industry was no guarantee of peace, although it would undoubtedly cut off a source of 
funding for the 'bought' press. Nevertheless, the weapons would remain instruments of 
death. A further problem was the incompleteness of such a proposal. To be truly effective, 
nationalisation would have to include all of the raw materials industries - the iron, 
potash, petroleum, and colonial markets - which contributed to the manufacture of arms. 
But perhaps more importantly, jospin saw a potential trap for integral pacifists in this 
proposal. Pierre Cot had already suggested in the Chamber that if nationalisation 
occurred it would remove one of the biggest arguments for pacifism. Jospin concluded: 'We 
have been fairly warned. Our total submission would be the ransom, the payment in a sense, 
for the nationalisation of arms'. 201 
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The Congress also passed by a large majority the report by S6bastien Faure in favour of 
unilateral disarmament; this report really summarised Faures thinking on a subject on 
which he had already published. 202 Maurice Weber's report on nationalist ideologies was 
also passed but it implied nothing for the League's tactics and was more a critique than a 
call to action. 203 In another report, though, Robert Jospin addressed the question of what to 
do if war actually broke out. He wove a narrow line between laying down specific 
recommendations and avoiding the entrapment of the 'lois sc6l6rates' by saying little that 
was precise. His emphasis, though, was on the hic et nunc. War had to be opposed before it 
erupted and this meant education and having the courage to take individual positions. 'We 
will reap what we have sown, he said, '... let us promise ourselves, and that will suffice'. 
His report was passed by the largest majority, thus giving it claim to being the method of 
fighting war most favoured by the LICP. 204 The Comitd Directeur had wanted to establish 
a sort of hierarchy of pacifist tactics at the Agen Congress. At the same time, it was careful 
not to exclude any and to leave the choice of tactics up to the individual sections. In order of 
preference, the LICP had therefore pronounced itself in favour of Jospin's educative 
approach with the latent suggestion that individual acts of resistance would be called for 
in the event of war, secondly for the idea of unilateral disarmament, and thirdly against 
the idea of a simple nationalisation of the armaments industry only. The popular 
referendum and Guilbeaux` political report were never discussed. 
The following year at the Bernay congress, the league continued its examination of 
pacifist tactics; Bauchet said in his Rapport Moral that while all methods were 
acceptable, the League needed to continue its attempt to establish a hierarchy of values. 205 
Aside from the theoretical questions, there were also practical issues to be considered. In 
the previous Congress, at Agen, Bauchet had presented a report on the practical 
organisation of the League, especially as it pertained to propaganda. 206 The following 
year at Bernay, Gerin ran through the many excellent suggestions made by Bauchet and 
CongTiýs d'Agen' loc. cit. See also Robert Jospin, 'Rapport sur la nationalisation des armements, Le 
Barrage 44 (14 March 1935), p. 4. 
202 S. Faure, 'Rapport sur le ddsarmement unilatdral', Le Barrage 44 (14 March 1935), pp. 5-6. 
See also'Les Travaux du Congrýs d'Agen' loc. cit. See also S. Faure, Nous vouZons la Paix (Paris: chez 
I'auteur, 1932), in which Faure argued the case for unilateral disarmament. 
203 Maurice Weber, 'Rapport-critique sur les id6ologies nationalistes, Le Barrage 44 (14 March 
1935), pp. 4-5. 
204 Robert Jospin, 'Rapport sur la question: Si la. guerre 6clatait? ', L-e Barrage 44 (14 March 1935), 
p. 6. See also'Les Travaux du Congrýs d'Agen'loc. cit. 
205 Emile Bauchet, 'Rapport Moral', Le Barrage 87 (5 March 1936), p. 4. 
206 See Emile Bauchet, 'Rapport sur l'organisation pratique, Le Barrage 44 (14 March 1935), p. 2. 
176 
found that hardly any of them were being followed. The league was in danger of failing in 
its mission because of lack of organisation. 207 
The 1936 congress saw two main doctrinal reports presented and discussed. The first of 
these, by Jeanne Humbert, dealt with over-population as a cause of war. Humbert argued an 
essentially Malthusian case, saying that there were natural or biological reasons for war as 
well as social and psychological ones. Overpopulation and the scarcity of food and raw 
materials caused wars, and she demanded in conclusion an end to the restrictive laws on 
anticonceptional propaganda and sex education. Humbert's report was adopted with near 
unanimity, although Challaye reacted strongly against the suggestion that overpopulation 
led inevitably to war. 208 
Political Parties, the Popular Front and Pacifism. 
The 1936 Congress also discussed a substantial report on 'The Political Parties, the 
Popular Front and Peace', drawn up by Robert Jospin and Maurice Weber. 209 They 
underlined the differences between the LICP's viewpoint and those of all political parties. 
Their distinction between political party and pacifist movement is important to'our 
definition of what is under discussion in this thesis. For Jospin and Weber, the essential 
characteristic of political parties was a preoccupation with the organisation of society and 
the state. 'All parties, however excellent may be their intentions, claim to create man's 
happiness in spite of him if necessary: they resign themselves sometimes to sacrificing a 
great number of men in order to guarantee the salvation of those who are left'. 210 Thus, in 
the authors' view, the masses were but the instruments. which the parties used to further 
their own external and internal political views. The LICP on the other hand, had a 
completely different conception of the role of the State; it placed the 'interests of the 
governed, not those of the govemors'first. 211 The distinction reduced itself fundamentally 
to one between an individualist versus a collectivist view of the state. The LICP believed 
fervently that the individual was the most important social unit, while still taking 
account of the needs of the larger social group. The problem in France was that the needs of 
society had begun to take precedence over those of its units, with the unfortunate result that 
society had become an oppressive creature periodically demanding the sacrifice of the 
individual to its 'higher' needs. The LICP was not arguing for unbridled individualism; 
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Weber and Jospin believed that individualism must be limited in its expression, but that 
equally society had to attempt to assure the maximum amount of happiness and prosperity 
for the greatest number in the greatest liberty. In France it seemed that there was an 
inevitable drift towards forgeting this principle; that was why the slide towards 
absolutism had to be constantly checked by, to borrow Alain! s expression, 'the citizen 
against the authorities., 212 The important concept in the report was that all political 
parties in France were infected with varying degress of the same mentality. 
With regard to the parties of the Right in France, Weber and Jospin demonstrated that 
they were torn between conflicting ideas and tendencies. The political situation had 
become even more complicated with the Nazi accession to power because the Right was now 
split between those who favoured a pact with Hitler and those who advocated the Laval- 
Stalin pact because they continued to conceive of Germany as the principal and traditional 
enemy. A pseudo-pacifism had thus insinuated itself into the Right, a pacifism based not 
on conviction but on political opportunism. Weber and Jospin thought that the LICP should 
be encouraged in its work without being under any illusions about the temporary nature of 
the conversion of these 'unexpected neophytes'; the Right remained camouflaged bellicists, 
interested only in the maintenance of France7s conquests and colonial domain&213 
As far as the Radicals were concerned, the report concluded that they had always been 
infected with nationalist and patriotic ideas. Some radicals it was true, professed a vague 
pacifism based purely on juridical principles - 'genre "Paix par le Droit"' - but their 
pacifism was based on too many mistakes from the past. The idea that peace could be 
achieved through the League of Nations or an armed international force was 'the policy of 
sanctions pushed to the point where it could provoke a war'. 214 The LICP rejected a 
repetition of this tragic vision from recent history. 
The position of the Communist party created special problems for the League. Weber 
and Jospin wrote that they were'profoundly convinced of the need to defend the USSR!, but 
the'essential question! was precisely to know by what means this could be achieved. As far 
as the LICP was concerned, methods of force and violence were not the way to go about this. 
The Stalin declaration had turned the world of pacifism upside down. Part of the blame for 
the situation lay with the Allies' failure to disarm according to the provisions of the 
Versailles Treaty. This had helped to prepare the way for Hitler. But they rejected out of 
hand any notion of a Communist-inspired crusade against the fascist dictatorships. For real 
pacifists the challenge and the duty were clear: 
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It is up to pacifists to affirm, despite all individual weaknesses, 
the convictions that are theirs, and to resist with all their force 
the bellicist contagion. They must maintain the distinctions which 
are necessary, and not permit the confusion- of the necessary fight 
against the fascist regimes with a crusade which would be 
transformed into a holy war... The danger is so great that one can 
perhaps after all consider the existence of a part of French public 
opinion favourable to Hitlerism - as long as it remains a 
sufficiently weak minority - as a useful counter-weight. For it is 
good that a government does not have behind it an overly 
unanimous public opinion; that helps to make it more prudent and 
wise. 215 
Because of this view of international politics, Weber and Jospin could only warn League 
members to stay away from the Rassernblement Universel pour la Paix, as well as Soviet 
front organisations like the Amsterdam-Pleyel movement. 216 
Unlike the situation within the PCF, the Socialist party was completely divided on 
the question of peace and how best to attain it. The party contained a number of different 
individual attitudes which did not concern the LICP as much as those of other parties. This 
was not to say that they all gave complete satisfaction - far from it. The writers singled out 
Zyromski and his faction, in particular, for attack. They praised the SFIO for always 
having refused to condone the Versailles treaty and for its condemnation of the Ruhr 
occupation. L6on Blum was lauded for his personal stand against war and for unilateral 
disarmament, but he was too constrained by his position as party leader. Paul Faure was 
praised, There was also support for Marceau Pivert's Gauche Rdvolutionnaire which 
seemed to be evolving towards the sort of pacifism espoused by the LICp. 217 
The programme of the Front Populaire came in for serious criticism as much for what it 
did not say, as for what it said. Weber and Jospin provided a critique of the seven points of 
the programme of the Popular Front which related to the defence of peace. The first of 
these was an appeal for the collaboration of the masses in the work of the organisation of 
the peace. But as the writers acerbically remarked, if peace was indeed so threatened and 
in such a precarious state, it was certainly not the fault of the masses, but rather of 
governments. It was these same governments which had created the Versailles system 
which was the origin of so many of Europe's troubles. 218 
The second point of the programme demanded national collaboration within the context 
of the League of Nations, and collective security through the definition of the aggressor and 
the automatic application of sanctions. The LICP rejected this idea almost in its entirety. 
Its confidence in the League was very limited anyway, and the notion that military 
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sanctions could be called for under article sixteen of the Covenant was completely 
unacceptableý219 
The third point spoke of an 'incessant effort to move from a state of armed peace to one 
of disarmed peace!, through the negotiation of an accord first on the limitation, and then on 
the reduction, of armaments through gradual, controlled and simultaneous disarmament. 
The LICP praised the good intentions, but criticised the method. Goverrunents did not have 
the courage to set an example through unilateral disannament. 220, 
Fourthly, the programme called for the nationalisation of the armaments industry and 
the suppression of free trade in arms. The LICP report saw this as a positive demand but one 
which was far from capable of assuring peace. Jospin and Weber wrote, 'to say that war is 
due to the will of the arms merchants is really to minimise and make puerile a terribly 
complex question'. 221 But it would not do away with the problem of war and pacifists 
should not be lulled into thinking that it would. 
The Popular Front's fifth point was a 'repudiation of secret diplomacy', coupled with 
an attempt to reintegrate into the League of Nations those countries which had left it, 
whilst at the same time reaffirming the ideas of collective security and an indivisible 
peace. Weber and Jospin rejected the notions of collective security and indivisible peace and 
stressed that the programme did not mention the denunciation of the secret treaties already 
in force. This had to be done in order to clean up international affairs. 222 
The sixth point dealt with the 'peaceful adjustment of those treaties which were 
dangerous for the peace of the world'. It is interesting to note that the LICP view of what 
constituted a dangerous treaty was any treaty which 'was not in accord with the political, 
econon-dc, and moral realities of the moment, and which were dictated to the vanquished by 
force, instead of being freely negotiated between equals'. 223 
Finally, Weber and Jospin criticised the seventh point of the programme which pressed 
for an extension of the open pact system in central and eastern Europe along the lines of the 
Franco-Soviet Pact. They rejected the idea that these pacts were in fact open to everybody; 
they could not be because they were based upon a vision of Europe which had its origin in 
the Versailles Treaty and was therefore inimical to the desires and view of the defeated 
nations of 1918. The Franco-Soviet Pact was in danger of becoming anything but 'an 







that they contain no military clauses, but the reticences of the programme on the specific 
point of secret treaties caused Weber and Jospin great concern. 224 
These specific concerns were relatively minor alongside Jospin and Weber's main worry 
about what the Popular Front programme did not say. There was nothing in it about 
imperialism which the authors called the idea that nations enjoyed an absolute 
sovereignty in their own affairs. This was the real cause of wars. Harking back to 1918, 
Jospin and Weber strongly criticised the programme for remaining frozen in the past and 
refusing to embrace the still untried ideas of Wilson, 'the only ones which can lead to a real 
peace'. 22-5 The indispensable revision of the treaties could never occur in a moral and 
political climate so opposed to it. They concluded: 
This peace programme is insufficient for the creation of Peace. It is 
liable, if not of leading into a war, at least of being impotent to 
preserve us from one, despite the good will of its authors. 226 
Having criticised at great length the policies of both the Popular Front and of the main 
political parties in France, the authors passed to an examination of what they considered 
the fundamental question, the conditions of a genuine Franco-German rapprochement. With 
regard to recent events, such as the remilitarisation of the Rhineland and the abrogation of 
the Locarno treaty, Jospin and Weber 'dared' to write that they found the new situation 
'more encouraging' because clearer. They cited Paul Faure in an article of 8 March in the 
Populaire, who wrote that 'everything remains to be done, everything remains to be re- 
begun, or rather everything must now begin. ' As far as the internal atrocities of the Nazi 
regime were concerned, these undoubtedly constituted a'difficult psychological obstacle to 
be overcome'. In a biting criticism of what they perceived to be the essentially anti- 
German, rather than specifically anti-Nazi orientation of recent French foreign policy, 
they wrote, 
In reality, the argument about the internal regime is really just a 
bad pretext; those who would move against it confound the 
necessary struggle against fascism within each country with an 
anti-German crusade. These are not real pacifists. These people 
did not seriously protest against the formation of the'Stresa Front', 
and they continued to view Mussolini's Italy as a pacifist nation 
right up to the outbreak of war in Ethiopia. They also find it 
completely normal to have military alliances with the little 






Thus, while reserving the legal and moral right to criticise, Jospin and Weber argued 
that the only logical and sane approach to the dilemmas posed by Nazism was to follow 
religiously the old diplomatic rule of 'taking no account of our preferences or repugnances for 
any particular regime'. 228 To do otherwise required a constantly high level of military 
preparedness and constituted what the authors called 'the revolutionary deviation of 1792' 
which led 'us to foreign wars, militarisation and Bonapartisrre. 229 They rejected the idea 
that by refusing an alliance with the USSR, France would be opening herself up to the 
possibility of an aggression which would finally rebound onto her. They supported 
Guilbeaux's idea of a Franco-German-Soviet union which had not actually been discussed at 
the previous year's congress. 
Weber and Jospin concluded their report with a plea for a measure of historical 
transcendence, Europe urgently needed to forget the History of which she was the victim, 
and to unite. If this did not occur, they foresaw instead a new war of religion between the 
latter-day faiths of fascism and communism. They accepted Hitler's principal 
prescriptions for a peace with Germany: equality of rights, bilateral and reciprocal 
treaties, simultaneous demilitarisation of two zones on both sides of the border, the return 
of all European nations to the League of Nations, this time on an equal footing, and a 
thorough revision of the Treaty of Versailles. In order for much of this to be accomplished, 
the League's covenant would have to be separated from the Treaty, and a rapid and total 
disarmament would have to occur. 230 
In the discussion of the report at the Bernay Congress, it was stressed that while the 
League disagreed with many aspects of its programme, it did not want to do anything to 
harm the Front Populaire in terms of domestic politics. Jospin indicated the point of 
disagreement with most socialists on the question of peace: the pacifists of the LICP could 
not support the reservation 'in a capitalist regime' inherent in the traditional socialist 
rejection of war. As he said, 'our refusal of war is absolute', and that was what 
distinguished integral pacifism from all other shades of antiwar feeling. The Congress also 
decided not to mount a public campaign against the policies of the PCF, but merely to 
continue its comments in the pages of Le Barrage. The Weber-Jospin report was passed 
unanimously. 231 
The Bernay Congress came at the mid-point of the LICP's trajectory vis-A-vis the 
Popular Front. The League had originally supported the idea of a Popular Front, not so 
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range of issues, including peace. 232 By early 1936 many of the reservations discussed above 
had already begun to make their appearance. Jospin attacked the insufficiencies more than 
the defects of the Front's programme. It had nothing to say about the two-year military 
service law, the swollen war-budget, repealing the Daladier-Forcinal law on conscientious 
objection, or about creating a statute for COS. 233 After the election victory of the Popular 
Front, however, Gerin expressed the optimistic euphoria of the League in what he hoped 
would be the pacifist orientation of the new government. He declared that the victory of 
the Front meant the defeat of fascism in France, and the creation of a left-wing government 
a sign of hope for pacifism because'it is always on the left, among the exploited that world 
peace is wished for most ardently and prepared the best'. 234 The hopes he placed in the 
Popular Front - especially as regards the liberation of conscientious objectors and a separate 
statute for them - were almost bound to be dashed. He spoke of theguaranteed vote of an 
amnesty of COs, and the failure of fascism in France. In the longer term, Gerin demanded a 
real disarmament, 'supported by a policy of sincere rapprochement with all peoples'. 235 
These hopes invested in the Popular Front were great, and it is easy to see how 
disappointments followed. Gerin had in fact put his finger on one of the reasons for this. 
He wrote of the opportunistic hypocrisy of the Communists who, in order to attract middle- 
class votes, had 'noisily accepted the need to guarantee the national defence and the 
defence of "democratic" liberties'. 236 He thought that this sudden conversion had 
undoubtedly profitted them in parliamentary terms, but would have little impact on the 
Revolution. The world of French politics was rapidly changing in the face of threats from 
within and Without; and as integral pacifists were to learn in the next few years, the 
presence of a left-wing government in the Palais Bourbon was no guarantee of the 
implementation of pacifist policies. 
There was no lack of warnings in the pages of the Barrage of the disappointments 
likely to be in store for pacifists who put too much faith in the political process. Armand 
Charpentier welcomed the Popular Front, but warned that pacifists ought not to have the 
I naivety' to believe that much would change. Relatively few members of the Popular Front 
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parties were in any sense integral pacifists. 237 S6bastien Faure echoed these fears in even 
more precise form. He predicted that the Blum government would very quickly make 
concessions on two capital points: the League of Nations, and support for the national 
defence. He claimed that Blum had never considered disarmament outside the bounds of 
the League of Nations, and in order to retain power it would be necessary to arrive at a 
modus vivendi with the military establishment. He wagered that the Popular Front would 
not change to any appreciable extent the foreign policy of France, that the length of 
military service would not be diminished, the size of the Army and its budget would not 
decrease, and if they persisted in talking about disarmament, it would be a very official 
and gradual one. 238 
Disenchantment was not long in making its voice heard, quietly at first and then in 
increasingly strident tones. At the end of May 1936 Gerin urged the Popular Front to 
embrace a real antin-dlitarism which would move beyond the anodyne natiprialisation of 
the arms industries to real disarmament. He criticised the Socialists for following the 
evolution of the Communists towards the idea of defence of the Soviet fatherland as well 
as of France. This was all a result of the Franco-Soviet pact, and he noted that the closer a 
party got to the reins of power, 'the more it is willing to compromise with the militarism 
which will be its protector'. 239 This was why the Socialist party had sworn in the recent 
elections to support the necessary credits for the War Ministry. Ldon Blum wanted 
disarmament, but he was now constrained by the realities of holding power. Gerin hoped 
fervently that at least the minimum programme of controlled, simultaneous and progressive 
disarmament would be achieved. 240 - 
The wave of strikes in June 1936 provided an object lesson for pacifists. Gerin wrote that. 
they proved that if the people had the courage to follow Mirabeau's dictum -'the people 
would be powerful if they knew how to remain immobile'- they ought to be able to prevent 
any war from breaking out. No mobilisation was possible without the active consent of the 
mobilisable. This was the antithesis of the Communist approach which preached the 
creation of the revolution from within the army in time of war. The militarism and 
uncertainty of this method were reason enough to reject it. Instead, Gerin enjoined his 
Communist comrades to 'meditate instead on the lesson of these past days; and for the 
maintenance of peace, as well moreover for the triumph of the revolution, to draw the 
necessary conclusion041 
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There was tremendous initial goodwill towards Uon Blum within the LICP. At the 
outset of the Popular Front, the League often criticised its failures and shortcomings while 
at the same time making clear that it believed in Blum! s commitment to peace. Thus, 
Georges Pioch announced in June 1936 that he was'playing the Uon Blum card'. 242 At the 
same time Challaye addressed an open letter to Blum which was full of affection and faith 
in what Blum was trying to achieve. He clearly considered Blum to beone of us', but he was 
most concerned that Blunfs government break with the past and with those advisors who 
were urging continuity in French foreign policy. Blum also had to contend with those within 
his own coalition who were partisans of revolutionary wars. Challaye enjoined him to 
remain true to his convictions. There were serious lacunae and ambiguities in the 
government's programme, but Challaye demanded that these be transcended and that 
France declare 'peace to the world' through moral disarmament, revise the treaties of 1919, 
and proceed to A material disarmament as well. The latter point Challaye recognised 
would be difficult, if not impossible, for the Popular Front government even to achieve, so as 
a first measure of good faith, he advocated the reduction of military service to one year. 243 
By July 1936, the LICPs disillusionment with the Popul; r Front was palpable. In a 
second letter to Blum, sent on behalf of the Leagues office-bearers, Challaye expressed his 
disappointment that there was no mention of conscientious objectors in the bill being 
prepared on an amnesty. 244 Georges Michon was far more caustic. He wrote that the first 
sitting of the new Chamber exclusively devoted to questions of foreign affairs, had been a 
'demonstration of an anti-German union sacrie'. 245 The ministerial statement had 
'affirmed... the continuity of French policy', making no mention at all of the rather 'timid' 
hints of a complete revision of the unjust treaties which had been contained in the Front's 
programme. Instead, there had been the familiar insistence on the need for a strong defence 
and the prevailing length of the military service had been reaffirmed. From Right to Left 
there seemed to be unanimity on the fact that Hitler was the great danger to peace. Rather 
than revise the treaties, the government was preparing to follow the Moscow line and 
recommend regional treaties within the context of the League of Nations. Michon 
concluded: 
These are the consequences of the Blum speech. In truth, Poincar6 
and Tardieu could not have done better. Did the electors of the 
Popular Front want that? On top of this, there are the stupefying 
reversals of the Communists, and the apotheosis by the extreme- 
left of the Marseillaise, the flag, Joan of Arc(who will remain the 
symbol of religious mysticism and monarchical faith), and of the 
242 Georges Piochje joue la carte L6on Blum, Le Barrage 100 (11 June 1936), pp. 1-2. 
243 Micien Challaye, 'A bas les deux ans! Lettre ouverte A L6on Blum, Le Barrage 101 (25 June 
1936), p. l. 
244 Fdlicien Challaye, 'Lettre A L6on Blurn', Le Barrage 102 (9 July 1936), p. l. 
245 Georges Mich6n, 'Union Sacr6e', Le Barrage 102 (9 July 1936), p. l. 
185 
national union in all its forms. These manifestations create in some 
a demoralising effect, and in others a nationalistic and pseudo. - 
revolutionary state of mind which recalls Boulangism, both of 
which are essentially favourable to fascism and above all to the 
acceptance of war. 246 
The criticism of the Popular Front continued, even into 1939 with post-mortern comments 
on why it had all failed to give satisfaction to the great desire for peace. Having lost its 
political virginity, the Popular Front seemed unable to move beyond quiescence and lack of 
daring in everything from its foreign policy to what Pioch considered to be its unworthy 
attitude towards the Moscow Purge trials. 247 
We have already noted the affinity felt for Blum within the LICP. There was also 
initially a tremendous feeling of communion of thought with the Socialist party as a 
whole. But by 1937, the LICP was becoming very concerned at the evolution the SFIO 
seemed to be taking on questions of peace. Maurice Weber and Sylvain Broussaudier took 
opposing views of whether the Socialists could be counted on as a force for pacifism. Weber, 
who in 1936 had written that he could see no incompatibility between membership of, the 
SFIO and the LICP, 248 wrote the following year that the situation seemed to be changing as 
the party moved steadily away from its old, admittedly vague, but deep-seated 
antimilitarism, in the face of German rearmament. Weber concluded that the next party 
congress would likely see the end of pacifism within the SFIO. 249 Broussaudier disagreed 
with Weber's conclusions about the direction the Socialists seemed to be taking. Instead, he 
thought that while the SFIO could not be described as integrally pacifist, it would continue 
to represent a 'minimum pacifist programme, realisable in the short term, and able to 
exercise a positive influence on the govemment'. 250 
But it was perhaps left to Ren6 Gerin in early 1939 to sum up the feelings of 
disillusionment experienced by many pacifists, in an article in which he referred to Blum as 
a simpleton. After the Montrouge congress of the party, it was clear that Blum must 
henceforth be plac ed among the LICP's adversaries. He was perhaps not even still a 
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socialist because he seemed to put little stock in the concerted action of the international 
proletariat against war: 
If one renounced the union of the world working class, in order to 
participate totally and without reservation in the defence of the 
fatherland; if, in spite of all denials, one became an imperialist, 
under the grossly false pretext of pacifism, then one can certainly 
lay claim still to the title of Statesman, but it would be an 
imposture to call oneself a socialis051 
Gerin also asked whether Blum was any longer a democrat, because he had recently 
expressed support for the 'exaltation of all energies' and the 'effort of national 
stimulation'. Citing Paul Val6ry's bon mot, Gerin charged that since coming to power, Blum 
had become a petty politician, practising the art of 'preventing people from involving 
themselves in the things which concern therrf. 252 Finally, Gerin asked whether Blum could 
be considered a pacifist any longer. The answer was a categorical no, because. he 'no longer 
believes in peace'; instead, Blum had become an 'evangelist for the policy of blocs, a man 
who wanted 'his peace and not the peace'. 253 
Wars and Rumours of Wars. 
The positions taken during the thirties by the LICP on questions of foreign policy were 
consistent with its general outlook and activity in the domestic sphere. In both domains, 
the LICP's stance was a reflection of its general dissenting attitude outlined at the 
beginning of this section. In the period from 1934 to 1938, the League's pacifism was 
challenged by events outside France. The most important of these were the outbreak of the 
Italo-Abyssinian War, the Sa-zir. plebiscite, the remilitarisation of the Rhineland, the 
Franco-Soviet Pact and the Spanish Civil War. 
With regard to the Saar , Gerin wrote in late 1934 that if Paris was worth a mass, then 
peace was certainly worth the Sam He was in favour of negotiations with Hitler, and 
approved Blum! s statement that he was prepared to shake the bloodiest hand for peace. 254 
There was dissension, however, within the League. Rudolf Leonhard, the German 
propagandist who had been an active member of the LICT's Comitd d'Honneur almost from 
its inception, disagreed entirely with the Gerin analysis. He put his case in a two-part 
article published in late December 1934 which was printed with the disclaimer that the 
views expressed therein were those neither of the Barrage, nor of the LICP. Leonhard 
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wrote that for some time now, German dmigr6s had been receiving a bad press in France; it 
was almost as if they,. rather than Hitler, were to blame for preventing an entente with 
Germany. He attacked a recent article in La Paix par le Droit which sought to minimise 
the atrocity stories coming out of Germany; on the contrary, Leonhard retorted that he 
'could show the pacifist review La Paix par le Droit and Georges Demartial the unhealed 
wounds which our comrades have brought back from the Hitlerian hell'. 255 As to the 
argument that the dn-dgr6s were fomenting war, Leonhard underlined that not only did they 
not believe in the efficacy of a 'war of liberation', but that each time the opportunity 
presented itself, they spoke out against any notion of a preventive war as well. Coming 
finally to the question of the Sarre, he wrote that it was false to assume that Hitler had a 
united German people behind him. Leonhard claimed to be speaking as a German on the 
Sarre issue, and as such, it was his considered opinion that the status quo should prevail in 
the Sarre. Why? 'Because the Sarre is German, without the slightest doubt. We want it to 
remain German, and not become Nazified. '256 The problem of the Sarre was not so much a 
Franco-German one as an international one. It ought to be seen in European terms and the 
Sarre should remain independent until Germany herself became so once again. 257 
Georges Dernartial responded by insisting that the only course for French pacifists was 
to respect the internal affairs of Germany and avoid meddling in them. 2-58 Henri Guilbeaux 
took the same line, castigating Leonhard for supporting the point of view of the Sarre 
Communist Party which received its orders from Moscow. 259 When the vote finally went in 
Hitler's favour, Guilbeaux thought it entirely predictable - and not just the fault of the 
Nazis, but also of the incompetence of the Social Democrats and Communists. He did not 
want to see the Sarre become a further point of friction in Europe, but argued that it could 
instead evolve into a sort of bridge between France and Germany, perhaps through an 
econon-dc and customs accord. 260 
Gerin tried to demonstrate that the massive vote in favour of attachment to Germany 
proved that the war-guilt issue, which transcended party political lines, was one which 
all Germans wanted to see expunged. The vote in the Sarre was the 'consequence of all of 
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the stupidly inhumane policies of France in the last fifteen years'. 261 Hitler had said that 
there now remained no more territorial problems between France and Germany. Gerin 
thought that the time had now come to try to resolve the moral issues which continued to 
fester between these two countries. 262 
The LICP also took a very measured view of the ren-dlitarisation of the Rhineland 
which conformed with the general position it had taken on the Sarre. Gerin wrote that 
people from the extreme Left to the extreme Right were asking what Hitler really wanted. 
The answer was simple: 'the suppression of Article 231 of the Versailles Treaty, which 
gratuitously and stupidly dishonours a great people, [and] equitable revision of the 
treaties'. 263 He expressed no surprise at the ren-dlitarisation of the Rhineland: 
It was to be expected; Germany has a habit of presenting her 
adversaries with a fait accompli. And it is to be expected, too, 
that our rulers, after having for so long refused a policy of open 
hands, will be forced, one day, to accept the fait accompl064 
The exculpation of Hitler's moves in the present was thus justified by the LICP's view of 
the past. As the League officially stated in a front-page communiqu6, 'bellicists and bell! - 
pacifists obstinately continue to close their eyes to the injustices of the past, and dream of a 
war to resolve the conflict'; integral pacifists, on the other hand, 'proclaim that it is time 
to have recourse to a genuine peace policy- a policy that is frank, loyal and courageous. It is 
time to recognise the errors and the faults of the past which are at the origin of the present 
conflict. '265 The apparent insouciance with which the LICP viewed the remilitarisation of 
the Rhineland n-dght well be summed up in the headline of that fount of irony, Le Canard 
Enchaini, at the time: 'L'Allemagne envahit ... I'Allemagne'. 
266 In taking such a position, 
the League seemed to ignore that more was at stake than simply the Versailles Treaty. In 
ren-dlitarising the Rhineland, Hitler had also torn up the Locarno accords as well - an 
agreement which had been fairly negotiated with Republican Germany. This point was 
passed over in silence by the Barrage. 
It is interesting to contrast the above two incidents to the reaction of the League to the 
outbreak of the Italo-Abyssinian conflict. The LICP found it much easier to condemn Italian 
aggression and atrocities in Ethiopia than to castigate Germany for the Rhineland episode. 
Undoubtedly there were good reasons for this. Ethiopia was, after all, a real war. But one 
wonders if the ability to censure more easily in the case of Italy might have been due to the 
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fact that the LICP always saw the German problem as the major difficulty wlich had to be 
resolved in French foreign affairs. Its resistance to post-War French policy, its politics of 
dissent, created an in-built need in its political analysis to criticise French policy towards 
Germany. Having said that, the League did maintain a pacifist position on the Ethiopian 
affair while criticising the Italian government very sternly for its aggression. 
The received opinion within the LICP was that the developing conflict in Ethiopia was 
more about colonialism and imperialism, than about Italian fascism per se. Henri- 
Guilbeaux claimed to see the occult hand of British imperialism in the matter, with a 
supporting role being played by Japam267 Challaye echoed this view, and denounced the 
spurious Italian argument that they were performing a 'civilising' task in Ethiopia where 
slavery still existed; better to have black man exploiting black man, than to have the 
wholesale proletarianisation of the nation under the imperialistic boot of the white man, 
according to Challaye. 268 Two months later, in September 1935, he analysed what the 
Italo-Ethiopian conflict meant in terms of the principles of the LICP. People who called 
themselves pacifists were currently making two sorts of comments on the conflict. There 
were those who argued that sanctions led to war and should therefore be avoided. And 
there were others, like the British TUC, who advocated the imposition of all sorts of 
sanctions, including military ones if necessary. In Challaye's view, the latter positon was 
not'pacifist'at all. So, was the choice between doing nothing and going to war? He argued 
that on the contrary, the Ethiopian people should fight foreign oppression by means other 
than war, which would have as its only effect the destruction of their country. Challaye 
suggested Gandhian non-violent resistance, strikes, individual acts of terrorism, 
insurrections, and so on. As for the other nations of the world, it was incumbent on them not 
to get involved at almost any price. He rejected the idea of an indivisible peace and argued 
that wars must be localised, not generalised. The methods to use were a diplomatic, moral, 
economic and financial boycott, universally applied. Sanctions did not automatically mean 
war because their application could be limited to ones own national territory. There was no 
suggestion of using gunboat diplomacy to erect naval blockages around the belligerant 
countries. 269 
Challaye's prescriptions for peace were reiterated by the League as a whole which 
published a manifesto on the Ethiopian crisis. It condemned fascism and Mussolini's 
incursion into Ethiopia but advised the Ethiopian people that it 'would defend itself more 
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effectively and bring honour to itself in not having recourse to the means of war., 270 The 
League also condernned in anticipation any attempt on the part of other powers to get 
involved in the conflict. The political anarchism of the LICP, or its politics of dissent, 
came through baldly in its statement that for both the Italian and Ethiopian peoples, their 
primary enemy was to be found in their own governments. The LICP recommended the 
breaking-off of diplomatic relations with Italy, a freeze in all arms trade with both 
countries, and the refusal of all bank credits to the aggressor. The important task was to 
halt the spread of the conflict. 271 
The Ethiopian war had as a further interesting result the significant emergence for the 
first time of what the LICP chose to call, somewhat incongruously to the Anglo-Saxon ear, 
the pseudo-pacifism of the French Right. This was to appear in even more evolved and 
virulent form at the time of Munich. But 1935 gave a foretaste of things to come. The 
Barrage of 10 October catalogued the anti-interventionist views of a number of right-wing 
newspapers and the anonymous writer concluded that this 'pacifism! was all well and good. 
The LICP would remember it the next time when it was no longer a question of fighting 
'Uncle Mussolini'but instead of going into battle against'our German, Russian or Patagonian 
brothers'. 272 Gerin denounced Mussolini's aggression and French fascists for supporting him. 
He also condemned the League of Nations for not doing anything to stop the conflict and 
Laval for tacitly supporting the Italians. 273 
Gerin had nothing but scom for the 'patriots' who had the 'audacity to cry "down with 
war".. not because they want peace, but becaue they want a victory for external fascis&. 274 
Challaye tackled head on the issue of what the League viewed as the opportunistic 
pseudo-pacifism of the Right in an examination of the Manifesto, 'Pour la 136fense de 
I'Occident', drafted by the royalist Henri Massis. He recognised that the intellectuals who 
had signed it agreed with the LICP on several points. Should the League reject or accept 
this apparent convergence of views? Challaye recalled La Rochefoucauld's maxim that 
'hypocrisy is a praise that vice gives to virtue'. It was clear that this so-called pseudo-, 
pacifism of the Right was ephemeral. The signatories of the Manifesto were not against all 
wars like the LICP. With no inkling of what lay in store at Munich, Challaye concluded 
with an attack on the Right in which he assumed its Germanophobia as a constant value: 
'If it so happens that a government approved of by the signatories of the manifesto wants 
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one day to throw us into a war against Germany, we shall turn back on these gentlemen the 
weapon of their own declarations'. 275 
Throughout the rest of 1935 and until Addis-Abbaba fell, the LICP continued to press for 
the application of economic and financial sanctions against Italy, and a complete boycott of 
war material to both belligerant countries. The LTCP did not want to see the Italian 
people die of hunger, but they were profoundly disappointed that the sanctions which 
should automatically have come into play under article 16 of the League Covenant, never 
did. But even with the apparent end of the war, the LICP still expressed its certainty 
that Mussolini would one day pay for his African adventure. One writer in the Barrage 
expressed the hope that the atrocities committed by the Italian army would not be simply 
forgotten. 276 
The LICP viewed the Laval-Stalin Pact and the general evolution of the French 
Communist Party on the question of peace with a very jaundiced eye. It has'already been 
noted above that there was much friction between the early League under Wric and the 
PCF. This increased in the wake of the Amsterdam Congress with which the LICP would 
have little to do, at least officially. There was therefore a long tradition of hostility to 
the opportunistic antin-tilitarism - not pacifism - of the Communists. The League could 
never agree with the Communist distinction between just revolutionary wars and unjust 
imperialist wars, nor with the notion of sending young Frenchmen to the casernes to learn 
the military art in the hope that some day this knowledge could be used against the 
bourgeoisie. For the LICP external war was external war and could not be justified. 
It is no surprise therefore to learn that the League condemned the Laval-Staln 
declaration and the nascent anti-Nazi nexus which seemed to be developing between Paris 
and Moscow. Sacred alliances spelled holy wars, and the LICP wanted to avoid this at all 
costs. The Franco-Soviet Pact spelled the end of the hopes of integral pacifism in the 
peaceful outlook of the Soviet Union. 277 Hubert Gilbert wrote that the pact brought France 
full circle back to the situation of 1894 and the defensive military alliance with tsarist' 
Russia. 278 Gerin condemned the pact without reservations, but had seen it coming for some 
time. In the course of the League's speaking tours across France, they had been 'constantly 
asked to take a position for the defence of the USSR which was confused with the defence 
of peace'. 279 But the League's position had been and remained one of opposition to all 
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alliances. The Franco-Soviet Pact had changed definitively the LICP's view of Soviet 
Russia. It would continue to support the. econon-dc and social work of the revolution, but the 
Soviet leadership was now to be placed in the same camp as that of other nations. He 
underscored that the LICP rejected all military alliances, even with the land of the 
Revolution, and refused all foreign wars. The League also 'rejected all civil wars - which in 
no way means that we do not accept the revolution, but we want a clean revolution, and if 
this revolution becomes bloody, it will not be we who have wished it so'. 280 Gerin! s 
rejection of civil war is here more absolute than it was to become at the time of the Spanish 
Civil War of which more will be said presently. 
The Pact occasioned. the departure of Challaye from the Cercle de la Russie Neuve, of 
which he had been one of the founders. 281 It also created one of the fissures within integral 
pacifism which would slowly lengthen into the attempt to split antifascism from pacifism 
in the wake of Munich. But it is instructive for what was to follow that 1761icien Challaye 
rejected in 1935 any suggestion that such a divorce was necessary or desirable from the 
pacifist point of view. What was good was that people were now being forced to think 
about political choices that related to peace. As Challaye concluded, 'one n-dght well be 
tempted to thank Stalin for having, involuntarily, provoked this vast outpouring of 
pacifist sentiments - just as Leibniz praised God for having allowed the fall of Adam 
because it occasioned our redemption through Jesus Chrise. 282 
Louis Emery attacked the Pact as a danger to peace because despite its pretentions to 
being open to Germany, it was in fact directed solely against her. It was a one-way treaty, 
and destroyed the symmetry of Locarno which envisaged, theoretically at least, an attack 
by either France or Germany. To say that such a treaty was open to Germany was 'really to 
abuse the elasticity of the language. 283 No one could take this type of formula seriously. 
For Gerin, the Franco-Soviet Pact represented a lack of faith in the Revolution and in 
the ability of the masses to carry it through. The Russians were simply, afraid of Nazi 
Germany; but fear led to massacres as much as did ambition. He had always felt that 
Communist comrades did not put enough stock, enough faith in the feeling of revolution, the 
desire for revolution. This desire was only temporarily asleep in Germany - and he begged 
the Communists not to compromise the world revolution by lowering themselves to the level 
of reaction, that is to say the battlefields on which it preferred to fight. 284 
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The Sarre, the Rhineland, Ethiopia and the Franco-Soviet Pact were all important 
stages on the pacifist journey in the thirties. But no event so shook the world of the integral 
pacifist as the Spanish Civil War. Spain caused French pacifists to reflect deeply on the 
problems posed by international fascism. Should one resist and if so how, and on what 
level? These were the issues which Spain raised and which were debated within the 
LICP. The LICP had certainly never proclaimed itself against civil wars in principle. In 
August 1934, for example, Gerin had explained that there were many in the League who 
believed in the necessity of the revolutionary struggle. If this struggle became violent and 
blood was shed, it would not be the pacifists who would strike the first blow. The non- 
violence of the civil struggle was therefore to be the responsibility of capitalist society; if 
the Rubicon of bloodshed were crossed, it alone would bear the responsibility. 285 
It is not surprising, then, to find that with the worsening situation in Spain, Gerin and 
the LICP took the position that the Spanish conflict must be prevented from becoming an 
arena for imperialist rivalries - be they black or red - and also that there was nothing 
preventing an integral pacifist placed in a situation similar to that of Spain from 
responding to social violence with violence. In an editorial in early August 1936 Gerin 
reiterated the Leagues opposition to both civil and foreign wars. 'We are against all wars, 
including civil wars', he wrote. 'We believe, in effect, that to shed the blood of ones 
"fellow citizens" is just as abominable as to shed that of "foreigners"'. 286 One of the 
differences, though, between civil and foreign wars, was that in the former one generally 
knew why and against whom one was fighting. Integral pacifists would. never foment a 
civil war, and they did not confuse civil war with revolution. Having said all that by way 
of preamble, Gerin nevertheless admitted that if he were Spanish, he would have taken up 
arms to fight for Azafta and the Republic against the rebels. The reasons for this were 
threefold. First, Azaha represented democracy (for what it was worth), freedom and some 
measure of the social revolution. Even the 'anarchists' who fought with him agreed on 
this. Secondly, the civil war in Spain had been forced upon the Azafta government. The, 
Spanish government, the Popular Front, were thus in a state of legitimate self-defence 
against their own internal fascism. Finally, Gerin wrote that this internal Spanish fascist 
enemy was completely comparable to an individual enemy. Only Tolstoyans would refuse to 
fight such an enemy. The Spanish state had become a collection of internal 
- 
police forces 
which were fighting a domestic foe. It was the occasional duty of the citizen to aid his 
police forceý287 
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Gerin's position on the conflict in Spain is interesting. It points out the rather artificial 
dichotomy which existed in the LICP's view of international versus civil conflicts. The 
League believed that only in cases of civil conflict could the aggressor be reliably 
determined. The problem reduced itself to one of the fight against internal fascism and the 
propensity for fascist reaction inherent in the institution of the Army itself. In GeriWs 
view, armies served merely as hotbeds of reaction which provided the means for a fascist 
coup d'dtat and hence civil war. If one got rid of the army, the potential problem would 
disappear as well. But the important aspect of Gerin's position on civil war is his insistence 
on the need for violence only in cases where civil conflict has been imposed upon a pacifist 
population. In general, he continued to affirm that the revolution could and should occur 
without recourse to violence, even if only by means of the general strike. 288 
It was clear, though, that Gerin's position was far from being the unanimous position of 
all league members. There must have been a sizeable minority who were opposed to civil 
war as well as foreign wars, because Gerin and Challaye both responded to criticisms in the 
next number of the Barrage. For Challaye it was important to point out that the LICPs 
pacifism extended only to'wars imposed by governments on the peoples in the name of a so- 
called national interest'. He argued for mutual indulgence within the League so that 
revolutionaries and Tolsoyans could continue to live and work together. 289 
Adrien Duthu was one such leaguer who refused to adn-dt the rectitude of civil wars. He 
begged to differ with GerirVs and PiocWs statements that if they were Spanish they would 
be fighting. For Duthu, there was nothing intrinsically different about civil as opposed to 
international conflicts. The LICP had made much of the idea that any modern war would 
be so costly in terms of the destruction it would bring that it must be avoided at all costs. 
Duthu asked why a civil war would be any less destructive. He suggested that the LICP 
should make disarmament its condition of support for the Left. In no case, however, should 
the masses consider taking on the Army. Technology would quickly slaughter vast numbers, 
and that was what was happening in Spainý90 
The general impression gained from the Barrage, however, is one of non-interventionist 
moral support for the Spanish government coupled with the implicit or even explicit 
warning to reactionary forces within France, that if the Republic were attacked, integral 
pacifists would be found amongst those who defended it by force of arms. The general 
principle of separation of internal antifascism from external pacifism found its expression 
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clearly in the Spanish Civil War. Rdgis Messac, for example, wrote of accepting the battle 
#on class frontiers, but not on capitalist frontiers'. 291 Maurice Weber also thought that the 
events in Spain were producing a profound reorientation in pacifist thinking. It had long 
been part of pacifist mythology that it was governments who often- caused or declared wars. 
This had now been shown to be false in Spain, wheM- the legitimate government had been 
attacked by the rebels, and more recently in France where only the sang froid of the Popular 
Front had prevented France from becoming embroiled in the Spanish war. Paradoxically, 
both the Communist party and the CGT advocated this intervention. Weber congratulated 
Blum and Delbos for having resisted the interventionist temptation. While it was tragic to 
have to put the Madrid government on the same moral footing as the rebels, imposing 
sanctions was a necessary step in order to prevent the conflict from spreading. He saw the 
hand of Moscow behind all of the formerly pacific forces which were trying to get France 
involved in the Spanish war - the Communists, the CGT, some parts of the Socialist Party 
and the Amsterdam-Pleyel movement. In 1936, Weber believed the greatest danger came 
from what he called'red fascism! as opposed to 'black fascisrW. 292 
In official pronouncements on Spain, the LICP tried to emphasise that it remained an 
organisation for all types of integral pacifists, while acknowledging that there were some 
pacifists who would fight in a civil war. The League decined therefore to take a position on 
the legitimacy of the Spanish Civil War, although its sympathies were with the 
government. It approved the French government's decision to impose an embargo on Spain, 
and drew from the Spanish tragedy the justification for one of its standard theses. If Spain 
had been disarmed, the aggression of the rebels - and hence civil as well as international 
war - would have been impossible. 293 A year later, the League was still holding to this 
official position of strict non-interventionism coupled with the belief that if the Spanish 
situation were to be replicated on French soil, many league members would take up arms. 294 
Guernica. seemed to provide another striking proof of the rectitude of the Leagues long- 
held position against war. 'TI-dnk ... what the effects would be of a war brought over great 
cities by, not just fifteen or twenty airplanes, but by hundreds and thousands. '295 In this 
situation it was a nonsense to speak of passive defence. 
291 Rdgis Messac, 'Que chacun reconnaisse les siens! ', Le Barrage 106 (3 September 1936), p. l. 292 Maurice Weber, 'Excitations Guerri&es, Le Barrage 106 Q September 1936), p. 3.. Armand 
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Thus, while it is true that the LICP hardly presented a unanimous face to the world 
regarding the Spanish Civil War, it is nevertheless the case that the majority of League 
members seem to have taken the line consistently presented by Gerin, namely that civil 
wars could be justifiably fought by pacifists but only within their own national context. 
Even in Spain, where the conflict had quickly become internationalised, one could still 
speak of an essentially civil affair in which the'men fighting knew for whom and for what 
reasons they were laying down their lives.. There was thus a fundamental distinction of 
scale and of orientation between civil and international wars. What integral pacifists 
outside Spain had to do was ensure that the conflagration did not spill over the Pyrenees to 
the rest of Europe. As Gerin wrote in 1937, 'the most clear-sighted and effective pacifism in 
these troubled times is undoubtedly not that which refuses all wars, but rather that which 
refuses to transform localised civil conflicts into universal butchery'. 296 
The period from 1934 to the beginning of 1938 ended for the LICP on a worried note. The 
Sarre, the remilitarisation of the Rhineland, the Italo-Abyssinian conflict, the Franco- 
Soviet Pact, and the continuing development of Nazism in Germany had all provided in 
different measures a challenge to the LICP's pacifism. Through it all, the League had 
remained true to its initial pren-dses that external wars and internal fascism could and must 
logically be fougjht together. Spain began the slow process of doubt that perhaps integral 
pacifism could ill afford to be so absolute in its prescriptions. In the final two years of the 
interwar period th6e doubts manifested themselves in two opposing lines of thought. Some 
pacifists began to express serious reservations about the extent to which pacifism could 
claim to be absolute, whilL- for still others, it became finally necessary to argue the 
primacy of pacifism over antifascism. These challenges . to the LICP's carefully elaborated 
world view came in 1938 and 1939, and it is to this final stage that we turn now. 
296 Rend Gerin, 'Wense de libert6s et "Ddfense Nationale"', Ix Barrage 111 (27 May 1937), p. 1. 
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11.4. Munich and all that (1938-1939). 
It is strange that while the events of 1938-1939 seem to have challenged the LICP's 
view of pacifism, there is nevertheless no single moment which can be selected as the point 
at which the Leagues world view changed. No line was drawn that could not be crossed. In 
terms of the Leagues comments on the issues raised by the crises of this eighteen month 
period, there was little apparent dissent over its policies. The debates which did occur 
seem almost to have taken place in a vacuum. The Anschluss did not produce a crise defoi 
and neither did Munich. March 1939 and the final agony of Czechoslovakia occasioned no 
prise de conscience and in August, the League was still most unwilling to die for Danzig. So 
what happened? There is no doubting that fundamental changes were occurring in the 
League's thinking. The inttgraliff of its pacifism was brought into question, and there was 
an attempt to separate antifascism from pacifism. In other words, major debates took place 
in the immediate pre-War period, but they did so in some isolation from real political 
events, on which the LICP maintained a steady pacifist doctrinal outlook. 
In the first crisis of 1938, the Anschluss of Austria to the Third Reich, there was little 
surprise and certainly no breast-beating within the League. Gerin sanguinely commented 
that the treaties were being revised and it was in that light that the League saw the 
annexation of Austria. He seemed to take roughly the same position as that of the Canard 
Enchaini at the time of the remilitarisation of the Rhineland: Germany was invading part 
of Germany. He stressed that the Anschluss had been effected without war, that it did not 
seem to affect too many Austrians who had been living under a dictatorship already 
anyway, and that, citing the expression of La Fourchardi&e, 'what happens between 
Austria and the Reich is pure politics'. 297 Moving from the particular to the general, Gerin 
also considered the question of the other Auslandsdeutsche. He thought that as a 
democratic principle, they should be allowed to join the Third Reich if they wanted to. 
This begged the question of whether democratic principles were involved at all, but Gerin 
seems to have passed this problem over. As an interesting backdrop to what was to follow, 
Gerin attempted to refute the argument that Hitler would tum on the other peoples of 
297 Ren6 Gerin, 'On revise les trait6s..., Le Barrage 125 (17 March 1938), p. l. 
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Europe once the German minorities had been reintegrated into the Reich. In a stupendous 
miscalculation of the nature of Hitler's plans, he wrote that 'if the Sudeten Germans, at 
least in part, desire to be reattached to Germany, the Czechs, for their part, will never 
want to submit to the yoke of the Reich. Hitler is not so stupid as to compromise the 
advantages he has justly won through an attempt at an imbecile conquese. 298 In any case, 
the whole problem was the fault of the 1919 treaties and of French policyý and he foresaw 
that France still had more to pay in penance for the errors of its ways at Versailles: 
We have several moral kicks up the backside still to receive - 
unless - better late than never - our rulers decide to substitute the 
policy of the extended hand ['de la main tendue'] for that of the 
presented posterior, and understand that peace will only result 
from an international economic and political negotiation, openly 
and generously offered to everyone, to the Germans as well. And to 
the Germans of 1938 since we did not want to deal with those of 
1928 who were still in a republic. 
All mistakes are paid for. And the longer one waits to pay for 
them, the more expensive they are. 299 
The important thing was to prevent these mistakes being paid with the blood of twenty- 
year old young men. 
Henri Jeanson expressed the complete sense of disillusionment and alienation from the 
Third Republic felt by some pacifists at the time of the Anschluss. For jeanson, the enemy 
was within. In response to the cries for an anti-Hitlerian Union Sacr&, he wrote, 
So be it. 
I want to fight for the Republic. 
I want to defend democracy. 
I want to sacrifice myself for freedom. 
But first, give me a Republic, give me a democracy, and restore my 
freedoms. 
The Republic is a trust, democracy is a business, and freedom is a 
monopoly. 
... Our real enemies are not outside. 
They are within. 300 
Instead of looking outside France for the battle to come, he invited readers to begin the 
fight amongst Frenchmen. The old class struggle had been waylaid, but in the interests of 
defeating fascism once and for all, Jeanson declared that it was necessary to defeat the 
General Staff, the industrialists and the 'petty politician001 
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The LICP's 1938 Congress was held in the city of Arras. Three important reports were 
debated dealing with the. economic and political aspects of the fight against fascism and 
war, and also with the colonial problem. Probably the most important of the three was 
Sylvain Broussaudier's report on the political aspects of the fight against fascism and war. 
Since the Nazi seizure of power, this question had been debated with increasing urgency 
and frequency. Broussaudier took it as given that everyone within the LICP was as equally 
committed to antifascism as to pacifism, but many old friends were beginning to renounce 
their pacifism in favour of antifascism pure and simple. Pacifism was slowly becoming a 
dirty word and pacifists were accused of doing Hitler's work. This idea was current amongst 
Communists and a growing number of Socialists. As for the Radicals, 'their jacobinism is 
strangely allied with the anti-Hitlerism of the extreme-left'. 302 The Popular Front had 
now more or less abandoned its antin-dlitarism and accepted the preparation of war with 
either enthusiasm or resignation. 
The crux of the question was to determine whether or not fascism inevitably meant war. 
Broussaudier reminded LICP members that after the events of 6 February, the League had 
included a line to this effect in its statues. But in 1938, he rejected the fatalism of this view 
for a number of reasons. First, there had been many wars before fascism appeared, and even 
the most democratic of countries had many of them on their consciences. Secondly, France 
bore heavy responsibility for the emergence of German fascism. Thirdly, it was clear that 
France did not hesitate to ally herself against Germany with regimes which were 'clearly 
fascist', such as those of Poland, Rournania, and Yougoslavia. Fourthly, and perhaps more 
importantly, because it revealed the dissenting nature of much of the LICPs thinking on 
internal versus external politics, Broussaudier wrote that, 
Our democracy is often only distinguishable from fascism by 
differences of degree and not of nature. The adn-tinistration of the 
country is over-run with fascists, and our politics are subject to 
economic forces which have nothing in common with the will of the 
people, but on the contrary are in solidarity with capitalism and 
external fascism. 303 
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Finally, Broussaudier argued that if fascism did, indeed, bring with it an increased danger 
of war, it did not mean that war was inevitable. In either a democracy or a fascist 
dictatorship, war was only possible with the active consent of the populatio004 
Two possible approaches to the problem of fascism presented themselves. One was the 
policy of firmness or even of force. This entailed engaging in an arms race with Germany in 
the belief that the structural weaknesses of the Nazi regime would cause a collapse in its 
economy thus making war impossible. This was a pernicious argument, though, because it 
required in the democracies an abdication of all hope for social progress through lack of 
public funds, and therefore, in reality, a 'progressive fascisation'. It was an illusion to 
think that the democratic econon-des were immune for this same sort of dislocation anyway. 
Secondly, he argued that economic hardship in the fascist countries would not necessarily 
bring about their internal collapse; it was equally possible that it might exacerbate the 
political situation to the point where in a moment of desperation, these countries threw 
themselves into a war as a way out of their difficulties. 305 
At the opposite end of the spectrum, there was the policy of peace. Broussaudier argued 
for a policy of concessions to the dictators so that wounded national feelings could be 
assuaged, and the psychological reasons for war thereby removed. In the process, the 
political rug might be pulled from undemeath the dictators. If the protestations of peace of 
Hitler and Mussolini were shown to be false, this hypocrisy would 'explode' in the eyes of 
their own people. What is important here, thoughis the fact that Broussaudier stressed 
that the LICP did not at all agree with a policy of simple capitulation. Capitulation, 
instead, had been the hallmark of the policies of French governments. "I'lie absurdity of 
the policies followed until now by France in particular, is that they combined imprecatory 
bravado (verbal energy) and retreats (practical weakness), adding therefore the dangers of 
the one to the dangers 
-of 
the other, without drawing any benefit from either'. 306 In 
Broussaudier's view, the hope for peace lay in a resolution of the economic conflicts in the 
world. This would remove the primary propaganda weapons from the dictators and at the 
same time strengthen the democracies morally, politically, and economically. 307 
If war should break out anyway, Broussaudier underlined that the course of action to 
take was an entirely individual decision. But he believed that it was naive to think that 
one could defend ones liberties by fighting fascism. Flis report makes cle ar that even at the 
eleventh hour in 1938, the LICP still placed its primary emphasis on preventing war and 






was left entirely to the personal appreciation of the individual leaguer. The problem of 
civil war was necessarily beyond the purview of the LICP, but he believed that it could be 
prevented from occurring through essentially the same policy of reforms which would 
weaken fascismý308 
His, conclusions contain the seeds of the debates which would erupt later in the year in 
the wake of the Munich crisis. He believed that it was possible to reconcile the struggle 
against war and the fight against fascism'as long as the catastrophe has not occurred'. But, 
and here lay the crux of the future dilemma, 'pacifism can only be opposed to antif ascism if, 
all our efforts having failed, we are thrown into a war, that is to say, when all other 
acceptable solutions are impossibl&. 309 Broussaudier's report was passed unanimously by 
the Congress. 310 Later that spring, the League's statutes were also amended so that Article 
1 on the League's goals now read that it was 'against fascism which, destroying our 
liberties, aggravates still more the dangers of wae. This resolved the problem posed by the 
phrase in the 1934 version of the statues that fascism led 'ineluctably to war'. 311 
Gaston Pauthe's report on the economic aspects of the same question was full of statistics 
which gave credence to the idea of 'nations repues' and 'nations affamles'. It was a report 
larded with Leninist citations and analysis, and Pauthe envisaged the use of revolutionary 
violence in certain situations. The hour was desperate; he believed the current was pulling 
France ever closer to fascism, the union sacrie and war. The Popular Front had failed, and 
it needed to be recreated at the grass-roots level. As far as the external danger was 
concerned, Pauthe thought that the French people had to speak directly to the Germans, 
over the heads of both sets of rulers. When the Congress debated his report, it passed 
unanimously the first section dealing with the analysis of the economic situation, but 
declined to express its views on the conclusions arrived at by Pauthe because of their 
tendentious support for civil war and revolutionary violence. The League was, after all, 
supposed to be a home for pacifists of all persuasions, violent and non-violenL312 
Louis Emery's report on colonialism condemned the principle of colonialism, but equally 
rejected the Communist notion of wars of liberation and armed insurrection. He considered 
this method to be either utopian or catastrophic in its practical effects. It entailed allying 
oneself with indigenous nationalist parties, and this led to increased national isolation and 
not internationalism. Emery rejected nationalism for Frenchmen and also for their colonial 
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subjects. He criticised the parties of the left for having done preciesely nothing in the 
colonial field; the Popular Front was t6o occupied with questions of defence. What did 
Emery recommend as a solution to the problem posed for peace by the existen ce of colonies? 
He argued for an 'internationalisation of the colonial regime' within the context of a peace 
policy. This meant giving Nazi Germany colonies again. For Emery, justice and peace 
demanded a new division of colonies: 
it is annoying that we have allowed Hitler to be right; in the area 
of colonial demands, he is right ten times over... You say that we 
cannot possibly make a negro from the Cameroon a subject of Nazi 
Germany; start at least by asking him if he prefers that we make 
of him a cadaver dressed up in horizon-blue ..... But naturally, the 
transfer, pure and simple, of a colony must be considered as the last 
possible solution, only war being more abominable. What must be 
tried, is the creation of a system which will provide the greatest 
amount of international control... the mandate system of the League 
of Nations was an appreciable progress. We must take inspiration 
from this system and perfect it. 313 
Emery's report was passed unanimously, too. 314 
The Arras Congress manifesto, which was written by Challaye, reaffirmed the LICP's 
implacable opposition to fascism but stressed that fascism could only be fought inside one's 
own country. The League declared itself against the idea of any foreign war for freedom. 'In 
the city of Robespierre, we reiterate his formula: "Liberty cannot be found at the tip of a 
bayonet. The peoples do not like armed n-dssionaries"'. 315 On the Anschluss, the Manifesto 
expressed the disgust of the League at the excesses of militarism which had accompanied 
it, but underlined that it had long been the desire of the Austrian people to be joined to 
Germany. Looking ahead to the coming Czech crisis, the LICP 'rejected in advance any idea 
of war for Czechoslovakia'. Challaye tumed around the phrase in vogue, to express the 
LICP's belief that war would mean the suppression of all liberties in favour of a military 
dictatorship: we know, he declared, that 'War is Fascism'. 316 
With the worsening international situation and especially, perhaps, with the 
experience of the Spanish Civil War, some parts of the LICP began to express doubts about 
the use of the word intigral to describe the League's pacifism. Gerin gave voice to these 
concems in two articles in early 1938 in which he argued that it was time to abolish the 
term 'integral' because it was 'incorrect, inexact, and even pretentious'; it was abstract and 
evoked the absolute. Gerin thought that it was enough to affirm that 'we are pacifists as 
much and as well as we can be. That is already not so easy! Let us reject all verbal 
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outbidding'. 317 The LICP contained pacifists of many tendencies but what united them was 
their opposition to wars between peoples. To imply more in a word such as infigral only 
gave ammunition to the League's opposition, and confused 'our friends and comrades'. The 
clinching argument for abolishing the word 'integral' was that it allowed people to assume 
that the LICP espoused absolute non-violence, according to Gerin. But there was no 
'catechism7 in the League. He could not come up with a word to replace 'integral' however, 
nothing seemed to capture fully the essence of the League's pacifism, which he defined in 
largely dissenting terms: 
Our pacifism is antinationalist, antifascist (in a sense which the 
next congress will define), anticolonialist, antimilitarist... and 
anti-many other things. But it also wishes to construct peace in a 
positive way by multiplying efforts towards justice on both the 
national and international levels. 318 
In any case, the Arras Congress declined to follow Gerin in his apparent evolution away 
from an absolute expression of pacifism, deciding instead to retain the use of the word 
'integral'because no other word seemed to come close to expressing the League's positioný319 
If the Spanish Civil War and the generally worsening international situation proved to 
be major trials for the LICP's pacifist vision, Munich and the two-step dismemberment of 
Czechoslovkia provided the major crisis of the period under discussion here. 
Paradoxically, as has already been noted, Munich also occasioned an upsurge in the 
Leagues membership. 
Beginning in the spring of 1938, writers in the Barrage began to comment on the 
impending Czech crisis. They rejected the idea of fighting a war for Czechoslovakia in 
part because they viewed the Czech state as. the bastard creation of Versailles. Adrien 
Duthu, for example, argued that in 1919 when the Czech state was created, Austria advised 
against including the Sudeten German minority, but it was to satisfy the demands of the 
Czechs for their 'natural' frontiers and the heavy industry of Bohemia, that the 
Sudetenland was included. He did not believe that France was in any way compelled to 
come to the aid of Czechoslovakia in the event of an attack because the Locarno treaty, to 
which the accord with the Czechs had been linked, had fallen by the wayside. This was a 
convenient euphemism for Frances abdication; strangely, it seemed that Duthu was arguing 
that one abdication was worth another. Because the German minorities were apparently 
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oppressed by the Czechs after the war, he believed that they ought to be given self- 
detem-dnation. In short, Czechoslovakia was not worth going to war for. 320 
Louis Emery was even more radical in his prognosis for the future of Europe, a future 
which he saw quite naturally dominated by Germany. He attacked the 'pacifists' who 
would have France defend the territorial integrity of Czechoslovakia. Instead, he 
proposed a referendum along the lines of those held in Upper Silesia and the Sarre. If this 
idea were refused, he suggested that Czechoslovakia should be assimilated into the Swiss 
federation. Whatever happened, the Czechs must renounce their alliances with France and 
the USSR, and give up all ideas of collective security, which were nothing but a smoke- 
screen for an anti-German coalition. The Czech affair was not about principles in Emery's 
mind, but about the defence of a political system in which the Czech state played an 
important role - in other words, the old balance of power. According to this view, then, 
Europe needed to adjust peacefully to the historically determined rise of a German 
hegemony: 
Any real pacifism presupposes that one believes in the possibility 
of changes in the organisation of the world, changes which are 
made inevitable by the play of natural forces which need not 
entail war. We do not see how it is possible to prevent Germany 
becoming the economic and demographic power called by virtue of 
its size and its workforce, to colonise Danubian Europe. 
Did not the Versailles Treaty. prepare this victory in the long run? 
All that we can hope is that this evolution will take place in 
peace. 
The only chance this has of happening is through a global 
negotiation with Germany, including the Czech problem, in a 
search for a just equilibrium of the resources and vital needs of 
everyone. It is necessary for the-democracies - and this is their 
supreme chance to avoid the catastrophe - to take the initiative of 
this revision of the treaties, in the broadest possible sense, in thus 
using the last possibility they have to undertake a new and 
generous policy, that is to say one that offers a new colonial 
partition capable of leading to a moral detente and to 
disarmament. May each one take his responsibilties here, and 
know, in himself, if he really wants peace. 321 
When the September Crisis finally broke, Gerin declared that it was the beginning of 
peace. War would not break out over Czechoslovakia because neither Hitler nor the 
German people wanted it. Secondly, no one anywhere else either wanted war, with the 
possible exception of what he called some 'communistes exalt&'. The French government 
did not have the nerve to declare war, he thought, and even if it did, it was doubtful 
whether there would be the required unanin-dty either in Parliament or in the country as a 
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whole. No one wanted war. He seconded Alain's declaration that the September crisis was 
in fact the beginning of peace. It was beginning with the wholesale destruction of the 
iniquitous treaties of 1919. He said that a sort of 'immanent justice' was repairing the 
damage of Versailles, and if that process went against France it was because France was too 
proud to have done it herself. 'Am I exaggeratedly optimistic? ', he asked, 
I am convinced that we have just won the peace: at the hour in 
which I write these words, English and French are in the process of 
trying only to save face, in accepting the inevitable. 
Courage, comrades! The treaties are being revised without war! 
This is indeed what we have been demanding in our propaganda. 
But we never dared to hope that we would be listened to so sooný27- 
There certainly seem to have been few tears shed in September 1938 in the pages of the 
Barrage for the truncated Czech state. Armand Charpentier attacked it as a totally 
artificial creation which should not exist, this 'proscenium arch called Czechoslovakia'. 
He proclaimed 'eternal glory to Neville Chamberlain,. 323 
At the beginning of October Gerin reiterated his belief that peace was just beginning. 
War had been impossible in September because circumstances were not at all comparable to 
July 1914. None of the diplomatic, military, social, moral or psychological conditions were 
favourable to the explosion of a war. 'We knew that in 1914 all of the rulers and all of the 
peoples had to some degree wanted or accepted the massacre, and that in 1938 no people, no 
government even, envisaged it with a light hearf. 324 The 'peace of the peoples' had thus 
emerged from the Munich crisis. For the first time the masses had shown their pacifism 
and there had been a collective rejection of war which made a mobilisation impossible. He 
claimed victory for the pacifist cause. This peace was their peace. It was a peace 
'conceived before the war', and a 'revision of the treaties without war'. He went further 
and called it the 'birth of a ... peace psychosis'. But he warned against complacency. 'Real 
peace, that which will last, because it is just, has not yet been made. It is only starting to be 
made. We are at the dawn of a new day, at the first hour. Everyone to work! 325 
If the LICP was Munichois, it was so from pacifist conviction and a (perhaps 
misguided) historical Weltanschauung, not from philo-fascism. In late October 1938, Gerin 
returned to the question of Munich to underline that there were still at least two dangers to 
beware of. The first was a n-dsplaced confidence in Hitler. Gerin did not believe that 
Hitler wanted a war, but equally he stressed that the paix hitl&ienne in no way 
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represented the LICP's ideal. He blamed the European situation on 'French idiocy' which 
had allowed the gars de Berchtesgaden to reign in Europe. On the domýstic level, it would 
be criminal to express the slightest admiration for Hitler's man in France, Flandin. If 
Flandin had served the cause of peace in September, the LICP was only 'moderately 
thankful' to him. In any case, the League rejected German hegemony in Europe, as indeed it 
rejected all hegernonies. He warned Leaguers to have nothing to do with what he termed 
an ideology as dangerous as that of Stalinism, that is to say, the wave of antisen-dtism 
which had been sweeping across France in recent monthO26 
The second big danger was that of rearmament. Chamberlain had returned to London to 
announce a major armaments programme and the same thing was happening in France, 
Gennany and the USA. An understanding had to be reached. The peoples had made it very 
clear three weeks previously that they wanted nothing to do with a war. They must now 
refuse to pay for the armaments which their governments wanted. For the first time, Gerin 
laid down a test for FHtler: 
Disarmament and negotiations - in the order that one wishes or is 
possible - this is, this must be our programme. If, now, Hitler and 
his disciples, German and French, accept this programme, may 
they say it and prove it. Then - and only then - will we be able to 
reach an agreement with them. 327 
March 1939 and the annihilation of the rump Czechoslovkia occasioned a partial prise 
de conscience in Gerin. The scales seem at least partially to have fallen from his eyes. He 
recognised the odious threat posed by Hitler, but refused obstinately to modify 'one iota' of 
the League's principles. He rejected the solutions of force proposed by others, and called 
instead for the immediate convocation of an international conference. He did not specify, 
however, exactly what this conference should discuss. As far as economic sanctions were 
concerned, these he rejected 'in principle', at least until such time as all attempts at 
economic collaboration with the Reich had failed. Instead, he suggested moral sanctions 
which he thought the Reich feared most. He proposed a propaganda campaign by radio to 
enlighten the German people to the point of revolt. But even this method was to be used 
only in the last resort, because it was in essence an attack on the territorial integrity of 
another country. So, in Gerin's view, the situation, while serious, had not reached the point 
where this type of moral sanction ought to be imposed. 328 
326 Rend Gerin, 'EcueUs, Le Barrage 135 (20 October 1938), p. l. 
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328 Rend Gerin, 'Pour un appel aux peuples', Le Barrage 146 (30 March 1939), p. l. 
207 
Robert Jospin was also in favour of some sort of international conference to sort matters 
out, although the title of his article -'force or collaboration' - was an unfortunate semantic 
example of what was to come. He thought that Hitler had made an enormous mistake in 
taking the rest of Czechoslovakia, but he also ran through the usual litany of Allied faults 
running back almost twenty years, as if the sins of the sons were justified by those of the 
fathers. He could see no way to stop the expansion of Germany into south east Europe. The 
peoples of the Balkans needed German markets and vice versa. Germany had no choice but 
to expand. It was either that or disappear. From this (and indeed from many other articles 
in the Barrage), it is clear that the League had accepted the Nazi arguments about 
Lebensraum. 'Collaboration! with Nazi Germany was thus the only possibility whkh did 
not lead straight to unparalleled slaughter, although to give Jospin his due his article was 
vague about what he actually meant by this term. 329 
By the spring of 1939 it was clear that support for the LICP was falling off as the 
international situation worsened. In early May the League commented that 'we receive 
only a very few communiqu6s from the Sections [and] the requests for speakers are less 
numerous...,. 330 Claude Jamet, writing a fortnight earlier, noted that pacifism was once 
more in retreat as a minority belief: 'We are alone in a world, in a country, almost 
unanimously gone crazy. It doesn't matter. Truth is often in the minority'. And referring to 
the departure of the pseudo-pacifists of the previous September, he said 'here we are once 
again by ourselves, few but pur031 
The moment seemed to have arrived when political pacifism had become virtually 
untenable. Gerin wrote in May that he considered the annexation of Czechoslovakia 'both 
a mistake and a crime. He did not see how anyone could be convinced of the rectitude of 
Germany's cause by Hitlees speech of 28 April. But the speech did appear to open the way 
to further negotiations. Hitler's tone was more moderate and diplomatic than previously, 
and he seemed to be renouncing the ideological demagogy which had been his stock-in- 
trade. His demands were also becon-ting more precise and his support for Mussolini was on 
the wane. In the short term, Gerin thought that the pacifist policy of disarmament was 
dead in the water. What remained was the fight to prevent war from breaking out and 
that had not yet been lost. He foresaw the policy of 'firmness' towards the dictators 
continuing for many months or even years. Hitler was fooling himself if he thought he 
could separate the two western democracies, but France and Britain were deluded if they 
believed it possible to throttle Germany economically. Gerin believed firmly that only 
329 Robert Jospin, 'Force ou collaboration, Le Barrage 146 (30 March 1939), p. 1. 
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negotiation could save the day. It had started already, but the road would be long and 
hard, and pacifist nerves would be truly frayed before its end was reacheC032 
Gerin's moral revulsion at what had finally happened to Czechoslovakia was not 
echoed by all League members, however. One of the original architects of historical 
dissent, Georges Demartial, could not see the difference between the German duplicity in 
overturning the Munich accords, and the history of French and English double-dealing in 
Egypt and Morocco. Try as he might, he could not attune himself to the 'general diapason', 
as he put it, he could not 'share the indignation of which Germany was the object,. 333 If 
Germany had been able to lay its hands on Austria and Czechoslovakia without firing a 
shot, without shedding blood, this was 'incontestably because of the anarchy into which 
these two States had fallen which was leading them to civil war'. 334 He saw the Nazi 
armies almost as liberators. Both peoples either accepted or desired their inclusion in the 
Third Reich; the Austrians had ratified it in a plebiscite, and the civil and military 
authorities in the Czech Republic had quickly put themselves under German protectionýý 
Ni droite, ni gauche ?- or Pacifism versus Antifascism 
The extent to which the LICP was prone to equate the failings of the western 
democracies with those of Nazism and Fascism has already been noted. Because of its 
peculiar historical vision and dissenting stance with regard to French political society, the 
League was apt to justify the Nazi re-shaping of the map of Europe for historical, as 
opposed to moral or present-day political reasons. Even near the end, when Btler's designs 
were at last becoming apparent to all and sundry, there was still debate within the LICP 
about the rectitude of Nazi expansionism. 
The League was also concerned with the internal threat posed by Fascism in France. 
Taking historical inspiration from Robespierre, they were convinced that France must look 
inward on itself and deal with its own political open sores rather than busying itself with 
the affairs of others. As the thirties progressed, this political introspection finally 
succeeded in isolating the League from the rest of political society. It also led in the first 
months of 1939 to an attempt to separate the fight against fascism from that against war. 
The origins of the Leagues isolation go back well into the mid-thirties. Georges Pioch, 
for example, as early as 1935 wrote that'the time has come when the criers of the Union 
332 Rend Gerin, 'La n6gociation aura lietf, Lze Barrage 
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sacrie, whether they be of left or right, will soon have only one enemy... the conscious 
pacifist who desires a complete peace'. 336 
Having said this, the LICP had to deal with the gradual emergence in the thirties of 
an extreme-right-wing pseudo-pacifism which seems to have become confused in the public 
n-dnd at the time of Munich with the genuine pacifism of groups like the LICP. For 
example, as early as 1935 once again, at the time of the Italo-Abyssinian War, the Barrage 
was complaining of what it regarded as the opportunistic conscientious objection of Charles 
Maurras. With regard to the situation in Ethiopia, Maurras had written, 
We do not say: down with war. We say: down with this war. It 
would be vain, empty, iniquitous and a folly! Down with war 
against Italy. Down with a war for London and for Geneva. Down 
with war for the Covenant .. 
337 
The sea-changes occurring in the old right-left boundaries on the question of peace left 
the pacifists of the LICP somewhat confused. In early 1936, one writer said quite simply, 
'we do not understand anymor&338, and in April of that year the Barrage commented on a 
piece by Albert Thibaudet in the Nouvelle Revue Frangaise which had argued that the 
danger of war now came more from the Left than from the Right. 'The war of religion for or 
against Moscow is replacing the war of religion for or against Rome'. 339 
By early 1938 it had become apparent to Gerin that the Union sacr& was rejected only 
by integral pacifists and some parts of the Right. But he stressed that the motives and 
ideals of the Right were not at all those of the LICP. The Right rejected the idea of a union 
sacrie with the Left 'because they wanted to rid themselves of the representatives of the 
proletariat' and because'they adn-dre, at the end of the day, both Hitler and Mussolini,. 340 
The attitude of the right was therefore completely ephemeral and opportunistic. Its 
rejection of war was based upon internal political antipathies and external political 
sympathies which transcended national boundaries. Gerin wrote that he rejected the 
notion of the union sacrie because he was opposed to fascism, dictatorship and national ist 
reaction, and because he desired justice and peace. These reasons were very different from 
those of the right. And he rejected the idea that integral pacifism could find an ally in 
this passing pacifism of the Vautels, Doriots, Maurras and their ilk: 
Let there be no equivocation! We are not two-faced. We reject and 
will always reject, in all cases, any national union, any sacred 
union... One would have to be terribly naive not to understand the 
hypocrisy of the Right. It would be the most vulgar stupidity to 
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consider as allies, even temporarily, the neo-conscientious objectors 
of the journal, Gringoire or the Action Franqaise. They are just as 
pacifist as the malignant Muscovite041 
This was the somewhat confusing backdrop then, to the debate which broke on the 
League in January 1939. Rlicien Challaye published an important article in which he 
questioned the linkage between pacifism and antifascism which had until then been one of 
the cardinal tenets of the LICP's sys , tern of belief. It was the Spanish Civil War which 
had caused him to begin to revise his ideas on the acceptability of civil war. He described 
how the old political divisions of left and right seemed to have become blurred. The 
warmongering spirit seemed to lie more to the left than to the right now, 'in the sole 
interest of Stalinist policies'. 342 For Challaye, the choice was simple. 'If one had to 
choose, it would be better to save the peace with the right than to throw oneself into war 
with the left or extreme-lefC. 343 Happily, though he did not think it would be necessary 
to make this choice. There was a right-wing in France which 'remained true to itself, the 
right of Tardieu, de Kerillis and Pertinax. The great dividing line had been the events of 
the past September. Munich, which caused Challaye 'not the slightest humiliatioW, had 
occasioned a great political effervescence which had not yet settled. On the question of 
peace, however, the route to take was clear for Challaye: 
Certain of our comrades are not wrong to say that neither 
Chamberlain, nor Daladier, nor Bonnet is a pacifist in the sense 
that we give to the word, because we demand a disarmed peace and 
they are for over-armament. But the 'Anti-Munichois" too, the 
lborezes, the Uon Blums are in favour of over-armament. Between 
these over-armers, whose common thesis I reject, I ask permission to 
prefer those who have wanted and who want peace, to those who 
have wanted and want war. 344 
Challaye argued that his new position did not change one iota his fundamental 
opposition to fascism. He remained a convinced antifascist, which he defined as the 'will 
to protect in our country those of the union, political and daily freedoms which still exist', 
the will to reconquer those which had been lost, the will to liberate the workers in a 
capitalist society, the imn-dgrants who were the subjects of police harassment, and the 
peoples suffering under the yoke of colonialism. 345 He also called antifascism the struggle 
against war, because he believed that once war had broken out, it spelled the end of all 
liberties and the imposition of a form of fascism, through military dictatorship. Here lay 
the essential distinction in Challaye's mind. He distinguished between what he called an 
341 Ibid. 





'antifascism of peace' and an 'antifascism of war'. Because of recent events, he thought it 
would be wise to dissociate antifascism from pacifism in the League's propaganda. 346 
Gerin replied to Challaye in the next number of the Barrage. He insisted that he, too, 
supported an 'antifascism of peace, not of war. But he was equally insistent that all 
League members were resolutely opposed to fascism, Challaye's article contained the seeds 
of 'grave disagreements' within the League if the issues it raised were not dealt with 
quickly. For his part, Gerin rejected any idea of separating antifascism and pacifism, for 
four main reasons. First, he argued that just because certain antifascists deported 
themselves like 'bellicose imbeýiles' was no reason in itself to renounce one's own 
antifascism. The League was not obliged to follow them in'their criminal deviations'. in 
his vitw, it sufficed to distinguish as they had always done between antifascism for 
internal use and antifascism for external use. This usage, consecrated by time, was also 
easier to understand than Challaye's rather nebulous construct 'antifascism of peace% If 
antifascism were removed from the LeagutYs programm I e, Gerin said he would resign from it 
immediately. 347 
Secondly, he pointed out that t he League had been officially antifascist since its 
congress at Montargis in 1934, that is to say two years before the arrival of the Popular 
Front in power. If the Popular Front had subsequently deviated from its original 
programme, that was of no immense concern to the LICP which ought to remain true to its 
own ideals. Thirdly, Gerin argued that to acce pt Challaye's proposition would actually 
mean taking a step in the direction of a union sacrie with the very political elements that 
were the natural enemies of pacifism. Le Matin, Le Te? nps , Gringoire and the Action 
Franoise had none of them ever genuinely worked for peace between the peoples; what he 
called their pseudo-pacifism was opportunistic and ephemeral, and they represented 
moreover an attack on the same freedoms which the League was trying to protect. If these 
pseudo-pacifists of September 1938 had rejected war with Germany, this was all well and 
good, but Gerin was certain that given half a chance they would support a war against 
Soviet Russia. He urged the League not to be admirers of either Le Matin or LHumanitl, 
but to remain true to itselfiý 
Finally, Gerin recognised that the League had perhaps been wrong in 1934 to call 
'fascisrn' in France what was in reality merely the most recent manifestation of an old, and 
deeply-rooted, French right-wing reaction. But this reactionary force in French politics 
was becon-dng increasingly 'fascist' in the proper sense of the word - in the same way that 
Stalinism had evolved towards a sort of left-wing fascism. Gerin believed that fascism 
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could be found on the left or the right, and he declared that it was the thing that the LICP 
hated the most because it implied natiopalism, militarism, racism and totalitarianism. He 
wondered aloud whether any Combattant de la Paix could be found who could say he was a 
fascist. 349 
Gerin disagreed with Challaye about other things as well, such as the use of the word 
'integral' to describe the League's pacifism. He continued to believe that this was 
meaningless and furthermore dangerous. He also disagreed about the unacceptability of 
fighting a civil war should it be forced upon one. Unlike Challaye, he thought that to 
fight back in a civil situation was legitimate. In the troubled days of early 1939, he 
defined the kernel of pacifist truth to which the LICP as a whole adhered: 
We are agreed not to prepare or start a foreign war, or even a civil 
war, on the pretext of antifascism. Fascism, we have always 
affirmed, can only be effectively fought inside a country. But we 
must also be agreed neither to give arms to our own fascists, nor to 
those outside. Let us condemn fascism wherever it exercises its 
ravages. Let us sweep first before our own door, but let us retain the 
right, indeed let us fulfil the duty, of pointing out that the 
doorstep of our neighbour can be just as dirty, if not more so, than our 
owr, 350 
It was necessary to put Tardieu, Kerillis, Pertinax, Pdri, Aragon, Le Matin, Cringoire, the 
Action Francaise, Flandin, 11itler, Mussolini, Franco and even Daladier and Bonnet, all in 
the same bag, because each one was as much in favour of an arms race as the other. The 
LICP was not in the business of choosing between surarmeurs.. Gerin concluded that 'we 
cannot do otherwise. To act differently would be to betray our programme and peace 
itself. 351 
The problem did not seem to disappear, however. A month later Gerin was writing as if 
the number of Combattants de la. Paix prepared to do business with the French fascists was 
larger than he had first suspected. 352 Pioch, too, roundly attacked the notion that real 
peace, 'our peac&, 'this peace which makes us not non-resistants, but the only real resistants 
to war - that this peace could have anything in common av ec 0.353 It was an'impossible 
pron-dscuity'. 354 
The debate bubbled on into late March. Louis Tr6garo attacked the tendency of some 
LICP members to support the extreme-right following Munich. He insisted that in order for 
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orientation. Since Munich, it had been in crisis. Pacifists had been lumped together with 
Daladier and anyone else supporting the accords, for whatever reasons. He was 
particularly concerned at the position taken by Challaye, Louis Emery, and the Ligue des 
Femmes pour la Paix. 355 
Louis Emery replied to Tr6garo's article in the next number, arguing that pacifism could 
no longer be assumed to be uniquely a left-wing position. As far as the temporary and 
'fortuitous' alliance with the right at the time of Munich was concerned, it had changed 
nothing in the basic pacifist credo. Recent history seemed to put the lie to the assumption 
that pacifism was necessarily of the left. Blum was in favour of a policy of armaments, and 
the Communists had become just as bellicose as the right had ever been. What he called 
this 'parliamentary and electoral geography' was no longer of the slightest interest to 
pacifists. The defence of liberty, no more than the defence of peace, was no longer a reliable 
criterion of political judgement. For twenty years and in twenty different countries, he 
argued the left had often been just as authoritarian and militaristic as the right. Emery 
argued that pacifism had to remain above and outside the political parties - it was no 
longer even nominally a party issue. Instead, it had taken on almost mystical proportions. 
He rejected the idea that it was the preserve of socialism, or even any particular class. By 
extension, there was also no reason why pacifism should necessarily be revolutionary or 
anti-capitalist. If that were the case, and orthodoxy had been important, the LICP would 
never have been formed, and the fight for peace, such as it was, would have remained the 
preserve of the political parties. 356 
Emery stressed instead the mystical nature of pacifism, and argued that pacifists had 
to be prepared to place their doctrine above party and political considerations. One could 
no longer deny that large sections of the working class, for example, now advocated an 
ideological war against fascism. So, it was a nonsense for pacifists to feel obliged to fight 
both war and capitalism, and to refrain from choosing, if hard choices for the higher ideal 
of peace became necessary. He firmly believed that fascism was only aided by the 
bureaucratic and military demands of war, and that it was as likely to come from the left as 
from the right. He rejected completely the charge that he and his friends were the dupes of 
international fascism, however: 'What man of good faith could possibly contest that a 
programme which goes completely in the individualistic, anti-State direction, is therefore 
intrinsically anti-fascist? ' From all points of view, Emery believed that his pacifism was 
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'diametrically opposed to Nazi doctrine'; in fact, much more so than many of the present 
manifestations of socialism. The fascist states thrived on international tension and 
econon-dc competition. Take this away and they would slowly crumble. He concluded that 
'the most fecund and certain revolution is the establishment of peace'ý57 
Challaye and Emery seem to have faded into the background after this debate. Given 
the importance of the issues it raised, it is surprising that it appears not to have been 
discussed at the League's 1939 Marseille Congress which was, all things considered, a 
rather tired affair. 358 The only report of note was that by Jospin on economic problems and 
peace. He argued that the economic aspect of the present discontents was by far the most 
important. The dangerous ideologies of the hour had been erected on the sub-structure of 
economic malaise. There was a tremendous disequilibrium. between the wealthy and the 
poor nations. The latter reacted to this situation by creating a powerful military apparatus 
which they used for territorial gain. Politically, they evolved into fascism, trying to solve 
their problems internally through econon-dc autarchy. Fascist ideology was therefore not 
that important according to Jospin; what mattered was the economic side of the question. 
'The problem of peace and of war is entirely there'. 359 
Mourir pour Dantzig? 
A spirit of lassitude seemed to descend on the League in the final six months before the 
outbreak of war. Rdgis Messac wrote that France had become a small country between two 
big power blocs: the Anglo-Saxon nations on the one hand, and Germany on the other. Her 
only hope was to become the trait d'union between them. He thought the fight had gone out 
of the French, and his description of the France of 1939 is dejected: 
France already no longer belongs to the French, and the French are 
incapable of taking it back. Aside from the fact that they are no 
longer strong enough, either from the economic or the demographic 
point of view, their heart is no longer in it. We let things happen, 
even to us, but we are incapable of action or reactionXO 
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Poland was the final item on the European agenda before the shooting began. The LICP 
had not had much sympathy for Czechoslovakia, although it had certainly castigated the 
final dismemberment of the country in March 1939; it had even less sympathy for Poland, a 
country 'least worthy to be called a nation' in Gerin's words. 361 Poland was a mixture of 
different ethno-linguistic groups, largely illiterate, not at all liberal, but rather a country 
under the boot of a domestic fascism. Furthermore, it was a nation in which antisen-dtism 
was as rife as in Nazi Germany. It was a 'still more artificial and stupid' creation of the 
1919 treaties than Czechoslovakia, and as such Gerin did not believe that France or Britain 
would be prepared to go to war for it. It was plain to Gerin that Danzig was a German city 
and the corridor was still probably more German than Polish despite the expulsions. He 
agreed that Poland should have access to the Baltic, but this should naturally be the 
estuary of the Vistula. All of the territorial problems raised by the Polish question could 
be resolved without war, and Gerin predicted many more'Munichs! to comeA2 
Even in the face of so obvious an external threat, the LICP continued to affirm that the 
primary foe was an internal one. In early June, Gaston Pauthe attacked a recent speech by 
Daladier in which he had said that 'the French belong to a privileged nation and their 
margin of happiness can only be preserved by an heroic resolutiore. 363 Pauthe rejected 
categorically the idea that there was one nation of Frenchmen who must defend their 
privileges against an external foe. For him, the enemy was and would remain a class 
enemy: 'Yet again, let us state that our enemy is above all here at home, and Blum is worth 
no more than Daladier... '364 
The desperate optimism of the League remained right up to the end. In July, echoing 
the title of a play by Giraudoux, Gerin was proclaiming that the 'war for Danzig win not 
take place'. 36-5 He thought it was 'incontestable' that a certain d6tente seemed to be 
developing on the international level. He asked whether it was but a truce in the war of 
nerves, and arrived at the conclusion that there would definitely beý no war, at least that 
summer. The situation had been 'serious' at the end of March after the 'crime' of the Nazis 
in invading Czechoslovakia. The union sacrie had begun to reestablish itself in France, the 
Anglo-French alliance became very close, and the encirclement of Germany was obvious. 
But the situation had improved since then for two reasons. First, the protests against the 
preparation of war had helped a lot.. In particular, 136at's articles had provoked a good 
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deal of discussion. Even the right-wing parties now seemed ready to consider negotiations 
rather than war. Secondly, and more importantly, the Anglo-Franco-Russian alliance did 
not seem to be coming together. The so-called 'peace front', the coalition of the 'pacific 
democracies', the organisation of 'collective security' had all failed. This was a happy 
event for Gerin and the LIM Tensions remained in the international sphere but pacifists 
would have to keep their sang-froid as they had done so far. 'The treatment for our nerves 
through a system of hot-and-cold shower-baths [la douche dcossaisel is surely not over'A6 
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III. I. Introduction. 
James F. McMillan in his book Housewife or Harlot argues quite rightly that the 
history of ferninism in the Third Republic has been neglected. He examines at some length 
the impact of the Great War on French society, and argues that 'it had little effect on the 
status of French women'. 1 On the contrary, he sees continuity rather than change as the key 
concept in this period - in contradistinction to the views of many contemporary observers. 
With regard to women's activities during the war, McMillan writes that '... the average 
French woman accepted the First World War as a cruel and evil necessity. She was 
prepared to make immense sacrifices, but she did so with her eyes open. She did not 
attempt to delude herself that here was a crusade to be supported with a kind of mystical 
patriotic fervour. Without wanting the French government to purchase peace at any price, 
she was well aware that the war brought misery and privatiorf. 2 
So much for the views of the average woman, but what about those who could rightly 
claim to be self-conscious feminists, aware of themselves and of their femininity? 
McMillan writes that 'the official feminists were stridently patriotic. Propaganda on 
behalf of the right to vote was dropped in favour of exhortations to serve the patrie... 
Compared to the enormous amount of patriotic activity, opposition to the war effort among 
French women was almost negligible'. 3 Thus, in McMillan's view, the 'most important 
conclusion that can be drawn from this rapid survey of womerfs position on the home front 
during the First World War is that both the 'patriotic' and the 'pacifist' camps were in a 
distinct minority in the country as a whole`3 
But it is perhaps necessary to look behind this apparent inactivity on the part of 
feminists in the fight against the militarism of European society in the era of the Great 
War and afterwards. Jo Vellacott argues in a recent paper that far from being of no 
I James F. McMillan, Housewife or Harlot: The Place of Wo? nen in French Society 1870-1940 
(Brighton: The Harvester Press, 1981), p. 5 
2 lbid, p. 105. 
3 lbid, p. 112. 
4 lbid, p. 114. 
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consequence whatsoever, women's peace efforts in the First World War and afterwards were 
important because by involving themselves in the peace movement, women were stepping 
outside their assigned social roles and thus making a powerful feminist statement. By 
implication, what matters according to Vellacott's argument is not so much numbers as the 
mere essential fact of women's activity within a larger peace and protest movement. She 
writes: 
Women's peace efforts are often disn-dssed as simply part of the 
general softness of womerf s nature, or as part of their motherhood 
role, with no serious import for the public sphere. This patronising 
view has not only made it possible to disregard the content of what 
peace women have said, but at times even succeeds in making peace 
a suspect cause among feminists. Many first world war feminists, 
however, believed that pacifism was not only a logical 
development from feminism, but an integral part of it. 
In a culture which strongly enforces gender inequality and the 
widely differentiated traditional roles of men and women, where 
women are relegated to the private sphere, and where they are not 
organised to reclaim equality or push back the frontiers, women do 
not emerge as forceful opponents of war, demanding to be heard. 
They fulfil instead their assigned role, in war as in peace, 
sacrificing their sons and lovers without complaint (mourning yes, 
but complaining no), keeping the home fires burning, loving 
soldiers, being sexually available, bearing and nurturing cannon 
fodder for future war, enduring hardship, taking on extra tasks for 
the duration and relinquishing them without a murmur when the 
men come home-5 
Vellacott suggests that simply by stepping outside this traditional role vis-a-vis war, 
women were taking part in the larger feminist movement and it is in that context that their 
action must be seen. Although she is primarily concerned %ith the British example, her 
analysis is sufficiently broad in its theoretical implications to be interesting and useful 
here. Her statement that'in the long run ... making use of certain gender-based advantages, 
sisterhood made a stronger anti-war showing than brotherhood' is a provocative one. 6 
Leaving aside the British case, one would have to agree with McMillan that the Great 
War provided many examples of women active in the suffrage and feminist movement who 
supported the war effort jusquau bout. 
-5 Jo Vellacott, 'Women against Militarism in the First World War: the British Connections'. 
Paper read at the American-European Consultation on Peace Research in History, 24-29 August 1986, 
Stadtschlaining, Austria. To be published in Charles Chatfield and Peter van den Dungen, eds, 
Peace Movements and Political Cultures (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, in press). 
6 Ibid. 
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It is the purpose of this section to examine the putative link between feminism and 
pacifism in interwar France in the form of its clearest nexus, the French section of the Ligue 
Internationale des Femmes pour la Paix et la Libertd (LIFPL). There is no doubt that women 
played an important role in both womeWs and n-dxed French pacifist groups in the twenties 
and thirties. Some women such as Madeleine Vernet and Marcelle Capy saw their role as 
little different from that of men, and organised and led important nouveau style pacifist 
groups from about 1928 onwards. 7 Both of these women were also active as pacifist and 
feminist journalists. Primarily though it is the French section of the LIFPL and its 
contribution to the pacifist debate at both the international and national levels which will 
be the focal point of this section. The LIFPL was founded at the Hague in 1915 and was 
initially called the Women's International Committee for a Permanent Peace. It grouped 
together the cream of British, European and North American avant-garde fen-dnist womeO 
In France its leading lights were Gabrielle Duch8ne, Camille Drevet, Andr6e Jouve, Uo 
Wanner, and Madeleine Rolland. 9 These five women served for much of the interwar 
period as members of the International Executive committee of the LIFPL. Duchýne was an 
international vice-president for a number of years and Treasurer from 1935 to 1937. Camille 
Drevet was International Secretary during the n-dd-thirties, and the others were so7called 
non-voting 'consultative members of the executive. 
A second, more tangential, purpose of this section is to consider the extent to which this 
nascent French feminist pacifism was challenged by what will be termed the 'misogynist' 
attack, men who tried to lay the blame for the European Calvary of 1914-1918 at the feet of 
women. 
In a broader sense, though, this section raises questions about the nature of the French 
fen-dnist paqifist experience in the interwar period. For many feminist pacifists of the time 
(and indeed still today), 10 it was a self-evident axiom.. as Vellacott mentions above, that 
feminism and pacifism ought to be linked. But it will be argued, unlike Vellacott, that it 
was not sufficient for women to emerge from their traditional sphere into the post-war, 
political world in order to make a feminist statement for peace. As Vellacott herself 
admits, the content of women's peace ideas was important, and it was this content which 
,' See James Friguglietti, 'Marcelle Capy' in Harold Josephson, ed. Biographical Dictionary of 
Modern Peace Leaders (Westport, London: Greenwood Press, 1986), pp. 141-43. See also Albert S. 
Hill, 'Madeleine Vemet' in ibid., pp. 986-988. 
8 For an account of the international work of the LlFPL see Gertrude Bussey and Margaret Tims, 
Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (London: 1965). For a generalised overview 
of the French section of the LlFPL see Yvonne S6e, RAdiser VEspirance (Paris: Section franqaise de la 
LlFPL, 1983). See also Gabrielle Duchine 1870-1954 In Memoriam (Paris: Section Franqaise de la 
LIFPL, n. d. [19541). , 9 See Albert S. Hill, 'Gabrielle Duch6ne! in Josephson, Dictionary, pp. 226-228. See also Yvonne 
S6e, 'Andrde Jouve! in Josephson, Dictionary, p. 481. 
10 See for example Pam McAllister, ed, Reweaving the Web of Life: Feminism and Nonviolence 
(Philadelphia: New Society Publishers, 1982). 
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distinguished womeWs efforts for peace from 'masculinist' pacifism. What was inherently 
new, exciting, innovative and unique in the feminist contribution to peace in the immediate 
post-war world, was lost in France by the thirties. In the process, the French section of the 
LIFPL became a shadow of what it n-dght have been, its arguments a shell of what they 
once were, and the only genuinely avant-garde French fen-dnist contribution to the pacifist 
debate a mirror image of the ideologically divided world of mainstream French pacifism. 
Paradoxically this is in no way to denigrate the French feminist contribution to peace. 
Right up until 1939 women such as Gabrielle Duch6ne continued to play an extremely 
important role in the larger French pacifist mov? ment, but they did this increasingly as 
pacifists in the male mould, rather than as feminists. 
Thus, the fen-dnist contribution to the pacifist debate in interwar France can be situated 
between the two exVemes which have been examined in Parts I and H of this thesis. If the 
first two sections define the opposing paradigms of new and old-style pacifism, then the 
pacifism of the women of the French section of the LIFPL contýýituted a sort of 'theme and 
variations' on the motif set in the world of 'masculinist' pacifism. The evolution of feminist 
pacifism in late Third Republic France followed a curve in opposition to the currents of he 
day. Thus, in the first decade of the predominance of pacifisme ancien style, the women of 
the LIFP`L were representatives of integral pacifism before it became known as such. And by 
the time the new pacifism had begun to emerge in the early thirties, the LIFPL, or at least 
its leadership, was beginning to evolve away from absolute pacifism towards a defence of 
justice and freedom. This led to an interesting communion de pensie between mainline 
bourgeois pacifists like Ruyssen and the once radical pacifists of the LIFPL. 
The Great War and the Misogynist Memory 
Romain Rolland in his war-time journal, quotes a 'modest proposal' taken from a 
provincial newspaper, with regard to the activities of French women during the great 
conflagration. The father of a provincial lawyer apparently suggested augmenting the 
number of combatants and disposing of a 'social problemý at the same time by the following 
means: 
We must mobilise under the standard of the good and saintly Joan 
of Arc, the multitude of evil women from twenty to forty years of 
age who exist in France. To the battalions of these sad girls, who 
corrupt the race, we will join the vile adulterous women. All of 
these harmful beings must go to the army and [come] under fire like 
our beloved sons. 11 
11 Cited in Rend Arcos, Rom4in Rolland (Paris: Mercure de France, 1950), pp. 206-207. 
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Interwar writing on the question of women and peace shows similar antipathies. Some 
male writers created almost a minor literary genre vilifying perfidious women who, they 
claimed, ought to have prevented men from going to war. Women, whose voice no one 
wanted to hear in the great days of August 1914, were reproached for having let their men 
go off to the trenches, for having harangued shirkers into uniform, in short for having done 
the 'patriotic' thing. 
Other fictional, as opposed to polemical, works, such as Raymond Radiguet's Le Diable 
au Corps created scandal by portraying the young wife of a soldier away doing his duty at 
the front involved in a steamy love affair with a sixteen year-old boy -a generational as 
well as a sexual betrayal and treason on the home front. 12 
Finally, there was the feminist retort to all of this, that women are naturally peace- 
makers and have an in-bred hatred of war. 
To take an example in the first category, Fernand Corcos, a barrister in the Court of 
Appeal in Paris and a member of the Central Committee of the Ligue des Droits de 
Momme, wrote a couple of books in the late twenties exan-dning the question of women and 
the Great War. In the second of these, entitled La Paix? Oui, si les femmes voulaient! 
(1929), Corcos wrote that in 1914 he thought that women would somehow find a way to stop 
the war, would prevent men from the collective folly that seemed to be overtaking them. 13 
But he was 'deeply mistaken. Before, during and since the war, at any bellicist 
demonstration, there have been, there are as many women as men. At all pacifist 
demonstrations there have been, there are, more men tha? j women. Women' s activity is 
therefore at the present hour indiscernible from that of men, insofar as war and peace are 
concemed., 14 
But Corcos seemed to be caught in the paradox which still afflicts modem feminists: 
that between separatist and integrative fen-dnism. 1-5 For example, he writes: 
The feminist says: woman is naturally a pacifist. I respond: in 
1914, woman mobilised herself, by her own will... Not a single 
soldier was wounded or killed, in one army or the other, by a 
weapon that was not manufactured by the hand of a woman... 
Woman is just as bellicose as man. 16 
12 See Raymond Radiguet, Le Diable au Corps (Paris: Grasset, 1923) 
13 Fernand Corcos, La Paix? Oui, si. les femmes voulaienti, (Paris: Editions Montaigne, 1929), 
p. 286. 
14 Ibid, pp286-287. 
1-5 See for example in this regard Jo Vellacott, 'Separation and Integration: the nature of women 
only actions for peace. Unpublished paper provided by the author. 
16 Corcos, pp. 216-217. 
223 
He went on to repeat Andreas Latzko's assertion that women had been prepared before the 
war to break windows and be vilified and attacked in their struggle to attain the vote, but 
that when their men left for the front not a word was spoken, not a hand lifted. Corcos 
concluded that women's education needed to be changed, that instead of trying to make 
them carbon copies of men from the point of view of passions and ideas, new generations of 
women must be women, with all of the sweetness and invincible resistance that that word 
carried. 'This is the angle from which I view the utility of feminism', he wrote. 'My 
feminism is one of complete encouragement. I ask women to serve Peace for their children 
and fathers, for their husbands and their men. In so doing they will serve the Patrie. So 
well, in fact, that everyone will be satisfied - the amazons and the simple, true women 
too,. 17 
Corcos' at times self-contradictory analysis was greatly exceeded, however, by a 
review article by G6rard de Lacaze-Duthier18 published in 1933. He examined the role of 
women in the light of a recent book by Victor Margueritte entitled Les Femmes ef le 
Disarmemenh: 
.... Victor Margueritte publishes a work of the highest interest. He demonstrates the role which women are called to play in the 
disarmament of hatreds, prelude to a disarmament of peoples. If 
ever woman had a role to fill, it is surely that of mediator between 
these enemy brothers called men. For too long she has used her 
charms, her seductions, her power, to sow discord among the 
representatives of the stronger sex. The weaker sex must get hold of 
itself and renounce the use of its weakness to play the game of force. 
Woman has no other mission in this world than to teach her sons 
not to kill, for whatever pretext. That is true feminism. There is no 
other. War against War must be the word of the day for all those 
women who do not consider themselves the vassals of men but 
rather their equals. There is no better way for them to prove that 
they are something other than sex-fodder or work-fodder. Faced 
with this task of regeneration, what weight can the little claims 
of an inverted feminism possibly have? What interest can the 
conquest of power possibly hold for the daughters of Eve? They 
must stop playing the game of militarism first, they must cease 
falling into ecstasies before stripes or a flag, they must preach the 
love of peace to their sons, and try to extirpate from the breast of 
humanity by all the means in their power, this chancre which is 
war ... Afterwards, we'll see... 
... [Women's] conduct in the just War was below everything. Women showed themselves in 1914 in all countries to be more 
ignoble than men. They had a disastrous influence on the latter. 
Sowing hatred, encouraging the combatants, denouncing those 
whose heroism failed them, we saw these modem-day amazons at 
17 Corcos, p. 217. 
18 Gdrard de Lacaze-Duthier, 'Les livres' in La Patrie Humine, no. 50 (7-14 January 1933), p. 2. 
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work more ferocious than those of old. These tigresses exulted 
when the ones they claimed to cherish fell on the field of honour... 
Since the war, have women tried to repair the damage they did? 
Victor Margueritte notes with sadness that if women have become 
emancipated in the past few years, 'they have become drunk on 
excessive licence. Short hair, short skirts, short ideas'. - their 
emancipation reduces itself to that. 19 
Lacaze-Duthier echoed Margueritte7s call to women to join leagues and become active in the 
pacifist fight, and also 'to have no more children as long as the nations have the right to 
assassinate them'. 20 
This is undoubtedly one of the more misogynist diatribes of interwar French pacifism 
and it is interesting for a number of reasons. The anticonceptional propaganda - what Victor 
Mdrie called Ia grýve des ventres, 21- is a theme which recurs several times in the speeches 
and writings of major pacifist figures in the 30s and one for which several of them were 
hauled before the courts and tried, having contravened the Third Republic's posi-war 
legislation on natality and anticonceptional propaganda. Secondly and more importantly, 
there is the attempt to shoulder women with the moral and literal responsibility for the 
First World War and the militarism which pervaded French and European society. 
The Feminist Response 
Most French feminists took quite the opposite view of recent history and women's role in 
it. Henriette Sauret argued in 1930 that, 
If anyone can do much for the establishment of peace it is the 
woman. Until these past few years she has not been able to play a 
role of real efficaciousness with regard to this great work. But by 
virtue of her increasing intellectual importance, her increasingly 
rapid accession to all branches of human activity, her influence 
which broadens more and more each day ... woman has been designated to tear the torch of peace away from the hands which 
until now have held it in an intermittent or debilitated way.... 
... In the opinions of men regarding the attitude of women vis-A-vis 
war and peace, there is a duality of viewpoints which is rather 
strange and which should be noted. During the period 1914-1918 
the public, the press and in general masculine circles found it 
scandalous that women should become involved wtih pacifism. For 
the record let us remember the persecutions suffered by Gabrielle 
Duchýne, Julia Bertrand, H616ne Brion, Marguerite Th6venet, etc. 
Since the armistice, a change in attitude. Men presently are trying 
to lumber women - or almost - with the responsibility for the war. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Cited in Joseph Folliet, Pacifisme de Droife? Bellicisme de Gauche (Paris: Editions du Cerf, 
1938), p. 14. 
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Many a writer has given us his reflections on this subject, which can 
be summarised more or less as follows: 'Women ought to have 
thrown themselves in front of the trains! Prevented men from 
leaving! Not one of them protested! Women adjusted themselves 
to the rhythm of war. They were the valiant nurses, the amazons 
of. the wagons, the lovers of those on leave! Pacifists, women? 
Away with you! Pitiless Comelliennes, yes! Chasers of shirkers', 
yes! 22 
And Sauret cited as examples of this 'literature' as she politely termed it, the works of 
Andreas Latzko, Corcos, Pierre Mille, etc. Echoing Simone Ratel, she wrote that one does 
not undo the effects of a thousand years of education and training in one night, an education 
which taught women to find good and admirable all that men did, and furthermore one 
which taught obedience as the supreme virtue. 23 
'Man is fleeing from himself, she wrote, 'he is accusing phantoms instead of looking his 
own infection in the face and admitting that at the bottom of his heart he consented to the 
war and that his old instincts were contented'. 24 
In Sauret's view, men were incoherent. While protesting loudly about women's 
supposed failings in matters of peace, they went blindly on preparing the next war. Women 
would be fully justified in saying 'Get on with it' and refusing to have anything more to do 
with men's childishness. But that was not womeWs way, according to Sauret. Women were 
above all else generous, and history showed that they had an amazing capacity to sacrifice 
themselves to great social movements for the sake of mankind, movements in which they 
personally had little stake - and she cited as examples of this women's contributions to the 
French Revolution, the fight against slavery, workers emancipation, and so forth. 2-5 
Marthe Bray of the Ligue d'Action F6n-dnine pour le Suffrage des Fernmes also attacked 
the tendency of what she called 'sceptical or poorly informed minds' to claim that feminists 
neglected in their programmes the fight for peace, or even that women looked kindly on the 
twarrior spirit, as if women had invented the Patrie!, 26 On the contrary she claimed that 
a look at any feminist tract would soon put the lie to this sort of misogynist slander. 
The woman who has embraced the feminist doctrine is a woman 
liberated from all that the past has handed down to her in the 
form of errors and prejudices. Giver of life, and of a life which she 
22 Henriette Sauret, 'Le K61e de la Femme dans la Pacification des Esprits' (30 November 1930) 




26 Marthe Bray, 'Oui, les femmes veulent la paixl', in'Le Prqgrýs Civique, no. 535 (1931), p. 214. 
See copy in BDIC/DD/FARds 312/l/47. 
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111.2. Aims, Political Orientation and the Fiffirerprinzip 
The French section was certainly never the largest of the LIFPL international sections. 
In the mid-twenties it numbered some 500 members compared with Germany's 5000,4000 in 
Britain, some 8000 in the United States and 10,000 in Denmark. 28 Out of an estimated total 
League membership of some 35,000 members, it seems insignificant indeed. Likewise the 
financial. contribution of the French Section to the international work of the League was 
minimal. In a statement of sums received for a six-month period in the mid-twenties, the 
French contributed the equivalent of $12.00 compared with the two largest contributions of 
$3,000 and $542 from the American and British sections respectively. 29 However, by 1935 
the French section was claiming a membership of about 4500 women. 30 Whether this is an 
accurate representation of its size it is difficult to say. In 1931 Ducht-ne had warned her 
colleagues on the International Executive Comn-dttee of the dangers of an international 
organisation appearing too small numerically. She counselled prudence in whom these 
figures should be released toý31 This might imply a certain elasticity in her approach to 
the truth in the matter of membership figures, especially given the French section's 
increasing isolation and its struggle to maintain its influential position internationally 
within the League in the mid-thirties. It is impossible to be certain about this, but as a 
point of comparison, it should be noted that the total maximum membership of the fourteen 
groups present and voting at the 1936 French section national conference was only 1700 
membersý2 
Whatever the actual size of the French section, there is no doubting its importance at 
the international level of the league, and also as an influential part of the larger peace 
28 Cited in typescript entitled 'Washington Object' in BDIC/DD/FARds 208/5/5. 
29 Cited in 'Statement of Sums Received from National Sections within Six Months', Women's 
Interilional League for Peace and Freedom, International Office, Geneva. In BDIC/DD/FARds 
205/5/4. 
30 Minutes, International Executive Committee Meetin& Geneva, 12-16 September 1935, p. 39. 
In BDIC/DD/FARds 206/ Septembre 1935 
31 Minutes, IEC Meeting, Geneva, 4-8 September 1931, p. 3. In BDIC/DD/FAR6s 206/ 
Septembre 1931. 
32 Cited in Proc&-verbal de la Conf6rence Nationale de la Section Franqaise de la LIFPL des 27 
et 28 juin 1936, p. 6. In BDIC/DD/FAR6s. 208/17 
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movement in France. As has been noted above, at various times in the twenties and thirties 
the leading women of the French section served in different capacities on the International 
Executive of the League. Thus, despite its relatively small numbers and lack of financial 
power, the French played a disproportionately important role within the international 
councils of the LIFPL. Primarily through Duch8ne, the French section developed a specific 
approach to the problems of peace and the answers which it hoped pacifism would 
provide. In this endeavour they were often joined by the members of the German section. 
The conununity of spirit between the French and German sections became one of the two 
poles around which the theoretical and practical debates within the League revolved 
during the interwar period. The other pole was, perhaps not surprisingly, epiton-tised 
above all by the ideas of the British section, with the Scandinavian countries and the 
American section playing increasingly important supporting roles as the shadows 
lengthened over Europe in the thirties. 
It was perhaps inevitable that in such an international organisation disagreements 
should quickly arise over goals and methods. Hardly had the euphoria of the first post- 
war congress in Zurich in 1919 subsided than discussions began which gradually became an 
at times acrimonious debate for the heart and soul of the League. This debate spanned 
almost the entire interwar period and saw the British and French sections locked in an 
almost permanent confrontation from about 1924 onwards. If, as John Cairns has put it, the 
British in the interwar years were 'a nation of shopkeepers in search of a suitable 
France, 33, the reverse can also certainly be said to be true within the LIFPL (during the 
thirties especially). The debates centred on three significant areas: the question of aims or 
goals for the League, the debate over the nature of the League and its Executive - should it 
be national or international, delegative or leadership-oriented, and finally, the question of 
policy - whether the League should be politically engaged, or rather pursue a primarily 
educative role. 
The debate over the aims or object of the League is one which highlights the different 
approaches taken by the various sections to the question of war and peace. As early as 1920, 
the International Executive Comn-dttee was expressing its concern that new associate 
members should sign a statement of 'our object' in order to effect a kind of pacifist quality 
control on incoming members. 34 By 1923 at its meeting in Dresden, the question seemed to 
have become more acute, with the English pacifist Catherine Marshall remarking that the 
resolutions passed at The Hague in 1915 'are not any longer a real guarantee of pacifistic 
33 John C. Cairns, 'A Nation of Shopkeepers in Search of a Suitable France, 1919-40', American 
Historical Review 79,3 (June 1974), pp. 710-743. 
34 Minutes, IEC Meeting, Geneva, 14 June 1920, p. 14. In BDIC/DD/FAR6s. 206/juin 1920. 
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convictions, especially not in Central and Eastern Europe'. 35 She urged that sections ask 
their members to subscribe to a statement of aims drawn up by the American, Emily Greene 
Balch, which included the phrase that the members of the LlFPL opposed'all wae. 36 
But it was in 1924 that the debate over the aims of the League began to become acute, 
and it is from that year that one can date the beginnings of the Anglo-French rivalries 
within the League which found expression in the differing conceptions of the nature of 
peace work and the direction the League ought to be taking. For most of the rest of the 
decade the battle-lines were drawn over the question of the admissibility of 'defensive' 
wars, with the French taking the more absolutely pacifist stand that they were not to be 
countenanced. As Andr6e Jouve put it in a letter to Kathleen Courtney in December 1924: 
We cannot accept partisans of defensive wars in the League. The 
French Section was formed at the moment when the [German] 
invasion was in full swing: it is precisely because we were 'opposed 
to any war, offensive or defensive', that we were at that time in 
disagreement with almost all French women. They would all be 
with us today if we declared ourselves only against offensive wars 
or wars of conquest. And we all know what the distinction between 
these two types of wars is worth. We certainly have no need of 
members who are going to resign at the first incursion of an 
airplane ... 
37 
The following summer at the International Executive Committee meeting in Innsbruck, 
the British section attacked the offending re-wording of the Object which had occurred at 
the League's congress in Washington in 1924. Together with the Polish, Scandinavian, and 
Czech sections, the British protested that the new wording of the aims made the work of 
the league in Britain extremely difficult. 38 By February 1926 the American section had 
decided that it, too, wanted the Washington object altered to remove the reference to 
defensive wars, and a concerted move began to amend the League's constitutiom39 As 
DuchLane pointed out, it appeared a bit illogical that the American section was prepared to 
accept a condemnation of 'all wars'.. but not of 'defensive wars'. 40 
Some members thought that the Leaguels role should be to educate women about war 
and peace, and in so doing gradually bring them into the full work of the League. But as 
Andrde Jouve argued, the League had been founded in wartime and had taken a very 
unpopular stand which it would be now rather difficult to go back on. 
35 Cited in Minutes, IEC Meeting, Dresden, 1-5 September 1923. In BDIC/DD/FARds. 206/ 
septembre 1923. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Andr6e Jouve to Kathleen Courtney, December 1924, in BDIC/DD/FARds. 208/5. 
38 Minutes, IEC Meeting, Innsbruck, 10-15 July 1925, in BDIC/DD/FARds. 206/juillet 1925. 
39 See Minutes, IEC Meeting, Paris, 6-10 February 1926 in BDIC/DD/FARds. 206/Fdvrier 1926. 
40 Ibid, pp. 5-6. 
230 
As far as the education of members is concerned, we do not have a 
pacific association more radical than the French section. We 
represent therefore integral pacifism. We do not fulfil our goal if 
we do not hold to the very firm ideal which was set at the 
beginning. We believe that any formula ought to be the ideal one 
holds, that is to say pursue it by different paths, by different 
stages more or less quickly; but what is necessary in any case 
constantly to maintain is the sense of where one is going. This is a 
method of working which is different from that of our American 
and English friends, but what we must do is understand one another 
and find a common ground3l 
The divergences of viewpoint may have been due to differences in national 
temperament. Catherine Marsha1142 seemed to think that there were fundamental 
differences in outlook between the English section on the one hand, and the French and 
German sections on the other. She wrote to Duchia-ne in 1926 
... this much I can say, perhaps: I think there is a rather fundamental difference between the way the British Comn-dttee ... 
regards the task and function of our League, and the way in which 
the French Section, and again the German Section, regards it. 
English people in general, and the women who form the greater 
part of our membership in particular, are inclined to be very much 
absorbed in the political aspect of things, and to attach less 
importance to thought and feelings and more importance to action, 
than is the case with your countrymen and the Germans. We tend to 
be not very much interested in the processes that prepare and 
determine events, and to wake up only when the events are 
actually happening and there is something to be done, here and 
now. We tend to dislike too much theorising ... 
43 
Marshall's analysis of the French section may be applicable to the situation in the mid- 
twenties, but as will become clear later on, it did not apply to the thirties when the French 
section became avowedly political whilst struggling to maintain its veneer of impartiality 
vis-A-vis the political parties. Even with regard to the 1920s, Marshall's comments 
underestimate the broad interests and strengths of the French section. As early as 1921, for 
example, DuchL&ne had written in her yearly report to the Leagues secretariat in Geneva 
that 'unfortunately, the majority of the women who have joined us through conviction are 
too busy (emphasis added) with political action to work for the pacifist cause elsewhere 
other than within their party political groups. Their action is no less useful for that, but 
41 Cited, in French version of minutes, p. 5, appended to ibid. 
42 For a biographical sketch of Marshall, see Jo Vellacott, 'Catherine Marshall' in Josephson, et 
Biographical Dictionary of Modern Peace Leaders, pp. 606-607. 
43 C. E. Marshall to G. Duch6ne, 29 January 1926 in BDIC/DD/FARds. 206/fdvrier 1926. 
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that of the Section suffers from it,. 44 The French section was always politically conscious 
and active, but it is true to say that in the 1920s it placed more emphasis on activities like 
the Summer Schools, the preparation of the Cahiers de la Paix (an activity wlkh was once 
likened to the intellectual preparation of the Revolution of 178945), aid to famine-stricken 
areas of Europe and so on. 
The question of the nature of the League had already been raised briefly in Dresden in 
1923 in a discussion of the 'Competence of the Executive Committee to take action for the 
whole league'46. But it was in 1927 at the Executive's September meeting in Geneva that 
the issue became an important one. The British section desired a change in the method of 
voting at the International Executive which would see the vote given to the Consultative 
Members from each of the sections, in addition to the vote already held by the 
international executive members duly elected by the congresses. Duchene, on behalf of the 
French section, was completely opposed to this change. In her view, it would weaken or 
destroy the international character of the League and leave it changed into a body of 
national groups: 
National representation would have as its inevitable consequence 
the modification of the spirit in which the members of the 
executive work. Elected by national sections, it is towards them 
that they would feel themselves responsible; it would be no longer 
possible for them to liberate themselves from national points of 
view. 47 
The problem with national representation was that it would give too much power to 
'recently enfranchised' nations which had not yet evolved enough in Duchene's view to be 
able to work effectively. Sections such as Greece and Bulgaria were still too imbued with a 
'nationalisme aigu' and needed careful nurturing up to the level of the more advanced 
nations. Duchene considered the debate over the method of representation in the League 
perhaps even more important than the debate about the Object: 
On this change - or on the maintenance of the present rules - 
depends the future orientation [of the League. ] We have been 
asked to act only by unanimous decision. But if unanin-tity can be 
achieved on the philosophical level, it cannot be at the level of 
action. Action is life - life is the multiPlicity of actions and 
reactions, diversity. 
44 Extraits du Rapport sur Vaction de la section franýaise au cours du dernier exercice, 1920-1921, 
adressd au Comitd Central de la Ligue. In BDIC/DD/FAR6s. 206/septembre 1923. 
45 Duch6ne's comment in Minutes, IEC Meeting, Dresden, 1-5 September 1923. 
BDIC/DD/FAR6s. 208/2. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Typescript remarks of Duch6ne dated September 1927 in BDIC/DD/FARds. 206/Septembre 
1927. Emphasis is Duchfte's. 
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Unanimity ceases to be possible in action, it would lead fatally to 
impotence. 
.... If our League wishes to continue to be what it has been until now: 
a sower of new ideas; if it wishes to introduce new principles into 
the social, economic, and political domains, it cannot pretend to 
unanimity. It must choose: action, that is to say struggle and 
decisions taken by the majority or: unanimity in nothingness. 48 
She felt the issue to be so important that she threatened the secession of the French section 
if it should come to pass. 49 
The problem reared its head again the following year in Geneva with another debate 
on the constitution, prompting Duchýne to ask what the other sections' conception of the 
League was. For her it was to be an avant-garde international organisation, but she 
suspected that for others it might be conceived in more conservative national term&50 
Madeleine Rolland, one of the French section's consultative members, echoed Duchýne's 
comments, saying that 'an avant-garde society signifies an absolutely pacifist society, and 
we must be very clear about what we would do in case of war and if we are opposed to all 
wars.... the LIF would prefer to be a small group of absolutely pacifist women... a small 
group of convinced pacifists can have a real influenc&. -51 
The purity of Duchtne's pacifist internationalist principles is exemplified in her 
suggestions regarding the healing of the divisions within the Czech section which was 
split into two sometimes opposing groups, one German and the other Czechoslovak. In 1929, 
she proposed 'the creation of a small group of genuinely pacifist women imbued with an 
international spirit in which no attention should be paid to the nationality of the 
president. This would be the core of a future section, ý2 Pacifism for Duchýne was no matter 
of spineless compromise, however. She believed ardently, in Jane Addam-e words, that 
'that which unites us is more important and stronger than that which divides us,. 53 
Pacifism was a stronger, more positive force than mere compromise as she insisted to the 
International Executive Committee after an unfortunate incident at a public meeting 
organised under its auspices in Geneva in September 1927. As she said the following day, 
'Some things that were said during the speeches gave the impression that one of the 
speakers, in concluding, identified pacifism with a method of compromise and this was a 
deep shock. Another speaker seemed to wish to indicate that in action the League should 
48 Ibid. 
49 Minutes, IEC Meeting, Geneva, 11 September 1927, afternoon session, p. 4. In 
BDIC/DD/FAR6s. 206/septembre 1927. 
50 Proc6s-verbal, Comit6 Executif International, Geneva, 20-24 March 
. 
1928, p. 7. In 
BDIC/DD/FARds. 206/ mars 1928. 
51 Ibid., p. 8. 
52 Proc6s-verbal, Comitd Executif International, Geneva, 16-19 April 1929, p. 3. In 
BDIC/DD/FAR6s. 206/avril 1929. 
53 Cited in Andr6e jouve, 'Jane Addams' En Vigie 1,1 (October 1935), p. l. 
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not let itself feel too closely bound by its high principles. These things are equivocal and 
seem out of place in a meeting organised under the auspices of the League., 54 
The differences between the French and British sections on the question-of principles 
converged on a number of occasions in relation to specific political issues. At the time of the 
Geneva Disarmament Conference in 1932 this became clear. The League held its bi-annual 
congress that year in Grenoble and one of the main points on the agenda was the 
international work in favour of disarmament. Lida Gustava Heymann and Gertrude Baer55 
representing Germany and Duch8ne speaking for France demanded a radical manifesto, but 
were opposed in this by the British. Mrs Corbett-Fisher said 
that the difficulty is the same as in the past. The sections have 
different points of view in different countries. In Great Britain 
radical pacifist work is done by the No More War Movement, and 
although we know that the LIF is in favour of total disarmament, 
its principal role is to be an association of women well informed and 
ready to demand practical and immediate measures on any pressing 
. MC ques n., -" 
At the League's Dublin Congress in 1926 the first great revisionist debate on the 
League's aims and its structure occurred. DucMne agreed to accept a modification of the 
aims, removing the reference to defensive wars and replacing it with the more anodyne 
phrase that the LIFPL strove to unite'women in all countries who are opposed to every kind 
of war, exploitation and oppression, and who work for universal disarmament and for the 
solution of conflicts by the recognition of human solidarity, by conciliation and arbitration, 
by world co-operation and by the establishment of social, political and economic justice for 
all, without distinction of sex, race, class or creed. '-57 But she was adamant that the 
international character of the League be enshrined in a second paragraph which stated 
that the work of all of the national sections should be based 'upon the Statements adopted 
and the Resolutions passed by the International Congresses of the League'. 58 
By the beginning of the 1930s the situation had thus begun to reverse itself and the 
French section increasingly found itself on the defensive, having to defend its attitude to 
the other sections. This was no mere accident but rather the result of a change in the 
54 Minutes, IEC Meeting, Geneva, 13 September 1927, afternoon session, p. 5. In 
BDIC/DD/F, &R6s. 206/septembre 1927. 
5-5 For biographical sketches of Heymann and Baer, see Amy Hackettý 'Lida Gustava Heymann, 
in Josephson et al , Biographical Dictionary ... pp. 405-407. See also D. v. Westernhagen, 'Gertrud Baer', in Karl Holl and Helmut Donat, eds., Die Friedensbewegung. Organisierter Pazifismus in 
Deutschland, Osterreich und in der Schweiz (Hermes Handlexikon) (Dilsseldorf: ECON 
Taschenbuch Verlag, 1983), p. 35. 
56 Procýs-verbal, Comitd ExC-cutif International, Grenoble, 11-14 May 1932, p. 7. In 
BDIC/DD/FARds. 206/mai 1932. 
57 Minutes, Dublin Congress, 8-15 July 1926, p. 7. IN BDIC/DD/FAR6s. 205/5/4. 
58 Ibid. 
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orientation of the French section, away from an 'integral' pacifist position towards a more 
ideologically Marxist view of peace and pacifism, at least at the official level. This slow 
evolution from what Duch&e herself called pacifist idealism towards pacifist realism59 
was accompanied naturally enough perhaps by a gradual softening of the French sectiores 
official position on the question of non-violence, civil war and the methods of the 
Revolution. This gradual process resulted in an estrangement from the rest of the League, 
with the exception of the German section, which finally saw Duch6ne lose her seat as an 
international Executive Committee member at the last pre-war League congress in 
Luhacovice, Czechoslovakia in 1937. 
The 1934 League Congress in Zurich is the key point at which the changing views of the 
French section became clear. Indeed it marked a watershed for the League as a whole as 
well. The world of 1934 was no longer even that of 1932 - the accession to power of the Nazi 
party in Germany had seen to that. The German pacifist Gertrud Baer remarked in the 
opening discussion that the League was undergoing an 'intellectual crisis,. 60 In a long 
address, Clara Ragaz, one of the international vice-presidents, spoke of non-violence as the 
! nost important question for the League in the time of trouble it faced in the international 
sphere, but she wondered whether 'this same strong majority' existed with regard to social 
struggles or the social revolution. She recognised that right became very difficult to 
distinguish from wrong in this area, and asked what the path of true liberation was. 61 1934 
marked the LIFPL's first hard encounter with the real world of interwar Europe on a 
domestic as well as international level. In many ways, the 1920s and the experience of the 
Great War had presented relatively clear-cut moral decisions for the pacifist women of the 
League, but the 1930s marked the convergence of two new factors in a startlingly violent 
way. First, the rise of fascism and then the Nazi seizure of power destroyed the 
humanitarian, rationalistic approach to peace which had been possible in the post-World 
War One era. And secondly, the gradual insinuation into the LEFPL of a Marxist conception 
of peace led inevitably to a confrontation on the social, domestic level between converts to it 
and the heralds of the old doctrinaire 'idealistic' pacifism. 
The French section quite obviously viewed the 1934 congress as an important event for 
the future course of the League's work because its delegation of twenty voting members, two 
executive members and two consultative members was its largest during the interwar period. 
59 Gabrielle Duch6ne, 'Les Deux Conceptions du pacifisme, typescript of report prepared for 
the 1936 National Conference of the French section. In BDIC/DD/FAR6s. 208/17. 
60 Minutes of Proceedings, Eighth International Congress, Zurich, 3-8 September 1934, pA In 
BDIC/DD/FARds. 205/8/8. 
61 Clara Ragaz, 'Changements d'ordre politique, social et dconomique du monde depuis 1918. 
Probl6mes qui en r6sultent pour le travail et les m6thodes de la LIFPU. This was the opening address 
to the 1934 Zurich Congress. In BDIC/DD/FARds. 205/8/5. 
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In a total voting body of 135 delegates,, the French section was clearly a strong force. 62 At 
the next congress in 1937 it only managed to send three voting delegates, 63 so it may perhaps 
be inferred from this that the 1934 congress was viewed as a pivotal event by the French 
section and that thereafter its commitment to the international work of the League waned. 
Pivotal the 1934 congress certainly was. Once again the Aims of the League were debated 
at great length with the usual stand-off between the Franco-German and British positions. 
The essentially Franco-German statement of aims that was finally voted after long and 
acrimonious discussion was much longer than the earlier versions and for the first time 
contained direct references to the need to abolish 'the present system of exploitation, 
privilege and profit' which caused wars and to 'facilitate and hasten by non-violent 
methods the social transformation which would permit the inauguration of a new system 
under which would be realised social, economic and political equality for all'. The women 
at Zurich saw as their goal 'an economic order on a world-wide basis and under world 
regulation founded on the needs of the community and not on profit'. 64 The British counter- 
proposal, much more general in its political analysis and stronger in its pacifist principles, 
originally read that the league 'is opposed to all resort to bloodshed and violence whether 
by States, by Classes, or by individuals, to dictatorship whether from the "right" or from 
the "left"'. 6-5 The British proposal also contained references to the need for a 'social 
transformation' required before the aims could be achieved, but they did not wish to go into 
too much detail. 'By defining we create division' said Kathleen Innes, 'The British Section 
is not entirely opposed to the Franco-German proposal. They do not, however, believe that 
any new order would necessarily bring peace nor that social, economic, and political 
equality alone would mean peace'. 66 Instead, she thought that the acceptance of such a 
tendentious statement might very well drive members, and even entire Sections, out of the 
League. 
The British were apparently astonished that the French proposal for a statement of 
aims made no reference to civil conflicts. Mlle Christol from the Marseilles section strongly 
opposed 'the suggestion that civil conflicts should be settled only by international 
arbitration!. In her view, the League'must stand definitely with the workers even if, as a 
last means, they had to resort to violence'. 67 One of the other French delegates, Mlle 
62 List of Delegates, 1934 Zurich Congress, in BDIC/DD/FAR6s. 205/8/7. 
63 Roll Call, IXth International Congress of the LIFPL, Luhacovice, Czechoslovakia, 1937. In 
BDIC/DD/FARds. 205/9/2. 
64 See the revised version of the aims and the debate that preceded it at the 1934 Zurich 
Congress in 'Constitution. Paragraph II. Statement of Aims'in BDIC/DD/FAR6s. 205/8/6. 
65 See 'Cl. British Section Proposals for Revision of Constitution as a whole' in 
BDIC/DD/FARds. 205/8/6. 
66 Minutes of Proceedings, Eighth International Congress, Zurich, 3-8 September'1934, p. 17. In 
BDIC/DD/FARds. 205/8/6. 
67 Ibid, p. 19. 
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Paquet, emphasising that she spoke for a whole group of young delegates, urged 'the 
necessity of a clear definition of violence under present day conditions'. In her view 
... it is violence if young strong people are prevented from working. Even the very fact that we enjoy a more or less comfortable life 
while others are starving is violence. If we stand for peace we must 
not indulge in passivity but work out practicable methods of non- 
violent action. 68 
Catherine Marshall saw the essential differences between the French and British 
sections hinging on two points: the question of international war and class war, and 
secondly, on the definition of violence. She did not consider a general strike to be violence, 
nor was she prepared to accept responsibility for the covert violence of the system. She 
asked the French to define what they understood by violence to which Duchene replied 
that 
... in her opinion bloodshed is not always the worst form of 
violence, oppression in all its forms is violence as well. To the 
question towards which use of violence we ought to be more 
indulgent she [stated] that we must understand and sympathise 
with the oppressed even if they resort to arms. The Speaker makes 
it however. quite clear that under no circumstances should the 
members of the League fight with armsfi9 
The extent to which the demands of a domestic social policy heavily inspired by the 
Communist party impinged on the French section's ability to relate to the international 
debate on non-violence and pacifism can be seen in the remarks of Germaine Baurez, one of 
the French section's Consultative Members, who explained to the Congress 
that to accept the workers' violence in social struggles does not 
mean to advocate violence but only to consider it unavoidable. In 
France the union effected between Socialists and Communists makes 
a general strike possible, within a few months and it must be clear 
that if, as a result of this, Government forces are used against the 
workers and they are thus compelled to react %kh violence, our 
sympathy must definitely be with the workers. She would prefer a 
non-violent action but thinks that there is no time left now to build 
up an organisation for such action which it took years to do in 
India. 70 
It is clear from the above that for the French section support of a social struggle the 
parameters of which were defined by the Communist party had become more important 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid., p. 21. 
70 Ibid., p. 27. 
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than the struggle for international peace. One wonders if the French section would ever 
have seen the light of day in 1915 if Duch8ne and the other women of that first hour had 
considered the organised violence let loose over European society 'unavoidable'. The 
attitude here is in sharp contrast to that of the Munich and Jena sections during the days of 
the German revolution in 1918-19 when women of the LIFPL several times intervened, not 
always successfully, with the military authorities and the revolutionaries in an attempt to 
ward off violence. 71 
The Congress nevertheless passed the Franco-German proposal regarding aims, albeit it 
in slightly amended form, but the French section voted against the clause which repudiated 
the use of violence under any circumstances. 72 This occasioned a rather bitter discussion at 
the International Executive Committee following the congress when the French sectiores 
commitment to non-violence was openly called into question. Clara Ragaz, the Swiss 
pacifist, noted from the chair that there was 'some uneasiness in regard to the presence on 
the Executive Committee of a representative of the French Section, since the French 
Delegation in the Congress had voted against the clause in our new Aims which repudiates 
the use of violence under any circumstances. '73 Duch8ne replied that the French section was 
'realist' and saw things as they were. She claimed that the French detested violence as 
much as any other section but 
they do not believe that the social transformation which seems to 
them indispensable to assure peace and justice in the world can 
realise itself without any violence. The French Section is in face of 
a revolutionary situation. The French workers - who are not armed 
- are almost daily the vicitms of acts of violence on the part of the 
Government or of reactionary factions. 74 
The French section had accepted Madeleine Rolland's amendment to the aims which spoke 
of achieving the social transformation deemed necessary 'by the methods most calculated to 
lessen [emphasis added] violence', an amendment which Duch8ne said showed neither'the 
naivet6 nor the absence of sense of reality of the other amendments,. 75 In any event, the 
Rolland amendment was defeated three times in the voting on the new constitution. 
Duch8ne said that it was this lack of reality in the other amendments which was the cause 
of the French abstention, but she added that it should in no way be construed as an 
71 See Gertrud Baer's comments on this in ibid., p. 22. 
72 Minutes, IEC Meeting, Zurich, 10 September 1934, p. 12. In BDIC/DD/FARds. 205/8/7. See 
also Minutes of Proceedings of the 1934 Congress, p. 35, paragraph 279 which records the details of the 
vote on the League's aims. It is unclear from this whether some members of the French delegation 
abstained or voted negatively. 
73 Ibid. UEC Minutes) 
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid., p. 13. See also Congress Proceedings, pp. 25-26,29 and 34 for the discussion and voting on 
the Rolland amendment. 
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acceptance of violence, or as an unwillingness to continue to work within the League. She 
quite rightly pointed out that certain sections had achieved the removal of all 
condemnations of defensive wars from the aims; in the past without it bringing into question 
a sectiorfs continued membership. At the time of the League's campaign for disarmament, 
the British section refused to accept the phrase 'total disarmament' and yet on Duch8ne's 
suggestion it had been agreed to allow two formulas to exist side by side within the 
League. 76 
The continued participation of Duch&e and the French Section in the League was in 
fact in question. Emily Greene Balch said that when Duch8ne 'had asked her directly 
whether she thought the League would be better without the French Section she had 
replied that she had arrived, with great pain, at the conclusion that G Duch&e was 
hampered in her work by her connection with the WILPF, and that the WILPF found its 
work made difficult by G Duch8ne. Duch8ne, for her part, supposed 'that her activity in 
the Amsterdam movement where she has accepted collaboration with personalities and 
groups which are not non-violent, [had] not been approved'. She however was of the 
opinion 'that in working successfully to realise unity in France she [had] done more in two 
years for the cause of peace and liberty than in 20 years of work in the League'. 77 
The German section represented by Dr Anita Augspur& Lida Gustava Heymann and 
Gertrud Baer protested vehemently against the attacks made on Duch6ne and the French 
section. Heymann thought that many of the troubles 'have arisen because there is too much 
"Quakerism" in our Executive. Quakerism was simply not up to the task of dealing with 
political situations outside the social and humanitarian sphere in which it normally 
operated. 78 The comment is interesting because it shows the fundamental differences 
between an essentially political approach to pacifism, which was primarily that of the 
French and German sections, and the more idealistic, perhaps religiously inspired 
orientation of the Anglo-American sections. The Dutch section, too, seemed prone to view 
pacifism in an ethical, moral light rather than as a political problem. Mme Wulfften- 
Palthe, a Dutch consultative member of the Executive, spoke of 'pacifism as a new religion 
and of the need to be 100% pacifise. 79 None of this discussion, however, really called into 
question DuchZn&s personal commitment to non-violence. Gertrud Baer recounted how in a 
conversation with DucMne about the February troubles in Paris, Duchdne had said that 
Inever in her life would she be found on the barricades'. 80 The meeting ended with DucMne 
still on the Executive Committee and the French section still part of the League, but the 
76 Ibid. UEC Minutes), p. 13. 
77 Ibid, pp. 13 and 15. 
78 Ibid, p. 14. 
79 Ibid, p. 15. 
80 Ibid, p. 14. 
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incident serves to highlight the extent to which by 1934 the French section had begun to 
isolate itself from the rest of the League. 
In some respects it is difficult to understand why Duch&e and the French section should 
have been singled out for this sort of treatment since in many respects Duch6ne's views were 
no more 'radical' than those of the Gennan Section, or for that matter those of Clara Ragaz, 
the Swiss international vice-president. Ragaz, for example, earlier that year at an 
executive meeting in Geneva had said that the League's struggle 
for peace must be conducted on two fronts, if not three: against 
militarism pure and simple, against fascism which is but a 
disguised militarism, and against the present economic system, 
that is to say against capitalism, which is a supporter of fascism... 
We have always wanted peace and freedom. But all of these 
problems are becoming more concrete and insofar as they become 
more concrete they put us before the necessity of taking some very 
clear, very precise decisions, while in thepast we have perhaps 
contented ourselves with more or less vague theories .. 
81 
At this same meeting the Executive Committee passed a declaration drafted by 
Duchene on the League's position on the current political situation. The document, 
especially in its final form, is imbued with a starkly Marxist analysis of the causes of the 
'present discontents'. Duchene wrote that the complexity of the problems facing the world 
was so great that pacifists and intellectuals were falling into increasing confusion about 
what course to take. She considered the healthiest attitude for the LIFPL to take to be 
summed up as foHows: 
Reject all dogmatism - even pacifist - to become conscious of reality; 
Tear ourselves away from the greyness, of formulas which satisfy 
the mind too easily, in order to enter into positive action. 82 
Duch6ne saw the civilised world sliding into a barbarism without equal in human history 
and proclaimed that the 'passive cult of peace no longer suffices, what was needed in this 
dangerous hour was an 'active, positive, incessant struggle' against war and fascism. Andif 
real peace was desired, one had also to desire the conditions for it. 83 Without the support 
of any doctrine, she claimed that the mere objective examination of the facts obliged one to 
recognise that: 
81 Extraits du discours d'ouverture prononc6 par Clara Ragaz au Comitd Ex6cutif International'. 
Geneva, 24-28 March 1934. In BDIC/DD/FAR6s. 206/mars 1934. 
82 Ddclaration adopt6e A I'Ex6cutif de la LIFPL (Gen6ve-Mars 1934) in BDIC/DD/FAR6s. 
206/mars 1934. A rough draft of this declaration is in BDIC/DD/FAR6s. 208/15 and is dated 
February 1934. 
83 Ibid. Cf. Romain Rolland's message to La Volont6 de Paix on much the same theme some 
years previously. Romain Rolland, Ta Volont6 de Paix', Par la Rivolution, la Paix (Paris: Editions 
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1) the capitalist regime is incompatible with real peace, with 
lasting peace. 
2) that fascism is nothing but a manifestation of the self-defence 
mechanism of a capitalism under threat. 84 
She 'knew' that capitalism would disappear - as the regimes which preceded it in turn had 
disappeared - but she knew too, that it would not merely abdicate, but would fight until the 
bitter end. She proclaimed that the hour had come to take sides, to affirm the League's 
position and to work for a 'social transfonnation' (a transparent euphemism for revolution! ) 
which was to be achieved with a 'n-dnimum of suffering'. 8-5 She warned in the rough draft 
that for the league, which considered true peace as its ultimate goal, the fear of a little 
blood spilt today would have as its consequence the future shedding of much more as the 
political situation worsened. 86 She urged her fellow Leaguers to accept the historical 
inevitability of this 'social transformation', to abandon neutrality in internal as well as 
external conflicts and individually and collectively to adopt an objective, realistic 
attitude. 87 
It is interesting to note the differences between the declaration finally adopted at the 
International executive level, and the rough draft written by Duch6ne in February 1934. 
The draft version contains a much fuller analysis of the French reacibn to the rise to power 
in Germany of the Nazi party and the problem that posed for the League. DucMne 
underlined the fact that the League had never ceased to denounce the injustice of the 1919 
peace treaties, to demand equal treatment between victors and vanquished (but only 
through disarmament and not rearmament). The French section did not confound the 
German people with the new German government. Without underestimating the dangers 
posed by the new situation in Germany, - DucMne did not think it impossible to arrive at 
some sort of modus vivendi with Hitler. A treaty of non-aggression would be more than 
possible provided it contained no military clauses and was not directed against any third 
countries. The French section believed 'that its position of principle vis-A-vis Germany 
should not be changed because of the fact of a change in government'. They. also rejected 
categorically 'the idea of a preventive wae or a 'crusade of the democracies against the 
fascist countries', and came out solidly against any thought of a boycott against Germany 
which they considered both dangerous and impossible to effectO Finally, DucMne wrote 
that the French section was convinced that the danger of a war with Germany was neither 
84 Ibid. 
85 Ibid. 
86 See the rough draft of this in BDIC/DD/FARds. 208/15. 
87 'Nclaration adopt6e ... ' 88 See the rough draft of the declaration in BDIC/DD/F, &Rds. 208/15. 
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the principal nor the most immediate danger, and she warned her members not to become 
obsessed with the 'German peril, but to keep everything in proportion. 89 
The removal of the paragraphs relating specifically to the position to be taken with 
regard to the new Germany, and the continued insistence in the final published version on 
the need to support the workers in a potentially violent struggle for historically pre- 
determined power, suggests a preoccupation on the French section! s part not merely with a 
Marxist analysis of contemporary society, but perhaps more important a concentration on 
the domestic political situation in France in 1934. It is possible, one could argue, to see in 
the comparison of these two 1934 documents the beginnings of a political introversion 
within the French section of the League, an introversion which paradoxically was often in 
t1vcoming years to express itself in international terms. The draft version of Duchene's 
declaration is a mi-kture of domestic Marxist analysis and traditional League 
internationalism, whereas the manifesto finally adopted by the International Executive 
Committee is a Marxist political broadsheet and no more. 
Despite the constitutional changes effected at Zurich, sectional peace did not descend 
on the League. In March 1935 at a meeting in London, Kathleen Innes complained that the 
British Section disapproved of 'any party implication in the aims accepted at Zurich' and 
served notice that her section wanted a 'more democratic organisation of the WILPF which 
they would soon be trying to achieve despite the opposition they encountered. 90 The French 
and German sections expressed their astonishment at the British action which they 
believed undermined yet again the basis for concerted international work in the League. At 
this London meeting, Duchene was appointed Treasurer of the League, a position she held 
until the Congress in 1937. The appointment came only after a protracted debate in which 
the English international vice-president, Edith Pye, attacked Duchene's lack of 
commitment to non-violence and said that her appointment as Treasurer would upset the 
delicate political balance amongst the officers of the League. Duchene was finally 
appointed on the understanding that she exercise no political role as Treasurer. 91 
The internecine sniping went on for another two years until at the executive meeting in 
April 1937, Duchene proposed a 'ladies' agreemenV or a 'truce' not to raise constitutional 
question s, 'until the present political crisis is over'. Failing that, she proposed a 'friendly 
divorce' between the two opposing tendencies within the League. Her proposal for a truce 
was narrowly accepted with those dissenting reserving the right to propose constitutional 
amendments at the upcoming IXth International Congress in Czechoslovakia anyway. 92 
89 Ibid. 
9() Minutes, IEC Meeting, London, 25-30 March 1935, p. 16. In BDIC/DD/FARds. 206/1935 mars. 
91 Ibid, pp. 23-25. 
92 Minutes, IEC Meeting, Bruges, 6-10 April 1937, p. 42. In BDIC/DD/FARds. 206/avril 1937. 
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But at that congress DucMne lost the seat she had held for so many years as a member of 
the International Executive and returned to the ranks of the nominally non-voting 
consultative members. 
It is tempting to conclude that no one was happy with the constitutional arrangements 
worked out at Zurich. The British certainly were not and arguably neither were the 
French. Undoubtedly one of the reasons Duch6ne lost her seat in 1937 was the complete lack 
of French delegates there to support her. Unlike 1934 when the French delegation had 
numbered 24 women, in 1937 it consisted only of Duch8ne and the two consultative 
members. 93 This is perhaps an indication of Duch8ne's lack of interest in the work of the 
LIFPL by this time, or perhaps more correctly an example of how the strife-ridden French 
section was no longer the international force it once had been. But that is to take us from the 
general to the particular. The internal debates of the French section will be exan-dned in 
due course, but first it is necessary to look at how the political debate over aims., orientation 
and leadership was translated into concrete political action by the French section in its 
dealings with the larger league in the'era of tyrannies'. 
93 See Roll Call, IXth International Congress, Luhacovice, Czechoslovakia, in BDIC/DD/FAR6s. 
205/9/9 
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111.3. Realism and Politics: the French contribution to 
international action. 
Moving from the level of theory to that of practice, one is struck by the French section's 
commitment to action. Even in the early 1920s before the debates on an active, positive 
pacifism took place, Gabrielle Duch8ne and the French women of the League saw their role 
as feminist pacifists in very active terms. Despite the analysis cited above of Catherine 
Marshall regarding the alleged propensity within the French section for theorising, there 
is no doubting the French commitment to political action. Indeed, by 1936, Duchene was 
'astonished that in such a characteristic case as the situation in Spain there [was] so much 
theoretical discussion! within the rest of the Leagu04 
That said, it is probably true that the nature of the action changed as the twenties 
rolled into the thirties. The French section, and indeed, the League as a whole, in the more 
immediate postwar years was primarily concerned with mediation, revision of the peace 
treaties, practical help to famine-struck areas of Europe, disarmament, and the 
dissen-dnation of ideas of international brotherhood by means of summer schools and the 
like. In the 1930s with the rise of fascism, the deteriorating political and economic 
situation, and arguably, with the gradual politicisation in a Marxist direction of the 
French section's views on peace and pacifism, the calls for action became concrete in a way 
they had not previously been. As examples in the first category, one might note in passing 
Duchýne`s participation in a group of six women delegated by the 1919 Zurich congress of 
the League to present a series of resolutions to the peace conference of the power in Paris. 95 
The LIFPL seemed to make a speciality of this sort of delegation. Another example 
including French participation was a delegation composed of Andr6e Jouve, Catherine 
Marshall, Dr A Jacobs and Gertrud Baer which visited the Dutch, German and French 
governments during the Ruhr crisis in 1923. It is a measure of the esteem in which the 
94 Cited in Minutes, IEC Meetin& Geneva, 10-14 September 1936, p. 18. In BDIC/DD/FAR6s. 
206/1936 septembre. 
9-5 See 'Resolutions to be Presented to the Peace Conference of the Powers in Paris, in 
BDIC/DD/FAR6s. 205/1. The other members of this delegation were Jane Addams (USA), Charlotte 
Despard (Great Britain), Rosa Genoni (Italy), Clara Ragaz (Switzerland), and Chrystal Macmillan 
(Great Britain). 
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League and these women were held that the delegation was received by the German 
Minister of the Interior who told them'in a long and very serious interview the opinion of 
the cabinet that it is the first and most important aim to bring about an agreement between 
France and Germany appoved by the other Allies'. He complained that this idea had been 
urged for several years by the German socialist party but had not been taken up by the 
French government. 96 
Further examples of the French sections activity during the 1920s will be discussed in 
the following chapter which deals specifically with its internal affairs. It is above all 
the 1930s however which demonstrate Duchýne's attempts to force concrete political action 
on the League. Duch8ne and the French became increasingly willing to take sides and to 
choose what they considered to be the moral and political high ground in the political 
conflicts of the thirties. While other sections of the League gradually settled into a sort of 
post-Hitlerian pacifist lethargy, the French section demanded action. Neutrality was 
anathema to them. Politics was the art of choosing, and choices were made within a neo- 
Marxist ideological construct no matter how much Duchýne might talk about arriving at 
purely objective conclusions. Four instances, among others, deserve mention here as an 
indication of the French attitude to political action: first, the Leagues reaction to the Sino- 
Japanese conflict in 1932, secondly the developing Spanish situation, thirdly the official 
league reaction to the remilitarisation of the Rhineland, and finally, the overriding 
concern of the French section in the thirties to support the policies of the Soviet Union. 
At the 1932 League congress in Grenoble, Edith Pye, the English pacifist, presented a 
report on her recent trip to the Orient which was not at all well-received by the French 
section. Pye argued that the League should adopt a position of neutrality in the nascent 
Sino-Japanese conflict and avoid coming out on the side of one country or the other. Thdrýse 
Pottecher, one of the French delegates, argued on the contrary that it was no good tryin& as 
Miss Pye had done, to examine impartially the wrongs committed by both sides. In her 
view, the 'great powers control business'. She did not have Pye's faith in the League of 
Nations, but thought rather that the governments of the day were but faqades for financial 
interests. In her view the boycott of Japan by China was completely justified. 97 Camille 
Drevet echoed Pottecher's calls for concrete action saying that the fact that Miss Cao, the 
Chinese representative to the League, felt it impossible to remain a pacifist in the present 
situation, only served to underline the extent to which the women of the League had failed 
in their mission. Something more than the mere sending of telegrams was needed. She 
proposed a move on the Leagu&s part to stop the shipment of men and munitions to China, 
96 'News letter from Geneva'in BDIC/DD/FAR@s. 206/septembre 1923. 
97 Cited in the debate on the report of the Commission on China, in PrGces-verbal, We Cong-rZs 
International, Grenoble, 15-19 May 1932, pp. 12-15. 
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and to that end suggested talks with trades unions. Uo Wanner of the Lyons section must 
have become quite agitated during this discussion, because Duchene felt obliged to 
apologise for the 'vivacill' of her colleague and to term her temperament not 'violent, but 
'passionate'. Duchene emphasised the feeling of impotence and inactivity felt by the 
members of the French section in this instance. 
If the French temperament shocks some delegates, the 
impassibility of the latter annoys the French. She thought that 
once blood began to run, one could not simply 'wait' before acting. 
She regretted very much that amongst the telegrams read to 
Congress, that of Mme Sun Yat Sen to Romain Rolland had been 
omitted. If Chinese women can no longer be pacifists, that proves 
that we have not yet done the work we should have. People of the 
west are too little interested in the Orient. She proposed the 
adoption of a strong motion against the attitude of Japan and the 
great powers to be sent to the League of NationsY8 
The Grenoble congress did not satisfy the desires of the French section, Duch8ne complained 
after its close that it had been a major disappointment for young people particularly, 
because it had not adopted a radical manifesto. 99 
The Nazi re-militarisation of the Rhineland provided another example of an occasion 
when political action taken by the international vice-presidents, Clara Ragaz and Gertrud 
Baer, was called into question and then condemned by the British section. In a letter of 16 
March 1935 to the President of the Council of the League of Nations, Ragaz and Baer 
demanded that action be taken against Germany if the moral standing of the League were to 
be saved. This action must not be military in nature, but they did envisage the application 
of moral, political and economic pressure collectively applied, and if German troops did not 
leave the Rhineland, the eventual use of economic and financial sanctions. The British 
section argued that the letter conflicted with League policy by leaving the door open for a 
food blockade. It futhermore succumbed to the dangerous temptation of ultimatum which 
had never worked in the past. 100 Significantly once again Duchfte had supported the 
sending of the letter when consulted in early March by telephone. 101 
Far more significant perhaps than the re-militarisation of the Rhineland was the 
French section's consistent support for the policies of Soviet Russia. These date back to the 
n-dd-twenties when there was considerable support within the League as a whole for the 
98 [bid, p. 14. 
99 Procbs-verbal, Comitd ExScutif International, Grenoble, 20-22 May 1932, p. l. In 
BDIC/DD/FAR6s. 206/1932 mal. 
100 'British Section protests against Chairmen's Letter' in BDIC/DD/FAR6s. 206/1936 avril-mai. 
101 See 'First Replies: telegrams, telephone or short notes received from Executive Members 
elected by Congress commenting on the draft letter to Mr. Bruce, sent to them on March 12th 1936'. 
In BDIC/DD/FAR6s. 206/1936 avril-mai. 
246 
disarmament proposals of the Soviet Foreign Minister, Litvinoff. But by the early 1930s 
many sections of the League were beginning to become more hesiVcant and less fulsome in 
their support of the Soviet Union, a tendency certainly not reflected in the policies of the 
French or the German sections. 
This became very clear at the September 1935 meeting of the International Executive 
Committee in Geneva at which Gertrud Baer delivered a long and wide-ranging analysis of 
the political situation in Europe. Baer viewed the signing of the Franco-Soviet and 
Czecho-Soviet pacts as treaties of 'mutual assistance' designed to meet the situation 
created by the formation of 'blocks of countries aggressive and hostile to one another'. 102 
She furthermore believed these pacts to be in harmony with the League of Nations 
covenant because they were 'open for the free and sincere collaboration of all the states 
interested'. 103 Her only veiled criticism was that the two pacts contained no references to 
disarmament, but she thought that this question n-dght be taken up by the LIFPL with the 
countries concerned. That rider notwithstanding Baer concluded that the two pacts could 
serve as 'instruments of collective security [emphasis added] and peace'. 104 Not all of the 
League's Executive accepted this charitable gloss put on the Franco-Soviet Pact. Cor 
Ramondt-Hirschmann, the Dutch executive member and sometime vice-president, believed 
that far from representing a success for peace, the pact was a 'war danger because it enforces 
the military system'. Treaties of non-aggression were one thing, but a pact of mutual 
assistance like that signed between France and the Soviet Union was quite another. 105 This 
criticism was repeated by the normally left-leaning American pacifist, Dorothy Detzer, 
who felt. that the pacts constituted a danger because it was now in the interest of Russia to 
have its allies heavily armed. She thought that this would lead the Soviet Union to ask 
Communists in other countries to support increases of armaments for defence against fascist 
attack, and that thus the united front of Communists and pacifists would be rent asunder. 106 
This was in fact precisely the price that Laval had exacted from Stalin in the signing of 
the pact as American State Department documents for the period show. In return for signing 
the Laval-Stalin pact, Stalin was to call off the French Communist party's 
opportunistically antimilitarist line. 107 




105 Ibid, p. 10. 
106 Ibid, pp. 10-11. 
107 See for example US National Archives, 751.611/76, Ambassador Bullitt to Secretary of State, 
Moscow, 15 May 1935, in which Bullitt reports a conversation he had with Pierre Laval. Laval said that 
Stalin had agreed to tell French Communists to stop opposition to the Army budget and the two-year 
service bill. See also US National Archives, 851.0013/160, 'Strictly Confidential Report of Conversation 
between Mr. Marcel Cachin and Ambassador Bullitt', Moscow, 6 July 1935. Bullitt reported that 'I 
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The extent to which DucMne may or may not have been briefed in the new line to take 
by her Communist friends in the Amsterdam-Pleyel movement is open to question. There is 
no doubt, though, that she argued forcefully for support of the Soviet position. In response 
to the criticisms of Ramondt and Detzer she 
insisted very strongly upon the fact that though pacts of mutual 
assistance were not the ideal solution, they had been the only way 
to prevent an alliance between England, France and Germany 
which would have been a great success for fascism. Since every 
country is invited to join the Franco-Soviet pact, it can become a 
general treaty. The pacts were therefore not directed against 
certain countries. She eýpressed her surprise that pacifists should 
have any objection to this system. 108 
Her further comment that 'the United Front between Communists and pacifists in France 
was stronger than ever (and they had never stopped to stand for general disarmament and 
to oppose all proposals for an increase of armaments), is inaccurate as should be clear. Not 
only was there great dissension within her own section as to the wisdom of the Franco- 
Soviet pact, but within the larger French pacifist movement there were many groups which 
viewed the entire Laval-Stalin exercise with a great deal of suspicion. 
This pro-Soviet policy on the part of the French section was a constant though in its 
dealings with the rest of the League in the 1930s. As will become clear in the next chapter, 
it was a policy hotly contested within the French section. Internationally, however, the 
section managed to portray a face of monolithic support for the Soviet position. 
Coupled with this pro-Soviet stance was a remarkable clear-sightedness on the part of 
the French section with regard to the danger posed by Hitler for which it must surely be 
praised. By March 1935 in a debate within the International Executive Committee on the 
political situation, DucMne was attacking the attitude of 'Great Britain which encourages 
the audacity of Hitler by its politic (sic) of resignation, about which the French population 
is very alarmed'. Running throughout the minutes of this meeting is a continual stream of 
criticism of the British government's position by both the French and German executive 
members. Lida Gustava Heymann and Dr Anita Augspurg both warned their. colleagues of 
Hitler's real designs and asked people to read Mein Kampf if further corroboration were 
asked Mr Cachin what the French Communist Party would do in case France should become 
involved in war with Germany. Mr. Cachin replied that unquestionably the French Communists 
would make no attempt to hinder mobilisation and would march... I asked Mr Cachin if Stalitfs 
statement to Laval, approving French armaments, had not placed the French Communist Party in an 
extremely embarrassing position. Cachin replied that on the contrary, it had made the position of the 
French Communists easier as it was now possible for a Communist in France to be both a good 
communist and a good patriot'. 
108 Minutes, IEC Meeting, Geneva, 12-16 September 1935, p. 11. In BDIC/DD/FARds. 206/1935 
septembre. 
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needed. Heymann spoke of the 'extremely dangerous' situation and said that the 'various 
actions we are taking to tranquilise our own conscience are of no real effect'. What was 
needed was a mass movement of women dedicated to fig hting fascism. DuchLane expressed 
the hope 
that the British Section will not support the attitude of their 
Government towards Hitler. France always was in favour of 
agreements but there are different kinds of agreements. England is 
frightened of -Russia and prefers fascism to communism. But England also fears Hitler and out of this fear delivers itself to him. 
The French government by fear n-dght also come to take the same 
weak attitude ... 
109 
She condemned the conclusions of the British White Paper with regard to the rearmament 
of Britain, but believed fervently however that the LIFPL could not put its head in the sand 
and ignore the fact of Gen-nan rearmament. 
Spain, and the problem of civil war, undoubtedly marked the critical juncture in the 
pacifist debate of the mid-thirties, not only for the LIFPL but also for most other pacifist 
groups as well. The gradual politicisation of the league, and especially of the French and 
German sections, blossomed into full flower in 1936 with the eruption of hostilities south of 
the Pyrenees. As Clara Ragaz, the international vice-chairman said in her opening 
remarks at the International Executive meeting held in Geneva in September 1936, 'let us 
frankly admit it, very often also we find ourselves confronted with situations in which we 
do not yet see our way, where we seek with fumbling and where we recognise the complexity 
of questions which do not permit of simple, or apparently simple solutions. I allude among 
other examples to the civil war in Spain. ' Civil war was the question of the hour and 
Ragaz wondered whether the women of the league would be up to the challenge of finding 
answers to the problem it posed. 110 
Kathleen Innes in a report on the situation in England said that the 'peace societies 
reflect the division of the Government'. There were political societies which had their 
own outlooks and divisions, and there were on the other hand societies which preached 
peace on moral grounds and did not seek to apply their principles to political situations. 
Innes thought that there was a danger in this in that the government might use the latter 
sort of peace society as an excuse for taking no leading part in continental political 
affairs. 111 For once agreeing with something said by Mrs Innes, Madame DucMne in her 
report declared that the 'situation of the pacifist societies (in France) is identical to that of 
109 Minutes, IEC Meeting, London, 25-30 March 1935, pp. 7-10. In BDIC/DD/FAR6s. 206/1935 
mars. 
110 Minutes, IEC Meeting, Geneva, 10-14 September 1936, pp. 1-2. In BDIC/DD/FARds. 
206/1936 septembre. 
111 Ibid., pp. 4-5. 
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England... some pacifists see that some principles must be modified in order to meet the 
immense danger of a near world war, whilst others are sticking to their doctrines'. 112 
The crisis had come to the League in Gertrud Baer's view. In a resumC- of the political 
reports, she concluded that most reports 'reflect that the Liberal element from which our 
League members are mostly drawn is more and more won over to Fascism. The League has 
therefore, as stated in Zurich, a responsibility of showing these elements the real tendency 
of Fascism'. 113 And Spain was the critical case which seemed to have paralysed action 
within the LIFPL. She recounted how she and Ragaz had wanted to issue a statement to 
members and to the press making it clear that the Spanish civil war had been started by 
Franco and not by the Bolsheviks as some press accounts would have it, but they had been 
opposed in this by the third of the international vice-presidents, Con. Ramondt- 
Hirschmann of Holland, who 'did not think it right to say that we could not remain neutral 
in sympathy'. 114 Another opportunity for action had been lost said Baer. The League must 
have a decisive policy which would permit action between executive meetings. She 
concluded 
it cannot be a violation of principles to state our sympathy with 
those who are fighting to maintain the principles we are standing 
for. The outcome of the Spanish war may be fatal for Europe and 
the whole world, if, at the last moment, the democratic forces in 
all countries are not uniting to assist those fighting for democracy. 
She deplored that the message of sympathy drafted at the same 
time of the Azafia Government could not be sent and urges the 
Comn-dttee to agree on a statement expressing that we cannot 
remain neutral in this fight for Peace and Freedom, against 
Fascism. 115 
The ensuing debate revolved around two opposing resolutions, the first a more hardline 
version by Ragaz and Baer, and the second a more conciliatory resolution by Ramondt and 
Pye. At issue was the difference between an 'idealistic pacifism' and a more 'realistic' 
approach to the problem posed by Spain. Some members of the committee thought that the 
Ragaz/Baer resolution was too aggressive and not becoming to a league which had peace as 
one of its goals. The issue essentially was that of peace or freedom. The Ragaz/Baer 
resolution clearly attached blame to the Franco side in the conflict, which led the 
American Lola Maverick Lloyd to wonder aloud whether the League would ever have been 
formed in 1915 if questions of blame and guilt had been allowed. She recalled that the first 
rule then was not to discuss these things, and she urged the members in 1936 to concentrate 
112 Ibid. ', ppS-6. 




instead on what c6uld be done to end the Spanish civil war. Duchene cut through this 
theoretical discussion by demanding action. 'If we remain neutral we become accomplices of 
Fascisrif, she declared. 116 In the end the executive passed a compromise resolution bringing 
the - two'opposing sides together. However a Message to Spanish Women drafted by 
Duchene was rejected on a motion by Kathleen Innes because it was felt to be too partisan, 
not being directed to all Spanish women, but from the context only to Spanish women 
fighting against Franco. 117 
In 1938 Duchene pressed the LIFPL to pass a resolution demanding that the Pyrenees 
frontier with France be opened to the Spanish Republicans, but Ramondt and others spoke 
against it, arguing that 'it may be alright for political parties to ask for it, but as a peace 
organisation we cannot advocate it, because it means opening to arms (sic)'. 118 In the event 
the resolution was not passed. 
The above instances demonstrate the extent to which the debate over the aims and 
orientation of the league was mirrored in the debate over the day to day political action of 
the LIFPL. Once again, it is possible to generalise and say that this debate was largely 
conducted around an Anglo-French axis. With the deepening crisis in Europe, the French 
section under the leadership of Gabrielle Duch8ne became increasingly strident in its 
demand for concrete political action. Whilst laudable in itself, the demand for action 
became a reflection of the policies of the Amsterdam-Pleyel movement and hence of the 
Third International. In a bicephalous league such as the LIFPL, such a soul-searching 
debate was inevitable, confronted as these women were with the unique political situation 
of a Europe rotten to the core. Some sections continued to cling to their immediate post-war 
conception of peace as women's highest calling. The French section did not. Like the 
German section and some others, the French gradually placed more and more emphasis on 
Freedom, and indeed on a Marxist conception of freedom. Only through the 'social 
transformation' would true freedom be attained, and what began to matter more and more 
was the daily struggle to maintain what little freedom they saw around them. In so doing 
the moral, and perhaps feminist, fight for peace became eclipsed. One should not censure 
the French section for all that. In an age of increasing pacifist paralysis the French fought 
back, demanded action, worked for peace and freedom as they conceived it. For that they 
must be lauded. In an age in which women's voice was seldom heard, and even more rarely 
heard gladly, the French section of the LIFPL made a significant contribution to the debate 
on peace. If their conclusions are not ours, if their thoughts seem perimks by the passage of 
116 Ibid., pp. 13-19. 
117 Ibid., pp34-57. 
118 Minutes, IEC Meeting, Geneva, 7-11 September 1938, pp. 69-70. In BDIC/DD/FARds. 
206/1938 septembre. 
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time, we must not condemn them for it. They act. ed in a difficult age and in many ways we 
must say with St Augustine, 'there but for the grace of God go 1'. 
252 
111.4. Inside the French Section. 
- It would be wrong to suppose that the face the French section showed to the rest of the 
League represented the unanimous views of its members. In precisely the same way that the 
League's primary concerns and aims evolved from the twenties to the thirties, so the 
preoccupations and activities of the French section, as well as the theoretical debates 
which determined them, all changed in this period. It is the purpose therefore of the final 
chapter of this section to examine the nature of these changes within the French section. 
As has been noted above, the French section was never one of the LIFPL's largest 
numerically or in terms of its financial influence. It was nevertheless a very significant one 
because of the breadth and variety of its programmes and because of its intellectual 
contribution to the life of the larger league. 
Broadly speaking one can say that the 1920s were marked by two parallel campaigns 
within the French section: that for disarmament and that for peace education. Certainly it 
is true that at the beginning of the interwar period, Gabrielle Duch6ne and the French saw 
their role in much less dramatic and revolutionary terms than was the case in the thirties. 
For example, in her annual report for 1921-22, DucMne noted that 'it is above all the work 
of aid to children in which we have been able to act most effectively'. 119 At this stage, too, 
the section was much more closely allied to pacifisme ancien style in the form of the 
D616gation Permanente des Soc! 6tds Franqaises de ]a Paix, a group which represented the 
dominant strand of pre-war liberal, internationalist pacifism interested in the juridical 
approach to the problem of peace. 120 In 1921 they participated in the IXe Congrýs 
National de la Paix which was held in Paris and one of their members, the feminist 
journalist Sdverine, was asked to close the congress. DucMne also noted that she and 
S6verine were both elected to the D616gation Permanente, a move which constituted in her 
n-dnd a sort of recognition of the importance of the French section within the larger scheme 
of French pacifism. 121 The fact that she placed such value on this recognition is perhaps an 
119 Extraits du Rapport sur I'Action de la Section Franqaise au cours du dernier Exercice (1920- 
1921) adressd au Comitd Central de ]a Ligue. In BDIC/DD/FARds. 208/2. 
120 Cf. Part I above on pacifisme ancien style. 
121 Mentioned in 'Extraits du Rapport ... 1920-1921' in BDIC/DD/FARds. 208/2. 
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indication of the rather conventional, bourgeois starting point from which the French 
section was to evolve under Duch&e's leadership in the years ahead. 
But if the Marxist overtones which were to characterise so much of the Sectionýs 
thinking in the thirties were absent in the immediate post-war period, the integral 
pacifism of Duch8ne was not in question. This is one of the paradoxes of early interwar 
French pacifism. In the immediate postwar period, the divisions and ideological 
differences of later years were not yet apparent. Barbusse, Rolland, Duchýne, Ruyssen, and 
Prudhommeaux: still believed that it was sufficient to desire peace. As has been shown in 
Parts I and II, it was only over the course of the twenties that the question of means began to 
take precedence over that of the end to be obtained. And, in fact, the very notion of the goal 
began to be redefined by the mid-twenties as French pacifism began to define itself 
increasingly in terms of its position on what became integral pacifism. Thus, in the 
immediate postwar period, the LIFPL represented an integral pacifism larvi - hidden 
largely because of the unconsciousness of French pacifism generally of the differences which 
divided it. 
Undoubtedly women did have an important role to play in the immediate postwar 
debates on peace, on the peace, and on how to pull Europe back together again after the 
cataclysm it had suffered. Not much positive action seemed to be forthcon-ting from the 
masculine world of French politics of pacifism; and, as during the days of wartime despair, 
it was the filling of this void which Duchýne saw as the crucial role of the LIFPL. As she 
wrote in 1922: 
The profound trouble of the present situation renders pacifist action 
very difficult whilst at the same time showing the urgent need of 
it. 
The divisions at the centre of the parties set at odds men whose 
goals are very often identical, and shows the necessity for pacifist 
action independent of all partisan questions. This has given birth 
to a current sympathetic to the independent feminist pacifist 
movement. 122 
Here lies the kernel of original, independent, feminist pacifist truth. There was nothing 
blindly idealistic about Duch6ne's 1921 report but in the passage cited above there is the 
recognition of the differences between masculine and feminist approaches to peace. Perhaps 
with the memory of the 1915 founding congress relatively fresh in her mind, Ducheme still 
adhered to Jane Addam s' dictum that that which divided had to be set aside, and that 
which united, emphasised. 
The French section defined its work in 1922 as two-fold: first to exercise some form of 
political action to facilitate understanding between governments. Recognising the minor 
122 Ibid. 
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political part played by French women, the report conceded that 'this action, pursued with 
zeal everywhere women have a political role, reduces itself in France, alas, to a few 
platonic demons trations. 'l 23 Secondly, the French section strove towards a rapprochement 
'of the peoples, giving them the desire and the opportunity to get to know each other better 
and to help each other; to bring together the elite of all nations in a common struggle 
against prejudice, ignorance, injustice and universal violence'. 124 It was especially this 
second part of the Leagues work which the French section considered most fecund from its 
own perspective. In 1921-22 it had contributed to the 'work of human solidarity par 
excellence' which was the aid to infants stricken by famine and privation in other European 
nations. 'In particular the French section contributed 10.000 Francs to the relief of children 
in Russia through the Union International de'Secours aux Enfants' in Geneva. 125 
In this same year the French were also active in the pedagogy of peace. Andr6e Jouve 
and Madeleine Rolland spoke at the Summer School organised by the English section in 
Salzburg in 1921 at which some 300 students took part. Members of the French section also 
participated in summer schools organised in the English Lake District, at Bremen, and also 
-at Burg-Lauenstein. Not to be outdone, the French in conjunction with the Italian section 
held a surnmer school of their own in 1922 at Varese in Italy. 126 
Andr6e Jouve was also the Leagues representative to the Comit6 d'entente des Grandes; 
Associations de coop6ration intellectuelle, with Camille Drevet as her substitute127 from 
1927 onwards. In that year the French section also organised a summer school directed by 
Fdlicien Challaye at which Dr Schweitzer was one of the lecturers. The school dealt with 
the questhn of relations between the races. 128 
In a report on Summer Schools delivered to the international executive committee in 
Lille in April 1931, Andr6e Jouve tried to outline her philosophy for those for which she 
had been responsible. The underlying principle seemed to be one of openness. The League 
had no desire to preach only to the converted, and accordingly looked for 'young people 
whom we hope to win for our ideas, through presentation of the facts themselves and clear 




127 See Minutes, IEC Meeting, 13 September 1927, afternoon session, p. 2. In BDIC/DD/FARds. 
206/septembre 1927. For further information on the peace education movement during the interwar 
period, see Elly Hermon, 'Approches conceptuelles de 1'6ducation en vue de la compr6hension 
internationale dans 1'entre-deux-guerres' Canadian and International Education 15,2(1986), pp. 29-52. 
See also Elly Hermon, 'The Rise of the International Peace Education Movement: Some Historical 
Considerations', paper read at the American-European Consultation on Peace Research in History, 
Stadtschlaining, Austria, 24-29 August 1986; to be published in Charles Chatfield and Peter van den 
Dungen, eds, Peace Movemenfs and Political Cultures (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, in 
press). 
128 Ibid. (Minutes). 
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reasoning'. 129 In Jouve's philosophy of education it was 'best to guard against direct and 
dogmatic preaching of our doctrine, as that is a sure method of turning active and original 
minds away from us,. 130 The method seemed to produce results because a French section 
summer school held at RibeauviII6 in Alsace in 1930 dealing with the question of the 
Alsatian separatist movement resulted in the creation of League sections at Colmar and 
RibeauviII6.131 
The section was also very active in the campaign for universal disarmament. Its efforts 
in this area were largely organised by Camille Drevet who, long after disarmament had 
ceased to be a popular pacifist issue in the mid- to late-thirties, was still campaigning for 
it both within and without the League. The French section never attained the vast numbers 
of signatures on its petitions for disarmament that some of the other'sections were able to 
achieve, but the campaigns did find a certain resonance within France. In the early thirties 
many French cities could boast a local peace cartel, one of whose goals would have been 
disarmament. The disarmament interest probably reached its apogee in 1932 at the time of 
the Geneva Disarmament Conference. The Grenoble Peace Cartel, for example, sent 21,918 
signatures in favour of universal disamament to DucMne in February of that year. 132 
The French Section seemed to change its mind in the space of only five years on the 
efficacy of the Lord Robert Cecil/Pierre Cot initiatives for peace. In 1931, at the time of 
their campaign for disarmament, Camille Drevet thought that the whole exercise had 
been taken over by the French politicians involved, especially Herriot and de Jouvenel. In 
her view, nothing much would come of such a conference so obviously under the thumb of the 
French government. 133 These criticisms were similar to those voiced by Victor M6ric at the 
time. 134 Only five years later, however, the French section had joined what were 
essentially the policies of collaboration between the tenants of Soviet-inspired pact 
politics and the exponents of a more traditional form of bourgeois collective security. 
It is important to note the degree to which the leading women of the French section 
were linked to other pacifist groups. Uo Wanner represented the LIFPL at the 1931 War 
Resisters' International congress in Lyon. Camille Drevet was involved with the 
Ra ssembýhient International contre la Guerre et le Militarisme in the late 1930s. Gabrielle 
129 Andr6e jouve, 'Summer Schools', report prepared for the IEC Meeting at Lille, 8-13 April, 
1931. In BDIC/DD/FARds. 206/avril 1931. 
130 Ibid. 
131 Procýs-verbal, Comitd Ex6cutif International, Amsterdam et Loenen, 11-15 October 1930. 
Mornin y session, 11 October, p. l. In BDIC/DD/FAR&. 206/octobre 1930. 
13 La Secr6taire du Comit6 de Ddsarmement, Secr6taire Adjointe au 'Cartel de la Pabe, to 
Duch6ne, Grenoble, 5 February 1932, in BDIC/DD/FAR6s. 208/24. 
133 See Drevet's comments on the'Disarmament Conference at Paris initiated by Lord Cecil'in 
Minutes, IEC Meeting, Geneva, 4-8 September 1931, p. 25. In BDIC/DD/FARds. 206/septernbre 1931. 
134 For Mdric's negative comments on the Cecil/Cot/de jouvenel initiative, see V. Mdric, 'La 
Bataille du Trocaddro', PH, new series no. 3 (7-22 December 1931), p. 2. 
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Duch6ne was involved in literally everything: the RUP, the Cornit6 d'Entente des Grandes 
Associations Internationales, the Amsterdam-Pleyel movement and its subsidiary 
movement the Comitd Mondial des Fernmes contre la Guerre et le Fascisme. Marcelle Capy 
who had been closely involved with the French section during the 1920s went on in the 
thirties to become a leading light within the Ligue Internationale des Combattants de ]a 
Paix and finally its president. Madeleine Vernet was closely allied to Duch6ne and the 
LIFPL for a time, but then founded her own pacifist group, La Volont6 de Paix, in 1928. She 
maintained close contacts however with Jeanne Challaye, and together with Jeanne 
Alexandre, they became the integral pacifist thorns in the French section's side in the late 
thirties. Rudolf Leonhard, the exiled German pacifist, propagandised both for the LICP 
and the LIFPL. And the list goes on. 
One of t he French sectiorfs more novel methods of propagandising its views in the late 
1920s was the use of the French general election campaign. Token candidates were fielded 
in the 1928 general election campaign, a ploy which gave them access to the ubiquitous 
French election billboards as well as the right to have their 'candidates' speak at election 
rallies. 135 The campaign was centred in Paris where eight candidates ran in eight electoral 
districts. One of them was General Alexandre Percin136 who had experienced a Road-to- 
Damascus pacifist conversion ýi couple of years before his death and was only too willing to 
repent of his evil ways by helping the women of the LIFPL in their pacifist campaign. The 
eight quartiers were chosen with care as being the most likely to bear fruit for the cause of 
peace. Tracts, posters and speeches at rallies were all used to put the pacifist message 
across. Teams of women, journalists for the most part, were deployed to distribute the tracts 
and to speak whenever the occasion presented itself. Marcelle Capy was often greeted with 
enthusiasm in the meetings in which she spoke. Jouve's comments on the extent to which 
the League's peace ideas were taken over by other political groups is worth citing: 
It is interesting to note, I believe, that almost the whole electoral 
campaign was conducted around the idea of Peace: internal peace, 
external peace. It was in camouflaging themselves and in 
supporting this programme that the majority of the candidates, 
even those of the Union Nationale, were able to win their votes. 
It is also to be noted that for their own electoral campaign the 
feminist groups borrowed a part of our programme. It was with 
these arguments, often developed by the women who normally 
oppose us: 'give the vote to women, women's vote guarantees Peace, 
all women are against war', that their propaganda was made. 137 
13-5 Andr6e Jouve, 'Rapport sur I'activitd de la Section Franýaise relative aux actions ddcid6es 
par le dernier Comitd Extcutif, September 1928. In BDIC/DD/FAR6s. 206/septembre 1928. 
136 See Gdn6ral Alexandre Percin, Le dofsarmement moral (Paris: Delpeuch, 1925); Gengral 
Alexandre Percin, Guerre it la Guerre (Paris: Editions Montaigne, 1927). See also James Friguglietti, 
'Alexandre Percin' in Josephson, et al, Biographical Dictionary of Modern Peace Leaders, pp. 740-742. 
137 Ibid. (Rapport) 
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It is not our purpose here to exan-dne t. his aspect of French political society, but it would 
seem possible to suggest that in the 1920s the mainstream of French politics saw fit to paint 
itself with the pacifist veneer, a veneer which had little to do with the genuine and 
radical pacifism of groups such as the LIFPL. 
The question of the numerical size of the French section has already been dealt with in 
a preceding chapter of this section, but it would be useful to consider here the extent to 
which the section grew from the twenties to the thirties. During the 1920s the French 
section listed its membership officially as around 500 women. By 1935 this was claimed to 
be somewhere in the neighbourhood of 4500 members, although the fourteen sections voting 
at the 1936 French Annual General Meeting had a maximum total membership of only 1700 
women. 138 Examining the problem from the grassroots level one can easily conclude that 
the section experienced substantial growth from about the late-twenties to the mid- 
thirties, but it is almost impossible to arrive at aggregate figures because the extant records 
simply do not support such an analysis. 
That notwithstanding some insight can be gained into the size and distribution of the 
membership of the French section from the occasional comments and figures which exist in 
the corr 
* 
espondence between the various groups and the secretariat in Paris. Wihout doubt 
the Paris and Lyon sections were the largest numerically, which makes the purge of the 
Lyon section in 1934-5 all the more strange. 139 In 1936 the Lyon section still numbered some 
300 members, but Paris was larger with 421 members, and perhaps another 200 at most in the 
suburbs. At the 1936 Annual General meeting the following groups were present or 
represented although only fourteen of the sixteen are listed as having voted: Dr6me- 
Ardkhe, Le Havre, Rouen, Arles, Lyon, La Rochelle, Chalon s/Sa8ne, Dijon, Chamb6ry, 
Nimes, Roubaix, Troyes, Seine, Seine et Marne, Seine et Oise, Paris. The reason for the 
apparent irregularity in the voting procedure was that the meeting decided not to permit 
voting by proxy. To the above list was added the Montpellier section which voted, but 
subtracted from it were the Chamb6zy, Le Havre and Nimes sections which did not vote. In 
total, then, at the 1936 annual meeting some seventeen groups were represented if not an 
actually voting. 140 
Other indicators give some credence to Duchýne`s 1935 claim of 4500 members for the 
French section. Early numbers of SOS, the organ of the French section from 1930-34, had a 
138 See the discussion of membership figures in Part 111.2. of this thesis. 
139 For the membership figures in 1936, see Proc6s-verbal de la Conf6rence Nationale de la 
Section Franqaise de Ia LIFPL, 27-28 June 1936, p. 6 in BDIC/DD/FAR6s. 208/17. The purge of the 
Lyon section is discussed more fully later in this chapter. 
140 Ibid., pp. 1 and 6. 
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print run which varied from 2050 to 3000 in 1930 and 1931.141 Unfortunately further figures 
for subsequent years do not exist. Not all French secoon members received SOS or its 
successor EnVigie however. In 1931-32 for example the Grenoble section reported a total of 
156 members only 49 of whom took SOS. 142 This figure for Grenoble shows considerable 
growth in the period since 1926 when the group seems to have been formed. In 1928 it had 
numbered only 27 membersj43 
The Auxerre group was another one which seemed to show remarkable growth in the 
early 30s only to die out in 1934. It included members outside the town itself and further 
afield in the department of the Yonne. In 1930 the group listed 73 members, half of them 
'active', the remainder merely adhirent. In a list of members' occupations, one finds six 
institutrices, one woman school principal, a grammar school teacher (professeur), one 
hairdresser, a woman farmer, a lawyer, and a voyageur. Jean-Michel Renaitour, the mayor 
of Auxerre and the local deputy was also a memberj44 Another undated list gave ninety- 
nine members in the department. A list for the year 1931-32 gives some 150 members, and in 
1933 the group claimed 220 active members and 70 membres adh&ents. The group foundered 
in 1934 on the same issues which provoked so much dissension within the French section, 
and which will be discussed here shortly. 145 
The Le Havre group had some 55 members in 1934 but in late 1935 it became moribund 
due to pressures on the time of its local secretary, Mme NoO. A meeting held in January 
1936 to revivify the group produced a turnout of only 8 of the 70 members still on the group's 
books. 146 
The Abbdville group reported thirty-five members by 19 November 1932. The Caen 
group had 21 members in 1933,27 in 1934 (of whom several were primary school teachers, six 
were telephonists and one was a parfumeuse), 35 members in February 1934, and 45 members 
in March of that year. By 1937 the Caen group had forty-four members,, five having 
resigned that year. The membership list for this year seems to be the only one extant which 
provides some clues as to the origins of the women in a small provincial group. Of the forty- 
four women in the Caen group, only eight were unmarried. Not all of the names listed 
provide information as to occupation, political affiliation or religious belief, but he 
majority do. The group contained two primary school teachers, one commerCante, one 
ý 
141 BDIC/DD/FARks. 208/11 contains bills for SOS Nos 4 and 5 from the Association 
Typographique Lyonnaise. 
142 A membership list c. 1931-32 gives these figures in BDIC/DD/FARds. 208/24. 
143 In BDIC/D/FARds. 208/24 (report c. 1931-32). 
144 Membership list, 1930, for the department of the Yonne, in BDIC/DD/FAR&. 208/21. 
145 The undated list and the lists for 1931-32 and 1933 are to be found in BDIC/D/FARds. 208/21. 
See also DuchZne to Groupe d'Auxerre, 26 December 1934 in ibid. 
146 See 1934 report on the Group's activity in EDIC/DD/F, &Rds. 208/24. See also the letter of 
Mme. Noal to Duch6ne, 25 January 1936, in ibid. 
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telephonist, the director of the local Catholic newspaper, L'Eveil Normand, one 
landowner, one restaurant owner, and five women who worked for the Post Office. In terms 
of political affiliation, three women belonged to the Marc Sangnier movement, one was the 
secretary of the local Socialist party, one was Communist, and eight others were listed as 
gauche or tr& gauche. The commerqanfe belonged to the Communist party and was also the 
Treasurer for the local RUP. 'Me landowner had the additional failings of being bourgeois 
and Catholic but her saving grace was that she had two sons who were nette? nent paciflste. 
There was one war widow who was described as a 'good pacifist'. Another woman was 
'very afraid of war', while still another 'was afraid of her husband'. Mme Lenormand 
cynically observed that four women had joined the LIFPL 'in order to please me', while a 
further ten names carried no annotation or were simply described as 'insignificant'. Four of 
the women had been drawn to the LIFPL through the newspaper articles written by Mme 
Lenormand. 147 This very schematic overview provides the only insight into the origins and 
orientations of the membership of a small provincial group of the French section. 
The Cannes section was constituted in the spring of 1931 and seems to have had around 
forty members in 1933-34. By 1938 it had sunk slightly to 36 members. The Chartres section 
showed a membership of 35 in a report dated 22 April 1931; another undated (perhaps 
later) membership list gives 120 members. The Chamb6ry group which was founded in 1931 
had nineteen members by November of that year, once again several of them were primary 
and secondary school teachers. The predominance of the teaching profession in the 
provincial groups is strong. The Bordeaux group, too, was composed largely of secondary 
school teachers with a large minority of institutrices. 148 The composite view then is one of 
groups gradually increasing in size in the early thirties with some fall-off in the mid- to 
late-thirties. The teaching - element was strong in some of the groups while others 
displayed a more heterogeneous mixture of women from different social classes. In making 
the above comments one is very much aware of the lack of proper data on which to base a 
substantive analysis. 
With regard to the activity of these local sections, diversity across the length and 
breadth of France is again the key. Some groups were much more radical and left-wing in 
their orientation than others. Some were primarily middle-class in their outlook. Others 
viewed pacifism in a primarily moral, rather than political, light. Many local groups 
belonged to peace cartels in their cities or towns. Others had links with Marc Sangnier's 
147 See'Adhdrentes de la LlFPL - Caen' in BDIC/DD/FAR6s. 208/22. The date of this list must 
be 1937 - it is referred to by Jeanne Lenormand, the Caen group secretary, in her letter of 25 January 
1939 to Duch6ne (also in FARds. 208/20) in which she mentions having drawn up such a list giving 
comments on the group's members two years previously when she had resigned her office. 
148 See material on the Abbdville and Bordeaux g-roups in BDIC/DD/FARds. 208/21. Material 
on the Caen group is in FAR6s/22, and material on the Cannes, Chartres and Chamb6ry g-roups is in 
FAR& 208/23. 
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Jeune R6publique, while still others had close contact with local sections of the Ligue 
Internationale des Combattants de la Paix. 
A common problem for the peace women of the French section in the thirties was the 
attitude of right-wing elements of the population to their campaigns for peace. Not only 
internationally, but within France as well, the LIFPL became quite incorrectly associated in 
some minds with the Communist party. This attracted the attention of the Camelots du Roi 
and other right-wing n-dlitarist groups as much as did the League's pacifism. From about 
1930 onwards one begins to see references in the correspondence of the French section to the 
problems posed for peace women by the intimidation of these groups. Writing to Duchýne in 
the early thirties, Mme L Daudin of the Bordeaux group underlined two problems her 
section had faced in its campaign for the petition in favour of disarmament. First, the 
attitude of a large number of women revolted her, with their haughty, indifferent and 
egotistical 'that-doesn't-interest-me' point of view. She added that it was hardly 
necessary to mention the second form of aggravation which consisted in the 'daily incidents' 
provoked around the group's stand at the local fair by the Camelots, du Roi. 149 The Auxerre 
group experienced similar difficulties in May 1933 at the local fair at which the LIFPL had 
a stand, manned by three of the group's women. The women were subjected to a diatribe by a 
passing officer, one Commandant Krazinski, who accused them of being in the pay of 
Germany. Apparently, similar incidents had occurred two years previously. The Auxerre 
women were not prepared to stand for this nonsense however. They sent a report to the 
president of the local section of the Ligue des Droits de I'Homme demanding redress. 'It is 
inadn-dssibl&, the report read, 'in a country in which one is after all still free, that an 
officer in uniform should come and accuse women who are campaigning for peace, of being 
sold to Germany'. . 
The incident only served to attract a sympathetic crowd and the 
supportive comments of the local Socialist newspaper, the Rýveil de l'Yonne. 150 
These are but two instances recorded in French section correspondence of intin-ddation on 
the part of right-wing elements. The LlFPL certainly never had to deal with this sort of 
attack to anywhere near the same extent as the Ligue Internationale des Combattants de la 
Paix as we have seen in the preceding section. However, it was intin-ddation such as this 
coupled with the French domestic political situation during the late twenties and thirties 
which undoubtedly fuelled DuchLane's tendency to see fascism lurking under every bed. As 
149 Mme L. Daudin to Duchine, Bordeaux, undated (dated 30 June and from context early 
thirties), in BDIC/DD/FAR6s. 208/21. 
1-50 Rapport A Monsieur le Pr6sident de la Fdddration de l'Yonne de la Ligue des Droits de 
I'Homme et du Citoyen par A. Pelcot, Pr6sidente du Groupe d'Auxerre de la LIFPL. Auxerre, 26 May 
1933. In BDIC/DD/FARds. 208/21. See also'Paix et Ddsarmement: Glorieux exploit d'un GalonnV, 
undated clipping from the Riveil di I'Yonne in BDIC/DD/FARds. 208/21. See also the text of the 
nationalist poster attacking the LIFPL which appeared on the walls of Auxerre during the Fair. It was 
printed in a local print sbdp whose manager was the Abb6 Oudin. Contained in BDIC/DD/FARds. 
208/21. 
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early as 1930 she told the International Executive Committee of the League that 'the police 
reign in France and there is a very clear tendency towards fasciým`. 1-51 There was also 
opposition to the LIFPL at the official level. In order to be able to hold a public meeting at 
the League's 1932 International Congress in Grenoble, Duchýne had been obliged to ask the 
mayor of Grenoble to preside. It was only by cloaking themselves in the protection of the 
mayoral mantle that the League could avoid the interdiction of the meeting by the Prefect 
who was opposed to pacifist ideas. 152 
The intimidation felt by members of the French section led some of them to ask whether 
they should be setting up some sort of self-protection corps for League events. Madame 
Perrin of the Besanýon group proposed at the 1933 annual general meeting the creation of 
'anti-fascist phalanxes' to protect meetings, and wondered if the League had the right to 
organise such self-defence organisations. Perhaps indicating yet again the differences in 
outlook between the French section and the rest of the Legue, Madame Duchýne responded 
that on the national level such a plan was possible, but that 'on the international level we 
could not do it because we would expose ourselves to criticisms and others n-dght say that our 
method of action was a form of violence. 153 This is a rather benign example of the way in 
which the rhetoric of violence insinuated itself into a pacifist group. In the LICP this 
tendency took on starker proportions with the creation of the so-called Jeune Garde 
pacifiste to protect LICP meetings from the ministrations of right-wing thugs. As the 
political fabric of the Third Republic continued to decay under the onslaught of competing 
antidemocratic forces (from both left and right) even the politics of marginality, the 
politics of dissent, were affected. 
The events of February 1934 produced another paroxysm of paranoia in Duchýne. She 
wrote in a circular sent out to the French groups that 'we have barely escaped a coup 
d'Etat'. 154 The fear did not dissipate. In her next circular she spoke of the preparations 
then in progress for the Rassemblement Mondial des Fernmes, contre la Guerre et I&Ascisme 
to be held in the summer of 1934, and saw the great danger of the hour coming from the 
threat of a fascist coup: 
Every day incidents and reactionary, arbitrary measures remind us 
of the efforts made to implant fascism in France. The decree-laws, 
too easily accepted, are a step towards such a regime. The successes 
151 See Duch6ne's comments in Proc6s-verbal de la rdunion du Comitd Ex6cutif International, 
Geneva, 23-26 April 1930, p. 3. In BDIC/DD/FAR6s. 206/avril 1930. 
152 See Duch6ne's comments in Procýs-verbal de la r6union du Comitd E)&cutif International 
Grenoble, 11-14 May 1932, p. 3. IN BDIC/DD/FAR6s. 206/mai 1932. 
153 Procbs-verbal de I'Assembl4e Gdndrale de la Section Franqaise, 1933, p. 5, in 
BDIC/DD/FAR6s. 208/14. 
154 'Circulaire no. 10 de la Section Franqais4e, p. 2. In BDIC/DD/FARds. 208/15. Undated (early 
1934 from context). 
262 
we have had so far must not make us forget that the 'party truce' 
serves above all to leave the fascists time to organise, to arm 
themselves even more, and'that we remain under the threat of a 
new attempted coup d'Etat. 155 
The constantly changing international and domestic political situation demanded the 
re-thinking of the shibbdeths cherished by French pacifists. Some women such as Uo 
Wanner jumped on the ideological bandwagon and proclaimed that the place of women was 
on the side of the dictatorship of the proletariat where true feminist, pacifist freedom was 
to be found. 1-56 A more measured analysis of the political situation came from Andr6e Jouve 
in a report prepared for the 1933 annual general meeting of the French section. In it she 
exan-dned three key political terms which were greatly misunderstood and abused: 
revolution, fascism and class struggle. She underlined the falsity of the position taken 
publicly by the parties of the left that fascism and Nazism were the 'last desperate 
attempts of capitalism to prevent its fall', and showed how in fact the Hitler and 
Mussolini regimes were supported by waves of popular support, at least at the outset. If 
Marxism was the main enemy of fascism it was precisely because it was internationalist, as 
opposed to nationalist. She rejected, too, the facile descriptions of class warfare which 
were the province of popular Marxism. She declared that 'bourgeois' and 'capitalisf were 
not synonymous. 
Without distinguishing, and with this habit of putting everything 
into the same bag for the sake of the cause, our theoreticians and 
propagandists do the greatest harm to the idea of a veritable 
revolution and economic reorganisation. We who are of no party 
within the League, must watch that this confusion does not 
contan-dnate us. Thus, as I have already pointed out, the fascist 
movement is in no way concerned with the divisions of class, and it 
is not on this ground that we can combat a movement of unity based 
on the mystique of race and of the nation and pursuing ends in the 
economic realm which are very close to those of the Marxists. 157 
The error was in trying to delin-dt the boundaries of these so-called opposing classes in a 
nation like France. At what point, she asked, did the bourgeois and the proletarian 
exchange places at the barricade? Was it a question of money or of esprii ? She noted that 
it was supposedly the bourgeoisie which created capitalist wars, but from which social 
class, she asked, did most conscientious objectors come from? It was a mistake in Jouve's eyes 
to try to limit the great pacifist experiment to any one class. Not all of the proletariat was 
155 'Circulaire no. 11 de la Section Franqaise, (May 1934), p. 3. In BDIC/DD/FAR6s. 208/15. 
1-" '6 See for example Ldo Wanner, 'La Femme et les Dictatures', SOS no. 16 (56me ann6e), 1934, 
pp. 1-2. 
157 See Jouve's report, 'Devons nous rdviser quelques unes de nos id6es? ' attached to the 
Procýs-verbal de I'Assembl6e Gdndrale de la Section Franqaise, 1933, in BDIC/DD/FAR6s. 208/14. 
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pacifist by any means despite theclaims of Marxist orthodoxy. She had equally measured 
comments about the word 'revolution! which had become a word without meaning in the 
political market place. She made it clear that she detested revolutionary injustice and 
repression in Russia as much as in Italy or Germany. The LIFPL was a league for freedom, 
Jouve emphasised, but it was also for peace; and it was here that she thought the members 
of the League would have to revise their ideas. The League's belief that causes of modern 
war were almost uniquely econon-dc was true from several points of view, but it did not take 
sufficient note of the impact of ideas on men's actions. In her view the economic crisis the 
western world was traversing could have led to either more internationalism or to the 
exacerbated nationalism it did produce. The reasons for the present unhappy political 
reality were. to be found in 'national defeat, the humiliation of the treaties, the vindictive 
obstinacy of the allied policy which oriented the opposition in this direction!. All of this 
had produced the predictable result of a profound nationalist revival. For convinced 
pacifists and internationalists the crisis reduced itself in Jouve's view to an intellectual one: 
It seems that the international idea, still lacking in mystique and 
traditions is not meaty enough, not rough enough, not heated 
enough to inspire and raise up the masses which abstract ideas and 
... reason itself do not raise up ...... A new mystique of peace must be bom without which we will not be 
able to hasten its advent other than by our own personal faith. But 
I hope that it will be neither so blind, nor so demoniacal, nor so 
lacking in reason and good sense as the nationalist mystique. 158 
This measured and thoughtful tone was not always the norm of the political discussions 
within the French section. Lko Wanner of Lyon was a particularly hardline representative 
of the extreme left-wing orthodoxies within the League which Jouve had argued against in 
her paper. As we have seen already at the international level, the French section 
presented a more left-wing face than did most other sections. With regard to t he increasing 
duality of the League's purpose - peace and freedom - and the difficulty from the early 
thirties onwards of reconciling these two ideas, Gabrielle Duch8ne prepared an important 
position paper for the 1936 French section annual general meeting onTes Deux conceptions 
du Pacifisme. It mapped out her approach to peace for the remainder of the decade. The 
paper had its origins in her sad observation that at the moment when unity was most 
needed, pacifists were most divided. She did not believe that pacifists were at odds over 
the goals to be pursued, but only in tactics, and she. wrote that 'the gravity of the situation 
imposes a tactic of unity which is as all-embracing as possible - with all of the sacrifices 
158 Ibid. 
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which this brings'. 159 In her view the defenders of the peace could be classified into two 
distinct categories: 'the pacifists who claimed to be intigraux, that is to say who wish to 
have recourse only to means which are absolutely pacifist and the realists who do not 
accept the questioning of the 'Absoluteness' of their desire for peace, but who see the facts 
as they are and take account of them, in their choice of means for the action to pursue'. 160 
The best of the former, she wrote, were doctrinaire and dogmatic, and erected systems of 
values and action. which they expected the real world to conform to. They were the 
practitioners of a new religion, with all of the mysticism, fanaticism, and exclusivity that 
the word religion implies. She criticised their indulgence towards Hitler who was both 
the enemy of peace and of freedom. Perhaps indicating the extent to which the sterile 
Stalinist debates of the mid-thirties had made inroads into Duch8ne's thinking, she stated 
in a strange paragraph of her report that the 'pacifiste idjologues' were strange 
bedfellows of the Trotskyists who wanted a permanent revolution. Her claim that both of 
these groups could be found on the same side of the barricades is a perplexing one. 161 The 
pacifist realists had grouped together with other people from many walks of life in the 
-Rassemblement Universel de la Paix. Not all its members were pacifists - that much was 
certain - but Duch8ne asked whether anyone had the right to search hearts and establish a 
hierarchy of pacifist values. The realists 
4e 
ready to do business with anybody, and in so 
doing to neutralise adversaries, and hopefully bring groups and individuals into the fight 
against war, whether from personal interest or out of idealism. The integral pacifists, on 
the other hand, denounced the RUP in Le Barrage, and in preparing a congress of integral 
pacifists comn-dtted the original sin of creating division. 162 
All of the above is interesting in view of Duch8ne7s insistence in the twenties, as we 
have seen above, on principles. Means became blurred with ends in her mind somewhere 
along the road in the thirties. In her desire to support the Soviet Union, she, along with 
large swaths of French pacifism, allowed her previously principled pacifist action to 
become enmeshed in the concepts of collective security. This collective security was 
p reached with equal vociferousness by both bourgeois, traditional statesmen and the 
denizens of a rightfully worried and still somewhat politically isolated Soviet Union. In 
many respects her analysis of the European political situation remained astute. In her 
evolution from absolute pacifism to pseudo-pacifism, one should not see a lessening of her 
desire for peace at all. But it is one of the arguments of this thesis that for many French 
pacifists the political nature of their pacifist experience was all important. What began in 
159 See Duch6ne, 'Les deux conceptions du Pacifisme'. Paper read at the Assembl6e Gdndrale 





the Great War and the twenties as an absolute revolt against the militarism of French 
society has many echoes across a whole spectrum of European pacifist feeling. In the early 
years of the interwar period, a political pacifist like Duchýne (and indeed many other 
French pacifists) could mistakenly assume that her convictions sprang from the same source 
as the more ethically, if not religiously, inspired British pacifism. But by the thirties this 
unconscious assumption was no longer tenable. The nature of French pacifism was by and 
large very different from that of the British experience, and by the n-dd-thirties this had 
become clear in the rapidly widening rifts between the tenants of the various French 
pacifisms. Arguably it was only some Christian pacifists and those in secular groups like 
the Ligue International des Combattants de la Paix in France who remained true to the 
purity of their pacifist principles. In so doing they divorced themselves from political 
society, no matter how much they might protest the contrary, and 'defined a faith', to 
borrow Martin Ceadel's phrase. Not everyone who says, 'Lord, Lord, ' shall enter the 
kingdom of heaven. 
By about the beginning of the thirties, the French section had begun to be put on the 
defensive at the international level of the league, especially following the Amsterdam 
Congress against Imperialist War in 1932. The same phenomenon can be seen at the national 
level within France, where the evolution of Duchýne and the leaders of the French section 
away from an absolute pacifism produced a revolt in the ranks. This was in large part due 
to the close identification of the official level of the French section with the World 
Conu-nittee against Fascism and War - or the Amsterdam-Pleyel movement as it was more 
popularly known - in the post-1932 period. 
On a theoretical level the issues at stake within the French section were non-violence 
and civil war; but in practical terms they were often expressed in terms relating either to 
the Amsterdam movement or the policies of support for Soviet Russia. 
Gabrielle DucMne was an important member of the World Committee against Fascism 
and War. She worked closely with Barbusse and Rolland, and indeed became the instigator 
and president of the off-shoot organisation, the Women's World Committee against 
Fascism and War. As the chapter dealing with the French section's international role has 
shown, the politicisation of the question of peace proved unacceptable for many national 
sections and the same was true within the French context. The Communist influence on the 
pacifist debate in France was thus extremely important. Gabrielle DuchL%ne returned from 
the Amsterdam Congress convinced that an -important step 
had been taken in the fight 
against war. She wrote in SOS of the unanimity which characterised the congress and of 
the efforts made by all of the speakers to put aside inflanu-natory'rhetoric and emphasise 
only that which united them all. This was due to 'the absolute desire of the organisers of 
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the congress to keep it above all of the parties'. 163 Her only , and somewhat veiled, 
criticism was that the final Manifesto passed by the Congress had been drawn up in too 
much haste and passed without discussion by the delegates. She and other members of the 
preparatory conu-nission had made their feelings known to Barbusse but he had gone ahead 
and drafted the document as he saw fit anyway. Romain Rolland condemned it for its 
negative view of conscientious objectors and Gandhian pacifism. 164 DuchMe concluded by 
emphasising that in the work ahead a great deal of mutual respect, tolerance and goodwill 
would be necessary. Unilateralism had to be avoided, as did discussions of doctrine in order 
to arrive at the primary goal which was positive, practical action against war. 165 
But it was precisely this openness which seemed to be lacking almost immediately as a 
hierarchy of neo-Marxist, neo-pacifist values became implanted in the thinking and 
political discourse of Duchfte and her colleagues within the Amsterdam movement. The 
new approach to peace was accepted with great difficulty, if at all, by many groups of the 
French section. On the question of adherence of local LIFPL groups to the Amsterdam 
committees which were supposed to be forming across France, DuchL%ne wrote in October 1932 
to the Grenoble group that it was possible to abstain from these, but only if this was done 
without any public displays of hostility. What, however, is more interesting is her 
comment in a letter to Grenoble that 'no one can refuse to fight against imperialist war, but 
if one wishes to fight against other wars that is a question of conscience,. 166 In that short 
statement can be sununarised the problem for the next three or four years for the French 
section since some local groups continued to cling to the integral pacifist positions which 
Duchýne condemned in 1936. 
Good will and toleration seemed to be lacking as local Amsterdam-Pleyel committees 
were formed across France. Supposedly coming together in a struggle for the higher cause of 
peace, local groups found themselves rent by the same bitter political divisions as those of 
French political society in the latter years of the Third Republic. Because the Amsterdam 
Congress had been against imperialist war, it was impossible to separate political doctrine 
and ideology from the problem of peace, for all the good will in the world. As one British 
pacifist present in Amsterdam remarked, 'Lord, how the word "pacifism" stinks in the 
nostrils of most delegates,. 167 
163 G. Duch6ne, 'Congrýs Mondial contre la Suerre, Amsterdam, 27-28 Aq fit 193T, in SOS no. 12 
(1932), pP-5-6. 
164 Cf. Romain Rolland, 'Lettre A Henri Barbusse sur la Place qui doit ttre faite aux Objecteurs 
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Rosy unanimity about principle and practice certainly did not prevail within the 
French section. There was much discus'sion and dissension as to aims and methods in the 
fight against war; and it was the Amsterdam Congress and the movements flowing out of it 
which brought these issues to the fore and polarised the factions within the French section. 
Whilst it was true that the larger League was officially non-partisan and a-political, it 
quickly became clear that the French section was increasingly dancing to what Romain 
Rolland called the 'inevitable tempo of history', in the form of a Marxist conception of war 
and peace. In the 1920s Duchýne had written about the difficulty of getting bourgeois 
women to join certain sections which were almost entirely working class; but in the thirties 
it became clear that the n-dddle-class sections resisted - in some cases fiercely - Duchýne's 
attempts to force them to follow the doctrinaire Amsterdam-Pleyel line which she had 
laid down. 
The Grenoble group provides a typical example of this sort of grass-roots revolt. Mme 
Rancon, the local secretary, wrote Duch6ne in August 1932 that 'the announcement of the 
world pacifist congress in Amsterdam has created some difficulty here'. The main problem 
- and this is a recurring theme across the length and breadth of France - was the role of the 
Communist party in the Amsterdam movement. Rancon wrote that the local party was 
excluded from the Grenoble Peace Cartel because the latter organisation 'setting itself 
clearly against war, whether it be imperialist or revolutionary, cannot in principle admit a 
party of violence'. On a purely practical level, the local PC conducted a campaign against 
members of the Cartel; and Rancon pointed out that it would therefore be most difficult for 
all conarned to have the Communists take a seat in its counsels. Later that autumn she 
wrote again to Duchýne to announce that the local LIFPL had decided unanimously to 
maintain its own fteedom and would not be joining the action committee formed in the wake 
of the Amsterdam congress. These and similar concerns were voiced by sections in 
Chamb6ry, Le Havre, Caen, Nimes and Rouen. 168 
168 See V. Rancon to Duch6ne, Grenoble, 27 August 1932; V. Rancon to Duch6ne, Grenoble, 10 
October 1932; and Duchine to Grenoble Group, 21 October 1932, all in BDIC/DD/FAR6s. 208/24. 
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One of the clearest statements of principle and of dissent is that of the Colmar group 
during the spring of 1934. In a letter of 10 May the section threatened the probable 
resignation of the entire local committee and of a good portion of the membership if direct 
answers to direct questions were not forthcoming from Duchýne and headquarters in Paris. 
The group said that for too long they had been kept in the dark about the policies of the 
League and that they had received no answers to repeated inquiries. Of primary concern 
was what the group termed the fundamental principle of non-violence. 'Concessions seem 
to have been made in this area', they wrote. 'We have looked in vain in SOS and in the 
latest declarations of the French section for an absolute condemnation of civil war, which 
like any other war, renounces the solution of conflicts through conciliation and arbitration'. 
A further source of concern, flowing out of the question of non-violence, was the 'total 
adherence without restriction! of the French section to the Committees issuing from the 
Amsterdam congress. In the view of the Colmar group this was a betrayal of principle - 
indeed of the very principle which had attracted the sympathies of many of the members 
who were now prepared to leave. 169 
But the question of non-violence and the place of the League within the larger 
Amsterdarn-Pleyel movement were but the tip of the iceberg. The League's entire political 
orientation of apparently blind support for Moscow was called into question. Madame 
Burger, the Colmar group secretary, in a moment of some political insight, wrote plainly 
that in her view the Soviet regime was as intolerant and unjust as fascism to those who 
sought liberty of conscience and of thought. She recognised that the Soviet Union had 
achieved tremendous success in bettering the social and economic side of life in Russia, but 
insisted that there were spiritual values in life which the regime did not uphold. It was on 
the immediate, practical level of watching the local Communists in action which had been 
most revealing to her, however: 
I cannot emphasise enough how much the demonstrations of the 
great majority of the militants of Communism have done, and 
continue to do, harm. They are a terrifying and disconcerting 
revelation of the spirit of violence which the 'leaders' induce 
without scruple in the fanatical masses. 170 
The Colmar group felt that it could no longer support the principle of collaboration without 
conditions with a party which hated and persecuted everything that was near and dear to 
them. She complained that while Pax Internationale (the international organ of the 
LIFPQ remained true to the principles of the League, the French section seemd to have gone 
its own way. For Burger and the Colmar section the crisis which was rocking humanity was 
169 M. Burger to Duchýne, Colmar, 10 May 1934 in BDIC/DD/FAR6s. 208/15. 
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above all else a moral one, one which political and economic reforms alone would not solve. 
What was needed was a sort of moral revolution, in Russia as well as elsewhere. She 
warned DucMne not to n-dsunderstand the motives behind her comments: 
Do not think that all of this is greyness of formulas or dogmatism 
on our part. The principle of non-violence is a principle of life, if 
we abandon it in practice it will be the definitive failure of all 
action and of lasting reform . .... Do not think [either] that these 
criticisms formulated in our group come from capitalist milieux.. 
Women who do not belong to the so-called bourgeoisie of our dty 
are setting themselves against the pan-soviet tendencies of the 
French section. 171 
DuchOne7s response to this letter seemed to mollify the members of the Colmar group - 
at least temporarily. They adopted a wait-and-se e approach in a subsequent letter to 
Duchýne. Permament damage had already been done however. Madame Burger told 
Duchýne that she thought the whole incident had served to alienate, probably 
permanently, the practising Catholic women who had been part of the group. The group 
'had decided to have nothing to do with the Amsterdam movement, which in any case was 
making very little headway in Colmar due to the lack of support for the Communists. 
Colmar left the issue open, deciding to wait and see what the outcome of the Zurich congress 
would be. On her way back to France from Switzerland in the autumn of 1934, Duch8ne 
visited the Colmar group; and what she termed later to be an amicable divorce was 
decided upon. Some of the Colmar members remained attached directly to the league on an 
individual basis; but Duchýne thought that the rest of the group would be happier working 
with another organisation more appropriate to local conditions, such as the Ligue des Wres 
et des Educatrices pour la Paix. A bloodless and friendly purge was thus effected, removing 
genuine pacifist elements from the league who no longer viewed the world situation as 
DuchOne did. 172 
The Stalin-Laval pact of 1935 provoked, not surprisingly, a similar crisis within the, 
French section. The sudden-about-face of the French Communist party on the question of 
military 'service and support for the army provoked a great deal of consternation within the 
ranks of fen-dnist pacifism. Camille Drevet, who had been the League's international 
secretary, wrote to DuchMe that she was 
surprised to see that you placed before France only two 
alternatives: an entente with Hitler or the entente with Stalin. Do 
you not think that there is a third, that of negotiating with 
171 Ibid. 
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everyone, including Germany, finally to begin the work of 
disarmament? But the question of the Franco-Soviet military 
entente is superseded today by Stalin's declaration. We couldn't 
have received a harder blow. To see Marxists justify the national 
defence of a capitalist country really surpasses everything. 173 
Whilst the ComitLs Mondial des Fernmes was apparently prepared to accept the new 
directive, some parts of the French section of the LIFPL were not. Mme Jeanne Petit of the 
Lyon group wrote to Duchýne that 'the present marching orders of the World Committee 
concerning international politics are accepted with some difficulty here. The vast majority 
of the group wants to see the League maintain the strictly pacifist position it has always 
had'. 174 And Petit promised to raise the matter at the AGM of the French section in July. 
The Lyon position was supported by the St Etienne group, whose secretary L Leclerc wrote 
that they had been disappointed by a recent lecture given by DuchLIne. This had done 
nothing to help the local LlFPL section, but had given a great boost to the St Etienne goup of 
the World Committee. The partiality of the Communist elements in the latter had 
provoked many negative obser%ions but Leclerc said that her group would sort this 
problem out itself. More important was Duchýnes support of the USSRs new international 
policy which Leclerc feared would 'one day force us into taking a position, and we do not 
want a war at any price, whatever it may be for'. Leclerc's letters made clear the sense of 
betrayal which the members felt: 'essentially', she wrote, 'we want to hold to the 
programme which converted us to the cause, and in this sense we share the view of the Lyon 
section completely975 
Many of these views were summed up rather succinctly by Madeleine Vernet, the 
founder of the Paris pacifist group and newspaper of the same name, La Volontd de Paix. 
She wrote to Jeanne Challaye in July 1935 asking her to voice her concern at the AGM of the 
French section which was to be held on the 7th. Vernet felt that she had come to the point 
of resigning from the League, but had refrained from doing so because of her friendships 
with some members. But, she wrote, 
I find that the attitude taken by the French section, reflected in 
SOS simply does not befit the League. To make the case for 
dictatorship and civil war cannot be the position of an organisation 
which has for its name 'League for Peace and Freedom'... 
Unfortunately divisions and political quSfelling have invaded 
everything. Since 1932 the League has become the reflection of 
Amsterdam, thus losing all its personality. The fight for 
disarmament has fallen by the wayside. [Instead] anti-Flitlerian 
propaganda is pursued. Now this is not for us. We owe it to 
173 Camille Drevet to Duch8ne, Claret-Toulon, 30 May 1935, in BDIC/DD/FARds. 208/16. 
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ourselves to seek appeasement first in order to arrive at peace 
later. I have no sympathy for Hitler, but his victory in Germany is 
the work of the governments of the allied countries of 1914.176 
Not all groups objected to the evolving political orientation of the French section 
however. The Marseille group was one which Duchdne could count on to exceed even her 
own political trajectory. Lucienne Leleu, the local secretary, wrote to Duchýne in 1934 
concerning the approach to take in the face of the rise of domestic and international 
fascism. In her view there was absolutely no place for neutrality and the League needed 
desperately to delineate its doctrine. She saw its condemnation of violence during the 
Great War and after as an idea born. of sentiment. She rejected the notion of neutrality in 
the case of civil war and declared that the League must be with the workers: 
The first confusion to clear up ... is above all that of refusing to see that violence is not something found only in war, but is at the base 
even of the present regime, and that it is not the unique, or even 
principal result of gunshots. The revolt against war which was the 
basis of the action of the League, if it is conscious and not merely 
sentimental, if it is a revolt against violence in all areas... must be 
a struggle against the present capitalist regime. A conscious 
pacifist must today be a revolutionary... 177 
She regarded the coming civil, partisan, class-based violence with astonishing 
equanimity, saying that western Europeans were not saints 'A la faCon de i3andhi'. The 
refusal of violence 'signified nothing' for Leleu. 178 
The ideological divisions within the French section described above were also 
manifestations of generational differences in the approach to the problem of peace. In a 
movement such as pacifism which seemed to be dominated by the pre-war generation (if 
subjective impressions are anything to go by in describing a movement which left such 
incomplete records), the French section of the LIFPL stands out as one group which seemed to 
recruit younger members. This younger membership contributed to the divisions within the 
French section, and between it and the rest of the League. As early as 1932 for example' 
Duch8ne declared that the League Congress had 'disappointed youth because it had not 
adopted a radical manifesto'. 179 Lida Gustava Heymann thought then that youth must 
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trace its own path in life180 but three years later she adn-dtted that the League lacked 
fyoung, energetic blood'. 181 There is no doubt that the LlFPL was an aging organisation. 
Even given the lack of eligible men in post-war France, the French delegation of 18 
unmarried and only six married women at the 1934 Zurich congress of the League must have 
seemed young in comparison with those of other national sections. 182 
The equation of youth and radicalism is perhaps a valid one. The youthful French 
delegation in Zurich was remarkably disappointed by what it heard and saw to the point 
that the two representatives of the Marseille group actually walked out of the congress in 
disgust. 183 Four other French delegates had already left the congress by that point, 
disappointed too at their first contact with the Intemational. 184 One of the delegates who 
remained, Germaine Baurez of the Ardkhe group, wrotethat those who stayed behind did 
so because Madame Duch8ne was 'there to preserve the avant-garde spirit in the French 
section'. She and the other remaining young French delegates left Zurich 
with a feeling of disaffection towards the League and little 
confident in the future of an organisation which no longer knows 
how to give satisfaction to the young. 
The 'young' have noted with sadness that a fraction of the 
delegates present were opposed to any new ideas and that these 
delegates could not or would not see things objectively. 185 
In another speech, Mlle Y Paquet condemned thefetishism of words' which seemed to 
afflict the league and its 'sterile formalism'. She sai d that the young had come to the 
congress to learn, to receive directives for future actions, and that instead they had heard 
little to allow them to say'now we know where we are going'. The question of violence and 
non-violence was all word play which had no bearing on reality. If youth could be damned 
for lacking in idealism, it was because it knew that 'real idealism is sometimes the 
sacrifice of idealism, an effort of living in the present, in reality with the oppressed of all 
nations'. 186 
DucMne recognised the danger inherent in allowing youth to distance itself from the 
struggle for peace. She told the Zurich congress that organisations grow old more quickly 
than individuals, especially in a world evolving as rapidly as it was in the 1930s. And if 
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these same organisations became immobilised in outdated formulas, they condemned 
themselves to a quick death. 'In order that they conserve their vitality, ' she wrote, 'in 
order that they might renew themselves through the support of contact with youth, they 
must constantly maintain contact with reality and remain supple enough to evolve'. 187 But 
as we have already had ample occasion to observe, this suppleness was selective; and 
evolution tended towards revolution. In this same speech, Ducht-ne defined the task of the 
'true defender of Peac& as the preparation of minds for the acceptance of the 'idea that a 
transformation of society is necessary, inevitable and at the same time, to hasten this 
transformation by destroying the evil institutions which block human progress'. 188 That 
was the long term goal but in the short term the present situation demanded less a response 
based on 'orthodox pacifist ideology' than on an 'effective practical, incessant struggle. 
against war and fascisrV. 189 
The dissent expressed in letters to Duch6ne from across France began to make its 
appearance at the annual general meeting of the French section in 1934 in a discussion of a 
dispute between the La Rochelle group and the local Amsterdam committee. 190 But it is in 
July 1935 that the rifts within the French section became readily apparent at the annual 
meeting. Gabrielle DucMne protested to the assembled members that she could not 
understand where the impression had come from that the LIFPL had changed its 
philosophy or orientation. But changes there certainly 
. 
were. DucMne spoke of the 
'amicable divorce' which had been effected between the section and the Colmar and 
Mulhouse groups. Jeanne Challaye read a letter from Madeleine Vemet criticising the 
present political line of the French section. These criticisms found their echo in a discussion 
on the Stalin communiqud and a report by Jeanne Alexandre which declared that in her 
view the Soviet Union had changed its foreign policy from 'one of peace to a policy based 
rather on force which repudiates disarmament as the Red Army grows, and that renounces 
revision of the Treaty of Versailles'. 191 The minutes record Alexandre's view that 
the declarations of Stalin consecrate the traditional policy of the 
capitalists which is a policy of armed coalition, the re- 
establishment of the division of the world into two camps, etc. 
She is certain that 'mutual assistance' with Russia is an assistance 
based on arms and that we have the right to raise doubts about the 
sincerity of Russia as regards peace. This pact that is supposedly 
187 'Intervention de G. Duch6ne, Congrýs de Zurich, 1934, in BDIC/DD/FAR6s. 205/8/5. 
188 Iýid. 
189 Ibid. 
190 Procýs-verbal de I'Assembl6e Gdndrale de la Section Franqaise de la LIFPL, 14 July 1934, p. 2. 
In BDIC/DD/FAR6s. 208/15. 
191 Procýs-verbal de I'Assembl6e Gdn6rale de Ia Section Franýaise de la LIFPL, 7 July 1935, p. 5. 
In BDIC/DD/FAR6s. 208/16. See also Madeleine Vernet to Jeanne Challaye, 5 July 1935, in 
BDIC/DD/FARds. 208/16. 
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open to Gen-nany, do we know on what basis Germany will be asked 
to join it,... 
Given the situation, she believed that the League must take a 
position with regard to the policy of the USSR, with clarity and 
precision. If the League wants to remain what it was in 1915 - first 
and foremost a league for Peace - she demands that it pronounce 
itself for peace. 192 
And she concluded by demanding the redressement of the political line of the French 
section. This provoked a long and at times acrimonious debate, at the end of which DucMne 
asked for a vote on several policy questions. The Assembly passed a resolution (although 
with some negative votes), expressing its belief in 'the desire of the USSR for peace, as 
demonstrated by the Pact'. A resolution stating that the 'pacts of mutual assistance [were] a 
measure for the safeguarding of peace' was apparently also passed although with several 
abstentions and a motion in favour of unilateral disarmament proposed by Camille Drevet 
was defeated. 193 
The dissent of 1933-35 became a full-fledged rebellion in 1936 and the most explosive 
challenge to DucMnes conception of the League's work and her continued leadership of the 
French section. In an immediate sense the confrontations of 1936 can be linked to the 
expulsion of the executive committee of the Lyon group and all members sympathising with 
it. But this incident, unparalleled in the history of the French section, also served to 
galvanise an entire body of opposition within the section which manifested itself at the 
1936 annual meeting. 
First, to deal with the purge of the Lyon group. It seems that trouble had been brewing 
for some time. In 1934 or early 1935 Uo Wanner of the Lyon group stopped production of the 
section's organ, SOS, for reasons which are unclear and refused to give up her proprietary 
rights to the title. This resulted in a long hiatus while Duchene searched for a new title, 
and also for someone to take over the job of editing and publishing it. The problem was 
finally resolved in 1935 and En Vigie made its appearance. 194 
The immediate origins of the affray lie in what Duchene termed 'the ironical 
presentation of, or the attacks on, the actions of the national or international bodies of the 
LIFPL' in the group's new bulletin, Rasse? nble? nent des Femmes pour la Paix et la Liberti. 19-5 
The offending lines, ironical perhaps, but only mildly offensive, read: 
The French section ... thinks that in putting pressure on our rulers, these gentlemen will end up listening to us and will do something in 
192 Ibid. (Prock-verbal). 
193 Ibid. 
194 Report on the section's journal in ibid, p. 3. 
j95 Procýs-verbal de I'Assemblde Undrale de la Section Franqaise, 27-28 June 1936, p. 17. In 
BDIC/DD/FARds. 208/17. 
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favour of peace. (Our comrades no doubt have not heard of the 
Rome agreements). In this hope, the leaders [of the League] are 
using their resources and their time to make representation to more 
or less important notables, to circulate petitions, etc... Better yet, is 
it not a question of a forthcoming pilgrimage to the cemeteries of 
the Nord to protest against the war which is returning? 
The results of this action seem to us to go so much against the goal to 
be attained that we have been dismayed at the thought of such an 
enterprise ... 
196 
The French executive committee informed the Lyon group that it considered it inadmissible 
to make such comments in a journal sold to the public. Receiving no undertaking from the 
Lyon group that it would mend its ways, DucMne, L. Mardchal, and Gertrud Baer, the 
international vice-president descended on Lyon for a special general meeting on 26 February. 
They were 'very badly received', however, and the 'aggressive nervosity of part of the 
assembled audience did not permit the objective exchange of views that had been hoped 
for'. 197 
The real reasons for Duchdane's annoyance become clear in a letter written to her by the 
Lyon committee in the wake of this meeting. She had apparently accused the Lyon group of 
being a 'branch of the Trotskyist party' because the group's new secretary, Berthe Joly 
belonged to a Trotskyist minority group. Mme Joly had only reluctantly accepted the 
position for fear that this very sort of confrontation n-dght occur, but she had the support of 
the entire Lyon group. The Lyon committee charged that DuchMe had made a tendentious 
interpretation of their doctrine, which they claimed was nevertheless in complete 
harmony with the fundamental principles of the LIFPL. By a large majority the Lyon group 
had decided to engage itself 'in the revolutionary work which seems to dismay you so 
mucW. They were 'outraged' by DucMne's 'suffocating tone' at the meeting in Lyon and 
hoped for better things from the 'proven militant who in other times knew how to lead the 
fight for peace in complete independence!. They declared that they would continue to work 
loyally for the goals of the League'which the national office ren-dnds us of constantly, but 
from which it deduces methods of action little in harmony with therw. They concluded by 
accusing DucMne and the Paris office of 'incoherence', 'sterile polemics', and an 
unwillingness to tolerate dissent and criticism. 198 
Andr&e Jouve responded to this letter on the part of the executive, quite rightly 
condemning the insulting tone of the Lyon group's attack,, but leaving untouched the 
substantive quesions it raised. 199 In a subsequent number of their journal, the Lyon group 
196 RassembUrment des Femmes pour 14 Paix et la Libertl (Lyon), no. 1, cited in ibid., p. 17. 
197 Duch6ne in ibid. (Procýs-verbal). 
198 Le Groupe de Lyon de la LIFPL A Gabrielle Duch6ne, secrdtaire nationale, 18 March 1936, 
cited in extensio in ibid., pp. 17-19. 
199 Jouve's response on behalf of the Executive Committee is given in ibid., p. 20. 
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protested again against 'the abuse of power at the summit of our organisation! and against 
the 'intolerable' participation of "'our" presidents and vice-presidents ... in the chauvinist 
campaign which has been unfolding across the country for several weeks, defending the 
policies of French imperialism in the Franco-German conflict., 200 Extracts from the minutes 
of the special general meeting published by the Lyon group make clearer though what the 
dispute was all about. The Lyon group seemed to fear that the Front Populaire was 
evolving into a Union Sacr& which they would never accept: 
This is the reason for which we are fighting against the Popular 
Front which has no other goal, fundamentally, than to effect a 
coalition of the workers with a view to having them approve the 
policies of French imperialism under the cover of the 'defence of 
the USSR' or of the 'anti-fascist struggle'. 201 
Mme Joly declared that it was because the action of the Paris office was so sterile that the 
Lyon group had decided to throw itself into the genuinely revolutionary struggle. The wife 
of Louis Emery wanted to know why DucMne had 'done an about-turn' and was now 
supporti ng the Franco-Soviet pact. She also wanted to know why the French section 
supported the Popular Front. Another 'comrad& demanded to know why the League had 
suddenly stopped its campaign against the two-year military service law after the Stalin 
declaration. The Lyon group accused both Duch8ne and Baer of having no confidence in 
proletarian sanctions but of putting their faith instead in the bourgeois governments. The 
group declared that 
We remain convinced that the whole of the policies of the Popular 
Front, such as they are expressed, can only favour the war 
psychosis to the profit of the capitalists. 202 
This was the straw that broke the camel's back. In a national executive committee 
meeting on 10 June, it was decided to purge the Lyon executive and all members of that group 
sympathising with it. Duchene denied vehemently that she had changed her view on 
disarmament, or working class sanctions and repeated her by now rather sterile assertion 
that the LIFPL took orders from no political party. 203 It seems that she was perhaps 
reluctant to go through with the purge because the topic was again discussed at the AGM in 
July and the expulsions did not finally occur until November. To draw the whole affair out 
200 Rassemblement des fem? ws pour la Paix et la Liberti no. 4. p. 3, cited in ibid., p. 21. 
2-()l Cited in ibid. Cf. 'Extraits du Rapport d'Andr6e Jouve "Nos taches dans le Front Populaine, 
prdsent6 A la. Confdrence Nationale, 28 Juin 1936' in BDIC/DD/FAR6s. 208/17. 
202 Cited in ibid. (Procýs- verbal), p. 22. 
203 See text of two notes sent to the Executive Committee of the Lyon group by the National 
Executive Committee following its meeting of 10 June 1936. Both are contained in ibid., pp. 22-23. 
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even further, it seems to have been raised yet again in a session of the international 
executive conunittee in a meeting closed to non-voting consultative members in Bruges in 
April 1937. No minutes exist for this meeting. 204 
The AGM of the French section in late June 1936 was thus an important one. It saw the 
most comprehensive attack yet made by the dissenters on the direction the League seemed 
to be taking. Sixteen groups were represented. 205 and Clara Ragaz, the international vice- 
president, was also there. DucMne knew that the outcome of the meeting would detern-dne 
the future course of the French section and her control of it. As she wrote in one of a series of 
letters in late June to people likely to support her view, 
We have alas in our League, too, a struggle of opposing tendencies 
similar to that within the ComIt6 de Vigilance des intellectuels: it 
is above all in the meetings on Sunday that this will manifest 
itself and we should be very happy if you could participate in 
these meetings because it is perhaps the future of the French section 
which is at stake. 206 
Much of the meeting was taken up in a naked power struggle between Duch8ne and the 
Paris secretariat on the one hand, and a collection of provincial groups trying to effect 
changes in the French section's direction. Their efforts bore little fruit; and indeed, the 
'coalition' fell apart when the story of the Lyon group's imminent purge was strategically 
made public on the Sunday afternoon. The combined efforts of the Nimes, Montpellier, 
'Rouen, Le Havre, La. Rochelle, Lyon and Arles groups effectively to disenfranchise the 
Executive committee fell apart as the Lyon saga was revealed by an astute Duch6ne. One 
after another, groups distanced themselves from the affair, while struggling lamely to 
insist on the need for changes in the sectiotVs management and orientation. 207 There is no 
doubting the feeling of discontent within the membership of the French section. The 
minutes make abundantly clear the sense of alienation experienced by most groups. On 
substantive issues, too, there was hardly unanimity. The Montpellier group criticised the 
text of the letter sent to the President of the Assembly of the League of Nations, condemning 
the re-rralitarisation of the Rhineland, which they did not believe was in conformity with 
204 Copies of the form letter of exclusion addressed to members of the Lyon group are in 
BDIC/DD/FARds. 208/17. See the agenda for the closed special session of the International 
Executive Committee, Bruges, 5 April 1937, in BDIC/DD/FARds. 206. See also Procýs-verbal de la 
Rdunion du Comitd Exkutif de ]a Section Franqaise, 10 June 1936, in BDIC/DD/FAR6s. 208/17. 
205 The sixteen groups represented were: DrOme-Ardkhe, Le Havre, Rouen, Arles, Lyon, La 
Rochelle, ChAlon-sur-Sa6ne, Dijon, Chambdry, Nimes, Roubaix, Troyes, Seine, Seine-et-Marne, 
Seine-et-Oise, Paris. 
206 From a collection of copies of letters from Duch6ne to unspecified persons in 
BDIC/DD/FAR6s. 208/17. Quotation extracted from letter dated 25 June 1936. 
207 Proc6s-verbal de I'Assembl6e Gdndrale de la Section Franqaise, 1936, pp. 1-3,6 and 12. In 
BDIC/DD/FARds. 208/17. 
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the League's principles. 208 Carrdlle Drevet expressed her belief in the tremendous work of 
the English women for peace. Both of these statements reveal that the French section's 
confrontations at the international level of the League did not represent the totality of the 
views of its mernbership. 209 
This was precisely the point. By 1936 it was apparent that DucMne had a very rigid 
idea of what constituted proper action-for peace, and her attitude to the French section 
gradually became one of rule by fiat. As a disenchanted woman in Valence wrote to her 
later that year, 'if I had known that in such a League the orders came "from above" and 
were given by an international executive committee, I should never have joined'. 210 This 
attitude - was evident in the discussion provoked by DucMne's paper on 'Les Deux 
Conceptions du Pacifisme already mentioned above. She made it clear that she believed 
that in a political organisation like the league, only the barest minimum of dissent from its 
policies could be tolerated. She condemned the 'divisionniste' faction which she claimed 
was ruining the work of the LIFPL by its aggressive and violent opposition. In her opinion if 
members could not see their way clear to working within the League, they should consider 
leaving it and joining a more amenable group such as the Ligue Internationale des 
Combattants de la Paix. As for the others, they were quite welcome to remain in the 
League as long as they did not hinder its action. The true pacifist, she claimed, must refuse 
to contribute to division within an organisation which had already given so many proofs of 
its devotion to peace. She defined the League for perhaps the first time as a body akin to a 
political party, with a doctrine which had to be imposed on the membership. In this she 
was both right and wrong, bot 
,h 
re-iterating an old League principle and creating a new and 
dangerous precedent at the same time. The LIFPL had always insisted on genuine pacifist 
conviction in its members - this principle had been at the heart of the 'aims' debates of the 
1920s as we have seen - but it had equally held itself above the level of party political 
strife. DuchMe herself had often said at international meetings that if members disagreed 
on methods, they certainly did not on the goals pursued by the LIFPL. But at some time in 
the n-dd-thirties it is obvious that the question of means and ends, of goals and methods 
fused together in DucMne's mind and she found it increasingly impossible to brook 
contradiction. Here in the 1936 annual general meeting one can arguably see signs of the 
faint Stalinisation of Gabrielle DuchMe and the French section. As Camille Drevet tried 
208 This is most likely the letter strongly condemning the Leag-u&s inaction in the face of Hitle? s 
remilitarisation of the Rhineland mentioned above. Mentioned in ibid., p. 4. 
209 Ibid, p. 4. 
210 'LM'to Duch8ne, Valence, 12 October 1936. Typescript copy in BDIC/DD/FARds. 208/17. 
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in vain to make clear, the real question was not whether there were Trotskyists in the 
League or not, but simply what policy the League should adopt. 211 
The problem of the Lyon group did not disappear after the 1936 annual meeting. Rather 
it continued to rear its head for some time to come. The French section even went to the 
lengths of taking legal advice in order to recover section funds held by the Lyon group at 
the time of the purge. 212 
Having scored a somewhat Pyrrhic victory at the 1936 meeting, however, Duchene 
could afford to appear to be slightly more indulgent in her dealings with dissent. With the 
necessary political victory behind her, she reverted to the essentially generous and 
democratic spirit of former years. For example, in a meeting of the Paris region in 
November 1936, called to choose representatives to a special general meeting, Duchene 
supported the inclusion of Jeanne Alexandre in the group's delegation because she 
represented the minority tendency. She also attempted to ensure that the French sectionýs 
executive should contain a member from the 'opposition! and that groups interested in 
sending delegates to the league's 1937 congress should seek, insofar as was possible, to 
maintain a balance in their representation. 213 
But the spirit of fair play and equity, which Duchene belatedly tried to reimpose on 
the French section was not enough or came too late. The factious fronde led by Jeanne 
Alexandre finally separated from the rest of the League in September 1938, abandoning 
what they called 'Ie beau mot liberte and creating simply a Ligue des Fernmes pour la Paix. 
As Duchene wrote in a special number of En Vigie in March 1939, 
This reveals, better than any long commentary, the differences 
between our two groups ... As for us, we are more certain than ever that to abandon the defense of freedom is not to serve the cause of 
peace, but rather to betray it. This is why, together with the 
International, our league will continue to put defenceýjqf Freedom 
and defence of Peace on the same level. 214 
211 Procbs-verbal de l'Assemb16e Cdndrale de la Section FranSaise, 1936, p. 7 BDIC/DD/FAR6s. 
208/17. 
212 See Compte-rendu de la Munion du Comitd Exýecutif de la Section Frangaise du 16/7/36 in 
BDIC/DD/FAR&. 208/17. See also Prc>c&, verbal de la Rdunion du Comit6 Ex6cutif du 13 avril 1937 
in BDIC/DD/FARAs. 208/18. See also 'Activitds de la Section Franýaise, Assemblde Cdndrale 
Annuelle, 15 et 16 mai 193T in En Vigie, 6/7 (October-November 1937), pp. 4-5. 
213 See ProcA-verbal, Rdunion des membres de la rdgion parisienne de la LIFPL du mercredi 4 
Novembre 1936, in BDIC/DD/FäRds. 208/17. See also Circulaire no. 22 (April 1937) in 
BDIC/DD/FäR6s. 208/18. See also 'Avis Important' in En Vight nos 4/5 (April 1937), p. 9. See also 
'Activitds de la Section Franýaise. Assemb16e Cdndrale Annuelte, 15 et 16 Mai 1937 in En Vigie 6/7 
(C)ctober-Nofpber 1937), pp. 4-5. 
214 'Avis Importanf, En Vigie nos 10-11-12 (March 1939), p. l. 
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Schism had finally come to the French section - schism almost inevitable as the pressure of 
real political events tore at the bicephalous French section, reducing it finally to impotent 
schizophrenia. 
The schism of the LIFTL French section underlines what Michel Bilis has called with 
regard to the Socialist Party, the 'untenable dilemma' of French pacifism. 215 The French 
section's acute sense of political reality finally forced a divorce between the desire for 
peace and that for freedom and justice. The political and pacifist trajectories had 
separated, or at any rate were no longer formed of parallel lines. As the Nazi menace 
became daily more palpable, French political pacifism became increasingly conscious of the 
need for unity, collective security, and (God forbid) the possibility of having to defend 
militarily, one's cherished conceptions of liberty. With each succeeding crisis in the 
thirties, the sands of intigralitd' poured faster through the pacifist hourglass towards 
September 1939. 
21-5 The phrase is from the title of Michel Bilis' book SocWistes et padfistes 1933-1939. Ou 
Vintenable dilemme des socMistes frangais (Paris: Syros, 1979). 
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HIS. Conclusion 
In examining the political and moral trajectory of the French section of the LIFPL 
during the interwar years, the ideological evolution of the pacifist debate cannot be 
overemphasised. What in 1915 had been a tremendous leap of humanitarian, feminist, 
pacifist courage, became increasingly in the 1920s a politicised debate, and in the 1930s an 
increasingly sterile, ideologically-determined struggle for one conception of peace for 
which some French women became increasingly willing to contemplate the shedding of 
blood. Because the women of the French section were so politically astute, their radical 
pacifism finally collapsed like a house of cards. The trump card was called Freedom; and 
it was for freedom that the French. section primarily struggled in the latter years of the 
decade. The widening gap between moral conviction and political reality made the 
pacifism of the LIFPL untenable until at last it was no longer really pacifism, or at least 
certainly not 'integral pacifisrif. 
It is too easy for the historian to look back at the interwar period with the benefit of 
historical hindsight, and to chastise and to laud a son gri. But until 31 January 1933 nothing 
seemed inevitable about the rise to power of the Teutonic Teppichfresser across the Rhine - 
threatening yes, but inevitable no. Before the duplicity of the Nazi-Soviet pact of August 
1939, little or no suspension of diSiief was required for many men and women of good win to 
believe in the Soviet Unions desire for peace. September 1939 was not a pre-ordained fait 
accompli, until it had actually happened. In order to understand the brave mixture of 
optimism and despair of the interwar pacifists, it is necessary to remind oneself constantly 
of these facts. 
The rise of fascism and the Nazi seizure of power transformed the world of politics. 
Under the pressure of political reality, the French section's early integral pacifism 
gradually disintegrated as the need to support the fight for freedom became increasingly 
evident. The gradually increasing ideological content of their pacifist analysis only served 
to widen further the space between their concern for peace and their fight for liberty. 
Thus, women's peace initiatives in interwar France became infected with the same 
dilemmas, distortions, detours and hard political choices as did more 'masculinist' efforts 
for peace. In terms of radical feminist pacifism, the 1930s were a decade of disappointments 
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as the women of the LIFPL were gradually f6rced into a permanent retreat behind the 
mental Maginot line of collective securitý and support for the bourgeois democracies. That 
which had been specifically and originally femirUst in the work of the LIFPL in France 
during the First World War and in the twenties, became diluted and distort ed - des idges 
pfti? nies - as the thirties drew to a close. 
While some fen-dnists argue that women are inherently pacifist, in practice this was 
not necessarily the case. 216 Women, like men, were susceptible to the drumbeats of their 
age. As in the working out of Christianity or socialism, there would appear to be no in-built 
ideological detern-tinism. which leads to peace through feminism. Human perversity and 
individuality usually see to that. 
Women in interwar France, individually and sometimes collectively, did make a major 
contribution to peace. However, they did this more as pacifists than as fen-dnists; and 
their pacifism gradually became overlaid, diluted, and distorted as a moral creed by the 
political and ideological demands of their ageý217 
In thus returning to the questions posed at the outset of this section, the measured words 
of the feminist journalist, Marcelle Capy, seem particularly appropriate. Grappling with 
the same issues dealt with here, Capy concluded: 
Many writers - of all countries - have shown themselves extremely 
severe with regard to women. They have admirably criticised the 
frivolity, the unconsciousness of some, the exasperated chauvinism 
of others. They are neither completely wrong, nor completely 
right. 
Is it right to demand that women be pacific heroines? For my part, 
I believe that men and women have nothing to envy one another, 
and that they need a reciprocal indulgence in order to judge one 
another. 218 
216 See notes 5 and 10 of Part III for examples of this sort of modem feminist interpretation 
217 Huguette Bouchardeau comes to similar conclusions about the nature of feminist pacifism 
in interwar France. She writes: Ve ddbat illustre bien ce qui est en train de se passer au niveau de la 
lutte des fernmes pour la paix. DVun c6t6, des action autonomes des femmes, int6ressantes dans leur 
port6e concrkemais souvent vou6es A l'inefficacitd et A I'angdlisme. De I'autre, des actions qui 
visent A des rassemblements massifs, s'ins6rent dans des luttes politiques d'envergure, mais sont 
rarement men6es A Vinitiative m6me des femmes. ' Bouchardeaus point is that the feminist pacifist 
movement became de-tracked and politicised, and thus less than one hundred per cent feminist or 
even pacifist in inspiration. 'Les th6mes des droits de la maternit6, de la fernme pacificatrice, qui 
avaient 6t6 si mobilisateurs, si "productifs" & la fin de la guerre et dans les ann6es qui ont suivi, vont 
devenir clichds, maniPulds comme arguments au service d'un discours qui trouve ailleurs ses 
fondements!. Women became, in Stalin's word, merely Ia grande rdserve' of the working class. See 
Huguette Bouchardeau, Pas d'histoire, les femmes... 50 ans d'histoire des femmes: 1918-1968 (Paris: 
Editions Syros, 1977), pp. 110-111. 




Wars have a nasty habit of ruining the high hopes of pacifists. This was perhaps 
especially true for those of the 'ideological' variety who in the case of France defined the 
old-style paradigm from which the new, integral pacifism evolved. Because the 
ideological pacifists of the APD were collaborative in their orientation to the political 
society they lived in, the failure of their pacifism was acutely felt. Failure was not 
. 
interpreted as the end of the struggle, however. As we have seen, if the League of Nations 
idea had fallen short of the mark, this did not in any way mean that the basic premisses 
behind the APD's pacifism were wrong. Far from it. Ruyssen, looking back over fifty years 
of pacifist activity in 1938, could justifiably be proud of the extent to which the theses of 
the APID had become accepted in political society. As Part I makes clear, if 1939 
represented the dashing of the reasonable hopes of reasonable men in an unreasonable 
world, this did not lessen in any appreciable way the long-term optimism with which the 
tenants of the old-style pacifism viewed the future. Of the final victory of their ideas 
they were convinced. 
No doubt the political world in which the interwar pacifists moved was very different 
when it ended from when it had begun. In the immediate post-war years, even the old- 
style pacifism of the APD had been somewhat suspect in the eyes of much of public opinion. 
We are no longer acquainted today with the species of warmonger who honoured the fact of 
war and glorified it as a salutary social instrument. But in the early twenties, the memory 
of the vilification to which the APD had been subjected in the pre-war years was still 
fresh. The trauma of the Great War did much to alter the political balance in favour of the 
theses of the old-style pacifists. By the late 1920s it was a common-place for politicians to 
support the efforts towards international reconciliation of Briand, for example. 
For the new-style pacifists of the thirties, the situation was rather different. 1939 
represented for them both the complete failure of all that they had striven for, and at the 
same time a sort of perverse justification of th e theses they had propounded. Peace had 
failed, but it had done so because of the complete rottenness of society. French political 
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society was rejected, as we have seen, because of an historical interpretation of the recent 
past, and an antipolitical, dissenting stance in the present. This, coupled with the fears of 
the next war, produced a powerful new variant of pacifism. When that war finally 
arrived, French integral pacifism was already completely isolated from political society. 
Indeed, one of its problems had nearly always been the fact that it was continuously being 
squeezed from Left and Right in a political pincer action which finally left it marooned on 
its own small island of despair. Only in the first few years of the LICP's existence, from 
roughly 1930-1933, was the League able to make any claims at all to limited public support. 
But the early thirties were still a time of relative optin-dsm. War clouds were gathering on 
the horizon and causing people to reflect. Pessin-dsm was around the comer. But in the first 
years of the League, it was possible for pacifists to make great inroads on public opinion 
because of the prevailing political climate of relative optimism. The failure of the Geneva 
disarmament conference, together with international tensions left unresolved by a League of 
Nations which was increasingly seen as impotent, and above all, the arrival in power-of 
Hitler in Germany, caused this world of public optimism to crumble. The late arriving 
effects of the world depression only served to exacerbate an already bad political situation. 
The Popular Front provided a brief respite from the slippery slope of pessimism, but it did 
not last. This was perhaps the cruellest of the political blows which integral pacifism had 
to suffer in the thirties. So many high hopes had been vested in the Popular Front, which 
despite the presence of Communists within it, was initially considered a tremendous 
guarantor of peace. Because of the id&s tnaffresses which underpinned it, the new pacifism 
quickly and easily slipped into an antipolitical withdrawal from society. This was an 
indication of its sectarianism or of the utopianism of its ideas - either model will do. What 
is interesting, though, is the manner in which this antipolitical movement which was the 
focus for so much vitriolic dissent from the rest of French political society, continued 
nevertheless to express itself in purely political terms. 
It is important to see the links between all three types of French pacifism discussed in 
this thesis. Not only can they be classified according to either the Chickering or Ceadel 
tA, )ologips, but they should also be seen as part of a time continuum. Their political 
evolution is important, and because so many of the major figures of both new-style pacifism 
and also fen-dnist pacifism began their political trajectories as allies, if not members, of the 
APD, the only method of explaining these evolutions away from the original pacifist 
'faith', seems to be that of paradigmatic change. Historical dissent begat political 
alienation, which in turn combined with the growing fears of another war, to produce a new 
type of pacifism which posited a radical departure from the methods of the past. The new 
pacifism incarnated the negation of politics, the negation of the recent past and the 
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affirmation of new political values drawn from, amongst other things, the ethical lessons of 
the Great War and a vision of French history which owed much to Robespierre. 
For the fen-dnist pacifists of the LIFPL, this dissent from political society was more 
moderately expressed. Women played no significant political role in interwar France, and 
it was thus easy for the peace women to make an impressive ethical stand against war in 
the early twenties. As the decades changed, however, this ethical stance became overlaid 
with many of the political concerns of the male world of politics, and arguably what began 
as a vibrant vision of feminist pacifism ended up as a shadow of the ideologically divided 
male version. 
The LICP ceased to exist with the con-dng of war in September 1939. The APD continued 
to publish its review, however, and only died out in the late forties when all of its leading 
members were at an advanced age. No younger hands seem to have been willing to take up 
the torch. But perhaps by then, the task was unnecessary because the post-war years saw 
the birth of the United Nations which seemed to reincarnate the hopes the APID had 
originally placed in the League of Nations. The only one of the three organisations which 
still exists is the LIFPL which seemed to survive the war experience rather well. 
For. the ideological pacifists of the APD, and indeed for the feminists of the LIFPL as 
well, the con-drig of war did not mean the ultimate defeat of their ideas. It is one of the 
traits of the old-style pacifism and of the feminist pacifism under discussion here, that 
pessimism and optin-dsm were mixed. Thus, the words of the APD's 1920 Appel-Programme 
seem to sum up its approach to the temporary failure of its pacifist hopes in 1939: 
We are rolling, it seems, the eternal rock of Sisyphus. A bitter 
observation and one which will discourage'some. But we are of 
those who never despair. Instead, we find even in the avowal of 
our own disappointment, positive reasons to envisage the future 
with a reflective confidence. 1 
As Appendix H shows, Romain Rolland astutely realised that the problem of peace 
had become very complicated by the early thirties. As he said, it was no longer enough to 
desire peace, one also had to desire the means to achieve it. Rolland represents the 
ideologising of the question of peace which was so rejected both by the old-style pacifists 
who preferred to think in terms of structures, and less in terms of the larger ideas behind 
them, and also by the new pacifists for whom peace was an over-riding concern that 
relegated all else to a secondary position. It was this view of peace as the ultimate goal 
defining all other political considerations which caused so much friction with the 
representatives of a Moscow-oriented Communism which sought to define its peace in terms 
of the social revolution and defence of Soviet Russia. The integral pacifists would have 
1 La Paix par le Droit, 'Appel-Prograrnme', PD 30,1/2 (January-February 1920), p. 3. 
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none of it, and in their rejection of the Communist view, they affirmed peace as an example 
of Weber's 'ethic of ultimate ends, an idea which underpins much of Ceadel's analysis of 
pacifism. 
The extent to which a political society can accommodate dissent like that of pacifism is 
perhaps a comment on its liberality. It is one of the paradoxes of France that a nation so 
individualistic in its soul should be so intolerant of political and ethical non-conformity. If 
nothing else, the debates occasioned by pacifism in the thirties represent a struggle for the 
French historical soul, an attempt to redefine the nature of French politics and the 
orientation it had towards the natiores revolutionary past. Pacifism struck too near the 
vitals of the modem French experience to be brooked gladly. The garrison mentality of the 
interwar years with its 'collective insecurity' was incapable of accommodating the pacifist 
thesis. In its ideological manifestation, pacifism was tolerated, but the political non- 
conformity inherent in the individualistic, dissenting new pacifism could not be accepted. 
Perhaps there is some grain of truth in H. N. Brailsford's rather antipathetic comment that 
France's 
partial eclipse during the last fifty years that followed Sedan has 
obliterated our recollection of the persistent military tradition of 
this most nationalist of peoples. ... A nation of small peasant 
owners and small investors will never be Liberal in the British 
sense of the word. 2 
Whatever the case, it is important to place the French pacifist experience firmly in the 
context of western European political history. Pacifism was a phenomenon experienced as 
much by the French in the interwar years as by any of the other western, liberal 
democracies. If this thesis has succeeded at all in rescuing the interwar French pacifists - 
men and women with different visions of the pathway to a better world, but of good will all 
of them - from the dustbin of history, then it will have partially attained its goal. 
2 From H. N. Brailsford's After the Peace, cited in AJ. P. Taylor, The Troublemakers: Dissent over 





The Circulaire Chautemps, 1933: The Third Republic Discovers 
Conscientious Objection. '
Despite the fact that some French dictionaries date the entry of the expression 
. 'conscientious objector' into the French language as 1933, there is little doubt that it was a 
known quantity both as a political instrument of resistance to war, and as a philosophical, 
moral or religious position, in the fairly immediate post-World War One period. During 
the 1920s and early 1930s a number of small books discussing the merits and disadvantages 
of conscientious objection as an instrument of war resistance were published. Certain 
newspapers of anarchist tendencies discussed the subject from their own particular 
perspective from about 1924 onwards. And, in the late 1920s, a bona fide pacifist press 
appeared and began to include reports on objection in its pages. 2 
Michel Auvray mentions several groups either promoting or supporting objection in the 
early twenties in France: inter alia the War Resisters' International and the International 
Fellowship of Reconciliation, known in France as the Mouvement International de la 
R6conciliation. He has discovered the first French support group for COs in existence as 
early as 1920, the Conscientious Objection Defence Committee, which counted amongst its 
1 Earlier versions of this appendix were read as papers at the University of Toronto and at the 
University of Edinburgh. 
2 For examples of the development of this genre, see: Manuel Devald6s, 'Les Objecteurs de 
Conscience Anglo-Saxons', in Mercure de France, CLXVI (15 September 1923), pp. 642-669; Manuel 
DevaWs, VEtat mondial de la question de robjection de conscience!, ibid., CXCVIII (15 August 
1927), pp. 100-122; Marceline Hecquet, L'Objection de Conscience devant le Service Militaire (Paris: 
Editions du Groupe de Propagande par la Brochure, 1924); Rend Valfort, L'Objection de Conscience 
et VEsprit magonnique, Prdface de Edouard E. Plantagenet (Paris: Collection des Documents 
maqonniques de La Nix, n. d. [19301); Madeleine Vernet, De l'objection de conscience au 
d1sarmement (Levallois-Perret: Editions de la Volontd de Paix, 1930); see also the newspapers and 
journals Le Semeur, La Patric Hum4ine, Les Cahiers de la Riconciliation, amongst others for a 
continuing discussion of conscientious objection in the late 1920s and early 1930s in France. 
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Committee of Honour writers such as Henri Barbusse and Georges Duhamel. 3 The earliest 
trace of C. O. activity in the files of the Ministry of the Interior, however, is the League for 
the Recognition of Conscientious Objection, founded in Lyon in 1924 by Paul Bergeron. 4 This 
League, despite a Committee of Patronage counting in its number a great proportion of the 
future leaders of the French pacifist movement of the late twenties and thirties, seems to 
have become rapidly moribund. The late 1920s and early 1930s also saw the first of the 
rather pitiful public trials of conscience which sent men of various political, religious and 
philosophical persuasions to prison for terms of a year or more; in the case of two Protestant 
theology students, Philippe Vernier and Jacques Martin, these were but the first in a series 
of sentences they would receive for their convictions until the chaos of June 1940 finally 
released them into the dangerous world of Vichy. 5 The essential point then is that despite 
the title of this paper, for those who had ears to hear and eyes to see, conscientious 
objection was no wildfire malignancy which, in a spasm of bad timing, contrived to make its 
appearance in the body politic at almost the precise moment that events across the Rhine 
were riveting French eyes on the spectre of post-Versailles revanche. Far from it. 
Conscientious objection existed in France throughout the interwar period, although always 
very much as a minority movement, if one can call it even that. But it was only in January 
1933 that the French government suddenly perceived that it had a 'conscientious objection 
problem'. 
The Circular of 26 January 1933 addressed to the Prefects of the French departments by 
Camille Chautemps, the Minister of the Interior, was the response to this problem. It 
originated in a letter of 9 January sent on behalf of Chautemps by the Director of the Stret6 
G6n6rale to Edouard Daladier, then Minister of War. Chautemps wrote that his attention 
had 'been particularly drawn to the development of a campaign (italics mine) presently 
being conducted in France in favour of conscientious objection, that is to say, young people 
-1 Michel Auvray, Objecteurs, insoumis, diserteurs. Histoire des Rifractaires en France (Paris: 
Stock/2,1983), pp. 174-175. 
4 Archives Nationales, Paris. 177/13352. See report entitled 'Le Mouvement en faveur de 
l'objection de conscience en France' (Paris, 16 February 1933); see also Tract I (NoO 1923) of the 
Ligue pour la Reconnaissance de I'Objection de Conscience in F7/13352. Tract 3 of the LROC is in 
Bibliothýque Nationale, Paris, 80 Wz 3636. 
5A few examples of men who were condemned in the late twenties and early thirties are: 
Ceorges ChevO, sentenced to six months imprisonment on 7 October 1927 [see report on Chevd's 
case in Le Semeur no. 108,19 October 1927]; Eug6ne Guillot, condemned to one year in prison on 10 
January 1930 (see UObjection de conscience et I'Affaire Eug6ne Guillot' in La Volonti de Paix, no. du 
Printemps 1930. For Romain Rolland's reaction to the affair consult Romain Rolland, UObjection de 
Conscience doit 6tre, non individualiste et libertaire, mais sociale' in Par la Rivolution, la Paix (Paris: 
Editions Sociales Internationales, 1933), pp. 91-92. See also 'Textes du Comitd de D6fense Eugbne 
Guillot' in Biblioth6que de Documentation Internationale Contemporaine (BDIC) Fonds Duch6ne 
FAR& 273/61; for the trials of Camille Rombaut, Jacques Martin, and Philippe Vernier, see Proces de 
Camille Rombaut, (Aubervilliers: 'la R6conciliation, 1932); Procas de Jacques Martin, (Aubervilliers: 
'La R6conciliation', 1932); Proc? s de Philippe Vernier, (Aubervilliers: 'La Rdconciliation', 1933); 
Martin and Vernier were also interviewed by the author on 16 and 17 September 1983. 
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who refuse to submit to the military laws for apparently moral motives'. 6 He wrote 
disn-dssively of the usual 'propaganda conducted for several years by the Communist Party', 
thereby recognising, perhaps subconsciously, that conscientious objection differed in style 
and intent from the more ideologically motivated and politically opportunistic 
antimilitarism which was part and parcel of the traditional mythical baggage of sizeable 
portions of pre-War socialist and post-War communist militancy. 7 In January 1933 the 
danger seemed to lie elsewhere. Chautemps and the SOretd were particularly concerned at 
the spread of this moral contagion to other social classes, in short, at its apparent, albeit 
nascent, generalisation across class barriers. 
Three recent events had provoked this worrisome conclusion. Firstly, a Father 
Ducatillon of the Dominican Order had delivered a series of five public lectures on the 
theme'True and False Patriotism'at the Pius )G Institute in November and December 1932. 
Ducatillon's lecture series, wlith culminated in a discussion of conscientious objection on 15 
December, was part of a larger series of lectures organised by the Institute in the winter of 
1932-33 dealing with the teach ings of the papal encyclical Caritate Christi on the world 
crisis. But more about Ducatillon in a moment. 
Secondly, Jacques Martin, a Protestant theology student in Paris, who had been 
sentenced to a one-year prison term for his refusal to carry out a twenty-one day period of 
reserve service, had received a letter and petition of support from an impressive group of 
more than twenty professeurs agriggs, businessmen, a medical doctor, a Polytechnicien and 
primary school teachers. Nearly all of them were war veterans, some of them had been 
injured and the group included two Chevaliers of the Legion of Honour, and five Croix de 
Guerre. Clearly not a group of young people anxious to avoid military duty for apparently 
moral motives. Nor were these wild-eyed agitators of the Communist Party. - Martin must 
have enjoyed a certain public repute because when the letter arrived at the Cherche-Midi 
prison, the military censor was scandalised to find that the envelope was covered with the 
fraternal salutation of five postmen: 'With you with all our hearts! Courage! ', and 
appended below were their signatures. 
Finally, Chautemps and the Ministry seem to have been sensitive to charges of softness 
levelled against them in the right-wing press. He cites an article published in the Action 
Franqaise of 19 December 1932 attacking the Tribune Vicinale, the organ of the national 
federation of local road engineers and technical assistants, which had published an article 
in favour of conscientious objection reading in part: 
6 AN F7/13352. Te Ministre de l'Intdrieur A Monsieur le Prdsident du Conseil, Ministre des 
Affaires Etrang&es, m6me lettre A Ministre Guerre!, Paris, 9 January 1933. 
7 Ibid. 
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To disarm we must disorganise the military apparatus, refuse to 
make or to carry arms. 30 conscientious objectors are surreptitiously 
imprisoned and the whole press, knowingly orchestrated, keeps 
silent. 300 conscientious objectors would sow confusion in the system. 
3000 conscientious objectors would destroy forever any possibility of 
an army. 
The Action FranCaise' s pointed question 'What sort of sanctions have been taken against 
(this group) by the judicial authority? ' seems to have struck home. 8 
Ten days passed, and on 19 January Daladier responded to Chautemps' original letter 
with a set of detailed observations which indicate the extent to which the MiniStry of War 
had already considered the question independently of the police and the Interior Ministry. 
Moreover, Daladier proposed to do something about the problem, and on the same day he 
sent a circular to the Military Governors of Paris, Metz, Lyon and Strasbourg as well as to 
the Commanding Generals of the various military regions, outlining the problem and 
instructing them to follow it very closely in conjunction with the Prefects. The civil 
authorities, Daladier assured the Generals, would be issued parallel instructions by the 
Minister of the Interior. 9 This effectively forced Chautemps' hand. Daladier had taken 
action from the military side and he clearly expected the civilians to follow suit - not that 
Chautemps likely needed much persuading, although in light of future developments it was 
certainly fortunate for the War Ministry that Chautemps had been obliged to issue his own 
circular to the Prefects. 
What was the view in the Rue St. Don-dnique of the situation? Daladier's letter is 
much more detailed in its analysis of the problem, its origins and in its prescriptions for 
action. He, too, refered to a 'movement' which had touched several social classes and 
professional groups. Among these were 'libertarian circles which recognise no authority 
and do not wish to suffer any constraints whatsoever', and 'certain Protestant churches 
which believe that the Law of Scripture is incompatible with Military Law' - and here 
Daladier singled out the Society of Friends. More important though in a country such as 
France was the involvement of certain Catholic groups which disapproved of the potential 
for war in a nationalism which seemed contrary to the Christian spirit. 'Information from 
reliable sources' even led the Ministry to conclude that the Pope approved of this sort of 
activity - what better proof after all could there be than Father Ducatillon's lectures? 
8 All of the above cited in ibid. Photograph of Martin's letter contained in 'Objection de 
Conscience (1924-32). Documents secrets du GMIY in AN F7/13352. 
9 AN F7/13948. 'Le Ministre de la Guerre A Monsieur le Ministre de l'Intdrieur', 19 January 1933; 
and 'Le Ministre de la Guerre & Monsieur le Pr6sident du Conseil', 19 January 1933. See also AN 
177/13352, 'Le Ministre de la Guerre A MM les Gdndraux Gouverneurs Militaires de Paris, Metz, Lyon 
et Strasbourg, les Gdn6raux Commandant les Rdgions: Paris IA5,7 A 13,15 A 18 et 20, le G6n6ral 
Commandant le 19e Corps d'Armde, les Gdn6raux Commandants Sup6rieurs des Troupes du 
Levant, du Maroc et de Tunisie, le Undral Commandant Supdrieur des Troupes Coloniales dans la 
Mdtropole!, 19 January 1933. 
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There were also the pacifist associations such as the Ligue Internationale des Combattants 
de la Paix, the Ligue Internationale des Jeunes contra la Guerre, the Ordre internationale 
des Bon Templiers, all of which, according to the Ministry 'believe that the refusal to make 
or carry arms is the most effective means of avoiding war. Newspapers of various hues 
were also singled out as being responsible for the spread of this moral disease; la Volonff, 
la Patrie Humaine, Le Bocage, Voila (all deemed to be pacifist), the Catholic newspaper 
L'Aube and finally an anarchist newspaper published in the Calvados called Le Semeur 
had been publishing news of conscientious objectors for almost ten years. Finally, Daladier's 
memorandum concluded that even the Government and Civil Service were not immune to 
this contagion. Civil servants belonging to the teaching profession, the Finance Ministry 
and the Post Office had all apparently openly manifested their sympathies for the 
recently sent enced objectors. 10 One can clearly conclude from this list that the War 
Ministry had been following the development of conscientious objection sympathies for some 
time and in some detail. But did the Ministry think the problem serious? Apparently, so. 
Daladier wrote: 
The effects of this propaganda have not failed to make themselves 
felt. Several young soldiers and reservists have refused to carry out 
their military service or their reserve period, and the reservists 
have returned their mobilisation papers either to the Minister or 
to the relevant mobilisation centre. 
15 young soldiers or reservists have been sentenced by the Military 
Tribunals, others are currently incarcerated and will be brought 
before the Military Tribunal shortly. Finally, several reserve 
officers have made clear their adherence to the conscientious 
objection movement. This movement in favour of conscientious 
objection risks taking a certain extension, if measures are not taken 
with a view to showing the nation the danger it represents, and to 
place on their guard against its consequences those who might be 
tempted to join it, either through conviction, personal interest or 
simply cowardice. 11 
He prescribed action on three fronts to counter the effects of C. O. propaganda. First, the 
military and civilian authorities must act so as to present, in the words of the circular to 
the Generals, ' a complete unity of views in this regard'. Secondly, he suggested that it be 
made clear to civil servants and state employees that 'conscientious objection constitutes a 
rebellion against the laws currently in force, and that those who approve of it and defend it 
risk incurring judicial proceedings'. One should note here that in Daladier's n-dnd it was not 
even a question of actually being an objector, merely of approving or defending those who 




the Government should enroll eminent political and religious personalities such as the 
Cardinal-Archbishop of Paris, the President of the Consistory of the Reformed Churches of 
France, and the President of the Ligue des Droits de I'Homme in the public fight against 
conscientious objection. 12 
These were Daladier's suggestions to Chautemps and the Ministry of the Interior in 
January 1933. But the War Ministry had already taken matters into its own hands and 
acted independently to curb discussion of conscientious objection in France. Here we return to 
the Ducatillon lecture series at the Pius XI Institute mentioned above. The Army appears to 
have taken an interest in Ducatillon's talks from the outset, as well perhaps they should, 
given the titles of the five lectures: 'What is the Fatherland? ', 'True Patriotism', 
'Antipatriotism and National Egotism', 'War and Legitimate Defence', and finally, 
culminating on 15 December 1932, 'Patriotic Duty in the Face of War (Conscientious 
ObjectionY. 13 A report by an officer from the General Staff on the third lecture, which took 
place on 1 December, is instructive. Around 2,000 people were present in the auditorium of 
the Pius XI Institute on the Faubourg St. Honord to hear Father Ducatillon. The staff officer 
present wrote that this lecture 'appeared to be but the exordium of a thesis of vast 
dimensions, designed to thrust before the world, under the aegis of the Pope, a new 
conception of individual patriotic duty when confronted with the danger of war. This is, 
moreover, the title of the lecture on 15 December (which) will examine conscientious 
objection and must apparently serve as peroration and conclusion to the arguments 
developed in the lectures of the 1 and 8 December'. 14 
The remaining two reports on Father Ducatillon in the Ministry of the Interior files are 
unmarked copies. Whatever their origins, however, they make astonishingly clear how 
well the War Ministry and General Staff were able to bring pressure to bear on someone 
propounding ideas deemed to be inin-tical to the interests of the state. The writer of the 
report on the final lecture noted the presence of several officers from the Military 
Government of Paris 
_ 
in the very full hall dressed in civilian clothes. The 
conclusions expected by Father Ducatillon's attentive audience were never drawn. In the 
words of the report writer:... 
at the preceding -lecture on 8 December, an officer of the G. M. P. 
(Military Government of Paris) had come specially on behalf of 
General G... to draw the attention of Father Ducatillon to the 
gravity of certain theories developed by him in his lectures of 1 
and 8 December - theories which would lead one to admit or excuse 
12 Ibid. 
13 In an attempt to defuse the controversy these lectures were later published. See Oe P6re) 
Joseph-Vincent Ducatillon, Le vrai et le faux paf riotisme (Paris: Editions 'Spes', 1933). 
14 AN F7/13352. Couvernement Militaire de Paris, Etat-major, Commissariat Sp6cial, unsigned 
typescript dated Paris, 2 December 1932. 
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conscientious objectors, if not approve of them. General Niessel, 
moreover, intervened before the lecture of 15 December in an 
analagous sense to signal the danger from the military point of 
view. 
Thus, when Father Ducatillon, after having linked his preceding 
lectures to this one, spoke of the responsibilities of the politician in 
the face of war, and of the duties of the simple citizen, those in the 
audience who had followed the previous lectures were not a little 
astonished to see that the normal conclusion demanded by all of 
the preceding argumentation was set aside. 15 
Instead, Ducatillon concluded rather lamely by saying that while the Church had never 
officially pronounced on the subject of conscientious objection, all indications were that it 
would condemn it. As the report writer noted rather ironically, this statement appeared to 
contradict the contentions of a book entitled La Papautj et les questions internationales, 
published by the Institute and on sale in the foyer immediately outside DucatilloWs lecture 
theatre. In a chapter entitled 'For the suppression of military service one could read that 
in the pontifical plan, general disarmament was to be realised by the suppression of 
military. service. 16 
Having achieved its desired ends, the General Staff proceeded to rub salt in the wound, 
using Ducatillores 'conclusions' to full effect. In an article in Le Figaro of 31 January 1933, 
General Niessel responded to charges by a Protestant pastor that the Pope and the Paris 
Don-dnicans were preaching conscientious objection by citing the 'correct' conclusions drawn 
by Ducatillon. 17 
These, then, were the immediate antecedents of the Chautemps Circular of 26 January. 
One week elapsed between the transmission of Daladier's circular to the Generals and 
Chautemps' parallel circular to the Prefects which is almost a textual duplicate of 
Daladier's. Chautemps enjoined the Prefects to co-operate fully with the military 
authorities in the 'struggle against this dangerous propaganda. Thus, despite the initial 
letter of 9 January 1933 from the Minister of the Interior, the Chautemps Circular is really 
something of a misnomer. The War Ministry seemed to be far ahead of the Interior Ministry 
in its surveillance of and thinking on conscienti ous objection, and it was largely Daladiees 
15 AN F7/13352. '56m-e Confdrence. Le Devoir Patriotique en Face de la Guerre (Objection de 
Conscience)', 20 December 1932; and 'Suite A une pr6c6dente note sur I'Objection de Conscience, 20 
December 1932. Both reports are in a file marked 'Documents Secrets du GMP Objection de 
Conscience'. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Le Gdndral A. Niessel, Te Patriotisme et I'Objection de Conscience', Le Figaro, 31 January 
1933. 
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wording over the hapless Chautemps' name which would create the scandal in the Press 
when the Chautemps version was leaked on 1 May 1933. . 
But that is to leap ahead somewhat. What fruits did the Chautemps Circular bear? It 
asked the Prefects to report on the extent of the contagion within their departments. Was 
the Hexagon loyal or had it been contan-tinated by an effete Parisian disease? Judging from 
the initial responses of the Prefects alone, one ndght safely conclude that not only was 
France loyal, but also completely oblivious of the very existence of something called 
'conscientious objection. Only six prefects - those of the Indre, Bouches-du-Rh6ne, Bas- 
Rhin, Ille-et-Vilaine, the Savoie, and the Calvados - reported any prior knowledge or 
awareness of C. O. activity in their jurisdictions. Twenty Prefects insisted that no such 
nefarious propaganda or activity had ever existed in their departments. 18 Some seemed to 
take it almostas a question of departmental honour. From Corsica one reads, 'I believe it 
necessary to inform you right now that no movement of this kind, up to now, has manifested 
itself in my department. Moreover, Corsica, which furnishes a considerable number of 
volunteers to the metropolitan and colonial am-des, appears to me to be the least likely of 
all the French departments in which such a campagin would have any success'. The Prefect 
of the Vend6e was even more emphatic: 'Already I think it possible to affirm that the 
propaganda in favour of conscientious objection will obtain no success amongst the Vend6en 
population which has always shown the greatest respect for the law as well as an 
enlightened patriotisrif. 19 The remaining sixty-odd Prefects, merely acknowledged receipt 
of the Circular, making no mention of any activity at all. Was this then, a tempest in a 
Parisian teapot, a case of Action Frangaise-induced paranoia chez AM Chautemps et 
Daladier? 
Not wishing to sound unnecessarily ambiguous, the answer is probably both 'yes' and 
'no'. Affirmatively for a number of reasons. First, there is little doubt that the view from 
Paris has often had a curiously magnifying effect on certain aspects of French political 
history, and it is safe to say that the various permutations and combinations of the French 
peace movement by and large had their focus in the capital and its environs. Thus, what 
was true for Paris might not have applied elsewhere in the country. Secondly, the number 
of bona fide objectors prepared to go to prison for their beliefs was, and would remain, 
rather small. Finally, the Government and the right-wing press tended to confuse 
conscientious objection with the larger peace or pacifist movements. People such as Marc 
Sangnier who did not personally support objection but rather maintained in more general, 
18 AN F7/13352. Te Ministre de l'Intdrieur A Messieurs les Prdfets', Paris, 26 January 1933. See 
this same file for the subsequent Prefectoral responses. 
19 AN F7/13352. 'Monsieur le Prdfet de la, Corse A Monsieur le Ministre de l'intdrieur', Ajaccio, 1 
February 1933; 'Monsieur le Prdfet de la Vend6e A Monsieur le Ministre de l'Intdrieur', La Roche- 
sur-Yon, 1 February 1933. 
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internationalist terms that 'si vis pacem, para pacerrV, were painted with the same black 
brush by the Action FranCaise as the most hardened, libertarian of objectors such as Urard 
Leretour. By equating conscientious objection automatically with pacifism, the Government 
could very easily have taken fright, because the peace movement had been growing 
steadily since about 1928 in France. But the distinctions between pacifism and conscientious 
objection were blurred - indeed there was much debate amongst pacifists themselves about 
the efficacy of objection. Conscientious objection was a sub-set of pacifism and hardly a 
genuinely independent movement, although there were signs that it could become one. 
But in fact, there was cause for concern. Though small in numbers, the fact that men 
were willing to incur harsh prison sentences for their beliefs in time of peace, with little 
immediate prospect of war, indicates a groundswell of opposition to military service for 
whatever reasons. Comparisons with Germany or Britain at this time are really rather 
meaningless - neither country had mandatory military service. Thus, one could quite 
cheerfully sign a pledge never to take up arms, or happily support flaccid young Oxford in 
its resolution 'under no circumstances to fight for King and Country'- because if war clouds 
were distant and if conscription did not exist, it was almost a non-issue. But in France it did 
matter. Conscientious and conscious refusal to subn-dt to military law, as opposed to 
desertion which was widespread, brought upon one the swift and sure wrath of the Third 
Republic. So conscientious objection was important - as the numbers of objectors increased, 
the Government might well conclude that traditional support of the Republican Army was 
being eroded to the Nation's great peril. The Government might have confused 
conscientious objection with the various forms of pacifism, but the pacifist movement was 
certainly beginning to make its presence felt. A pacifist press had sprung- up, eminent 
personalities were involved, and 1932 had been a year of great peace crusades centred 
around the Geneva Disarmament Conference. Some of the campaigns and speaking tours 
continued into the winter of 1932-1933. This great desire for peace undoubtedly begat some 
conscientious objectors, how many it is difficult to tell. Finally, though, w hen a rock is 
turned over, one usually finds far more activity than on the surface. So it was with the 
Chautemps Circular. 
The Interior Ministry files contain literally scores of subsequent prefectoral. reports on 
conscientious objection from all comers of France for the period February to the end of May 
1933. Strangely, the reports seem to cease thereafter - while there continues to be some 
material on conscientious objection, mostly in the form of internal memoranda or police 
reports, right up to 1935, the great swell of interest in the subject, at least from the 
departmental point of view, ceases in late May 1933. No follow-up circular from the 
Minister of the Interior exists in the file to explain this sudden halt to a programme of 
surveillance which was turning up a great deal of interesting material. One can only guess 
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that word might have gone out from Paris to stop the investigations in the wake of 
disclosure of the circular in the press in early May 1933. This is hardly likely, however, 
since a good proportion of the press supported the Government in its campaign against this 
'anti-national' sentiment. i 
What did the Prefects discover when they examined the question more closely? A 
number of departments continued to report no conscientious objection propaganda or activity 
within their jurisdictions. However one should note that these reports were sometimes 
ambiguous, and often contained errors of interpretation or fact. Some police comn-dssaires 
and sub-prefects were clever enough to distinguish between the existence of pacifist or peace 
groups within their locales, and groups of individuals committed to the extension of 
conscientious objection. For example, the Divisional Special Police Commissaire at Lille, in 
a report to the Prefect of the Nord, wrote that: 
There exists no group or isolated personalities in the Lille area 
openly manifesting any propaganda in favour of conscientious 
objection. Nevertheless, through excess of pacifism, the refusal of 
military duty through conscientious objection is admitted in certain 
Protestant circles which base themselves on the laws of the 
Church, and by the Ligue des Droits de Momme et du Citoyen 
which considers this refusal inherent in individual liberty and a 
means of avoiding the return of war. 
And here he cited Pastor Henri Roser of the International Fellowship of Reconciliation and 
F. Corcos of the Court of Appeal in Paris, who had both spoken at meetings in the Lille 
area. Both Roser and Corcos actually supported conscientious objection, however. In like 
manner, the sub-prefect of Douai could report on 7 February that there was no C. O. activity 
in his jurisdiction, but that Pastor Andrd Trocm6, who was actually a proponent of objection, 
had been speaking publicly mereiy in favour of peace. The Prefect of the Loire wrote on 11 
February that C. O. activity was almost nil but that a plethora of pacifist groups existed in 
his department. On 21 February, the Prefect of the Mayenne reported no conscientious 
objectors but noted the existence of a local section of the Ligue Internationale des 
Combattants de la Paix which had around 200 members. As we shall see shortly, it was 
the propaganda of some of the leading members of the LICP which was causing much of the 
concern in Paris. It was, in fact, a rare Department which would boast neither conscientious 
objection nor the presence of some of the pacifist organisations most likely to induce it as a 
result of their own propagandaýO 
20 AN F7/13352. Te Commissaire Divisionnaire de Police Sp6ciale A Lille A Monsieur le Pr6fet 
du Nord', Lille, 16 March 1933; 'Le Commissaire Sp6cial Vantomme A Monsieur le Sous-Pr6fet', 
Douai, 7 February 1933; 'Le Prdfet de la Mayenne. 1 Monsieur le Ministre de l'Int6rieur, Laval, 21 
February 1933. 
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Most Prefects reported some activity or sympathy for conscientious objection. For some, 
it was an easy case of enumerating those who had refused their reserve mobilisation papers 
and would therefore be serving short sentences in the local army garrison gaol. Other 
prefects reported genuine cases of young conscientious objectors, refusing all military service 
for the first time. For the vast majority, however, it was propaganda in favour of 
conscientious objection which preoccupied them. One is struck by the scrupulous detail of 
the reports which made their way to Paris. It seemed that every insignificant primary 
school teacher, postman, or shoemaker who held seditious views or had merely expressed 
sympathy for the plight of men and families caught in the trap of conscience, were all 
carefully noted down and sent to the Ministry. An example of this is a report on a Professor 
Choski of the Lyc6e in Oran, Algeria, who had delivered a lecture dealing with 
conscientious objection in a favourable light to his mathematics class on 29 March. Jaures, 
Einstein, and the Oxford Union debate all figure in the notes of a schoolboy's cahier which 
formed the basis of a report written by the Oran Division Commanding General and passed 
on to Chautemps through the Governor-General of Algeria in n-dd-May. 21 
The Ligue International des Combattants de la. Paix played a key role in the campaign 
in support of conscientious objection, despite the fact that it had no official policy on the 
matter and its membership was divided on its efficacy. That notwithstanding, several of 
its key speakers and organisers, notably Georges Pioch, Rend Gerin, Marcelle Capy and 
Jeanne Humbert, were of great concern to the authorities because of their extreme views on 
the subject. A lecture by Pioch on conscientious objection, scheduled for February, was 
cancelled by the Prefect in Strasbourg on the advice of the Interior Ministry which feared, 
it seems, the spread of this idea in border areas, especially Alsace-Lorraine. Pioch spoke 
nevertheless, two weeks later, but on a thinly disguised different topic: 'Poets against 
War'. 22 
Ren6 Gerin was probably the most indefatigable and dangerous of the LICP 
propagandists, however. This Parisian journalist, Chevalier of the Legion of Honour, an 
ancien Normalien, and Agrigi en Histoire, covered most of France in the winter and spring 
of 1933 in his campaign for peace, speaking regularly before crowds of 250 to 1000 people. 
On March 13th, Gerin and Henri Guilbeaux spoke before an audience of 2500 people at 
Limoges, and in a circumspect tone, Gerin had this to say about conscientious objection: 
21 AN 177/13352. Te Gdn6ral de Division Guedeney, Commandant la Division d'Oran A 
Monsieur le Gdndral Commandant le 19e CA Alger, Oran, 31 March 1933. Forwarded to the Minister 
of the Interior only on 12 May 1933 by the Governor General of Algeria. 
22AN F7/13352. 'Rapport de Hnspecteur Principal Ldonard sur la Confiftence Faite A Strasbourg 
par M Georges Pioch, Strasbourg, 2.2 February 1933. See also 'Rapport', Commissariat Spdcial, 
Strasbourg, 22 February 1933. 
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There are young people whom I would not advise to refuse to join 
their regiments, but if they did so, I should support them and take 
their defence. 
Above all I advise men of my age, who like me have already been 
at war, to refuse all military papers which might come their way. 
On receipt of their mobilisation papers they have only to follow 
my example and return them to Monsieur the Minister of War. 
Having done that, I have suffered no sanction and those would do it 
will be no more troubled than 1.23 
Pioch, too, when asked directly in public whether he counselled conscientious objection 
would only say that it was a delicate question which had to be answered by each person 
individually since the consequences were potentially very seriou&24 
Some LICP groups debated collective objection as a means of resistance to war, but 
seemed chary of actually putting match to tinder. On 4 March the Caen section of the LICP 
discussed the question after one member suggested a massive, organised return of all 
members' mobilisation papers. According to the police report, the President of the section 
replied that 'the number of conscientious objectors' is not yet strong enough for that, and he 
feared that the result obtained might be the complete opposite of that hoped for. He put 
his conclusions to the vote; they were adopted unanimously. It was decided to postpone 
until later the return of mobilisation papers,. 25 Small consolation for the government, 
though, which could only see that the LICP was organising a most effective and 
widespread pacifist propaganda campaign which touched all comers of the Hexagon. 
Some Prefects took matters into their own hands in an attempt to eradicate the problem. 
The Prefect of the Vosges, for example, informed the Minister on 10 March that all C. O. s 
and articles in the press encouraging the military to disobedience were being pursued to the 
fullest extent of the law. Further, he announced that all active propagandists would have 
their names inscribed in the Camet B. If they happened to be of foreign nationality, he 
would begin expulsion proceedings. Finally, he intended to ban all lectures or meetings 
called for the purpose of expounding publicly the'doctrine of conscientious objection'. 26 The 
final point is an ambiguous one. Despite the cancellation of PiocWs talk in Strasbourg, the 
Ministry seemed somewhat reluctant to cancel public meetings outright. The Prefect of the 
Calvados, whose department seemed to be a veritable hotbed of anarchist/ libertarian 
conscientious objection, asked on several occasions for permission to employ strong-arm 
23 AN F7/13352. Report from the Commissariat Sp6cial de Limoges, 14 March 1933. 
24 Loc. cit. L6onard report, Strasbourg, 22 February 1933. 
25 AN F7/13352. 'Le Pr6fet du Calvados A Monsieur le Ministre de l'Intdrieur', Caen, 6 March 
1933. 
26 AN F7/13352. Te Pr6fet des Vosges A Monsieur le Ministre de l'Intdrieur', Epinal, 10 March 
1933. 
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methods such as the banning of meetings at which well-known speakers of the LICP would 
be present. Finally, on 31 March the Ministry replied that 'the law does not permit the 
banning which he desires - but that he does have the right to delegate a police conunissar 
to sit on the rostrum and take notes on statements liable to provoke judicial action%27 
Perhaps the situation in Algeria was different, because there in late May, the Governor- 
General on his own authority banned public lectures by Rend Gerin before audiences 
comprising members of the indigenous population, and would permit him to speak only in 
centres of European settlement and even then only on condition that his talks not be 
advertised publicly by poster. 28 
This apparently vast campaign in favour of conscientious objection was accompanied by 
a vicious counter-campaign in the nationalist. and right-wing press which spilled easily 
into the streets, especially at public pacifist meetings in the Paris area. If. some of the 
objectors, in particular G6rard Leretour, were guilty of wild and irresponsible rhetoric, the 
police files make equally clear to what lengths the Camelots du Ro i and the Croix de Feu 
were prepared to go to combat it. As Jean-Baptiste Lhdrault, one of the leaders of Gustave 
Herv6's national socialist n-dlitia, wrote with reference to G6rard Leretour in la Victoire on 
1 March: 'We have well and truly decided not to let our disciplines be sapped, and if this 
individual is bent on commercialising his act of cowardice, we shall know, with all 
Frenchmen who understand the cult of the nation, how to remind [people] with arguments 
which our conscience will dictate, and with no objection, that we will have respected by all 
means that which is sacred for us: our patriotism. Lookout Leretour! '. 29 Words were put 
into action on several occasions and the Action Franpise gloried in its often successful 
disruptions of pacifist meetings, whilst at the same time slinging barbed attacks at a 
government which it perceived to be soft on conscientious objectors. Titles such as 'At 
Charenton: a lesson for M. Daladier, protector of the conscientious objectors"'(19 February, 
1933); or 'M. Daladier's police at the service of the traitors and conscientious objectors' - an 
article of 4 March complaining about what was in fact only a modicum of rather ineffectual 
police protection for a Leretour meeting in the Salle Bullier; or on 7 March: 'The Camelots 
du Roi prevent the meeting of the "objector" Leretour and send his worthy friends 
packing'. 30 With attacks such as these in the right-wing press, it would be easy for the 
public to conclude that little was being done about an increasingly visible problem. 
27 AN F7/13352. Manuscript note of 30 March 1933 attached to letter of 28 March 1933 (Prdfet 
du Calvados A Monsieur le Ministre de l'IntL4rieur). Response sent on 31 March 1933. 
28 AN F7/13352. See telegrams of 10,28,29 and 31 May 1933 from Governor-General of Algeria 
to Minister of the Interior. See also telegraphed response of 'Intdrieur Affaires Algdriennes A 
Gouverneur Gdndral et Securitd C. 6ndrale Alger', 11 May 1933. 
29 AN 177/13352. 'Note', Prdfecture de Police, 1 May 1933. 
30 'A Charenton. Une Leqon iM Daladier protecteur des objecteurs de conscience', Action 
Franpise, 19 February 1933; 'La Police de M Daladier au service des traitres et des objecteurs de 
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The Prefectoral reports are useful in another way in that they provide a look at grass- 
roots objectors and sympathisers. The material is sometimes sketchy, haphazardly 
collected and certainly not capable of supporting a full-blown quantifiable analysis, but 
certain admittedly impressionistic conclusions present themselves. Whilst it seems clear 
that the great propagandists and theoreticians of the movement tended to be Paris-based, 
well-educated, left-wing and middle-class, this could certainly not be said of the 
fmovement' as a whole. Indeed, in some areas, notably the Calvados and other parts of 
Normandy where the anarchist/libertarian strain of objection seemed to be strongest, one 
could even argue that local leaders were more important and influential than the great men 
of Paris. But with regard to the names which figure in the reports from across the length 
and breadth of France, one is struck by the variety of objectors and sympathizers. They 
vary from well-educated, n-dddle-class businessmen, to liberals belonging to the Ligue des 
Droits de Momme, to simple farmers, to shoemakers, a great many teachers, both primary 
and secondary, secretaries, bakers, shopkeepers, and the list goes on. In Paris, the 
Freemasons seemed to play an important role for a time. These indications make it possible 
to suggest tentatively that Roger Chickering's conclusions about the middle-class basis of 
the pre-War French peace movement are not applicable to the interwar movement. 31 
Given all this information, was the Government really worried about conscientious 
objection in 1933? There are two position papers in the ministry files on the subject. The 
first is dated 16 February 1933 and the second 19 April. The first report makes clear that it 
was not the number of objectors which worried the government; even in the case of war, the 
writer of the paper did not believe that the number of conscientious objectors would increase 
significantly. Nevertheless, he wrote, 'the campaign in support of conscientious objection in 
France has taken a not negligible development over the past few months', and he noted most 
disapprovingly that it made the citizen 'judge of his own opinions'. But if the danger did 
not lie in numbers, where did it lie? The report writer saw two great dangers in the C. O. 
movement. The first was 'the fact that, under the influence of the anarchists and 
Communists the idea of simple non-resistance, which is that of pure objectors, is being 
replaced little by little by that of rebellion. Rebellion is, moreover, envisaged differently 
by the anarchists and the Communists. For the former, it is the individual gesture, for the 
conscience', Action Franpise, 4 March 1933; 'A la Salle Wagram. Les Camelots du Roi interdisent la 
rdunion de TObjecteur' Leretour et dispersent ses dignes amis, Action Frangaise, 7 March 1933. 
31 For details of the backgrounds of some objectors and sympathisers see: 'Le Mouvement en 
Faveur de I'Objection de Conscience en France' (Paris, 16 February 1933) and 'Liste des objecteurs de 
conscience et des personnes ayant ddfendu l'objection de conscience ou ayant manifest6 de la 
sympathie pour les objecteurs identifidsi la date du 15 avril 1933'both in AN F7/13352. These two 
reports do not contain an exhaustive listing of all objectors or sympathisers known to the ministry. 
See also Roger Chickering, Imperial, Germany and a World Without War. The Peace Movement 
and German Society 1892-1914 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), pp. 327-383. 
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latter, it is the mass movement. But whether it be under one form or another, thoughts of 
rebellion are winning the world of objection!. The second fear was that of defeatism, the 
destruction of national morale by a moral disease. 'One cannot say that their efforts have 
been in vain. Already several reserve officers have given their support to Conscientious 
Objection. And even in the case where direct action would not be sufficient to create disorder 
in a mobilisation, the propaganda n-dght not remain without fruit in the aftermath. In 
essence, this campaign sows doubt in minds poorly placed to see and to understand. Even 
more, conscientious objection can serve as a cover for cowardice... Thus, this nefarious 
propaganda could be the source of a defeatism in the first few weeks of a war. And where 
will this defeatism end if the ravages of war and the hostilities are prolonged? A question 
which must be asked. There is here a disease capable of destroying the morale of the 
nation and enervating the force of its resistanc&. 32 
Two months later, in the report of 19 April, these basic observations were merely 
strengthened. The writer pointed out that in the interval, the number of objectors and 
sympathizers identified had doubled from ninety-five to 183. Still, this was enough to 
qualify as a 'great development', Much of the credit for the expansion of the movement 
was given to the LICP which regularly attracted large crowds to its meetings. Not a single 
city of any importance in France had not been the site of an LICP meeting. The writer 
detected a growing current of selfishness in the expanding C. O. movement. 
... the attitude of the greater part of the pacifists is evolving. As 
their "publie expands, they become more aggressive, and in their 
speeches, the "right of not endangering oneself" takes the place of 
the "duty not to shed blood". They are less attached to exalting a 
noble ideal than they are to awakening and strengthening 
sentiments of utility and individual preservation. There is here a 
danger for the morale of the Nation of a potentially grave 
nature. 33 
Thus, of immediate concern to the Government was the threat of nascent defeatism, 
incipient rebellion and a growing selfishness which denied national values. Notes such as 
one dated 2 May 1933 from an informer with good contacts in the LICP could still be a trifle 
shocking. According to this source, the LICP 'estimates at 300,000 the number of mobilisable 
men who, touched by the propaganda of this organisation in France, are liable to return 
their mobilisation papers or destroy them in the event of a direct threat of armed 
conflict'. 34 
The saga of the Chautemps Circular explcOed into the public domain on 1 May 1933, 
when the Echo de Paris, a conservative Paris daily, published the text of the circular under 
32 AN F7/13352. See ibid, 'Le Mouvement en Faveur... ' (report of 16 February 1933). 
33 AN F7/13352, short report dated 19 April 1933 attached to 'Liste des objecteurs... '. 
34 AN F7/13352, PJ/5 A-3870, Uun Correspondent' Paris, 2 May 1933. 
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the title: 'The Sabotage of the National Defence, a confidential circular from the Minister 
of the Interior to the Prefects'. The disclosure of the circular set off a furore in the press. 
Whilst almost all newspapers supported the campaign against the conscientious objectors, 
and indeed against pacifists of almost any hue, there was great discussion as to why it had 
taken the government so long to discover their existence. The Action Franqaise, unaware of 
the antecedents of Chautemps' letter to the Prefects, thought it most reassuring that the 
Suret6 Gdndrale appeared not to have known anything about the problem, but rather had 
been informed of it by the Minister of War. Daladier came in for attack as a man whose 
right hand did not know what his left hand was doing. On the one hand he was trying to 
suppress a growing campaign in favour of conscientious objection, and on the other he had 
given pardons to Gdrard Leretour in February and to Jacques Martin in April - both of them 
conscientious objectors convicted by Military Tribunals. The Catholic newspaper L'Aube 
demanded and received an apology from Daladier for being painted with the same pacifist 
black brush as other genuinely pacifist papers. Le Figaro and Ordre both supported the 
goverru-nent. LHumanit! condemned both the government and the conscientious objectors, 
predictably enough. Only Le Quotidien and La R6publique raised important questions about 
freedom of speech, Albert Bayet suggesting in a measured and thoughtful article in the 
latter that the debate be removed from the party political plane to the moral and 
philosophical level for further discussion. 35 
This was expressed in even more forceful tenns on 12 May in a resolution of the Central 
Conu-nittee of the Ligue des Droits de I'Homme which condemned the Government's attack 
on freedom of speech and freedom of conscience and called for the creation of an alternative 
civil service as a mechanism for dealing with men who for reasons of conscience refused all 
military service, whilst nevertheless reiterating the Ligue's position that conscientious 
objecton was inefficacious. 36 
35 Te Sabotage de la Ddfense Nationale. Une Circulaire confidentielle du ministre de 
l'int6rieur aux prdfets'. Echo de Paris, 1 May 1933. For reaction in the press, see: G. Larpent, 'La 
Politique. 1. La circulaire Chautemps. II. Les instructions aux g6n6raux. III. Indignations tardives. IV. 
Une Circulaire pour riere; in Action Fraqaise, 2 May 1933; Uon Daudet, 'A Propos . 
d'une circulaire, 
Action Franqaise, 2 May 1933; Louis Sauchon, 'Contre les Objecteurs de conscience, Le Figaro, 3 May 
1933; Emile Bur6, 'Le retour au bon sens, Ordre, 2 May 1933; 'Une Circulaire contre les d6faitistes. 
La propagande des objecteurs deConscience', Le Figaro, 2 May 1933; 'Contre une inqualifiable 
agression. Une lettre de "I'aube' AM Edouard Daladier', I'Aube, 2 May 1933; Bernard Auffray, 
UObjection de Conscience est pire qu'un crime, c'est une sottise, Ordre, 2 May 1933; Te Sabotage 
de la Ddfense Nationale. La Presse et la Circulaire de M Chautemps, Echo de Paris, 3 May 1933; 
Albert Bayet, 'L'Objection de conscience', La Ripublique, 4 May 1933; Andr6 Ferrat, 'En guise 
d'amnistie! ', L'Humanitl, 4 May 1933; 'A I'Institut Pie XI des Volontaires du Pape devant le RP Gillet 
les objecteurs de conscience sont huds par les patriotes', Action Franqaise, 5 May 1933; 'Les 
objecteurs de conscience', Le Quotidien, 6 May 1933; etc. Articles of this sort continued in the 
Parisian press until at least the middle of May. 
36 An F7/13352. Ta Ligue des Droits de I'Homme et I'Objection de Conscience. Projet de 
r6solution sur la Circulaire ministdrielle relative A I'Objection de Conscience'. Note of 12 May 1933. 
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The debate was quickly picked up by the provincial press and continued into late May. 
News of the Circular even spread as far afield as the New York Times. 37 A majority of 
provincial papers supported the government but there was vigorous discussion of the 
apparent slur against Catholics in the Circular, and local issues could present interesting 
variants on the national pattern. For example, on 10 May a Military Tribunal condemned a 
young man by the name of Armand Rolland to one year in prison for refusal of military 
service. This provoked a good deal of opposition to the harshness of the government's 
position- and sympathy for Rolland and his family in several newspapers in the Loire 
Valley. 38 
It remains something of a mystery who leaked the Circular to th e Echo de Paris. A 
memorandum in the Interior Ministry files claims that it must have been leaked by someone 
in the General Staff, or more likely, in the Ministry of War. Several figures at the War 
Ministry were known to have close contacts at the conservative Echo de Paris. Furthermore, 
the version of the Circular reproduced in the press carried the marking 'Secret', a 
classification apparently not in use in the Interior Ministry. Some parts of the press 
initially thought that Chautemps was trying to embarrass Daladier publicly, but it 
appears more likely that Daladier (or someone else in the War Ministry? ) was goaded into 
leaking the document by the continual charges of weakness hurled at him by the right-wing 
press. 39 
Whilst the Interior Ministry files fall almost silent on the problem of conscientious 
objection after May 1933, there continued to be much interest in the subject in the Rue St 
Dominique. A note of 26 December 1933 indicates that the matter was discussed at a 
meeting of the Council of Ministers and that subsequently a working party from the 
Ministries of Justice and War agreed to submit amendments to the law of 31 March 1928 on 
recruitment to the Army to the next sitting of the Chamber of Deputies. Whereas the old 
law had only penalised people who were convicted of actually materially impeding a 
37 'France combats spread of Conscientious Objection', New York Times, 1 May 1933. 
38 See for example: 'I; a devait arriver. Les Catholiques compromis par la folie d'un Francisque 
Gay et de son "Aubd". La Province, 23 May 1933; Armand Terriýre, 'A propos d'une circulaire 
ministdrielle. Le Patriotisme et le Pacifisme des Catholiques' Le Nouvelliste de Bretagne, 3 May 
1933. For the debate in the Loire valley surrounding the trial of Armand Rolland, see: 'Au Tribunal 
Militaire. L: Objecteur de Conscience Roland (sic) est jug6. Le Procýs de M Daladier', Le Petit 
Orl&nais, 14 May 1933; 'Au tribunal militaire. Uobjecteur de conscience Armand Rolland explique 
son refusde porter les armes, La France du Centre, 11 May 1933; VObjecteur de q'%science Armand 
Rolland devant le tribunal militaire', Le Ripublicain Orlianais, 11 May 1933; 'Tribunal Militaire 
d'Orl6ans. Le proc6s de l'objecteur de conscience', La France du Centre, 12 May 1933; TObjecteur 
de conscience, Le Journal du Loiret, 11 May 1933; TObjecteur de conscience, in ibid, 12 May 1933. 
39 For the theory that Chautemps was perhaps behind the leaking of the Circular, see 'Les 
Objecteurs de Conscience', Le Quotidien, 6 May 1933. A reply to this can be read in 'Contre les 
objecteurs de Conscience', Action Franpise, 7 May 1933. See also the internal 'Note Confidentielle' 
of 2 May 1933 probably written in either the Suret6 Gdn&ale or perhaps in Chautemps'own office - in AN F7/13352. 
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mobilisation, the proposed amendment to Article 91 extended the offence to anyone found 
guilty of 'provoking disobedience or the return of mobilisation papers', whether or not this 
propaganda or provocation actually led to the act in question - in effect creating a d9lit 
d'opinion. The penalities envisaged for recalcitrant reservists were harsher by several 
degrees of magnitude. Whereas previously purely disciplinary penalties of four or eight 
days in the local garrison gaol were provided for men who could not produce their reserve or 
mobilisation papers, the amended version of Article 92 laid down penalties of between six 
months and three years with a fine varying from 100 to 3000 francs and the potential 
removal of one's civic rights for five years attached for good measure. 40 
Daladier submitted these amendments to the Minister of Justice in early January 1934. 
The government wanted to slip this bill through the Chamber with as little fuss and debate 
as possible, 'having as its sole object the stopping of the most dangerous manifestations of 
the systematic propaganda which appears to have been organised for some time against 
the fulfilment of their military duties by French citizens. ' The harshness of the penalties 
envisaged was justified by the Ministry's fear that C. O. propaganda could conceivably 
compromise a mobilisation order. 41 
The events of 6 February intervened however, and removed Daladier from office. Not 
surprisingly, the new War Mirister, Marshall P6tain, was equally interested in stamping 
out the effects of the C. O. 'movement', as a note from him to the President of the Army 
Commission in the Chamber makes abundantly clear. The Army Commission agreed with 
the governmenfs analysis of the situation and the proposed amendments in a report dated 
21 February. On 2 March the Chamber's Civil and Criminal Legislation. Commission 
recommended that the penalties suggested in the amendments be reduced to between one 
month and one year. The Goverrunent and the Chamber's Army Commission agreed with 
alacrity, such was the desire to see the amendments become law. Despite the opposition 
and counter-amendments of the deputies, Chouffet and Planche, both of them pacifist 
sympathisers, the amendments were finally passed by the Chamber on 30 June, by the 
Senate on 5 July, becoming law on 8 July, 1934.42 
40 Service Historique de I'Arm6e de Terre (hereafter cited as SHAT), Chateau de Vincennes, 
6N468/Dossier 4. 'Note pour le Secr6tariat Gdndrat Travaux Ldgislatifs, 26 136cembre 1933. 
41 Ibid., 'Le Ministre de la Guerre A Monsieur le Garde des Sceaux, Ministre de la justice, 8 
January 1934. 
42 Ibid., 'Philippe Pdtain A Monsieur Ie Prdsident de la Commission de I'Arm6e de la Chambre 
des 136putds', 16 February 1934; 'Rapport no. 3086 CAnnexe au procýs-verbal de la 3e sdance de la 
Chambre des Ddputds du 21 f6vrier 1934) fait au norn de la Commission de I'Arm6e... par M Albert 
Forcinal'; 'Avis (no. 3157, Annexe au procýs-verbal de la sdance de la Chambre des D6putds du 2 
mars 1934) pr6sent6 au nom de la Commission de la Ldgislation Civile et Criminelle par M Georges 
Pernot'; 'Rapport Suppldmentaire (no. 3286, Annexe au. proc6s-verbal de la sdance de la Chambre 
des 136putds du 15 mars 1934) au nom de la Commission de I'Arm6e ... par M Albert Forcinal'; 'Note 
sur I'amendement de M Chouffet, Nput6,29 juin 1934; and M Jean Taurines' (Annexe au Proc6s- 
verbal de la s6ance du Sdnat du 3 jtiý0934). 
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All of this seems to coincide with Pdtain! s thinking on the nature of French education 
and military preparedness. The army was concerned about the direction of events in Europe 
and France's ability to 'enforce respect for a state of peace which she herself would not 
disturb'. As Pdtain wrote in a memorandum of 26 March 1934, 'the education of the race is 
too much neglected. Youth and children are not educated with a view to their duties: this is 
what must be remedied first of all, through a better pre-military preparation of youth and 
by a primary system of education which guarantees health of body and mi nd to the child. 
We ought to draw inspiration on these two levels from what is happening in Germany and 
Italy'. 43 
Perhaps the most significant and interesting effect of the disclosure of the Circular, 
though, was within the pacifist movement itself. Far more than Action Franqaise 
harassment or police surveillance had ever done, the ideological and tactical rifts opened 
up by disclosure of the Circular were of enormous import. As has already been mentioned, 
there had always been debate within the LICP and other pacifist groups about the efficacy 
of conscientious objection, individual or collective. These now came to a head. Eug6ne 
Lagot, the Secretary of the newly-formed Conscientious Objectors' League, tried to convince 
the officers of the LICP to strike while the iron was hot and government defences down, to 
mount a campaign to generalise his colleague Leretour's gesture into a nationwide movement 
in the true sense of the word. Here courage failed the LICP, and with a collective shiver of 
cold feet, the grand idea died. In a scathing article entitled 'Sous le Signe de la Peur' 
(Under the Sign of Fear) published in Le Serneur on 22 July, Lagot denounced the failure of 
nerve of the LICP in the face of obvious government oppression and fear, and the general 
tendency of the pacifist movement to content itself with meaningless rhetoric and big public 
meetings. Lagot, Leretour and their Conscientious Objectors' League struggled on by 
themselves for two more years until they were ordered to cease and desist in a court 
dissolution order early in 1935.44 
The Circulaire Chautemps makes clear that the French government was becoming very 
concerned by 1933 about the growth of the peace movement and its effects on public opinion. 
Conscientious objection was but an easily identifiable sub-set of this larger phenomenon 
which in its virulent anarchist/ left-wing forms presented special problems. The 
observation by the Interior Ministry memorandum writer cited above that the 'movement' 
was becoming more interested in simple self-preservation and less in high-n-drided moral 
valour rings true: then again, in a country whose soil was still damp from the blood of the 
43 SHAT SN577(2). 'Notes du Mardchal. Pftin pour le chef de FEtat-major g6ndral de I'arm6e 
sur "Ies Wes maltresses qui doivent inspirer l'organisation de la d6fense national"', 26 March 1934. 
44 Eug6ne Lagot, 'Sous le Signe de la Peur', Le Semeur, 22 July 1934. See also Notes of 22 
December 1934,2 January and 5 January 1935 on the dissolution of the Ligue des Objecteurs de 
Conscience from the Pr6fecture de Police - contained in AN F7/13352. 
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Great War, the former position is perhaps understandable if not admirable. The 
Chautemps Circular seems to point out the dichotomies and contradictions in the interwar 
French attitude towards the Army, the State, and the Individual. jean-Jacques Becker's 
comment that the French perception, of the Army had undergone a major change in the 
period 1870 to 1914 can probably be extended to the interwar period as well. No longer did 
the French quite as readily accept the burden of service in the glorious Republican Army. 
But equally as well, French political and military society was not prepared to accept the 
validity of the Napoleonic dictum, so often cited by the pacifist press, that 'the reign of 
the Nation ceases where begins the reign of conscience'. It would be another thirty years 
before the old anarchist Louis Lecoin would in his famous hunger strike of 1063 force General 
de Gaulle to agree to legislation creating a French statute for conscientious objectors. 45 
45 On changing French attitudes to the Army (and within the Army), see Raoul Girardet, La Socilti militaire dans la France Contemporaine (1815-1939) (Paris: Plon, 1953). See also Jean-Jacques Becker, Le Camet B (Paris: Klincksieck, 1973), pp. 13-16. On Louis Lecoin and the 1963 Statute for Conscientious Objectors, see Jean-Pierre Cattelain, L'Objection de conscience (Paris: Presses Urtiversitaires de France, 3rd edition, 1982), pp. 50-56; and Auvray, op. cit., pp243-260. 
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APPENDIX Il 
Romain Rolland, Interwar Pacifism and the Problem of Peace. ' 
Famous for his stubborn stand au-dessus de la met& against the folly of the First World 
War, for which he earned nothing but the bitter opprobrium of both his native France and of 
the Germany he loved, Romain Rolland[ 1866-19441 had become by 1918 France's most 
renowned pacifist and the 'Conscience of Europe. '2 Winner of the 1915 Nobel Prize in 
Literature for his ten-volume novel sequence, lean-Christophe, Rolland had already 
completed a good portion of his life's work by 1918. Indeed, in many respects he had become 
part of the 'older' generation before the war began - neither by inclination nor outlook did 
he belong to the 'generation of 1914' described in such fascinating detail by Robert Wohl. 3 
Rolland incarnated the infOlectuel engagi of the 1920s and 1930s long before Sartre ever 
popularized the phrase. As Wilhelm Herzog wrote in the 1926 special number of Europe 
dedicated to Rolland on the occasion of his sixtieth birthday, he was 
a man who does not simply want to 'do' literature. Rather, [he is] a 
man who wishes to help in bettering this miserable world, to 
transform its anarchy into an order inspired by reason... Certainly 
not a Marxist. But a man who, nevertheless, adopts the critical 
conclusions and the categorical imperative of Karl Marx.. 4 
I This appendix was originally read as an invited paper at the American-European Consultation 
on Peace Research in History held at Stadtschlaining, Austria from 24-29 August 1986. It is to be 
published in Charles Chatfield and Peter van den Dungen, ed., Peace Movements and Political 
Cultures (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, in press). It is largely based on the author's M. A. 
major research essay at the University of Toronto which was supervised by Professor John C. Cairns. 
2 Romain Rolland, Le Pýriple avec une Prdface de Maurice Betz (Paris: Editions Emile-Paul 
Fr&es, 1946), p. 148 (hereafter cited asPiriple). Unless otherwise indicated, all translations in this 
appendix from the French or German are the work of this author. 
3 Robert Wohl, The Generation of 1914 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1980), p. 15. 
4 Wilhelm Herzog, 74moignages & Romain Rolland', in Europe (No. spdcial consacr6 i 
Romain Rolland), 38 (15 February 1926), 165-66. 
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Committed to social justice and the principles behind the Russian Revolution, Rolland 
nevertheless declared in 1927 that 'Bolshevism had destroyed [high ideals] by its narrow 
sectarianism, its inept intransigence, and its cult of violence. It has engendered fascism 
which is Bolshevism in reverse. '5And yet, by the beginning of the 1930s, Rolland, to the 
surprise of many, had'sudden[ly] and inexplicabl[y] conver[ted] to the communist cause, 6. 
As David Caute says, 'no other idealist writer leapt as abruptly into the arms of 
Bolshevism as did Rolland. 7 Clearly, Rolland, too, was susceptible to the 'rhetoric of his 
time'. But he was not alone. His remark in the Prologue to Quinze Ans de Combat 
[published in 1935] that 'the "I" of which I recount the evolution is not me: it is the whole 
age to which we belong', rings very true. 8 
His first post-war fictional hero, C16rambault, in the novel of the same name [19191, 
became in Rolland's own words, 'the apostle and the martyr of those who refused to bend 
their spirit to the inevitability of the violence which was being let loose over the whole 
world... it became the gospel, the rallying point for all French conscientious objectors who 
were still rather uncertain about their faith'. 9 In response to a critique of his interwar 
novel sequence, LAme enchantie [1921-19331, Rolland wrote in 1935 that its theme 'is the 
negation of war, and he goes on to say that 'this refusal is still, to this very day, the basis 
of all my social ideas, as well as of those of our Soviet friends'. 10 The fight against war 
was not an isolated one for Rolland, however. Intimately and irrevocably allied to it was 
the categorical imperative of social revolution referred to by Herzog above. As the 
interwar period progressed this second tenet of Rolland's credo assumed increasingly large 
proportions. But looking back in 1940 on the early Thirties, as he wrote his spiritual 
testament". Rolland insisted on the binary nature of what he called his 'extraordinarily 
perilous task: to lead the opposition to war, which was a fundamental article of my code of 
social action, and the fight against international oppression'. 12 In the crepuscular seclusion 
of V6zelay, with the dust of the Nazi invaders before him, he could write with some 
5 Cited in Maurice Nadeau, 'Romain Rolland, Journal of Contemporary History, 2(April, 1967), 
216. 
6 Ibid. 
7 David Caute, Communism and the French Intellectuals 1914-1960 (London: Andre Deutsch, 
1964) p. 105. Hereafter cited as Caute. 
8 Romain Rolland, I will not rest, translated from the French by K. S. Shelvankar (New York: 
Liveright, nd, ) p. 12. Hereafter cited as IWNR. 
9 Ibid., 'Panorama, pp. 22-23. 
10 Ibid., p. 43. 
11 Piriple, pp. 11-23. The words are Maurice Betz': 'Le Testament Spirituel de Romain Rolland - 
Pr6face par Maurice Betz'. 
12 Piriple, p. 151 
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justification that 'I have never separated the struggle against capitalist and 'militarist 
imperialism . from that for the defence of international peace'13. 
It is the purpose of this appendix to exan-dne this 'perilous task! of Rolland's, to follow 
the evolution of his political thought on the problems of peace and pacifism, and to see how 
it was translated into concrete action in his relations with pacifist and war resistance 
organisations, during the interwar years. As will become clear, this evolution was one from 
Individualism to Collectivism, from one'above the battle' to one in its very thick, 'du Rke 
a IAction'. This process can be divided into three distinct periods: the first from the Great 
War to about 1924, the second from then until the early Thirties, and the final period from 
about 1932 to the outbreak of war in 1939.14 
The Rejection of Violence (1914-1924) 
Rolland's individualistic position as the defender of civilization and justice dominates 
the first period in our narrative. He spent the war years in Switzerland where he 
happened to be in July 1914, and it was from his Swiss retreat that he issued the periodic 
articles which earned him the general hatred of all sides in the conflict. The most famous 
of these was also the first, entitled 'Au-dessus de la m6l6e' (Above the Battle) -a title he 
was to regret in later life. In it, Rolland, the independent man of thought declared that 'for 
us, the artists and poets, priests and thinkers of all countries, remains another task. Even in 
time of war, it remains a crime for finer spirits to compromise the integrity of their 
thought..., 15 He laid the blame for the great European bloodletting at the feet of the 
rulers, and declared that there was no fatality about war: 'The only fatality is what we 
desire; and more often than not, what we do not desire enough'16. The war years show us a 
Rolland committed to individualism, independence of thought, and internationalism, and 
who rejected categorically the war and all forms of historical determinism. In the famous 
13 lbid, p. 152 
14 Readers should take note of three articles by David James Fisher which differ from this 
authoes periodisation of Rolland's pacifist activity but which nevertheless provide an interesting 
analysis of the period up to 1925. See David James Fisher. 'The Rolland-Barbusse Debat& in Survey. 
A journal of East and West Studies, Spring/Summer 1974 (20,2/3), 120-159. See also: 'Romain Rolland 
and the popularization of Gandhi: 1923-1925, GandhilMarg, July 1974, pp. 145-180. See also: 'Pacifism 
and the Intellectual: The Case of Romain Rolland', Peace and Change: A Journal of Peace Research, 
Winter 1982 (Vll, l /2), 85-96. 
1,5 Romain Rolland, Above the Battle, translated by CK Ogden (Chicago: The Open Court 
Publishing Company, 1916), p. 53. 
16 lbid, p. 42. 
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interview with the republican German joumalist, Hermann Femau. in July 1918, shortly 
before the close of the war, Rolland stated: 
I belong to no political party. Before the war I was invited several 
times to join pacifist organisations. I was unwilling because this 
official pacifism seemed childish to me, as long as it did not 
declare itself revolutionary and republican. - By profession an 
Historian, I am by nature in every sense an ndependent man of 
ideas. 17 
Rolland greeted the Russian Revolution gladly as 'the first act of that universal 
liberation of humanity from the tyranny of the past', which was necessary if mankind was 
'to escape a repetition of the sufferings of the First World War'. 18 He was, however, 
quickly disillusioned by reports of Bolshevik terror and the atrocities committed by both 
sides in the Civil War. 19 But whilst Rolland may have entertained doubts about the 
methods used by the Bolsheviks, he did not for one moment question the need to support this 
greai social experiment, which he saw as the unique effort being made to break away from 
the bondage of the past. One year previously, he had defined to Marcel Martinet his own, 
rather different, brand of internationalism as 
one of Love and not of Hate. It is doubtless impractical and more 
religious than realistic. But to each his own role. Mine is 
necessary, too. 20 
With the cessation of hostilities and the advent of peace negotiations in Paris, Rolland 
remained 'profoundly disturbed'; he thought that it would be the peoples who would 
continue to suffer, and he feared above all else the hatred which would insinuate itself into 
the peace treaties and thereby make another future war inevitable. 21 When the Versailles 
Treaty was finally signed in June of 1919, Rolland's feeling of doom was complete. His 
prophetic reaction is recorded in his journal: 'Sad peace! Ridiculous intermission between 
two massacres of peoples. But who thinks of tomorrow? '22 
Rolland faced the dawn of the post-war world with his idealistic faith in liberty, the 
individual and the free struggle of intellectuals for social justice intact. In the spring of 1919 
he issued his famous Diclaration d7nd6pendance de I'Esprit, which by 1921 had provoked 
Henri Barbusse to attack Rolland's detachment from the real world of political problems 
17 Hermann Femau, 'Romain Rolland und der Weltkrieg. Eine Unterredung', Wissen und 
Leeben, XX (April 1- September 15,1918), p. 301. 
18 Frank Field, Three French Writers and the Great War: Studies in the Rise of Communism 
and Fascism(Cambridge: at the University Press, 1975), p. 57. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Cited in Marcelle Kempf, Romain Rolland et I'Allemagne (Paris: Debresse, 1962), p. 276. 
Hereafter cited as Kempf. 
21 Ibid, p. 210. 
22 Cited in ibid., pp. 221-222. 
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where more was needed than 'independence of thought', where the revolution required a 
commitment to action, and if necessary to violent action. 23 Rolland took issue with 
Barbusse's and Clartifs tendency, as he called it, 'to assimilate the enigma of human 
evolution to a problem in Euclidean geometry'. 24 As he wrote retrospectively in 1934, 'l 
could not throw away my gods, those who had enabled me to live - the god Humanity, and 
the god Liberty, in order to serve only the god RevolutiorV. 2-5 He defended his right to be 
within the revolution and yet remain a free mamM And he adamantly refused to accept the 
need for violence: 'Our common enemy, he wrote to Barbusse, 'is the oppressive violence of 
human society as it exists at present. But against that violence, you arm an adverse 
violence. In my view .... that method only leads to mutual destructioW. 
27 
The answer lay elsewhere for Rolland and it is here that the first intimations of the 
development of his thought on the methods of pacifism in the twenties appear 
.... there is another weapon, much more powerful and suited for all, to the humblest as well as to the most exalted: it has already 
proved its efficacy amongst other peoples, and it is astonishing 
that no one ever speaks of it in France: it is that employed amongst 
Anglo-Saxons by the thousands of 'conscientious objectors', that by 
means of which Gandhi is now undermining the domination of the 
British Empire in India - Civil Disobedience. I do not say passive 
resistance, for make no mistake, it is the supreme resistance. 28 
The question of Means and Ends, of violence and non-violence, * is essential to an 
understanding of European pacifism and Rolland's development in it during the interwar 
years. In this initial period under discussion, up to 1924, Rolland's rejection of violence was 
absolute, and applied to all parties. As he wrote in the epilogue to Marianne Rauz&s book, 
L'Antiguerre, in November 1923, 'you perform a high and humane task in trying to group 
together all those who are opposed to violence, wherever it may come from, whatever it 
may be%29 Betraying already the influence of Gandhi, and pre-figuring his later concerns 
about the lack of realism amongst pacifists, Rolland wrote that action must be firmly 
23 JWNR , pp. 91-94. For George Bernard Shaw's refusal to sign the Declaration see Romain Rolland, Par la Rivolution, la Paix (Paris: Editions sociales internationales, 1935), pp. 11-14. See also 
Romain Rolland, Textes Politiques, philsophiques, et sociaux choisis, Avec Introduction et Notes par 
lean Albertini (Paris: Editions sociales, 1970), for commentary by Albertini, pp. 179-181. Inthissame 
collection, see also Henri Barbusse, Vautre moitid du devoir. A propos du Rollandisme, p. 193-194. 
See also Nicole Racine, 'The Clartd Movement in France, 1919-21's in Journal of Contemporary 
History, 2, no. 2 (April, 1967), pp. 195-208. 
24 1 WNR, p. 128. 
25 'Panoramaý, in ibid., p. 16. 
26 IWNR, p. 133. 
27 Ibid., p. 135. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Romain Rolland, 'Contre un pacifisme n6gatif Vettre ý Marianne Rauze, 23 novembre 1923), 
in Par la R-Avolution, la Paix, p. 93. 
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anchored in faith and in the soul, and must furthermore be prepared for the ultimate 
sacrifice. Th e positive task of those opposing la patrie wýS to oppose a new ideal to the old 
one, he wrote, 
and not to shy away from making it bum brightly in the hearts of 
the men of today, with all the flames of a new faith... whether the 
soul exists or not, you will only conquer if you act as if it did exist, as 
if you were sure of eternity. Because in the fight which is 
beginning, you are not a majority of numbeTS or of righteousness 
against an immoral minority. You are an elite, a moral minority. 
You mustn't delude yourselves, my friends. A new faith, like that 
which you represent - human fraternity, the Unity of the living - is 
never victorious before long trials, sacrifices and martyrdoms. 30 
The summer of 1924 began something of a political prise de conscience in Rolland which 
forced a re-exan-driation, and then a gradual repudiation of his slide into the Rbe of 
individualist, idealist independence. In Le P&iple, he writes that during that summer, 
'away from Paris, sick, alone, and trying to hide from Action, I took up again the happy 
chains of a new novel cycle. In order to escape better, I had submerged myself into the life of 
a woman, "une Ame enchantee-. 31 But escape he could not. 
In these summer months of 1924, a series of stunning events brought 
me violently back to reality from my dreams in the shadow of the 
old walnut at Villeneuve. In Italy on the 10th of June 1924, 
Matteotti was assassinated. On the 6th of April 1926, Amendola 
succumbed after months of suffering brought on by the most cowardly 
of attacks. These noble men, these pure consciences, both of them 
enemies of all violence... were both friends whom I admired. 
During all of 1925 1 was besieged in my retreat by the cries of 
anguish of the oppressed of the worlV2 
Recognising for better of worse that he was the 'Conscience of Europe', Rolland publicly 
declared in September 1925 that he was 'with all the oppressed, against all of the 
oppressors, 33, thus beginning the slow transition in his political thinking which would see 
his conversion to Communism in the early 1930s. In the period from 1924 until then, 
however, he became increasingly involved in the struggle for peace and social justice -a 
duality which he believed inseparable. 1924 marks the beginning of the end of his 
cherished 'independence of thought' upon which the'demands of action were beginning to 
impinge. As he himself wrote 
... once entered into these seven circles of sorrows, it was no longer 
possible for me to disengage myself... The more I attached a price to 
the maintenance of my independence, the more the parties at battle 
30 lbid, -pp. 95-96 
31 Piriple, p. 147. 
32 lbid, pp. 148-149. 
33 Ibid, p. 150. 
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attached a price to conquering it, or if they could not do that, to 
exploiting it, in availing themselves of my name as of a palladium 
of moral conscience. 34 
The Struggle for Peace and Social justice (1924-1932) 
From 1924 to the beginning of the Thirties was a time of searching for Rolland during 
which he attempted to rationalize his intellectual position in politics. And, as he later 
wrote, 'the great influence which dominated my spirit in those years was that of 
Gandhi'. 3,5 Action, consistent with his idealistic beliefs and non-violent disposition became 
the key goal. And, as Rolland was wont to say, there could be no more heroic action than 
that of non-violent resistance. 
I could never tolerate that Gandhi's thought [he wrote] should be 
confused with that of an enervated pacifism which bends its back 
and acquiesces bleatingly. I have always insisted on the 'fighting 
character', the word 'sword' which Gandhi repeats constantly - 
opposing it to the steel sword, blade against blade to characterize 
the heroic weapon of self-sacrifice, individual and collective, in 
the cause of the Truth... 36 
William Thomas Starr writes that 'Rolland brought to the [peace] movement two 
concepts: the army of the individual conscience (the rights and the cause of the conscientious 
objectors), and the army of the collective conscience (Gandhi's Non-Acceptance). '37 In fact, 
by 1924, Rolland had begun to see these two concepts as two sides of the same coin: the 
collective conscience of Gandhian non-violent resistance would only succeed if it were 
founded upon a multitude of individual consciences who were strong within themselves. 
Increasingly, after 1924, the two concepts which Rolland applied to the peace movement 
and tried to-reconcile, were the seeming antitheses of non-violence and social revolution. 
Whereas Cldrambault rejected the 'mechanical perfection of the ant-hill' in favour of the 
'individualistic ideal more productive for society'.. 38 Rolland's young interwar hero, Marc, 
like his creator, wished to reconcile the experiments being conducted in the U. S. S. R. and 
34 lbid, pp. 150,153. 
35 'Panorama, IWNR, p. 39. 
36 Ibid, p. 40. 
37 William T. Starr, Ro? nain Rolland and'a World at War(Evanston: Northwestern University 
Press, 1956), p. 83 [hereafter cited as Starr (1)]. 
38 Kempf, p. 224. 
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India. Society had to be changed and these were the only two hopeful possibilities which 
presented themselves. As Marcelle Kempf writes: 
Historic fatality had made them enemies, and he wanted to 
reconcile, like his young hero Marc, the Non-Acceptance of India 
with organized revolutionary violence, the rights of the Individual 
and the social imperative, le Rive ef IAction. 39 
It was a task which he later recognized was like trying to wed fire and water. 40 - 
As Rolland later realized, the world had to will the success of the great experiment in 
non-violence, and times were not propitious for such a concerted effort of collective self-will. 
'Our words must not be equivocal', wrote Rolland to Gandhi on 16 April 1928, 
In the coming crisis there must be no doubt about Gandhi's 
thought .... it is necessary to weigh all the consequences of the orders 
given, to weigh the forces of the men to whom they will be 
entrusted. The young men of Europe are aware of the trials waiting 
for them. They don't want to be duped about the imminence of the 
danger, which too many 'pacifists' are trying not to see and to put 
out of their minds. They want to look it clearly in the face, and 
they ask: 'To what extent is it reasonable, to what extent is it 
human, not to accept? Must the sacrifice be total, absolute, without 
exception, without any consideration either for ourselves, or for the 
things which surround us, and depend on us? And in all honesty to 
ourselves, can we be sure that this total suffering will diminish the 
sum total of future human suffering - or does it not risk handing over 
man's destiny to a barbarity without counter-weight? '41 
This long quotation is important for a number of reasons. It shows Rolland's awareness 
that a disciplined, and well thought-out approach was needed to the problem of non- 
violent resistance in Europe. Secondly, the criticism of the lack of realism in pacifist 
thinking is one which will reappear in the Thirties in increasingly strident tones. Finally, 
there is in the last phrase of the paragraph an ominous presaging of the trials which 
awaited European pacifists and non-violent resisters in the years ahead. In a sense, the 
final phrase is the rock upon which much of European, secular, left-wing pacifism was to 
founder in the late Thirties. 
Bringing together his ideas on peace and social revolution, Rolland told Gandhi in 1931 
that 'the only really effective non-resistance would be in the factories and the arsenals, 
that of the working proletariat,. 42 Accordingly, the 'official' pacifism of governments and 
the League of Nations did not interest Rolland. Nor could he come to terms with the 
39 Ibid. p. 250. 
40 'Panorama'in lWNR, p. 40. 
41 Romain Rolland and Gandhi Correspondence(New Delhi: Ministry of Information and 
Broadcasting, 1966). Hereafter cited as GandhilRolland, No. 125. Rolland to Gandhi, 16 April 1928, pp. 
112-113. 
42 GandhilRolland, No. 193. Extract from Romain Rolland's Diary, December 1931, p. 169. 
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'pacifistic imperialism' of Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi and his journal Pan-Europa, 
whose eurocentricity and avowed hatred of Soviet Russia and the social revolution were 
the antitheses of Rolland's own beliefs. 43 
Rolland took a much livelier interest, however, in the work of the War Resisters' 
International (or WRI), a federation of war resisters' organisations which numbered 
affiliated sections in twenty-one different countries in 1928.44. Whilst condenu-dng violence, 
the WRI espoused a positive pacifism which strove for 'the removal of all the causes of 
war'. 45 In the words of a 1927 WRI resolution, 'the first object of the War Resisters' 
International must be to prevent wa e, by amongst other thin gs, 'working for the suppression 
of Capitalism and Imperialism by the establishment of a new social order and international 
order based on the principle of co-operation for the common good'. 46 When Gandhi briefly 
contemplated a European tour early in 1928, it was the WRI which Rolland commended to 
him as an organisation deserving of his support, containing men of 'limpid faith calmly 
pre0ared for every sacrifice'. 47 
Rolland sent a letter of greeting to the WRI at its conference in July 1928 at 
Sonntagsberg, Austria. He echoed the appeal of the Roumanian pacifist, Eugen Relgis, for 
the creation of a Pacifist International: 'Put aside all that separates us, all these little 
shades of political, social, religious, and philosophical ideas', he wrote. 48 The only point 
of disagreement Rolland expressed was the assumption of Relgis and Professor Nicolai of 
the imn-dnent 'disappearance of war through its own elephantiasis,. 49 This tendency on the 
part of pacifist groups to view the world through rose-colored spectacles annoyed and 
worried Rolland - the common theme running through his correspondence with pacifists in 
the twenties and thirties is the need to look at the world objectively and realistically. 
War, he proclaimed, 'armed with new and gigantic weapons, threatens not to disappear 
before it has made humanity disappear... '50 
43 The expression is Coudenhove-Mergi's in 'Das Pan-Europa Programm', Pan-Europa, 1,2 
(May 1924), 3. See also Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, Pazifismus(Vienna/Leipzig: Pan-Europa Verlag, 
1924). For Rolland's reaction to a Pan-Europa survey of the attitude taken by selected European 
intellectuals and politicians to the idea of a United States of Europe, see'Rundfrage. Il. Teil' in Pan- 
Europa, 11,6/7 (1926). For Coudenhove-Kalergi's position on war and the revolution see 'Krieg und Revolution' in Pan-Europa, IV 9 (November 1928), pp. 1-9. 
44 War Resisters! Intemational, Way Resisters in Many Lands (Enfield: WRI, 1928), republished in Charles Chatfield, ed. International War Resistance Through World War II (New York: Garland 
Publishin& 1975), pp. 382-M. Hereafter cited as WRI, Many Lands. 45 Ibid,. pp. 388-389. 
46 Idem. International Council Communications, Nos 1-217, Swarthmore College Peace 
Collection Material, Microfilm, University of Toronto Library. Resolution passed at a meeting of the International Council of the WRI, 21-22 May 1927. 47 GandhilRolland, No. 109 Romain Rolland to Madeleine Slade, 7 March 1928, p. 98. 48 Letter of 24 July 1928 contained in WRI, Many Lands, p. 424. 49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
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But Rolland's views were evolving slowly. In 1928-29, in a protracted correspondence 
with Relgis over the latter's proposals for a Pacifist International, Rolland advocated not 
an abstract revolution, but rather one whose potential for violence he defended: 
No, I do not condemn the Revolution... I believe revolution, as much 
as evolution, to be a necessary and fatal form of human 
development;... Revolution is not necessarily a synonym for cruel 
brutality. It can be an explosion of enthusiasm and love. Such was, 
at the beginning, the Revolution of 1789.... revolution is an almost 
inevitable tempo of the symphony of history. And one must deny 
neither the grandeur nor the good of it. 51 
In a long counter-response, Relgis argued that revolution without recourse to violence was a 
chimera, throwing back in Rolland's face his earlier statements against violencefi2 
Rolland's position here on revolutionary violence shows how far his thought had 
progressed since the 1922 debate with Barbusse over the ends and the means of the 
revolution. Clearly, he was moving from a position of undaunted individualism to one of 
support for an idea regardless of its immediate implications. From this point on, Rolland 
increasingly beat the drum according to the 'inevitable tempo! of history. 
This gradual relinquishing of individual responsibility for the course of history can be 
seen in another article written by Rolland in 1928 for Madeleine Vernet who published a 
newspaper entitled La Volonti de Paix which was the organ of a new group of war resisters 
in Paris of the same name. La Volonti de Paix was an affiliated section of the WRI, had 
been represented at the 1928 Sonntagsberg conference, and had been active in a peace letter 
campaign in France and Belgium that yearý3 In his article Rolland posed the question, 'do 
we all want the same peaceT. It was not enough to want it, one also had to desire the 
conditions necessary for peace, and that meant knowing what those conditions were. 54 
Rolland wrote that the great crisis of the age was not so much a political, economic, or 
social one, as a crisis of conscience. Humanity, he said, found itself at a turning point where 
it had to choose between an ideal based on the past, and one based on the future. The former 
had begun to die, and the latter was not yet ripe. Yet it was essential to choose between 
them. The dying ideal was that of la Patrie nationale, and the one to come was that of la 
Patrie humaine. 55 Rolland's appeal to the members of La Volonti de Paix contains nothing 
really new. He re-iterated his call for co-operation between all groups, all peoples, and all 
nations of the world in the fight for peace, a peace which must include social justice. What 
is of note, however, is his use of the slogan, 'he who wants the Ends, desires also the 
51 Rolland in Eugen Relgis, L 'Internationale Pacifiste (Paris: Andr6 Delpeuch, 1929), pp. 28-29. 
'52 Ibid. pp. 90 and 107-108. 53 
54 
WRI, Many Lands, p. 404. 
55 
La Volontd de Pai)C in Par la R-fvolution, la Paix, p. 100. 
Ibid. p. jol. 
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Means'. 56 In this article it is not applied directly to a revolutionary situation (although 
certainly by implication), but it is nevertheless revealing as an indication of the direction 
of Rolland's thought. It will be remembered that six years previously he had attacked 
Barbusse for using precisely the same argument! 
Through-out 1930 and 1931 Rolland became increasingly concerned that anti-n-dlitarist 
and pacifist groups were beginning to look upon conscientious objection as a simple. matter of 
refusal of military service, without considering either a more positive contribution to 
society, nor what sort of ultimate self-sacrifice this conscientious objection n-dght entail in 
time of war, nor even what type of war the next one might be. This fuzzy-n-dndedness 
bothered him a great deal. In early January 1930 he wrote a letter to a group of French anti- 
militarists and libertarians on behalf of Eugýne Guillot, an imprisoned conscientious 
objector. 57 Rolland supported out of principle Guillot's right to be a conscientious objector, 
but rejected as a sound reason for this the simple fact that Guillot considered himself a 
libertarian and merely did not want to sign up for military service. 'I do not accept this 
consequence or this altemative, he wrote. 'Whether one accepts the idea of the Patrie or 
not, a man is never alone, and he must take account of the community. His conscientious 
objection is of value not to him alone, but also to the community, and it is it which he 
defends in defending his own conscience., 58 And here Rolland held up the example of the 
International Civil Service organized by Pierre Cdrdsole as an example of a positive act of 
service to the community. Only if there were a social side to conscientious objection could it 
have any value. 59 
But it was perhaps even more the cowardly, foolish optin-dsm of some leaders of the 
peace movement which worried Rolland, what he referred to as the 'criminal illusions by 
which certain leaders of the European non-resistance movement caressed and deluded young 
people'. 60 Small wonder, then, that he should find himself in complete disagreement with 
the practical implications of Albert Einstein's famous '2% speech' before the New History 
Society in New York City in December 1930. In this speech Einstein made two essential 
points: firstly, that if only two percent of the world's population refused military service, 
or any activity related to war, international conflict would become an impossibility. 
Secondly, he argued for the creation, by international legislation, of an alternative service 
for those who refused mflitary service. The '2% solutiore was immediately taken up by the 
56 Ibid. p. 103. 
57 VObjection de Conscience doit 6tre non individualiste et libertaire, mais sociale' (Lettre pour 
la lib6ration de Yobjecteur de conscience Eug6ne Guillot -8 janvier 1930. Rdponse A un groupernent 
d'antimilitaristes et de libertaires franqais), in Par la R6volufion, la Paix, pp. 91-92. 
-58 Ibid. p. 91. 
59 Ibid. p. 91 
60 'Sur la Rdsistance PassiveUettre du 14 juillet 1930 A un des jeunes organisateurs franqais du 
'septi6me camp d'amiti6 internationale' A Chevreuse), in Par la Rofvolution, la Paix, Note 1, p. 69. 
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War Resisters' International. In response to a WRI questionnaire of very influential people, 
Rolland maintained that it was for him an obligation of conscience to refuse to participate 
in war, either directly or indirectly. But if one moved from the level of moral obligation to 
that of practical utility, Rolland wrote that Einstein's proposal was modest indeed. 
Warfare had evolved considerably since 1914, he argued, and would continue to do so. He 
foresaw the day when small armies of technicians would fight battles of a destructive 
nature as yet unconceived. 61 
It must be said bluntly, without illusions. [There is] no other 
practical way to abolish war promptly than to abolish the present 
system of government and society which is the generator of wars! In 
effect, the revolutionaries are right: a social revolution is 
necessary. 62 
And perhaps the greatest revolutionary tactic, in his view, was the principle of 
Gandhian non-violent resistance. But war clouds could not be simply wished away. Mere 
refusal on the part of just 2% of the population would not stop the modem war machine. 
Massive organisation was needed, and a realization that self- sacrifice might very well be 
demanded. Interestingly, just two months before the 2% speech, Rolland had written to 
Einstein about the terrible responsibility bome by the leaders of the European anti-war, and 
about the efficacy of Gandhian non-violent resistance: 
You know that this is my conviction as well. I should merely like to 
be sure that we never forget, and we never let those who listen to us 
forget, that in our violent Europe, on the eve of a new attack of 
delirium tremens, this refusal has, or will have, self-sacrifice as a 
necessary consequence. Those over whom we have spiritual charge 
must not be allowed to form illusions on the strength of our words; 
they must realize that we are leading them to almost certain 
martyrdom. If they agree to this, then so do we. In our hard human 
life, martyrdom is almost always the necessary stage through 
which reason must pass in order to progress into the world of 
facts .... 
63 
Einstein, by stating that such a small proportion of the population could have such a great 
effect on world politics was contributing to a dangerous illusion. The War Resisters' 
International simply compounded the error. And so, in Rolland's words, 
I clearly separated myself from A. Einstein and the War Resisters' 
International which had adopted Einstein's declaration; I have 
condemned their illusions, characterized by a dangerously childish 
61 'Correspondance avec Runham Brown au sujet de la d6claration de A. Einstein sur le refus de 
service de guerre', February 1931, in Par la R-Avolution, la Paix pp. 65-66. 
62 Ibid., pp. 66-67. 
63 GandhilRolland, No. 381. Romain Rolland to Albert Einstein, 12 October 1930, p. 425. 
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optimism about the effectiveness in the abolition of war of simple 
individual refusal without any risks. 64 
Pragmatism and Peace (1932-1939) 
The period from about 1932 to the outbreak of war in 1939 is dominated by two major 
facts- Rolland's sudden conversion to a more doctrinaire support of Soviet Russia, and of 
course, the Nazi Machtergreifung of January 1933. -To his credit, Rolland never did allow 
his intellect to become completely submerged in the Third International. With the Nazi- 
Soviet Pact in 1939, with his spirited defence of conscientious objectors in the wake of the 
Amsterdam Congress, amongst other things, Rolland continued to affirm a certain degree of 
independence. As Caute remarks, there is a difference between faith and blind faith. 65 
It was the Amsterdam Congress of August 1932, of which Rolland and Barbusse (what a 
duo! ) were co-chairmen, which showed the path his thoughts on peace were taking in this 
period. In his opening address to the Congress, read for him in his absence, he proclaimed 
the need for a common front against war and the system that engenders it-66 'Action is the 
end of thought', he declared, 
All thought which does not lead to it is an abortion and treason... 
Future wars are in the hands of the working class. It depends on 
them to snuff them out. 67 
With this last statement, the struggle for peace seemed to become the moral preserve of the 
working class, although this apparently contradicts Rolland's repeated calls for people of 
all political hues to join the fight against war. The final manifesto of the Amsterdam 
Congress condemned conscientious objectors and Gandhian Non-Violent Resistance. As, one 
British pacifist remarked at the time, 'Lord, how the word 'pacifisrre stinks in the nostrils 
of most delegates'. 68 In a letter to Barbusse, Rolland vigorously defended the principle of 
conscientious objection and non-violent resistance, differentiating between them and the 
'pusillanimous and only too often hypocritical exploiters of a comfortable and verbal 
64 Tanoramaý, in IWNR, p. 82. 
6-5 Caute, p. 130. 
66 'D6claration lue a la premi&e Sdance du Congrýs mondial de tous les Partis contre la Guerre, 
Amsterdam, 27 August 1932, in Par la FAvlution, la Paix, pp. 4449. 
67 lbid, pp. 48-49. 
68 Martin Ceadel, Pacifism in Britain, 1914-1945. The Defining of a Faith (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1980), p. 114. 
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pacifism without risks'. 
69 But as a rather disturbing indication of how far Rolland's 
thought had progressed in the direction of support of violent revolution, he wrote: 
Everything can and must serve the common struggle: violence and 
non-violence (apparent non-violence for energetic Non-Acceptance, 
vigorously directed is the equivalent of the most violent blockade). 
Refusal of service disorganizes; bourgeois society, to which the 
violent action of the proletariat gives attack. 70 
Here for the first time, non-violence is defended as a tool - and as a preliminary, 
subordinate one at that - of violence 
During 1932 Rolland was Honorary President of the Ligue Internationale des 
Combattants de la Paix, a position which he resigned at the Ligue's Easter Congress in 1933 
because of its apparent inability to define clearly its position, and perhaps more because of 
its statement that pacifism had to be placed above all else. As Rolland said in his 
resignation message, 
Pacifism could not conceivably be 'placed above all else' without a 
demoralizing abdication - above the desperate struggles of the 
exploited and the oppressed, it could not be neutral - there are no 
neutrals in the face of oppression. Either one is against it or one is 
for it, is an accomplice. It is necessary to choose. It is too simple to 
proclaim oneself 'against all wars'. You cannot put the oppressed 
and the oppressors in the same bag.... Affirm clearly your line of 
action. For myself, I affirm mine. I place before all else the defence 
of the oppressed by the social state, and their efforts to realize a 
new society - the defence of the social revolution and of the 
exploited peoples, and I call to their aid the allied forces of the 
organized non-violent resisters, the conscientious objectors, and the 
armed proletariat. 71 
Rolland's view of peace and pacifism can perhaps be summed up in the title of the book 
he published in 1935: Par la Rgvolution, la Paix.. It is ironic perhaps that he should choose 
to use 'Par la R6volution, la Paix' as the title of the epilogue article in this book, for in 
many respects it marks an epilogue to his thought and activity in the period up to around 
1935-36. In this article, he wrote that despite his disgust with the bourgeois democracies, 
despite his implacable opposition to the imperialism of the West, despite all of the things 
he saw around him with which he did not agree, yet nevertheless, he had no wish to see 
Europe fall into the trap of war once again. He saw the threat of Hitlerism looming large, 
believed a war imminent if not quite inevitable, and argued that 'it is not war, but peace, 
69 Tettre A Henri Barbusse sur la place qui doit 6tre faite aux Objecteurs de Conscience et aux 
Gandhistes dans le mouvement r6volutionnaire issu du Congrýs d'Amsterdam', 20 December 1932, 
in Par la Rivolution, la Paix, pp. 61-62. 
70 Ibid., pp. 62-63. 
71 'Le Pacifisme et la Rdvolution', (Adresse du 15 mars 1933 au Congr6s National de P5ques de la 
Ligue Internationale des Combattants de la Paix), in Par la R-elvolution, la Paix, pp. 121 and 123. 
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which is fatal to Hitlerism (which is) incapable of resolving by ordinary means the social 
and economic difficulties which are throttling it. '72 This is the beginning of the final 
phase of Rolland's political approach to the problem of peace and pacifism, a phase in 
which he came to terms with the reality of the Nazi threat and the need for some sort of 
accommodat ion with the bourgeois democracies in the struggle against the new tyranny. 
By 1936 Rolland had rejected Gandhian non-violent resistance as the method which 
could save Europe from war. He realized that time was running out and that it was 
impossible to implement such a splendid philosophy in Europe where men had lost the 
required spiritual faith in a Divinity, and where totalitarian regimes based on violence 
would have no compunction about slaughtering innocent resisters. 73 What then to put in its 
place? In 1936, under the auspices of the World Committee against Fascism and War, 
Rolland published two essays. The first was his Message to the Brussels Congress, and the 
second was an essay entitled How to Prevent the War. 74 Rolland's prescription for peace is 
reduced in these essays to a practical, immediate level unseen in his earlier articles. 
Instead of calling for non-violent resistance as a prelude to social revolution, Rolland 
directed his attention to the problem of what the present bourgeois democracies could do to 
ensure that war would not break out. Accordingly, he argued that all the nations of Europe - 
including Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy - should be invited to join a collective security 
pact. In a departure from his earlier position, he declared his support for a revivified 
League of Nations to confront the present crisis. He continued to see the world situation 
through Marxist eyes, but he left no doubt in his readers' minds that for the moment the 
greatest danger by. far was the Third Reich - the imperialisms of Britain, France, and even 
Italy, paled by comparison. 7-5 Rolland was convinced that Nazism could not withstand the 
onslaught of an organized, collective peace offensive. 76 
The end was now in sight, however. Rolland, perhaps in a gesture of solidarity with 
his country in its hour of need, reversed his action of twenty-five years before, and returned 
to his native Burgundy from Switzerland, moving into a hillside property at Vdzelay. The 
72'Par la Rdvolution, la Pabe, in Par la Rdvolution, la Paix, p. 170. 
73 Starr (1), pp. 84-85. 
74 Romain Rolland, Botschaft an den Kongress von Brüssell and Wie kann man den Krieg 
verhindern? (Paris: Editions du Carrefour, 1936), translated by Rudolf Leonhard, hereafter cited as 
Botschaft or Wie kann man. 
75Wie kann man, p. 17. 
76 Ibid, p. 42- 
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Nazi-Soviet Pact of August 1939 stunned him - he immediately resigned his membership in 
the Association Franqaise des Amis de IU. R. S. S.. On 3 September Rolland wrote to 
Daladier to express his complete support for the French cause: 
In these decisive days in which the French Republic raises itself to 
block the path against the Hitlerian tyranny over Europe, permit 
an old fighter for peace who always denounced the barbarism, the 
perfidy, the frenetic ambition of the Third Reich, to express to you 
his entire devotion to the cause of the democracies, of France, and of 
the whole world which is in danger. 77 
Thus, with the coming of war in the Autumn of 1939, ended the interwar period and 
with it Rolland's active role as a leading light of European pacifism. He remained in the 
seclusion of his home at V6zelay, uranolested by the occupying German armies, until his 
death on 30 December 1944. 
Conclusion 
I have attempted to show in this appendix the evolution and progression of Rolland's 
thought on pacifism and the question of peace. Over the course of the interwar period he 
moved gradually from support of Individualism to Collectivism, from Civilisation to 
Humanitg, from Rgve to Action, a comn-dtment to action which took three successive forms: 
the primarily Gandhian approach with its emphasis on non-violent resistance on both the 
individual and collective levels; secondly, the essentially Marxian approach with its 
emphasis on revolution as a prerequisite to peace; and finally, the pragmatism of the final 
years with its tacit support of the bourgeois democracies. The common theme through-out 
the entire interwar period is his insistence on the pressing need for clear thought, foresight, 
and the necessary definition of tasks, options, and reactions to potential political Situations 
in a minority movement such as pacifism. 
Just how far is Romain Rolland representative of interwar French pacifism? The answer 
is probably to see his pacifism as an eclectic, rather cosmopolitan mixture of ideas and 
influences con-dng from a variety of international sources. For example, his early pacifist 
mysticism is in some ways completely out of step with the political nature of French 
pacifism, as opposed to the strong undercurrent of religious thinking informing much of 
Anglo-American pacifism. This early mysticism, traces of which remain right up to the 
end, was accompanied by an essentially elitist, individualistic and idealistic approach to 
77 Cited in Kempf, p. 273. 
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the problem of peace. This is the early Romain Rolland who could enthuse to Pierre 
C6r6sole in 1923 that 'I should greatly encourage young people looking for a thesis topic in 
history to study the origins and development of conscientious objectors'. 78 At this stage in 
his development Rolland undoubtedly viewed conscientious objection through glasses very 
similar to those worn in the Anglo-Saxon world - that liberty of conscience must be protected 
at all costs. But as the twenties roll into the thirties, this early individualistic ideal 
became overlaid with the trappings of a more orthodox Marxist view of peace and pacifism. 
Peace would only be achieved through revolution, and he finally came round to a reluctant 
acceptance of the potential for violence in the furtherance of that goal. Conscientious 
objection must therefore have a social side to it, and only certain wars and certain types of 
violence were to be objected to. Rolland was not alone in his thinking here. The rise to 
power of the Nazis in Germany, and perhaps even more the case of the Spanish Civil War 
served to produce a hierarchy of neo-pacifist values in some pacifists' minds. Thus, by at 
least 1930, Rolland's ambiguous stand on conscientious objection places him neither in the 
French anarchist/libertarian camp, nor in the majority strand of French pacifism which 
was always very wary of objection in any case. 
Certainly from 1932 onwards, Rolland was increasingly out of step with the main 
stream of French integral (or absolute) pacifism, typified by the Ligue Internationale des 
Cornbattants de la Paix. For French integral pacifists, putting peace first meant incurring 
the wrath not only of a traditional and also a new proto-fascist Right in France, it also 
meant fighting a continual rear-guard action against the attacks of L'Humaniti and the 
Parti Communiste. Amsterdam-Pleyel only served to exacerbate this phenomenon; despite 
the protestations of the French National Committee to the contrary, local Amsterdam- 
Pleyel groups continued to be dominated by local communists who in turn made anyone 
suspected of so-called bourgeois pacifism immediately anathema. Clearly, the major 
international events of the period, especially the rise of Nazism and the Spanish Civil 
War, greatly affected and informed the French pacifist debate. But this debate was 
conducted largely within the confines of a peculiarly French political culture and 
environment. The attacks of the far-left and the extreme-right acted as an ideological 
pincer which retarded and deformed the French peace movement. One sees this even today 
where in France to say that one is a pacifist immediately brings in its wake the assumption 
that one is also a member of the French Communist party. But the PCF in the twenties and 
the thirties espoused a bastard form of pacifism, an antin-tilitarism based not on principle 
but on political opportunism. The PCF was not and is not a genuinely pacifist party - it, like 
all political parties, has other more dominant concerns. 
78 CandhilRolland, No. 326, Romain Rolland to Pierre UrLsole, 10 October 1923, p. 381. 
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Undoubtedly, the role of a republican conscript army is important in an understanding of 
French pacifism, too. In a country proud of its revolutionary tradition, the concepts of the 
'nation in arms' and the imp6t du sang were particularly difficult to dislodge. 
Rolland's slide into Stalinism. and then support of collective security gradually left 
behind the French integral pacifists who had seen in him the father of European pacifism - 
as they, in their turn, became increasingly isolated from the rest of French political society. 
With the collapse of 1940, pacifism became equated with defeatism and collaborationism. - 
rightly or wrongly, and there are examples on both sides of the coin. Only now, some forty 
years later is the French political psyche gradually freeing itself from the spectre of Vichy 
to the point where a reasonable discussion of the French variant of a common international 
phenomenon called interwar pacifism can finally begin. 
Rolland was accused of renouncing his pacifism and urging recourse to violence. This is 
perhaps to distort his position. In 1931 he protested to Jean Gudhenno that 'he did not and 
never would approve of violence; but there are many things in this universe that must be 
accepted without approval - life and its mutual destruction as it has been imposed on us, for 
example'. 79 Rolland would undoubtedly have agreed with Bertrand Russell, who wrote 
retrospectively that 'the doctrine which Tolstoy preached with great persuasive force, 
that the holders of power could be morally regenerated if met by non-resistance, was 
obviously untrue in Germany after 1933'. 80 As the abyss opened once more before him in 
1939, Rolland did not shrink from it. His pacifism was neither absolute nor immutable. 
With a heart heavy with both resignation and hope for the future, Romain Rolland faced 
the war he was not to survive. As the epigraph to Mre ef Fils, taken from Spinoza, puts it: 
'Peace is not the absence of war, it is the virtue born of vigour of the soul'. 
79 Cited in William T. Starr, Romain Rolland. One against all. A Biography (The Hague, Paris: 
Mouton, 1971), p. 236. 
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Interviews 
Monsieur le Pasteur et Madame Philippe Vernier 
Monsieur le Pasteur et Madame Jacques Martin. 
Lord Fenner Brockway. 
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